

THE RETURN TO HEGEL AT GAME THEORY: A BRIEF HISTORY OF DOMINATION

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ABSTRACT: *This paper shows how the Hegelian dialectic of master-slave reflects the psychic evolution of patriarchy, ending up in modern characters as the perverse and the neurotic from psychoanalysis. But before studying Hegel's domination-submission itself, it is necessary to understand the theory of the social contract that sees rationality as the end of domination between humans; the patriarchal domination between animals; the exception to this rule represented by matriarchy among bonobos; and the Paleolithic and Neolithic prehistory, where matriarchy existed between humans; and how this became the patriarchy of the masters who followed the law of the strongest; and that after the advent of Christianity, it became the patriarchy of the perverse masters, that is, from those who pervert the social law of fairness from Christianity, through collusions structured as a prisoner's dilemma, as in (Faveret, 2014, chapter 1).*

KEYWORDS: Domination; Master-Slave Dialectic; Perversion.

INTRODUCTION

According to the theory of the social contract, which begins with Hobbes (1651), and then Locke (1682) and Rousseau (1712), with the advent of the state and the laws, the human being renounces to the use of violence, and places the monopoly of violence in state hands. Thus, protected by the state, humans can abandon the fight in groups against each other and become sovereign individuals in their choices, what stands out in economic theory of the nineteenth century as individualism and utilitarianism (Morier, 2014, pp. 14-16). With the growth of the market economy, comes into existence the idea of an individual choice, at the expense of a social practice.

However, the economic consequence of the social contract theory, is that any violation of the law would be irrational simply ignoring that humans continued to meet in groups to do collusions, and take advantages over other groups even within the modern state, perverting the social law, as for example in tax evasion (Faveret, 2014, chapter 1). For this reason this social contract theory is not able to adapt to a more modern psychological theory in which the agent has a more complex behavior than the mere individual choice of a consumer good, as the *homo economicus* of neoclassical economics. This more complex behavior is presented in Faveret (2014, chapter 2), where the people with the perverse character of psychoanalysis try to impose their own law in place of the social law, and therefore try to dominate, commonly through collusions and manipulations.

In psychoanalysis the perverse behavior is timeless, that is, there is no an evolutionary past history of the psyche, except for the fact that the influence of patriarchy and also the father's role tend to decrease in importance. However, the previous history of the psyche can be inferred by considering the thought of Hegel, which for many is considered a precursor of

psychoanalysis. "But the project itself to reread the text of Freud with the Hegelian perspective, which is, first of all, a large part of the Lacanian venture, had, at first no evidence" (Jalley, 2009, pp. 378-379).

Almost everyone knows that the Phenomenology of Spirit, published in 1807, is presented as a series of successive figures of the cultural experience of the human consciousness. But what is less noted is that, in the "Introduction" of this work, Hegel described the mechanism of such an experience in terms that we can currently say, do not fail to remember precisely what we know today as the process at the same time recapitulative and creative of a psychoanalytic cure (Jalley, 2009, p. 377).

However, other points of similarity, either as worthy of interest, or incontestable, between Hegelian thought and the psychoanalysis can still be put into evidence. First, Hegel described for the first time in explicit terms in the history of Western thought, the consciousness as a subject in development (Subjekt, Entwicklung), in which the being is only the result of their own history (Geschichte). The activity of this subject is largely unconscious (bewusstlos), is driven by drives (Trieb) and also is found in conflict with himself (Konflikt). This subject also takes shape in a personality (Personlichkeit) that encounters the basis of the sense of the self in a body (Körper). But the ego (das Ich) is really only there in the language (Sprache), which is "the supreme power among men." Certainly, these issues may well seem to us today, from the point of view that we take now, if you can say that, "just-after", metaphors, anticipations, premonitions of the great discoveries of psychoanalysis (Jalley, 2009, p. 378).

Thus by the return to Hegel's thought through Kojève (2002), one of its main commentators, it is possible to regress the roles of the perverse and the neurotic of psychoanalysis, to the roles of master and slave from Hegel, creating a history of the psyche which is the objective to be explained in this paper. The interaction between the roles of the perverse and neurotic is present at the Game Theory, through the game of the scorpion and the frog, (Faveret, 2014, chapter 2). The interaction between master and slave is a uniquely human consequence of the game of the dominant pig and the subordinate pig, due to human slavery. Interestingly, although the scorpion and the frog are animals, is a fable about human characters, although in the case of pigs, the game really comes to animals, which means that patriarchal domination begins in the same way in animals and in the early Paleolithic hominids.

