

**THE PALESTINIAN DILEMMA “PART ONE” “WHICH PIECE OF LAND DO YOU MEAN?” THE ARAB MENTALITY FROM ISLAMIZATION, PALESTINIANIZATION, TO CANTONIZATION**

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**ABSTRACT:** *This paper examines at the most complicated and intractable dilemmas for the century from 1914-2014, made by the hand of its people. The researcher debates the Palestinian dilemma which has shaped and created in the Arab-Palestinian mentalities, before its formation on the ground, as well as three chronic and fatal defects in their attitudes: Palestinianization of the (Muslim/Arab) mentality, Islamization of the (Palestinian) Cause, and Cantonization (fragmentation and shorthand the meaning of) the Land. In short, this study plans to explore the Arab-Palestinian dilemma, the “Piece” of “Land” of “Southern Syria” in 1948, the two peoples, the backwardness and modernization of Palestine from Ottoman Empire to Jewish settlement, and the Great Powers and “Refashioning” of “Greater Syria” from 1917-48. However, this work has entirely framed the main aspects and manifestations of the “Palestinian Dilemma” through the three endless imperfections of Arab culture and their attitudes; Palestinianization, Islamization and Cantonization; in the same context, the Palestinians (or even Arabs) have no single answer for the very simple question: “Which Piece of land they mean and want alike?” or which Palestine precisely in “Southern Syria”: Greek “Philistia”, Roman “Syria Palaestina”, Byzantine “Palaestina”, Ottoman-Mamluk province, Jordan, Israel, West Bank or Gaza? Along with the real blame that the Palestinians have dual standards in dealing with their (past) enemy “the Israelis”, they have a stereotype for Jews in terms of their creative energies, perhaps due to religion. The Palestinians in reality rely on Israeli services and products, which appears to onlookers in the Palestinian-Israeli clash as a form of “Mental Schizophrenia”.*

**KEYWORDS:** Palestinian dilemma, Palestinianization, Islamization, Cantonization, chronic, Schizophrenia.

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**THE PALESTINIAN DILEMMA: PALESTINIANIZATION, ISLAMIZATION AND CANTONIZATION**

It appears obvious to observers that there has been a “Historical Dilemma” in the Arab-Muslim world for at least a century (1914-2014), known as the “Palestinian Cause”. Unquestionably, this study cannot analyze all reasons and components prompted that “dilemma” or even uncover the kind of Arab attitude which affected the Palestinian Cause (the Cause vanished when Hamas administered Gaza by the end of 2006).

In my opinion, the true catalyst which brought about the Palestinian dilemma is that the Arab-Palestinian mindset believes that Palestine is part of the Islamic and Arabic world; what's more, most or all of them think of its soil as sacred. In addition to the dilemma extending from the end of First World War to the present, could shading and tainting the Arab societies by three chronic lesions; first Palestinianization of the Muslim/Arab mentality; second, Islamization of the Palestinian Cause (and several issues without obvious evidence), and last - but not least - Cantonization (fragmentation of) the Land.

However, we could review and survey the Arab-Muslim world to find information about the true history of Palestine, such as who created the name "Palestine", the genuine borders of land, since when Palestine was acknowledged as an Arab state or even a sovereign country, when precisely Palestine showed up "on the planet Map", and which heavenly holy Islamic sites are on that land. Even most/all Muslims are not able to recognize or distinguish between the two mosques: al-Aqsa and Dome of the Rock Mosque, and who precisely constructed every mosque, and so on. Then, we would discover that maybe more than 95% have no correct beliefs, knowledge, convictions, and discernments about such these issues. Regardless of the vast majority of Arabs/Muslims were battled and still prepared to fight for the "Mirage and Myth" of the "Palestinian dilemma" at this moment. Therefore, Hertz (2009) contended that:

*“The Palestinian cause became a key rallying point for Arab nationalism throughout the Middle East, The countries the British and French created in 1918-1922 were based largely on meridians on the map, as is evident in the borders that delineate the Arab states today. Because these states lack ethnic logic or a sense of community, their opposition to the national aspirations of the Jews has become the fuel that fires Arab nationalism as the ‘glue’ of national identity.....(Despite) archeologists explain that the Philistines were a Mediterranean people who settled along the coast of Canaan in 1100 BCE. They have no connection to the Arab nation, a desert people who emerged from the Arabian Peninsula.”*

Truth is, a significant issue in the Arab societies now relates to their dispositions, attitudes, and practices to any issue by and large and the Palestinian cause especially, so it will be profitable to survey Kelman's perspective (2007) to comprehend the concept of attitude, as he expressed that it focuses on four critical qualities of demeanor:

- Attitudes inextricably combine the affective and cognitive dimensions of our relationships to social objects.
- Attitudes are shared within a group, organization, or society and constitute properties of both the individual and the collectivity.
- Attitudes emerge and constantly evolve and change in a context of action and interaction.
- An attitude represents a range of potential commitment to the object at times extending from; approach to avoidance, support to opposition-rather than a single point on a bipolar scale.

