

**THE UNITED NATIONS/AFRICAN UNION INTERVENTION IN THE
DARFUR CONFLICT (2007-2010): ACHIEVEMENTS, CHALLENGES AND
LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE**

Adeniji, Adeyinka Samson, (Ph.D)

Department of Political Science and International Relations,
University of Abuja, Abuja.

Agaba Halidu

Department of Political Science and International Relations,
University of Abuja, Abuja.

James, Jacob Nda (Ph.D)

Department of Political Science and International Relations,
University of Abuja, Abuja.

ABSTRACT: *The paper examined the activities of the African Union (AU) and the United Nations aimed at resolving conflict and maintaining peace and security especially in Darfur, the secondary method of data collection and analysis was adopted. The study made use of conflict theory as the framework of analysis. The findings of the research revealed: that the conflict in Darfur was caused by the colonial heritage, ethnic rivalry, religious intolerance and ecological challenges; that AU and UN have contributed significantly in the peace process in Darfur in the areas of protection of lives and properties, provision of humanitarian assistance, provision of enabling environment for negotiation, among others. Nonetheless, these were not without challenges ranging from logistics, ecological, corruption. The following recommendations were arrived at: proper training for the AU / UN officials on peace keeping; cooperation of all the parties, especially the Sudanese government and AU / UN member states towards conflict resolution; and demonstration of political will by the international community.*

KEYWORDS: United Nations, African Union, Intervention, Darfur Conflict, Achievements, Challenges, Lessons for the Future

INTRODUCTION

The Darfur crisis which erupted in 2003 became a serious issue challenging world peace as this represented one of the most critical test cases both to regional and international organization particularly the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN) the custodians of peace and security. What appeared to be a mere struggle against perceived domination of non-Arabs by the Arab population in Darfur assumed international dimension with its attendant consequences for international peace and security. As a result of the crisis, over 300,000 thousand have been reported dead and more than 2 million people displaced aside other humanitarian abuses such as rape of women, abduction of women and children, theft of properties such as cattle:

The Darfur crisis has been described as one of the worst humanitarian crisis in the world...by 2004, there were estimated two million people affected by the continued armed conflict and violence against civilians (Apatow, 2010:1)

Netabay, (2009:1), shares similar view about the Darfur crisis by positing that:

The crisis in Darfur is not an accidental disaster, a human catastrophe... the crisis is not simple as represented which cast the conflict in terms of Arab versus black Africans... is human tragedy brewing for decades that finally erupted into a vicious circle of violence in 2003. The Darfur conflict is not only a problem for the Sudanese, but is also a regional problem. The conflict is threatening the stability in other regions of Sudan, and the Central African Republic.

Providing this background, regional and international actors carried out several peace initiatives to end the violence. One of this is was the establishment of an AU peacekeeping mission- The African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) following the signing of the Humanitarian Cease Fire Agreement (HCFA) in April 8, 2004). AMIS was mandated to provide military observers to monitor and report on the cease fire: an armed force to protect civilians and humanitarian assistance aid workers.

However, the deployment of African Union peacekeepers in 2004 under AMIS was confronted with serious challenges especially that of man power and finance.

Commenting on the challenges of AMIS, Waging Peace (2007:6), argued that:

At present, the AU's military capacity is seriously overstretched. With 7,000 troops already In Darfur, the Union has struggled to meet the target of 8,000 troops in Somalia. Consequently, the UN has draw up contingency plans to take over the operation... there is little chance to the AU members states will offer much more in any way of troops or equipment to the Darfur operation

This led to a proposal for an UN-AU hybrid force. Therefore and in accordance with the decision of the November 16, 2006 High level consultations in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operation (DPKO) developed and implemented a three- phased approach to augment AMIS and deployed an unprecedented joint AU/UN peacekeeping operation in Darfur. This was formally ratified by the United Nation Security Council Resolution 1769(2007) authorizing the establishment of the United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) with clearly stated mandate.

What therefore becomes the thrust of this paper is to look at the intervention of the United Nations and the African Union under the umbrella of UNAMID in an attempt to resolve the crisis.

Conceptual Clarification

There are some concepts used in this work which needs clarifications. These concepts are conflict, conflict resolution, and peacekeeping.