DOMINATION IN ANIMALS

In several animal species can be said that there is a patriarchal system, where the male is bigger and stronger than the female, and exercises the reproductive role, for which he fight with other males. Such is the case of the gorilla, ostrich, lion, gnu, the gazelle, the sea lion, and many other animals. An exception is the chimpanzee, which split into two subspecies, a more common and patriarchal, the chimpanzee itself, and the other matriarchal, known as bonobo.

The Chimpanzee and the Bonobo

Chimpanzees are the closest living relatives of humans, sharing approximately 94% of the DNA. The common ancestor of both lived between four and six million years ago. There are two chimpanzee species, the common or robust, which is called chimpanzee, and the pygmy or gracile, which is called the bonobo, slightly smaller than the chimpanzee. The separation between the two species, dating from a million years ago, began with the formation of the Congo River, between one and a half and two million years ago. As chimpanzees do not swim,

there was a separation into two species, with the chimpanzee at north of the river, and the bonobo at south.

Along with the common chimpanzee the bonobo is the closest extant relative to humans. Because the two species are not proficient swimmers, the formation of the Congo River 1.5–2 million years ago possibly led to the speciation of the bonobo. They live south of the river, and thereby were separated from the ancestors of the common chimpanzee, which live north of the river (Wikipedia, 2012, "Bonobo" entry).

The most interesting is that the chimpanzee and the bonobo developed completely different lifestyles, the first patriarchal, omnivores, relatively aggressive, able to face themselves in groups, and even devour enemies, although this is unusual. Different groups of chimpanzees may also have important cultural differences, like humans. Bonobos are primarily fruit eaters, and their society is not violent, egalitarian, matriarchal, and they resolve their differences using sex, that is, when there is an altercation, soon appear partners of both sexes available to sexual relations, and the quarrel is quickly forgotten. It is estimated that the cultural difference between the species has occurred because of the availability and type of food, and also less competition for food with other species in the region of bonobos.

Anatomical differences between the common chimpanzee and the bonobo are slight, but sexual and social behaviors are markedly different. The common chimpanzee has an omnivorous diet, a troop hunting culture based on beta males led by an alpha male, and highly complex social relationships. The bonobo, on the other hand, has a mostly frugivorous diet and an egalitarian, nonviolent, matriarchal, sexually receptive behavior. Bonobos are well known to have frequent sex and also to use sex to help prevent and resolve conflicts. Different groups of chimpanzees also have different cultural behavior with preferences for types of tools. The common chimpanzee tends to display higher levels of aggression than the bonobo (Wikipedia, 2012, "Chimpanzee" entry).

The availability of sex in the society of bonobos is abundant, and this seems to explain why bonobos are little aggressive. The existence of abundant sex seems to be possible due to the matriarchal organization of society. This matriarchal organization means that fatherhood is of little importance, and that the social position of a male is often determined by the social position of his mother, as in a matrilineal system, where are the women who give the name to the children. Females of bonobos come into collusions, as in human society, and use sex to manipulate situations and control the aggressiveness of males.

The bonobo is popularly known for its high levels of sexual behavior. Sex functions in conflict appeasement, affection, social status, excitement, and stress reduction. It occurs in virtually all partner combinations and in a variety of positions. This is a factor in the lower levels of aggression seen in the bonobo when compared to the common chimpanzee and other apes. Bonobos are perceived to be matriarchal; females tend to collectively dominate males by forming alliances and use sexuality to control males. A male's rank in the social hierarchy is often determined by his mother's rank (Wikipedia, 2012, "Bonobo" entry).

Supposing that chimpanzees also feature desire of recognition, like humans, behind the potentially conflictive situations that lead to collusions like the prisoner's dilemma, are jealousy and the desire of recognition. What happens between bonobos is that these situations are manageable with the use of sex, which is a way of giving the recognition requested. So the

matriarchal hierarchy acts for the recognition desire being met by sex, which is the most basic, direct and primitive mode of giving recognition.

De Waal has warned of the danger of romanticizing bonobos: "All animals are competitive by nature and cooperative only under specific circumstances" and that "when first writing about their behavior, I spoke of 'sex for peace' precisely because bonobos had plenty of conflicts. There would obviously be no need for peacemaking if they lived in perfect harmony." However, there are no eyewitness accounts of lethal aggression among bonobos, neither in captivity nor in the wild (Wikipedia, 2012, "Bonobo" entry).