With geographical consideration, Palestine -earlier was seen and comprehended a piece of the Fertile Crescent. It reaches from the Mediterranean to the Arabian Gulf and from the Taurus and Zagros mountains in the north and the Arabian Desert in the south. On the other hand, the name "Palestine" requires more illumination. Forming the understanding of the certainties for the "what" and "when" of Palestine might be inconclusive. Nonetheless, taking a look at a contemporary map, one might have an incredible challenge discovering a nation marked as "Palestine." If someone went by an old guide like the second half of the nineteenth century, they might in any have the same trouble discovering a certain heading. Indeed, until 1922, the name "Palestine" did not get any official acknowledgement (Harms and Ferry; 2008).

With a more intensive look at most Arabs in Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and obviously Palestinian cantons, we will find communities focus on only one issue in their daily life/discussion, "Palestine", despite the fact that they have real/major political, economic, health and education corruptions and problems. Moreover they visualize that there is only one evil and detestable (in their limited world) nation: "Israel and Jews (al-Yahud)", who are considered (according to their attitudes) the real factor behind all their problems, puzzles and dilemmas in their countries. These problems include poverty, political disturbances (with tyrannies and fascist dictatorships), divided societies, rebellions (with bloody events), random demonstrations (with narrow factional demands), (political and security) anarchy, (religious and social viciousness within and under the name of loathsome) sectarianism, absence of security (in risky states such as Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Sudan, Yemen and Libya), and (last but not least) backwardness of most villages and towns (specially Libyan, Yemen and Sudanese towns: the vast majority of them live in a tribal life/culture of the seventeenth century. Also after the current remapping of Syria under the name of Arab Spring, economically and militarily Syria specifically will retreat after the present events to the age stone, without doubt). In one statement, without any rationale reasons, Arabs' thought and disposition changed over to "Palestinianization attitude'. In this respect Ben-Ami (2005) argued that:

*"From the Arab Revolt 1936-39 onwards, Palestine would become the convenient battle-cry for the entire Arab world, the cohesive glue of pan-Arab nationalism, the platform for mass hysteria in Cairo and Baghdad, Tunis and Casablanca, Damascus and Amman. So much so that in 1948 the Arab states were practically forced against their will to invade the newborn Jewish state for the sake of Palestine....."*

Surprisingly, the thought of making a Palestinian state in its regions after the 1948 War was not recognized in those years, and indeed was unthinkable in the eyes of Palestinians and Arabs. They considered the establishment of the Jewish state in any part of Palestine illegitimate, and their political objective was the disposal of the State of Israel and the foundation of an Arab state in the whole range. Despite what might be expected, the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 profoundly changed the 1949 guideline and alongside it, the political environment in the Middle East. Toward the conclusion of the Six-Day War, Israel was left in control of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and Egypt's Sinai Peninsula and Syria's Golan Heights – as a two free endowments from Egyptian and Syrian governments. The new circumstances due to the war were prompted the "Palestinianization" of the Arab-Israeli clash. However, the analysis concurs

quite well with Kelman (2007), who theorized that the beginning of Palestinianization was the clash in and after the 1967 War. He posited:

*“By the end of the Six-Day War in 1967, the Israeli armies occupied the Palestinian territories “West Bank” and “Gaza Strip” in addition to Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights respectively. The 1967 War and the new geopolitical and strategic situation led the “Mentality” – particularly in all Arab societies- to the “Palestinianization” of the Arab-Israeli conflict, bringing it back to its origin as a conflict between two peoples over same piece of land.....the Palestinianization or Re-Palestinianization of the conflict has manifested itself in the action of the Arab states, of the Palestinian community itself and of Israel. Israel’s neighboring Arab states gradually withdrew from the military struggle against Israel –though not before another major war in 1973- leaving it, essentially, to the Palestinian themselves.”*

At the same context, Hertz (2009) stated that:

*“Palestinianism in and of itself lacks any substance of its own. Arab society on the West Bank and Gaza suffers from deep social cleavages created by a host of rivalries based on divergent geographic, historical, sociological and familial allegiances. What glue Palestinians together are a carefully nurtured hatred of Israel and the rejection of Jewish nationhood.”*

As early as the 1930s, Palestinian leadership depended on Islamic distinctiveness as a mass marshalling strategy against British and Zionist colonialist rule. All the way through the preceding century, both Jews and Muslims employed spiritual identity to justify special civil rights over the land of Palestine. At any rate, the mixing of religion and politics defiles both Israelis and Palestinians; when God's name is incited to legitimize damage to others, this degenerates everything asserted to be “holy”, as emphasized by Abu-Nimer (2004).

Remarkably, the Arabs-Palestinians had no any political and historical demands or even attempts for independence and liberty for their states and peoples during the Turkish occupation up until its fall in the First World War. The real reasons behind that were as follows: firstly, Arabs lived in one area called Greater Syria (formerly the Levant), while the Palestinians were in the domains of the South of Syria - later partitioned by the victors of the First World War into Jordan, Israel, West Bank, and Gaza. Secondly, the Arab mentality can certainly accept anything under the name of Islam, the Holy Caliphate or God “Allah”, for one specified reason or another, and felt satisfaction and fulfillment toward the Ottoman “Muslim” occupiers for more than four hundred years. Thirdly, Arabs had no any experience with issues such as human rights, the right of private possessions, or the concept of sovereign and free political states/entities. It implies that the Arab attitude manages their sway and other extremely vital issues by double principles; for Muslim invaders: they are eager or at least willing to acknowledge it without any objection, regardless whether it leaves them in a backward society or not. However, for outside conquerors, with diverse religions and dialects, even if a mandate will create and modernize their society, they need to oppose and battle it, swimming in a river of blood of their own people. Therefore,

the researcher portrays this status in terms of the "Islamized and Cantonized the Mentality" or "Socio-Historical-Political Schizophrenia Case". In this respect, Taylor-Weiner (2009) said:

*"During the rebellion of 1936-39, the Palestinian religious leadership had preached that anyone killed defending the land of Palestine would reside in paradise. In this way the Palestinian nationalist movement had become characterized in religious terms."*

In this regard, the notion of Palestine as an endowment, translating a political issue into religious language, was neither unique nor entirely new. In additional detail, the first run through the Arab leaders utilize the political talk within a Muslim celebration, suiting the Palestinian requests in terms of religious discourse, was before the flare-up of savagery of the mobs of Nabi Musa in 1920. There were exhibitions and political talks made by the Arab club in Jerusalem. In short:

*"The situation in Palestine changed after world war; beginning in 1919 there were the first reports of political speeches held during the procession. In 1920 a few pilgrims even carried –in Nabi Musa annual festival–banners with the slogan "Palestine is part of Syria"."(Kramer; 2011).*

From the 1920s, dismissal of Jewish nationalism endeavored to avoid the establishment of a Jewish homeland by force and the dismissal of any type of Jewish political influence, including any arrangements to impart stewardship to Arabs, which solidified into the outflow of Palestinianism. However, under the Mandate, the Palestinians additionally declined to create an Arab Agency to modernize the Arab community parallel to the Jewish Agency that controlled improvement of the Jewish area. Truth be told, the purported patriotism of indigenous Muslims thrived just when non-Muslim groups assumed responsibility of the Holy Land. The point when political control comes back to Muslim hands, the vigorous patriotism of the Arabs of Palestine mystically fades, regardless of how far off or tyrannical the legislature (Hertz; 2009). In this importance, Inbar (2009) stated that:

*"The 1967 war led to the "Palestinization" of the conflict, which meant that the Palestinians now became a political issue with a higher public profile as well as a growing political threat to Israel. Subsequently, the two-state solution paradigm reemerged. The sources for this change were multifold. First, there was a crystallization of Palestinian identity, resulting from the fact that the Palestinians were no longer under Arab rule, but under the governance of Jews, a people religiously and ethnically different."*

## **THE "PIECE" OF "LAND" OF "SOUTHERN SYRIA" FROM NUMEROUS NAMES, CHANGEABLE BORDERS TO INTERMIXTURE OF PEOPLES TILL 1948**