Peacekeeping: It is a new form of third party peaceful intervention designed to prevent conflict escalation and keep out the intrusion of rival power bloc (in the era of cold war politics). It is the prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities within states, through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention, organized and directed internationally using military forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace. It involves the presence of UN or sub-regional organization in the field, normally involving the and military

and police, with the consent of the conflict manager, to implement or monitor the implementations of arrangement relating to the control of conflict (cease –fires, separation of forces, etc.) and their resolutions or to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian relief (Ogomudia, 1997)

In the study, it is used to describe the intervention mission of UN forces in war zones.

Conflict: It is a state of disagreement or argument between people, groups, countries etc. It is also seen as a struggle involving ideas, values, and or unlimited resources. Essentially conflict connotes disagreement, dispute or controversy in ideas or viewpoints held by two or more individuals/groups. It is used in the study to mean disagreement between groups within the global system caused by clash of interest or struggle for common interest.

Conflict Resolution: This is defined as the attempt to dowse and diffuse tensions or crises which arise due to opposition to one or more groups of human in purling what appear to be incompatible goals. It is used here to describe the role the UN plays in diffusing tension through its peacekeeping mission initiative.

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework adopted for this work is conflict theory. Conflict is a perspective in social science which emphasized the social, political or material inequality of social group. Conflict theory has its root in the work of Karl Marx, Coser, Fredrick, Zartman and others. The central tenet of this theory is based on the argument: that conflict in the society may arise over struggle for value or claims to status, powers and resources in which the aims of the conflicting parties are not only to gain the desired value but also to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals; that the parties may choose to make relationship primarily conflictual or primarily integrative, cooperative supportive and agreed upon; that if conflict between factions or parties at the initial strains relationship, there will be nevertheless emerge at least few minimal strands of understanding and repository rules of combat. On the other hand, if the initial relationship is primarily negative, it is certain that conflict will develop if for no other reason that through the demands of the association itself as they compete with the preference of individuals and component group (Eyo, 2008).

The implication of conflict theory on the Darfur conflict and the peacekeeping operation by UNAMID cannot be over – emphasized. The conflict in Darfur could better be analysed within the premises of this theory, in that Sudan and Darfur is a plural society with divergent interest, each wanting theirs to prevail. These groups include: the Zaghawa, Arab, Fur and a host of others. Another very critical is the ecological challenge – drought and famine which consequently, made many to leave other part of Sudan to Darfur for safety and survival. Men, camel and herds from the north move to Darfur because of drought which has great impact on the available resources of Darfur.

An Overview of United Nation/ African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)

The United Nation/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) intervention in the Darfur crisis as stated in the introduction constitutes the third step of a three-phased approach to the resolution of the Darfur crises. The approach is a joint initiative of UN and AU which came on board to address the deteriorating situation in Darfur by strengthening and consolidating the efforts of the African Union to Sudan (AMIS) deployed in 2004 in response to the increasing

violence in Darfur. Therefore, a discussion of UNAMID may not be complete without recourse to AMIS.

AMIS was created in 2004 April following the ceasefire agreement signed in N'Djamena, Chad by the two rebel groups Sudan Liberation Movement/Army and Justice And Equality Movement(SLM/A and JEM) and the Government of Sudan. AMIS was deployed as an observer mission comprising of 60 military observers and a limited force protection component of 300 troops. AMISs was tasked with the responsibility of monitoring the ceasefire and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance. As the situation worsened, the mission was increased in October 2004 and again in March, 2005. Its mandates were expanded to include the protection of civilians. By October 2006, AMIS comprised over 7,000 uniformed personnel. According to Security Council Report 2007, AMIS as at 2007 had 6,143 military personnel and 1,360 police (compared to an authorized strength of 10,000 military personnel and 1,500 police (Stimson Centre, 2007)

However, it is worthy of note that AMIS was faced with incredible and daunting challenges, resulting in its inability to halt the violence in Darfur. These were attributed to the growing cost of maintaining the mission, financial and material inadequacies. These among others brought up the need for the transition of AMIS; an AU initiative to a UN operation, which was publicly discussed first in 2006.