Among the common chimpanzees, the patriarchal hierarchy serves to contain conflicts, but indirectly, through the rights and duties attached to each social position. However, the desire for recognition remains unanswered. This is further compounded by the fact that access to females sometimes is an attribute of dominant males.

The common chimpanzee lives in groups which range in size from 15 to 150 members, although individuals travel and forage in much smaller groups during the day. The species lives in a male-dominated, strict hierarchy, which means disputes can generally be settled without the need for violence. (...) A community's dominant males sometimes restrict reproductive access to females (Wikipedia, 2012, verbete "Common Chimpanzee" entry).

As the desire for recognition and sex is not attended by the hierarchy, common chimpanzees manifest that need doing coalitions, and sometimes they rebel against the ruling order. The quote below resembles the human patriarchal order.

Males maintain and improve their social ranks by forming coalitions. These coalitions have been characterized as "exploitive" and are based on an individual's influence in agonistic interactions. Being in a coalition allows males to dominate a third individual when they could not by themselves, as politically apt chimps can exert power over aggressive interactions regardless of their rank. Coalitions can also give an individual male the confidence to challenge a dominant male. The more allies a male has, the better his chance of becoming dominant. However, most changes in hierarchical rank are caused by dyadic interactions. Chimpanzee alliances can be very fickle and one member may turn on another if it serves him (Wikipedia, 2012, "Common Chimpanzee" entry).

The similarity of behavior between common chimpanzees and humans, and the importance of coalitions between the patriarchal chimpanzees underscores how to the economy is relevant the study of social perversions of law through collusions (Faveret, 2014, chapter 1). Due to the human subject is composed by the ego plus the Other, coalitions are actually the "natural state" of the human being, to be modified through the improvement of culture.

DOMINATION AT GAME THEORY

An example of domination-submission relations between pigs appears at Game Theory in Varian (2002, p. 578). In this game, psychologists lay two pigs in a long cowshed, where at one side there is a lever that when pushed, releases food in a trough located at the other side of the cowshed. The goal was to find out which pig would press the lever, and which pig would eat the food. The outcome of the game is that the dominant pig pressed the lever, and the subordinate pig waiting beside the trough ate nearly all the food, while the dominant pig ran to eat the leftovers.

Table 1 – Pigs pressing levers

		Dominant pig	
		Not press	Press
Subordinate pig	Not press	0, 0	4, 1
	Press	0, 5	2, 3

Source: Varian (2006, p. 578)

At table 1 if the dominant pig doesn't press the lever, and the subordinate pig presses it, the food goes all to the dominant pig. Conversely, when the dominant pig presses, his gain is one, and the subordinate pig, waiting for the food next to the trough has a gain of four. So the subordinate pig will never press the lever, forcing the dominant pig to do so. In conclusion, if the dominant pig shares the food with the subordinate pig, he would have possibly greater gains, but his aggressive instinct prevents this from happening. So the domination-submission leads to non-cooperation, and prevents the Pareto optimality of the social contract, as in the prisoner's dilemma tax evasion (Faveret, 2014, chapter 1).

DOMINATION IN HUMANS

It is quite common in higher animals that domination, aggression and selfishness are in greater proportion male characteristics, while cooperation, kindness and altruism are more present in the female. These features are present on the link made between the names of the canvas "The origin of the world" and "The origin of the war" and its pictorial representation.

It is precisely because the sex of the woman was, in his view, impossible to represent, to say and to give a name, that Lacan made the acquisition, in 1954, on the advice of Bataille, of the Gustave Courbet's famous painting, "The Origin of the World", painted in 1866 to an Ottoman diplomat Khalil-Bey, residing in Paris. ... But it was in 1989 that a feminist artist Orlan, adept of perverse sex, of performance, of transvestism, of body surgery and of revisiting the works of the Western pictorial heritage, held the most unusual Lacanian version of the canvas: an erect phallus in place of the sex of the woman. With this "work" entitled "The origin of the war," Orlan intend to unmask what was hidden in the canvas, performing a fusion of the unrepresentable "thing" with its denied fetish. (Roudinesco & Telles, 2011, pp. 88-90).



Figure 1: The origin of the world
Source: (Wikipedia, 2015, verbete "L'Origine du monde")



Figure 2: The origin of the war
Source: (Warburg, 2015, "L'Origine de la guerre")

In humans this remarkable separation of characteristics was made because man for countless generations stood away from home, individually or in groups of variable size and composition, to achieve well-defined goals, such as hunting. The woman, already, because of the offspring and pregnancy, was close to home, dealing with food and family farming, living in stable groups of women, partly for self-defense.

