David Hume’s epistemological project reinvigorates the British Empiricist tradition. His theory of knowledge thrives on the very idea that through impressions, the human mind mirrors reality and from there creates simple and complex ideas of our knowledge claims. It also forecloses the possibility of the apriori by elevating experience as the source through which man encounters and retracts knowledge of the external world. In its propositions, the Humean epistemological project regurgitates and retains the indubitability of sense data as fundamental to knowing. This paper therefore investigates the propriety David Hume’s claims. It identified and reviewed three fundamental premises of the theory of knowledge and submits that like other empiricists before him, his theory of knowledge is refutable primarily because, David Hume holds an overwhelming confidence in the viability of the senses without giving minimal cognition to its fallibility.
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