The rationale for the handover of AMIS to a UN operation was therefore based on the UN's greater experience and capacity in conducting a multidimensional mission to oversee a comprehensive peace agreement (Stimson Centre, 2007). This rationale became even clearer when the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed on 6 May 2006 by the Government of Sudan (GOS) and one of the two SLA factions.

So, the journey to the transition of AMIS to UNAMID started first by the expansion of United Nation Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) into Darfur. Security Council Resolution 1706 called on the UNMIS by up to 17,300 military personnel, and up to 3,300 civilian police and 16 formed police units.

The three phased approach to the resolution of Darfur crises which UNAMID is the third are:

Phase 1, UN Light Support Package (LSP) to AMIS. The LSP consists of:

- i) 105 military staff officers
- ii) 33 police advisers
- iii) 48 civilian staff for support to nine action, humanitarian liaison public information and mission support, and
- iv) Logistical support.

Phase II: UN heavy support package (HSP) to AMIS:

The HSP consist of

- i) 2,250 military officers (for static camp protection, transport, medical etc)
- ii) 721 police (including 301 individuals and 3 formed police units)

- iii) 1,136 civilians.
- iv) 984 mission staff to support the military and police deployment
- v) Equipment and support to reorganize AMIS
- vi) Logistical and aviation equipment including six attack helicopters for civilian protection and fixed wing for reconnaissance (Stimson Centre, 2007).

The third phase as earlier argued, led to emergence of UNAMID, i.e. AU/UN hybrid operation in Darfur.

Phase III: AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).

As a matter of fact, recalling the Security Council Resolution in Darfur, reaffirming its strong commitment to Sudan's sovereignty and independence the United Nation Security Council Adopted a Resolution 1769 (2007) at its 5727th meeting on 31 July, 2007 for a hybrid mission in Darfur, UNSC (2007).

The resolution was in accordance and under chapter vii of the UN charter. By this resolution therefore, the weak African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was merged with United Nation Mission in Sudan and renamed (United Nation/African Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)). UNAMID had an operational period of 12 months and formally took over from AMIS on 31 December, 2007. (UN Document 2009). Below is a synopsis of the 1769 UNSC Resolution in Darfur Crisis, i.e. the approval for UNAMID.

- i. Authorize and mandate the establishment for an initial period of 12 months of an AU/UN hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID).
- ii. UNAMID shall incorporate AMIS personnel and the UN heavy and light support packages to AMIS and shall consist of up to 19,555 military personnel, including observers and liaison officers, and an appropriate civilian component including up to 3,772 police personnel and 19 formed police units comprising up to 140 personnel each.
- iii. Welcomes the appointment of AU-UN joint representative, for Darfur, Rodophe Adda, now Ibrahim Gambari and Force Commander Martin Luther Agwai
- iv. Calls on parties to facilitate the full deployment of the UN light and Heavy support packages to AMIS
- v. Benchmarked October 2007 as the date for UNAMID to assume operational command authority over the Light Support Package (LSP), personnel deployed to AMIS, among others.
- vi. Requested the Secretary to report to the Council 30 days after the passage of the resolution and every 30 days thereafter on the status of UNAMID implementation.
- vii. Stress the need for unity of common purpose, in accordance to the principles of peacekeeping, i.e. a single chain of command.