Our ancestors lived in caves and used tools made of stone, bone, ivory and horns, and already were fed by animals hunted in large herds. The men went out to hunt in groups, and women were in the caves taking care of the children, and also, collecting fruits and vegetables. Awaiting the return of men with flesh of animals, that gave them a lot more energy. After the meal, prepared by women and divided equally by all, men were around the campfire talking and remembering the hunt, just as do the current men, in the famous bar meetings after work or watching television (with the remote control in hand). According Pease (2000), the fact that the current women like to go shopping without planning and without need, comes from this ancient phase, when they went out in groups, with no definite direction, to harvest fruits and vegetables. The men planned their hunts and tended to return where herds of animals had been sighted. Men are more objective, that is, go straight to the point (Abrantes & Abrantes, 2009, pp. 80-81).

With the important exception of the bonobo, which shows that the system of fighting among males is not the only alternative for the survival of a species, in most superior animals, however, the system is patriarchal, and hierarchies are formed in the dispute for food and by females, which in a simplified manner is a triangle: the dominant male, the subordinate male, and the female.

THE MATRIARCHY

Matriarchy in the human species is an anthropological theory that began in the nineteenth century, and later had resurgence in the seventies of the twentieth century, with the feminist movement. More recently, the anthropologist and professor at UCLA, Marija Gimbutas, has been highlighted in this field.

Early research on the societies of the ancient world, as represented by the work of J. J. Bachofen (1815-87) and R. Briffault (1873-1948), was based on a study of early historical records, archeology, myth, and ethnographic parallels. These men concluded that ancient European society was matrilineal (the structure in which inheritance takes place through the female line) and matriarchal. In the 20th century no large scale

interdisciplinary work has been done beyond George Thomson's The Prehistoric Aegean: Studies in Ancient Greek Society, 1949. Recent studies focus on separate geographic regions, mainly western Europe or central Europe (Gimbutas, 1991, p. 324).

The reasons that led to the matriarchal theory have its roots in the Paleolithic of hunter-gatherers (2.5 million - 10,000 BC), where countless female sculptures were found, and that continued to be discovered during the Neolithic agricultural revolution, indicating a cultural continuity. It is assumed that hominids were unaware of the male role in reproduction, and therefore they revered women as a source of life, also associated with the fertility in general.

"James Frazer, Margaret Mead and other anthropologists", writes Leonard Cottrell, "have established that in the very early stages of man's development, before the secret of human fecundity was understood, before coitus was associated with childbirth, the female was revered as the giver of life. Only women could produce their own kind, and man's part in this process was not as yet recognized" (Stone, 1976, p. 11).

A study of symbols in Paleolithic art demonstrates that the female, rather than the male, was the deity of creation. In fact, there are no traces in Paleolithic of a father figure. The bearing and nourishing of offspring – plant, animal, and human – was the primary model for the development of the image of the Goddess as the all-generating deity. (...) Essentially the same iconography attended the religion of the Goddess well into the agricultural era, although evolved, reflecting changing economic conditions (Gimbutas, 1991, p. 222).

In the Paleolithic of the hunter-gatherers was believed that most human groups had a matriarchal organization, which lasted throughout much of the Neolithic, when probably women of matriarchal groups invented agriculture and created the first matriarchal civilizations.

The earliest civilizations of the world – in China, Tibet, Egypt, the Near East, and Europe – were, in all probability, matrilineal "Goddess civilizations". Since agriculture was developed by women, the Neolithic period created optimum conditions for the survival of matrilineal, endogamous systems inherited from Paleolithic times. During the early agricultural period women reached the apex of their influence in farming, arts and crafts, and social functions. The matrilineal with collectivist principles continued (Gimbutas, 1991, p. 324).

The civilizations that worshiped the Goddess, which had flourished for thousands of years, bringing with them in earliest times inventions in methods of agriculture, medicine, architecture, metallurgy, wheeled vehicles, ceramics, textiles and written language, were gradually stamped out. Though the Indo-Europeans had initiated a great many changes, it was later the duty of every Hebrew and then of every Christian to suppress and destroy the worship of the female deity wherever it still existed (Stone, 1976, p. 193).

Domination as Slavery or Bondage

With agriculture came the economic surplus in the form of stored grain, which was the incentive to slave or bonded labor.

Cannibalism was also an expression of the relative backwardness of the Tupi people. They ate their prisoners of war because with the rudimentariness of its production system, a captive yielded little more than his consumption, and therefore there were not incentives to integrate it to the community as a slave (Ribeiro, 1995, p. 35).