Crucially, under the Ottomans the region generally known as "Palestine" (Eretz Yisrael in Hebrew) or *Falastin* in Arabic was undefined officially or politically, as were its natives (Muslim, Christian, and additionally Jewish). On the other hand, the late writing by Morris (2009) stated that even individuals from current Palestinian domain scarcely ever considered themselves Palestinians. In this manner, Palestine might not have existed on the map or figured



in the Ottoman confirmations, yet the possibility of Palestine occurred within its history and society (Strawson, 2010). In addition, there were numerous names for the "Southern Syria" used by individuals, such as Canaan's property, Philistia, Philistia, Holy Land, Historic and Sacred Land, Promised Land, Land of Passage, Land of Israel, Eretz ysrael, Arazi-I Muqaddese, Arz-i Filistin and so on; these are a few cases of antiquated area names.

The historical outset has been colorful for the land of Southern Syria, which has changed many times throughout the history. It has been transformed from the past until 1948, and this land has been characterized by the instability of its geographical and political landmarks. Additionally a few names have been constantly utilized for this area –which called Palestine or Eretz-Israel- in times passed by. As such a change is the focal point of the Palestine story over the time, as numerous individuals have possessed the place where there is Palestine. The circumstances were similar to an intermixed society, consolidated but developed separated, with common intermarriage around the tribes. However from the beginning of development to the quickly-approaching time until World War I, we have seen the expression "Israel" utilized as a part of association with the kingdom that was created in the Levant. Later, we saw the term utilized in conjunction with the yearned for Jewish country in scripture and its allocation by Zionist philosophy in regards to the real foundation of a country in Eretz-Israel. Also, Harms and Ferry (2008) clarified the key and verifiable circumstances as expressed in the following:

*“The word Palestine was obtained from Philistia. The name given by Greek writers to the territory of the philistines, in the 12th century BC engaged an undersized compartment of land on the southern coast, among contemporary Tel Aviv-Yafo (Tel Aviv-Jaffa) as well as Gaza. The Romans revitalized the name in the 2nd century AD in “Syria Palaestina,” assigning the southern segment of the region of Syria. After the Roman period the name had no authorized status waiting after World War I as well as the end of Ottoman rule”.*

Apparently, from the Canaanites to the Romans, there were established the foundations of ancient Palestinian and Jewish culture. After that, the descendants of the ancient Israelites, Jews, are additionally considered relatives of the ancient Canaanites. Besides, by one name or other, the Jews have populated the area for many years. Verifiably, it might be looked as Canaanite to Phoenician or Moabite or Edomite as the same group under Greek, then Roman, then Byzantine, and afterward the Palestinian-Arab culture of today.

In short, the Canaanites were not alone in Palestine; it had always been the crossroads of the near east. The individuals of Palestine used to go back and forth, passing through starting with one area then onto the next. It was an especially an occupied spot throughout the Bronze Age. In this way, Harms and Ferry (2008) contended and guaranteed that the Israelis and Canaanites existed in relative peace for quite a while. However, the same claim that came together and rose in the ancient past. Alternately, the Greeks vanquished the zone three centuries prior to the coming of Jesus, and in addition the Jews established an autonomous Judea that subsisted until the Roman arrival occurred fifty years after the fact.

According to Hertz (2009), the word Palestine is not Arabic, but was concocted by the Romans roughly around 135 CE from the name of an oceangoing Aegean group who secured on the shore of Canaan in old times. They were fundamentally the Philistines. The name wanted to re-make as Judea, seeing that a sign which Jewish domain had disposed of from accompanying of the Jewish upset by Rome. One thing necessity to be noted that, in the method for time, the Latin name Philistia was additional degraded into Palestine.

At the same connection, Carter (2009) clarifies that after one more rebellion in A.D. 134, numerous Jews were removed, and in addition the Romans named the area Syria-Palestine while the Jews called it Eretz Israel. Successively, in A.D. 313, Palestine was distinguished as Religio-Licita before Constantine created the religion of the eastern Roman Empire, thus, started the demonstrations of devotion that made Palestine the Holy Land. However history continued with the name game, as throughout Byzantine, during what is essentially the Christian period, the nation got the name of Palaestina. It did not really incorporate Galilee as a place with Phoenicia, and was rather isolated into three unequal parts. Within these three parts, the focal and biggest was Palaestina Prima with its capital at Caesarea; the second and smallest was Palaestina Secunda to the north with its capital at Tiberias; the third and least characterized part was Palaestina Tertia to the south with its capital at Petra. In spite of the fact that the Palestine, at that time, was for the most part Christian, its populace remained blended socially. Furthermore, the mixture occurred etymologically and ethnically as well, due to the diverse people groups who occupied, colonized, or ruled it. So in this respect, Hertz (2009) contended that the family names of numerous Palestinians confirm their non-Palestinian roots. In the same way that Jews bear names like Berliner, Warsaw, and Toledano, present-day telephone directories in the territories are loaded with families named Elmisri (Egyptian), Chalabi (Syrian), and Mugarbi (North Africa).