- viii. Decided that force and personnel generation and administration shall be conducted in accordance to paragraph 113-115.
- ix. Decided that UNAMID shall monitor whether any arms or related materials are present in Darfur in violation of the agreement of resolution 1556 (2004) in paragraph 7 & 8.
- x. Called on member state to facilitate the free, unhindered and expedition movement to Sudan of all personnel as well as equipment, provisions, supplies and other goods, which are for the exclusive use of UNAMID in Darfur.
- xi. Called for member states to contribute financially to support AMIS as regional organizations for early deployment of two (2) additional battalion during the transition to UNAMID.
- xii. Decided that the authorized strength of UNAMIS shall revert to that specified in resolution 1590 (2005) upon the transfer of authority from AMIS to UNAMIS.
- xiii. Called on all the parties to the conflict in Darfur to immediately cease all hostilities and commit them to a sustained and permanent ceasefire.
- xiv. Demanded for a cessation of hostilities and attacks on AMIS, civilians and humanitarian agencies, their staff and assets and relief convoys, and that all parties to the Darfur conflict to fully co-operate with AMIS, civilians and humanitarian agencies, their staff and assets and relief convoys and give all necessary assistance to the deployment of the United Nation L & HSP to AMIS and to UNAMID. UNSC R.
- xv. Decided that UNAMID is authorized to take necessary action, in the area of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities in order to protect civilians, facilities, and installations, support early and effective implementation of DPA.
- xvi. Requested the UN's Secretary-General to take necessary measures to achieve actual compliance in UNAMID, with the United Nation Zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse, including the production of bulletin to canvass against this, and keep the Council informed.
- xvii. Called on concerned persons to ensure that children protection was addressed in the implementation of DPA.
- xviii. Emphasized that there can be no military solution to the conflict in Darfur and welcome the effort of the GOS and other parties.
- xix. Welcomed the Joint Communiqué between the Government of Sudan and the UN on facilitation of Humanitarian Activities in Darfur and call for its full implementation.
- xx. Emphasized need to focus, as appropriate, on developmental initiatives that will bring peace dividend on the ground in Darfur which includes return of displaced persons back to their homelands.

- xxi. Requested the Secretary General to report between 90 days after adoption of the resolution on progress being made and challenges to implementation of H&L SP and UNAMID political process, the DPA, among others, cease fire, etc.
- xxii. Demanded parties to the conflict to fulfill their international obligation to relevant agreements and resolution and even the 1769 in question.
- xxiii. Express readiness to support the improvement of security of civilians in both northern, eastern Chad and northern Central African Republic.
- xxiv. That was situation Darfur improves, and upon Secretary General, and AU Chairperson Recommendations, UNAMID shall be terminated.
- xxv. Decided to remain seized of the matter. UNSC Resolution (2007)

Under Resolution 1769, UNAMID therefore was mandated in clear terms to:

- i. Contribute to the restoration of humanitarian assistance and facilitate full humanitarian access;
- ii. Contribute to the protection of civilians under imminent threat and prevention of attack against civilians;
- iii. Monitor and verify the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA);
- iv. Assist the political process to ensure its inclusiveness and support AU/UN Joint mediation efforts;
- v. Contribute to a secure environment to facilitate the return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees;
- vi. Assist in the promotion of Human Right and the rule of law;
- vii. Monitor and report security situation along the borders with Chad and the Central African Republic. Stimson Centre (2007)

UNAMID was to achieve these objectives through conducting robust patrols liaising with UNMIS for necessary and complementary support; support for capacity building, monitoring and law enforcement; assistance to the establishment of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, monitoring and promotion of Janjaweed disarmament; protection of women against gender violence and assisting relevant stakeholders in the effort to transfer resources to the Darfur States and implement reconstruction plans and agreement on land use and compensation issues.

ACHIEVEMENTS OF UNAMID

The next aspect of this work looks at the achievements of UNAMID during the period under review. The discussion covers a wide range of issues and areas. To this end, the discussion on the achievements of UNAMID in the Darfur crisis focuses on their role in the protection of civilians, humanitarian assistance, and political process.

Protection of Civilians: The Darfur crisis as earlier argued, up-rooted hundreds of thousands of Darfurians from their original dwellings, as thousands and millions had to leave their home seeking refuge in camps which became known as the camps for Internally Displaced persons (IDPs), some fled to neighboring states of Sudan and others to neighbouring countries like Chad, Egypt, etc. For the refugee camps as a case in point, it is argued that there are about 35 camps housing these refugees, the Internally Displaced People (IDP). These camps includes the Abu Shouk, Zam Zam, Abu Uins, Kalma, Ali Salam, Hamadiya and Ardmatu camps, just to mention but few.

As one of its mandates, UNAMID sees the protection of civilians especially those in IDPs as a responsibility that is second to none. UNAMID to this end, evolved a lot of measures to see to the protection of the people, these include conduct of Long Range Patrols, drafting of its forces to IDPs in order to protect them from external attacks and maintain peace within the camps, provision of access to various agencies in pursuance of their requirement to support peace in Darfur. The patrols as a case in point covered almost all the regions of Darfur.