However, the cases of the patriarchal robust chimpanzee, known as chimpanzee, and the matriarchal gracile chimpanzee, known as bonobo serve as a paradigm for this paper, because humans also developed the same two distinct types of organization, the matriarchal and patriarchal. In the case of the chimpanzee and bonobo, the two organizations did not mix because they were separated by the Congo River, and because chimps cannot swim, so they eventually separated themselves into two different species of chimpanzee, being the organizational differences probably due to the supply and the type of the food available.

In the case of humans, the two organizations began in prehistoric times, and there were no separation into two species because the patriarchal organization of Indo-European peoples, pastoral and who inhabited the steppes of southern Russia invaded the matriarchal organization, which dwelt Europe and the Near East, and had developed agriculture. The patriarchal organization, rudest and semi-nomadic, was devoted to grazing, and knew the horse, which was tamed. It was probably the success of the fixation on earth, with the development of agriculture in the most fertile land, and the consequent emergence of the economic surplus, which made the matriarchal organization, cooperative, egalitarian and non-aggressive, a prey to the patriarchal organization, aggressive and hierarchical. In many cases, however, the invasion did not happen with the destruction of matriarchal culture, but by the imposition of a warrior-caste.

Now better understood, it is clear that the original inhabitants of the land became the subservient or conquered class, while the invading Indo-Europeans assumed the roles of royalty and leadership, much as the Shemsu Hor did in Egypt and the historically attested Aryans did in India, Hurrian Mitanni, among the Kassites and later in Greece and Rome. "The Hittite state", says Gurney, "was the creation of an exclusive caste superimposed upon the indigenous population of the country...a group of Indo-European immigrants became dominant over an aboriginal race of Hattians" (Stone, 1976, pp. 93-94).

The takeover in Greece was apparently analogous to that of east-central Europe which entailed a transformation of the basic social structure and administrative system by the establishment of a ruling class in hill forts. A study of the physical types of the population shows that the Kurgan warrior groups were not massive in numbers and did not eradicate the local inhabitants. They came in small migrating bands and established themselves forcefully as a small ruling elite (Gimbutas, 1991, p. 389).

No weapons except implements for hunting are found among grave goods in Europe until 4500-4300 B.C., nor is there evidence of hilltop fortification of Old European settlements. The gentle agriculturalists, therefore, were easy prey to the warlike Kurgan horsemen who swarmed down upon them. These invaders were armed with thrusting and cutting weapons: long dagger-knives, spears, halberds, and bows and arrows. The Kurgan tradition represents a stark contrast to the civilization of Old Europe which was, in the main, peaceful, sedentary, matrifocal, matrilineal, and sex egalitarian. The Kurgans were a warlike, patriarchal, and hierarchical culture with distinctive burial rites that included pit graves with tent or hut like structures of wood or stone, covered by a low cairn or earthen mound. Their economy was essentially pastoral with a rudimentary agriculture and seasonal, transient settlements of semi-subterranean houses (Gimbutas, 1991, p. 352).

THE HEGELIAN PATRIARCHATE

In Hegel's phenomenology, Hegel begins the domination-submission by the dialectic of master-slave, as in the previous section began during the Neolithic. For Hegel, however, this dialectic begins in the city-states of ancient Greek world (Kojève, 2002, p. 95). Moreover, Hegel is teleological (argument or knowledge that relates a fact to its final cause) because he foreseen that the fights for domination would end up in love.

For Hegel, love is mutual recognition, which opposes to prestige struggle (the duel). In love, conflicts are not essential; differences, when they show up, don't become radical oppositions. Where there isn't love, conflicts are intensified, the situation is untenable, everything must be destroyed. But love can't exist at the principle: the master-slave conflict is essential and primitive. Love can only exist between equals. This situation of absolute equality can only present itself in the perfect state (universal and homogeneous) to which the history approaches. While the history lasts, there is existence in the struggle (and at work), not in love (Kojève, 2002, p. 248).

In the Phenomenology of Spirit (2008), Hegel shows the evolution of the consciousness in a patriarchal world, where to be human is to be marked by struggle and work. This world begins at the epoch of the fighting masters, and of the workers slaves, and ends in a homogeneous world, of the human spirit, where would be the end of history (of wars and revolutions). At the end of the history would exist the absolute knowledge, because the human spirit would reveal itself through the whole story of the cultural evolution, like a tree that reaches its full growth. What drives humans in this trajectory is the recognition desire.