In fact, the Arab connection with Palestine did not begin with Islam. For centuries, this connection had been encouraged through the actual presence of Arab tribes in and around the Palestine. By then, Bitar (2009) brought up an interesting issue that Palestine became one of the main Arab countries with a Muslim majority late in the seventh century. The land's prime distinctiveness and boundaries were after this consolidation in the seventh century known to the entire Muslim world by its Arabic name "Filastin", used to introduce Palestine. At the same context, Palestine was famous and recognized for its natural beauty, and its religious significance was also clearly spelled out in passages written in Arabic during the tenth century by the Medieval Arab geographers Istakhari and Ibn Hankal. As addressed by Istakhari and Ibn Hankal, the cartographic location of the territory of that Palestine, which was named Filastin, was used to itemize its internal organizes via cities as well as landscape features. De facto, Filastin was basically the westernmost of the provinces of Syria as found in the literature. Continuing from the evidence, at its maximum length starting from Rafh to the border of Al Lajjun (Legio), it would take of two days to travel. Moreover, this was similar to the time it took to traverse the province in its span starting from Yafa (Jaffa) to Riha (Jericho) Zugar (Segor, Zoar), as well as the country of Lot's people (Diyar Kaum Lot), Al Jibal (the mountains of Edom) and Ash Sharah. This was to the extent that Ailah, Al Jibal, and Ash Sharah were segregated provinces.

Throughout the late-Ottoman years, Palestine was not a solitary element as a national managerial area. Indeed, administration changed throughout the early of nineteenth century. At the end of the century nineteenth, it was isolated into three regions, or Sanjaks: Jerusalem, Nablus, and

Acre, all of which had been a piece of the Vilayaet "Governorate" of Syria. These names, truth be told, are found in that time as relating to towns that can absolutely be spotted on a map. Nevertheless, in the 1880s, these were related likewise to locales named after the towns as well. A little later, in 1887, Jerusalem became a free Sanjak, and Nablus and Acre became part of the new governorate of Beirut, formed in 1888.

Regarding that, Strawson (2010) also emphasized the distinctive geographical place as Palestine by defining the land within Arab nationalist discourse. Though the land of Palestine during that particular time was not ruled as a united territory, it was treated as single and separate administrative entity for the time being. Since it was subdivided into few districts, each district was ruled from a secluded capital. The area of Palestine from the Ramallah-Jaffa line southward, to Gaza and Beersheba, was ruled directly from Constantinople, because of the area's political and religious sensitivity, specifically in Jerusalem and Bethlehem. The area to its south, down to the gulf of 'Aqaba, was ruled from Damascus, and the northern half of Palestine was subdivided into three Sanjaks or sub districts, ruled until the 1880s from the provincial capital of Damascus. For that reason, by the end of the First World War, a small number of Palestine Arabs are privileged to consider Palestine as a separate geopolitical entity. This was perhaps the reason for the eventual consequences. Subsequently, distinct routes which led for its self-determination and statehood during 1920 included the severance of Palestine from Syria through the French takeover of Lebanon (1918) and Syria (1920). Furthermore, the British conquest of Palestine and Transjordan (1917-1918) and the following institution during 1920-1922 led to separate French and British mandates over these regions. From that point on, the Palestinian Arab Elite struggled to deny the Judaization of Palestine (Morris, 2009).

Consequently, until the First World War, southern Palestine was under the administration of Jerusalem, and the north regulated by Beirut. Disregarding this isolation, the entire of the region of the west of Jordan River and alongside south of the governorate of Beirut was alluded to as Palestine. Also, all Arabs, Jews, and Ottoman authorities alluded to the geographic region as Palestine, with the Ottoman government using the term Arz-i Filistin, which implies the place, was known as Palestine (Harms and Ferry, 2008).