The first of its kind of such patrol conducted by UNAMID was the one ordered by UNAMID force Commander Lt. Gen. Patrick Nyam Vemba and conceptualized, planned and conducted by Napalese Special Forces Company. Gonzales (2010) captures the patrol this way:

The trip served as a model for future exercise. The exercise included training on anti-ambush drills and combat life saver medical techniques. Additionally, it tested road communication enroute and gained a better grasp of the humanitarian situation

The above patrol, the largest and longest trip covered more than 500 kilometre and today is popularly known as the “Exercise of Habrub Chase” (UNAMID Bulletin 2010). The same effort was also replicated in El Fasher. Helicopters and dispatched convoy were used to conduct patrols. This is also captured in UNAMID Bulletin (2010:15):

El Fasher... had the support of helicopters which over flew the convoy on the more dangerous parts of the route. The exercise include training on anti-ambush drills and combat life saver medical techniques... the mission signifies the continuing enhancements of UNAMID’s capabilities and UNAMID’s as beneficiary.

Similarly, it was also extended to ABU shouk camp; a camp home to 75,000 people. This effort made life strong as refugees see the camps as a common place to all. Lulunka (2010:10) argued thus:

All seems common place to those living there... kids’ play, while adults go about their daily chores. As UNAMID patrol composed of police adviser and accompanied by the Indonesian Formed Police Units (FPU) drive by, children and elders stop to welcome them. While in the camp UNAMID meets with various stakeholders to discuss security issues, and holds meeting with women’s group on gender issues.

In Zam Zamp camp, (another camp housing over 23,000 people) UNAMID rose to the occasion of shielding the people who preponderantly are of the Zaghawa tribe after fleeing Muhjeriya Labado when they were attacked by the Janjaweed.

On patrol generally, more than 200 patrols were conducted every day throughout Darfur with many of these being within and around IDP camps. UNSC on UNAMID (2010) buttressed this point by arguing that during the period under review, UNAMID conducted 3411 routine patrols, 637 short range patrols, 324 long-range patrols, 1001 night patrols, 524 firewood patrols, 184 humanitarian escorts and 691 logistics/administrative patrols in IDP camps town and villages across Darfur.

Further still, UNAMID also encouraged civilians to take greater responsibility for public security and fully participate in crime management by recruiting volunteers and train them. In 2010, alone, about 2,414 of them underwent training and were integrated into security operative agents who protect civilians in IDP camps and community UNSC on UNAMID (2010). These volunteers provide public security, patrol camps and villages, make arrest of criminals and hand the suspect over to government police.

What more: UNAMID also helped in removing threat of unexpected ordinance contamination throughout Darfur, gave risk education lectures, surveyed and assessed contaminated areas, demolished identified unexploded ordinance. In 2010, alone, UNAMID destroyed 41 unexploded ordinance devices and provided risk education to the local population about the threat of these devices to local communities and villages. The assessment of unexploded ordinance in the same year covered over 648,050m of land, the Kalma camp experience is a good case in point.

UNAMID and Humanitarian Assistance: Extreme poverty is a key feature and an endemic phenomenon among the people of Darfurians especially among the IDP communities. It is been argued that over 9690 live below poverty line as a result of the crisis. Providing this backdrop, it behooved on UNAMID on the need to provide humanitarian assistance to them. The Humanitarian Recovery Development and Liaison Section (HRDLS) an agency of UNAMID is in charge of humanitarian Assistance. They pitched tents to house people who flee attack from the Janjaweed; similarly, they also provided food, water and other medical assistance. In 2009 for example, when a fight broke out, i.e. when Janjaweed attacked Muhajeriya, Labado towns, UNAMID military officers pitched tents to house over 50,000 residents. In the same year two Mission helicopters transport water-filled waters of fish to Darfurian across the town of Un-Dafog.the cargo weighing about 5,000 kilograms.

The year 2010 also witnessed a lot of humanitarian assistance to Darfurians from UNAMID. UNAMID distributed food, provided medical treatments and facilities to deal with diseases affecting IDPs:

The share of IDP households enjoying good food consumption (increased)... respiratory infection or bloody diarrhea, etc at or below access to land has improved in many parts of Darfur (UNSC report, 2010).