However, in Chapter IV of the Phenomenology, Hegel shows that the desire which is directed to another desire is necessarily recognition desire – which by opposing master and slave - generates and moves the history (while it is not definitely suppressed by satisfaction). Therefore, being realized, the time in which predominates the future generates history, which lasts while this time lasts, and this time only lasts as long as history lasts, that is, while humans perform acts in pursuit of social recognition (Kojève, 2002, p. 348).

This recognition desire, which is seen as the desire that looks for another desire, that is, the desire for the desire of the other, was tapped in Lacanian psychoanalysis, which used this expression to the formation of the child's unconscious desire. The desire for the other's desire appears with the same sense, and almost in the same format in both Kojève (2002, p. 14), and in Lacan (1978, p. 132), showing of the influence of Hegel on Lacan. In humans, due to the state of helplessness-dependence of the baby, the desire for recognition by the Other, or the desire for the desire of the other, is primordial and previous to the simple satisfaction of needs (Faveret, 2014, chapter 2).

The dialectic of master and slave starts with a struggle of life and death for reasons of pure prestige, because of the recognition desire, which is the unconscious reason for the fight. However one of the two does not support the risk of life and give up, becoming slave, and the other master. An interesting aspect of the next quote, approaching Hegel and Kojève even more of psychoanalysis, is that "to be human, it is needed at least two," making it clear that before the physiologic need there is the psychic need of being recognized by the other, or the desire of the other.

In short, we can say that: man is born and history began with the first fight that ended with the appearance of a master and a slave. This means that – in the beginning - the man is always master or slave, and there's only true man where there is a master and a slave. (For being human, it takes at least two beings.) And world history, the history of the interaction of men and their interaction with nature, is the history of the interaction of master warriors and slave laborers. Therefore, the history stops as soon as the difference disappears, the opposition between master and slave, at the moment that the master will no longer be a master for not having a slave, and the slave will cease to be a slave for no more having a master, without however being himself a master, because he won't have a slave (Kojève, 2002, p. 166).

But the master doesn't reach the desired recognition, because all he has is the recognition of a slave, while he intended to be recognized by an equal. "Therefore, he is recognized by someone he does not recognize. And in this is the failure - and the tragic character - of his situation. He fought and risked his life by the recognition, but only obtained a recognition of no value to him." (Kojève, 2002, p. 23). "In other words, the domination is an existential impasse" (Kojève, 2002, p. 169).

And so the master never stops fighting always in search of an impossible recognition. One can say that the master yearns for the look of love of the slave because the look is one of the objects of the drive (Quinet, 2005, p. 20), but instead of love, he receives a not look, half off, of fear. That's why the servants were never allowed to look directly to the eyes of a high dignitary, who did not like this look, empty and opaque, from the subordinate.

The Slave

As for the slave, through the work for the master (who does not work), rises above the animal condition, due to the transformation that he make in nature. Thus, by the technical changes that he himself creates, the slave transforms their own living conditions and creates his history. Hegel then identifies three stages of evolution of the slave consciousness, stoicism, skepticism, and the unhappy consciousness (Christian).

At stoicism the slave is free in thought, but he finishes bored. In skepticism the slave denies the value of things, which can take him to suicide. But both situations involve the same contradiction "between the idea or the ideal of freedom and the reality of bondage" (Kojève, 2002, p. 175). So the slave adheres to the Christian ideology, the last prior to the homogeneous state on Earth. The Christianity then produces the unhappy consciousness.

Man imagines God because he wants to objectify up. And imagines a transcendent God because he cannot objectify up in the world. But wants to make the individuality by the union with a transcendent God is to do it in the transcendent, in Jenseits, on beyond the world and of himself, considered as Bewusstsein (consciousness), as living in the world. It is therefore renounce to the realization of the ideal here on Earth. It is therefore being and knowing that everyone is unhappy in this world (Kojève, 2002, p. 196).

Hegel sees the origin and the basis of Christianity in the idea of individuality, discovered by the slave and unknown in the world of pagan masters. Individuality is the synthesis of the particular and the universal: it is the absolute or universal value taking place in and for a particular Being, The particular being getting as such an absolute value that is, universally recognized. Only this synthesis, performing as a human existence, can offer to the man the final satisfaction (Befriedigung), which makes useless and impossible all the escape (Flucht) for a beyond (Jenseits), escape that takes place in the faith or in the artistic imagination. It can also offer all true overcoming of a given world, which is produced by the denier effort of the struggle and the work, effort that creates a new real world. So, this man performs the perfect individuality and completes the historical evolution (Kojève, 2002, p. 151).