In summary of the above, from 636 to 1099, the region of Palestine was part of the Arab Caliphates that decisively seized the area from the Byzantine Empire after the Battle of Yarmouk. However, later on, from 1099 to 1187, European Crusaders held sway over the land. More likely in the year 1270, Palestine became a part of the Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt and remained so until the Mamluks were decisively beaten by the Ottoman Sultan, Selim I, at the Battle of Marj Dabiq. At the end of this battle, in the year 1516, Palestine became part of the Ottoman Empire and continued, with one brief exception when it conquered by Egypt, to be held one of its provinces until after 1917 when it was invaded and occupied by the British under the command of Field Marshal General Allenby. Geopolitically, Tibawi (1977) stated that just after the First World War, Palestine acquired definite political boundaries for the first time in history. Until then, however, the name denoted different historical, geographical or administrative meaning at different times. The geographical name of the land of Palestine was to some extent undecided before the year 1918.

Essentially, there was no directorial area of that name in the Ottoman Empire. Although there was to become Palestine under British rule, divided under Ottoman rule into three Sanjaks or



provinces. However, even these areas were not exactly aligned with the borders of British Palestine (Strawson, 2010).

## **THE BACKWARDNESS AND MODERNIZATION OF THE LAND FROM OTTOMAN EMPIRE TO JEWISH SETTLEMENT**

Indeed, the history recognizes as an incomprehensible cluster of realities, generally political and military in character, masterminded pretty much sequentially. In this manner, history is unalterable, with the exception of by the intermittent uncovering of a lost city or the disclosure of a trunk brimming with letters in a storage room (Brundage, 2008). Truly, throughout the Ottoman Empire era to the end of the First World War, the place known as Palestine and its tenants lived in destitution and under backwards conditions; however, beginning from the British Mandate and the Jewish migrations, society modernized.

It has been found that, Palestine was a feeble area of the breaking-down Ottoman Empire in the early nineteenth century. The Sublime Porte or the Ottoman's dominant voices in Istanbul scarcely indicated any worry in it for the reason of the heavenly places and also insufficient income wring from the discouraging residents. The country was of no political importance close to home, its financial system was prehistoric, and the small, racially varying populace subsisted on a wretchedly small amount. Indeed, the nation was defectively managed, as it is said. Also, a little measure of towns was little and miserable, the ways few and additionally abused. In a couple of words, Palestine was a sad backwater of a disintegrating realm, altogether different from the rich, prosperous area it had been in ancient times.

At the same time, sometimes the past seems far off and great and the present bleak and betrayed, though the area was area poor and ignored and individuals discouraged and pathetic in nineteenth-century Palestine. In addition, the administration was so frail and bumbling, by one means or another despotic too. Furthermore, the absence of dependable demographic information on Palestine and the Islamic period has been greatly bemoaned. Actually, for the Ottoman period there is an issue of sources, for are they rare and conflicting, as well as politically predispositions. So, per Kramer (2011), the first census made in Egypt and different parts of Ottoman Empire was not until 1846. Altogether, Palestine was not just an antiquated state destroyed and lying in ruins; however, the existing Palestine is currently just the rubble of what will never again exist.

Regional terms notwithstanding, the demographic weight of Palestine remained small into the nineteenth century, and its budgetary potential irrelevant. Its critical value for the Ottomans was more financial than vital, with size to a great extent controlled by religion. Into the understanding, the towns extended in size from a couple of dozen individuals to a few hundred. Matrilineal families and factions served as the essential unit of solidarity, of physical and standardized savings, intervention and mediation. While the houses in the fields were generally assembled of perishable mud block, in the mountains they were made for the most part of stone. With respect to the health framework in the social order, in Palestine elsewhere, sicknesses and plagues such as cholera, typhus, yellow fever, smallpox, and intestinal sickness caused a high

death rate, particularly for newborn children and youngsters. For instance, in 1865-66, a cholera scourge caused many deaths in northern Palestine, and in 1902, hundreds more died. Indeed, until 1920, a little untouchable province existed outside the doors of Jerusalem. A standout amongst the most common diseases, intestinal sickness, was fundamentally brought on by stagnant water that was discovered in low-lying swampy zones encouraged by winter downpours.

According to Kramer (2011), it was also the storage used to keep rainwater in Jerusalem and numerous different places too. In terms of the managing and game plans for the use of the area, it acknowledges fusions of neighborhood custom, Sharia (Islamic) law, and Sultanic statutes, serving a twofold purpose: to manage the rights to and control over a given parcel, and to focus assessment paying and different obligations appended to it. At the same time, travel permits provided for people dependent upon the enumeration registry, with all people relegated to a family. The passport was called the Murur Tezkeresi in that time. Later on it included a neighborhood, town, and religious group as well. As long as avenues were still without names and numbers, the family unit likewise served as a location. As an outcome, the family was an element framed for the reasons of organization and assessment; it didn't fundamentally harmonize with the organic family, which was extensive and broad.