In the same vein, UNAMID also during the period under review engaged in advocacy and coordination efforts with national actors which yielded tangible results. In 2010 for example, i.e. between September 15 and 16, 2010, UNAMID collaboration with the United Nation

Children Education Fund (UNICEF) and the World Health Organisation (WHO) delivered up to a total of 14 tons of essential medicines and nutritional relief to areas such as Feina, Golambei which had no humanitarian access for a long time. They (UNAMID in conjunction with these agencies) designed a comprehensive strategy for the protection of civilians, to ensure that available assets and resources were leverage to protect them.

In Khor Abeche, the story is the same. In December 2010, over 10,000 displaced persons were sheltered by UNAMID and 19 ton of food delivered to them. (UNAMID, 2010)

Political Process: During the period under review, UNAMID facilitated negotiation of peace agreement between belligerent parties and encouraged the improvement of regional relations between Sudan, Chad and the Libyan Arab Jamihiriya. Similarly, she enhanced the participation of civil society organisation in peace talks. Typical among these was the Doha Peace Talk. In a build-up to the Doha Peace Talk, UNAMID organized series of workshops, retreats across Darfur, and designed proposals to enhance popular understanding and to draw-up support for the peace process. These programmes were held in El- Fasher, among other areas.

She also coordinated other bodies like the African Union High Level Implementation Panel (AUHLIP) to support and compliment the Doha Peace negotiation. UNAMID also met with about nine political parties in Darfur for exchange of views, an idea which the parties welcome.

Other Effort Of UNAMID: Apart from humanitarian assistance, protection of civilians and political process, adherence to the rule of law, good governance and human right has also been promoted by UNAMID, providing numerous training sessions for government of the Sudan police and military personnel on a wide range of issues, such as training on how to tame the tide of sexual and gender violence, human rights, and criminal investigation methods. UNAMID's work also covered education, especially the education of the disabled. In Darfur-Sudan disability among children is common:

More than half of the thirty students in this classroom in El Fasher, North Darfur are deaf; the rest differs in physical disability. They come from both the town and nearby camps... the disabled are sometimes marginalized and segregated within their own families (Umbadda 2010:4)

Providing this background, UNAMID with other agencies funded a proposal to build several classrooms for the schools, which stood at the cost of 50,000 SDG.

Further, in an attempt to also restore peace in Darfur, it organized workshops among others. More than 40 workshops were organized including symposium throughout Darfur this on the belief of UNAMID that there cannot be military solution to the Darfur conflict. These workshops saw large crowds of people, native administration, traditional rulers, elders, women and youth groups in attendance. In Mallite town for example, over 100 people participated in such workshops where topical issues relating to power and wealth sharing, root causes of Darfur conflicts and plans for refugees to return home were discussed. Commenting on this regard, Karbo (2009:3) argued thus:

So far, considerable progress has been made in the (UNAMID's) reconciliation effort... some of the gains registered... included a significant reduction in hostilities and crime between...

communities resulting in improved freedom of movements as well as a marked increase in the cultivation of land that has not been experienced in the area in the last 12 years.

It is also instructive to acknowledge the effort of Civil Affairs Division (CAD) of UNAMID. UNAMID through CAD brought together warring factions, the Zaghawa, Jawamana among others in 2009, September, in El-Fasher, CAD organized a forum for donor agencies, countries, state, authorities, representatives of Darfur Peace and Reconciliation Commission (DPRC) and other native administrative of Darfur for cultural dialogue aimed at settling inter-community tribal difference. This alone made Darfur to receive serious attention in terms of social facilities provision.

UNAMID also used sport as a means of promoting peace in Darfur. Working with some local clubs in Darfur, ties were established among the youth living in the Internally Displaced Peoples (IDPs) camps:

Al Murada has 450 youth members and 75 more volunteers...between 2003 and 2005, when the IDPs first came to El-Fasher after the war, we met them in their new houses, we were the first to go to IDP camps the last match we had with our colleagues was on 5th May, 2010 (UNAMID Magazine 2010:2).