The Pagan Master

The pagan master lives a dual situation, which cannot be reconciled, the universal (state) and the other private (family). In the universal situation, he is a warrior, whose purpose is to defend the state, killing or dying by the human law. In the particular situation, he lives by the divine law, seeking fortune (love) to the family. These two situations are opposed, and they cannot be synthesized at an individual. "Only the individual can reach the satisfaction" (Kojève, 2002, p. 179).

While human actions of struggle and work are not synthesized in a single human being, the man is not fully satisfied. The realization and recognition of the action uniquely universal only in the state satisfies the man as little as the realization and recognition of his personnel being, particular, in the family. (...) In fact, for the family, the supreme value is the natural Being, the Sein, the biological life of its members. But what the state requires from each family member is precisely that he risks his life, die for the universal cause. So fulfill the citizen duty is necessarily breaking the law of the family; and vice versa. In the pagan world this conflict is inevitable and insoluble: the man cannot renounce to the family, since he cannot renounce to the particularity of his being; and cannot renounce to the state, since it cannot renounce to the universality of his action. Thus, he will be necessarily criminal, either to the state, or to the family. And that's what gives the pagan life the tragic character (Kojève, 2002, p. 180).

It is noted that this situation of opposition between the universal and the particular is given before the advent of Christianity. The universal (human law) was then the law of the flock (natural patriarchy) or the law of the strongest, hierarchical and not cooperative, while the particular (the divine law) was based on the family (matriarchy), which in principle is cooperative. Hegel, in the comment of Kojève puts into opposing camps the man of patriarchal hierarchy, i.e. the citizen, and the woman.

The old state has a natural basis; the Volk, an ethnic unit. The contradiction within the old state is also natural: the separation of the sexes. So when there is a fight between the universal and the particular, the citizen and the woman, the human law and the divine law, the state and the family, the state, in destroying the particular, destroys its own root (Wurzel) and destroys himself; and, if the triumph is from the particular, the state will be destroyed by this criminal activity. There is no mediation between universality (state) and the particular (family) in the pagan world (Kojève, 2002, p. 101).

Ultimately, the pagan world perishes because it excludes the work. But the immediate agent of his downfall is, curiously, the woman. Because is the woman who represent the family principle, that is, the particular principle that is hostile to society as such and whose victory means the ruin of the state, the universal itself (Kojève, 2002, p. 181).

The final destination of the pagan master in Hegel's phenomenology is his gradual disappearance, also turning up in a Christian, as the slave.

What will do the pagan master? Will lose interest in the state (of the universal); will stop making war, will adopt the ideas (particularistic) of the Slave: stoicism, skepticism and finally Christianity; so, he will disappear as a master, not in a revolution (as a result of a negating action from the slave), but by natural disaggregation, like an animal. The transition from the former state to the Christian will have revolutionary value, but will not be a revolution (Kojève, 2002, p. 101).

THE SOCIAL LAW, THE PERVERSE MASTER, THE NEUROTIC SLAVE, AND THE WOMAN

To recap, for Hegel there were two laws that were opposed, a human law or universal law, from the ancient pagan state, which represents the patriarchy of the masters who fight, and which could be called the law of the flock or the law of the strongest. The other would be the divine law or the particular law from the family, which represents the matriarchy of women and love, as well as the slaves that work, and that might be called the law of fairness or the Christian law.

It is the woman who is the immediate agent of the ruin of the former state, the master world. But is the slave by the adoption of Christianity, which is the religion of labor and love (i.e., of the slave and the woman), which unifies the universal situation of the Christian state and particular of the family, finally making himself a satisfied individual. At this point the pagan master become not interested in war, he adopts the

Christian religion and disappears. So to Hegel, the Christianity is the focal point of the history.

But the historical reality proved to be different from Hegel's phenomenology. The adoption of Christianity as the official religion of the Roman Empire is really the focal point of the history, but what happened is that the two laws remained there, with changed status. The law of fairness, or Christian law became universal, in the Christian Roman state, and can be represented by the words of Jesus: "Love one another as I have loved you", or "love thy neighbor as thyself" a call for cooperation.

Rawls, a philosopher linked to the social contract theory, which was "one of the most important political thinkers of the twentieth century" (Oliveira, 2003, back cover), updated the social contract theory, considering that justice as fairness should exclude the possibility of domination.