The above paints a good picture of existing relationship between the host communities of El Fasher with the IDPs. The relationship extends to invitation to marriage ceremonies and routine visits where issues that could promote peace are discussed.

UNAMID also engaged the Sudanese judiciary at the local level. As a result, UNAMID monitored trials in court and provided technical support for the establishment of a legal unit in the ministry of justice in Northern Darfur. UNAMID commissioned a legal library in El-Fasher and donated it to the Northern Darfur judiciary as part of its mandate to support and strengthen state and civil society legal institutions in Darfur.

To addressing the problem of climate which is partly attributed to as one of the causes of the Darfur crisis, UNAMID during the period under review worked seriously to reduce the impact of green house gas emissions in Darfur. She helped to improve solid waste management by segregating organic fraction for compost production. UNAMID also carried out sensitization campaigns or awareness on the impact of green house gas emission to the environment and society.

CHALLENGES OF UNAMID

UNAMID had daunting challenges during the period under review. The following are these challenges:

Logistic problem: Darfur is a very large country just like the size of Texas; the size therefore poses a problem to UNAMID especially in the area of logistics. These logistics problems range from infrastructure and resources inadequacies to personnel. Others include lack of mission support personnel such as camp managers, electricians, plumbers, etc. The absence of these led to environmental health hazards, as sewages and refuses could not be cleared.

Government interference: Darfur persistent insecurity and the Sudanese government tactics hindered UNAMID peacekeeping effort including their ability to secure access for humanitarian relief. Government of Khartoum imposition of stringent visa requirement and curtailing freedom of movement for peacekeepers and humanitarian aid workers did not help matters.

Renewed violence: The cases of renewed violence in Darfur impinged on the activities of UNAMID. In 2010 alone, almost 600 people died in rebel and tribal clashes. To worsen matters, JEM has remained adamant to participating in formal peace negotiations with Sudan ruling National Congress Party (NCP), accusing the Sudanese government army of carrying out attacks in contravention of ceasefire agreement.

Delay in troop contribution: Nation state or member state during the period under review developed cold feet to the contribution of peacekeeping forces. In Africa for example, only few African countries who contributed troops to AMIS contributed troops to UNAMID

Financial Challenge: UNAMID during the period under review faced serious financial problems in terms of funding. Member state, donor agencies did not redeem their pledges and dues to fund UNAMID. In the first year for example, UNAMID budgeted over \$2 billion which was never realized. UNAMID lacked detailed funding plan in place.

The geographical Isolation of Darfur: The harsh climate of Darfur, limited food and water supplies impeded UNAMID activities. In the rainy season, large swaths of territory became nearly impassable rendering both UNAMID and humanitarian operations exceedingly difficult.

Failure to quickly respond to attacks: A review of UNAMID activities reveals that UNAMID failed to protect the people when they are needed most. This is well captured in the Darfur Consortium as reported by one Osman who lived in the IDPs camps this way:

I live near the UNAMID compound recently there were three incidents in one single night. A woman got raped, a man got shot and wounded and other man was kidnapped while he collected firewood. This was so close to UNAMID base, yet they did nothing. Nobody is listening to us (Osman in Darfur Consortium 2008).

Other problems of UNAMID are delay in clearing mission shipments from customs authorities, lack of permanent accommodation for military and police contingents. The mission had inadequate system of managing ship document resulting in the lost of documents. Containers spend months without being cleared. Similarly, military and policemen deployed to Darfur live in tents. And the living conditions under the tent became difficult due to high temperature and sandstorms. Other problems include extra-marital relationships by UNAMID officials and peacekeeping forces which resulted in bearing of children outside wedlock.

Lessons for the future

It is expedient to take some lessons for the future from the challenges and failures recorded by the UNAMID during the peacekeeping operation in Darfur region. There is the need to have standing order to forestall any outbreak of conflict in all parts of Africa. Some the above challenges of the peacekeepers such as, the logistic challenge, Government interference, renewed violence, delay in troop contribution, financial challenge, the geographical isolation

of Darfur, and failure to quickly respond to attacks would have been tackled if the African Union were to be proactive.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The paper takes a critical look at the entire work of United Nation/African Union Mission in Darfur popularly known as UNAMID. In the course of the research, it was discovered that the United Nation/African Mission in Darfur is one of the largest peacekeeping in the global system. In fact, according to UNSC resolution 1769, the expected peacekeeping forces is about 26,000 and these forces are more near deployment.

The study further reveals that UNAMID have done prettily well in the protection of civilians especially those in IDP camps. They conduct patrols of various lands, long, short range, and firewood, among others which have helped in shielding civilians from attacks either from rebel groups, Janjaweds and as well helped in the maintenance of peace within the IDP camps.

Similarly, the study further reveals that UNAMID has contributed immensely to addressing poverty and humanitarian problems caused by the crisis in Darfur. This humanitarian assistance includes food, water, medical assistance which has allayed the suffering of thousands of Darfurians who are under abject poverty.

Similarly, UNAMID have also helped in restoration arranging peace talks among rebel groups, helped to ensuring the honouring of most of the peace accord between rebel groups and GOS among others. They also organized workshops, sensitized Darfurians on the need for peace and largely made arrangement for the return of IDPs to their original homes.

UNAMID also, from the findings of the study also engaged the Sudan judiciary, monitored trials in court and provided technical support towards the improvement of the judicial process in Darfur in particular.

The paper also observed that UNAMID was also confronted with a plethora of problems such as logistics, finance, and lack quick responses by UNAMID process, interference by Sudanese government, resurgence of violence, among others.

Drawing conclusion from the finding of the work especially to the challenges to the problems the following recommendation are being made which we believe if put in place will help in total restoration of peace in Darfur.

1. Many troops of UNAMID have not been clearly instructed to understand or fulfill their mandate, greatly impacting the mission's ability to proactively protect civilians. This must be addressed. The United States, United Kingdom, France and Canada must ensure training equip – deploy efforts prioritize mandate interpretation, and that leadership on the group troops and police to fully implement the UNAMID mandate.
2. The Sudanese government must cease its obstruction of UNAMID activities. Countries with influence over Khartoum must ensure that government troop, police and allied militias stop harassing UNAMID personnel and allow the force to move freely throughout Darfur.

The international community must honour their commitment to fully resource and deploying UNAMID. UN member's states, donor agencies and troops contributing countries must ensure outstanding resources are immediately donated to the forces. Even in future peacekeeping, this should apply.

The UN member states with ability to contribute vital assets to force-including transport helicopters, transport convoys should do this. In other words, member state with such ability should not wait until situation get out of hand before thinking of making donations to peacekeeping missions.

Lastly, the need for effective protection is too great for the world to resign itself to a second rate civilian protection in Darfur. There is urgent need for a clear demonstration of political will from the international community backing UNAMID. This should also be demonstrated to any UN led peacekeeping mission in the global system. More importantly, adequate care of peacekeeping forces should always been taken. Their allowances paid, routine visits to see the peacekeepers among others.

REFERENCES

- Apatow, S. M. (2010) Darfur: Rape as a Weapon of War 17 Fold Increase Crime Against Humanity in www.apatow.org
- Karbo, M. D. (2009) Civil Affair Division Promotes Community Reconciliation Initiatives. UNAMID News Bulletin. Issues 2009.
- Lukunka, S. (2010) protecting civilians: UNAMID's Top Priority. Voice of Darfur, July.
- Netabay, N. (2009) The Darfur peace process: Understanding the obstacle to success. Unpublished M.A. thesis University Notre Dame.
- Ogbemudia, A. O. (1997) International peacekeeping: The Nigeria Experience, in Garuba, C. A. (ed), international peace and searching, Gabumu.
- Osman in Darfur Consortium 2008.
- The UN -AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur: will it work. Waging peace building a safe and democratic world. A waging briefing – august 2007.
- The Henry L. Stimson Centre Peace Operations Fact Sheet Series 2007. UNAMID, AU/UN Hybrid Operationin Darfur.
- UNAMID Bulletin 2010.
- UNAMID Magazine 5th May, 2010.
- United Nations Security Council Report 2007.
- United Nations, Security Criminal Report, UNSC Report on UNAMID, 2010.