In justice as fairness, on the other hand, people accept in advance a principle of equal liberty, and without knowing their own specific objectives. Implicitly they agree, therefore, to adapt the concepts of their own good to those that are required by the principles of justice, or at least not claim anything that transgresses them. The individual who discovers enjoy seeing others in situations of less freedom understand that he has not any right to this satisfaction. The pleasure he feels from others' deprivations is wrong in itself: it is a satisfaction that requires the transgression of a principle with which he would agree in his original position. (Rawls, 2008, pp. 37-38)

On the other hand the civil law of Christian states becomes a particular perversion of the universal law, because the state policy to this day is still pregnant with collusions, chases, wars and uncooperative attitudes, that is, it is still the law of the flock, or the law of the strongest. These attitudes not cooperatives in the form of collusions can be considered as perversions of the law of fairness that emerged and became the social law. For example, the Crusades and the Inquisition were perversions of the social law expressed by the Christian maxim of love.

Then the masters have not disappeared as in Hegel, but became the perverse character of psychoanalysis, that is, those who try to impose their own law instead of the social law from culture, which is the law of fairness. Then are these perverse masters that join to fight associated in collusions within the modern state to obtain an unfair share of the economic surplus, even though through the manipulation of civil laws (Faveret, 2014, chapter 1). So the slaves are those who work within the social law, neurotics in trying to please the perverse masters, and survive to the civil law deformed by the perverse in modern states.

In Faveret (2014, chapter 1), it is considered a new hypothesis that the unconscious is in fact a social programming of the brain-mind that transforms emotions in symbolic, rational and objective behavior. So the unconscious emotion of the perverse, of revolt against the social law or the law of the father, which results in an attempt to impose his own law through collusions and perversions of the social law, has its correspondence in the ego of the master, who acts objectively trying to dominate through the struggle of collusions, either by policy, institutional power or wealth. So the perverse never stops

challenging the social law, by getting a perverse torsion of jouissance in his actions, as the scorpion, also the master never stops fighting, because he does not get the desired recognition from the struggle, because love can only be received by request, which implies the possibility of frustration of this request.

As for the neurotic, the repetition of his symptom reveals an insecurity caused by childhood trauma, from which he tries to fend by repeating his behavior. The purpose of this behavior is ultimately please the Other to stabilize psychically the cause of insecurity. This emotion (fear, anxiety), has its correspondence in the slave by the excessive submission to a hierarchical superior, when projecting in him the role of the Other, trying to please him.

CONCLUSIONS

Hegel apparently glimpses that the initial heterogeneous world of experiences and states of nature, becomes homogeneous by the links that people will establishing with each other, through the struggle and the labor. Hegel, however thought only in European terms, and for him the homogeneous state of the end of the history would be the Napoleonic Empire that would suppress the monarchies of Europe and unifies them, while for this paper the globalization will continue until the entire world ceases to make war, reaching a homogeneous psychic state, through cultural evolution, which according to Hegel would be the conscience of totality. So the hegelian conception the end of history and the absolute knowledge about what is humanity, still seems quite distant.

According to Hegel, is in and by the Napoleonic Wars and - in particular - in the battle of Jena that takes place this conclusion of the history by the suppression-dialectical (Aufheben) of the master and the slave. Therefore, the presence of battle of Jena in Hegel's consciousness is of paramount importance. It is because Hegel hears the noise of the battle that he can know that the history ends or ended, that - as a consequence - his conception of the world is a total conception, and that his knowledge is an absolute knowledge (Kojève, 2002, p. 167).

Many see that now people are living almost in a society of abundance, and not of scarcity, as many economic currents still believe. Rifkin (2014) shows that the current innovations are leading the world to the third industrial revolution that will result in marginal costs very close to zero, with the consequence that the cost of producing more goods is negligible, thus reaching up the society of abundance. Keynes (2010, p. 35) realized that in a few generations the economic problem of the absolute necessities could be resolved, if were not for the desire of superiority of some over others, that he called the relative needs, and this one yes, it is inexhaustible, and this looks a lot like the issue of domination. Rawls (2008, pp. 37-38), in the previous quotation, explicitly shows that to exist the cooperation in society of justice as fairness of society, there is no place for domination.

So the world is going through a paradigm shift to a world of greater cooperation and less domination, which implies in the understanding of the evolution of social law, and of the role of the perverse that prevents this evolution, and whose remedy to this is to

reduce the inequality that leads to domination, by the redistribution of income, perhaps through a tax on financial transactions (such as the Tobin tax), with redistribution of a basic income.

Finally this paper also shows, that unlike the *homo economicus* of neoclassical theory, there are three economic agents, from a social and psychological point of view (but not biological): the perverse master who struggle through collusions structured as a prisoner's dilemma, the neurotic slave worker, and the woman, who cooperates and does not fight.

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