As the British saw themselves playing the part of a legit broker, go-between and underwriter of security, prosperity, and advancement, that conviction that additionally served to legitimize the continuation of mandatory rule. Indeed, in the most challenging times, they endured in the contention that Palestine would derive economic benefits from the mandate in general and the Jewish national home specifically, as Jewish immigration, settlement, capital, and work might profit the nation in general and enhance the state of the Arab peasantry, whose misery was determinedly felt. In this matter, Peel (the head of the Royal Commission in Palestine 1937) Report communicated these two ideas succinctly:

*“.....it was assumed that the establishment of the national home would mean a great increase of prosperity for all Palestine. It was an essential part of the Zionist mission to revivify the country, to repair by Jewish labor, skill and capital the damage it had suffered from centuries of neglect. Arabs would benefit therefrom as well as Jews. They would find the country they had known so long as poor backward rapidly acquiring the material blessing of western civilization. On that account it was assumed that Arab fears and prejudices would gradually be overcome.” (Kramer; 2011).*

In anticipation of the Jews coming back to the Land of Israel in climbing numbers beginning the late nineteenth century to the touch of the twentieth century, as stated by Hertz (2009), the locale called Palestine was a God-forsaken land with a place in the Ottoman Empire, which was situated in Turkey. Then again, in the first Aliyah (1882-1903) 25,000 Jews entered into Palestine. To the extent that half might leave Palestine after arriving, after seeing the absence of developed areas. A number of the foreigners were amazed to discover minimal cultivable area accessible. By contrast, the second Aliyah (1904-14) comprises 30,000 Jews and brought about an equivalent and possibly more terrific, and most of them acquired as much land as possible to create a “Home” in Palestine for the Jewish people (Harms and Ferry, 2008).

In fact, the Jewish immigrants and the advancement of Jewish financial interests and appropriation in the different districts in its turn had a striking effect on the Arab economy and social order. The contrasts between Jews and Arabs were not all dependent upon philosophy, and they didn't need to be communicated in political terms. The contrasts were noticeable and substantial, effortlessly perceived from garments and construction modeling, from manifestations of behavior and financial association in urban ventures and provincial settlements apparently equivalent. However, Arab society offered an altogether different picture. Most Arabs and Palestinians, men and women, Muslims and Christians and Druze, had an alternate attitude towards the mandate, as well as to innovations in social, cultural, religious, and political life. For instance, Arab agriculture changed under the influence of Jewish migration and Zionist settlement.

In this respect, Pappe (2004) expressed that Palestine after the Second World War was very much not the same as at the start of the mandate. Many autos, transports and trucks showed up on the new system of black-top streets, where beforehand stallions and carriages had transported travelers in a moderate and erratic way. At the same significance, Kramer (2011) portrayed the conversion of Palestinian society/culture from backwardness to modernization from 1930s as follows:

*“There the Arab takes the harvest away on camel and donkey. Here the Jew delivers it in a truck. There the peasant “fellaha” woman herself takes her wares to the city in a basket on her head to offer them for sale. Here there is the Jewish sales organization, which takes standardized wares to the city to sell them in specialty stores.....the Arab economy supplied mostly agricultural and industrial products such as construction materials, (unskilled) labor for the citrus plantations and the construction industry, as well as real estate and rented space in the “mixed cities”; more important, however, were the land sales. By contrast, the Jews mostly provided semi-finished and finished products as well as services. In 1935 around 12,000 Arabs (5 percent of Arab wage earners) were employed in the Jewish sector, more than half of them in agriculture, especially in citrus groves; the remainder worked in construction, industry, and services (by comparison, 32,000 Arabs were employed by the mandate authorities, while 211,000 were either self-employed for working Arab employers).....how Arab agriculture changed under the impact of Jewish immigration and Zionist settlement – all of this can only be understood by taking account of these webs of relations. None of these phenomena developed autonomously, nor can they be understood in this way.”*

As a result, the Jewish settlers bringing capital and aptitudes constituted the absolute most significant element driving Palestine's fast financial improvements and consequently expanded the nation's ability for considerably more movement. So in this respect, Ben-Gurion kept in touch with the Arab patriots. George Antonius stated that:

*“We want to return to the east only in the geographic sense, for our objective is to create here a European culture.....at least as the cultural foundations in this corner of the world remain unchanged.... (But) We live in the twentieth century; they (the Palestinians) live in the fifteenth.....we have created an exemplary society in the heart of the middle age” (Ben-Ami; 2005).*

In one statement, in the Palestinian culture under British mandate and Jewish pioneers, the social and investment progressions of the 1920s and 1930s, specifically the development of instruction had prepared another class of men and additionally some ladies who were heartily occupied with legislative issues. In the urban communities, they were ready to utilize new types of correspondence. This was a consequence of changes in education, as well as in infrastructure, communication, and the spread of data. In short, the authentic truth was that the Palestinians were live in 'backwardness' status in all matters of their life throughout the Ottoman Empire work the British mandate and the landing of Jewish settlement, then the new settlers equipped to modernized the society by their experience, capitals, talented/skilled individuals and the European model of 'modernization'. As it depicted by Kramer (2011):

*“by the mid-1930s, all sorts of clubs and associations had formed in addition to the existing political parties, including welfare organizations, women’s associations, the bar associations, chambers of commerce, trade unions, sports clubs, the boy scouts, the Young Men’s Muslim associations, the YMCA and other Christian youth groups, and so forth.....along with horse and carriage, there was an increasing number of trucks, buses, taxis, motorcycles, and cars. In parallel to the transportation system, the postal and telegraph networks were steadily expanded. The telephone network was created in 1920, and in later years spread to all towns and larger settlements. In 1933 international telephone connections with Europe were installed. In March 1936 just weeks before the uprising, the Palestine Broadcasting Service went on the air, broadcasting daily programs in the three official languages of Arabic, Hebrew, and English. In the same year, the Muslim Friday sermon was broadcast from al-Aqsa Mosque for the first time. In a number of villages, public loudspeakers were set up to transmit government announcements to those who had no radios of their own.”*

### **“GREAT POWERS” AND “REFASHIONING” “GREATER SYRIA’ 1916-48: ONE LAND, FOUR COUNTRIES, TWO CANTONS, AND FIVE PEOPLES**

Viewing from the past and olden Middle East viewpoint, there was a standout amongst the most pressing inquiries raised about the most powerful in formations the history and the international law or victor constrain after the war. Notwithstanding, it might be enunciated that there is a nearby relationship between the military occupation or triumph of the area, and the topographical division, dividing, and remapping the land and/or nations (Shaw; 2010). The universal laws these days have turned into an opposing path as a substitute for political evaluation, indeed that time it was as well. In its great structure, this methodology to international law has something all the more in a similar manner as the "world of Harry Potter" than the one we occupy. It is transform into a magical substance to ensure that good triumphs over evil. Hence, International law is utilization to push the gatherings into the following round of battling in the conviction that their complete triumph is not only conceivable however completely legitimized. This rendition of law obliges that one side wins and different loses. Moreover the International law necessity is to predetermine the wisdom of cooperation that can help both gatherings to achieve their state dependent upon full equality and additionally wellbeing (Strawson, 2010).

The international law represented its project as 'scientific mapping' as with geography. Afterwards, the issue climbs subsequently like how some different states like Great Britain, Russia, France, Italy, and Germany alongside the United States are constantly characterized as compelling. In the meantime, the outline and identification of limits in scorn of individuals living in the better places and particular domains was extensive from Europe to whatever is left of the world. It was fundamentally throughout the period of Western expansionism from the sixteenth hundreds of years through the nineteenth hundreds of years. Somehow, it was initially drawn and by one means or another constrained by Western settlers that subsequently turned into the tasteful introduction for eloquent hostile to provincial anxiety for reason toward oneself and autonomous statehood (Zacher, 2001).

In the Middle East, the majority of the local influential people was ready to go forward with their own asserts to regulate territories no longer integrated contained by the Ottoman Empire. This technique start long before World War I, yet it was the assertion of Versailles that formally archived interchange or substitute of the Ottoman Empire's all inclusive territory with principle by different European mandatory powers under the sponsorship of the League of Nations. In this foundation, the League of Nations position for not much else besides the European state framework, which had, in any case, since a long time ago turn out as the urgent compel in Middle Eastern political associations (Lustick,1997). Subsequently, the rearrangement of the geo-political map is a developmental demonstration going before the formation of an up to date state. This was valid for just about every state made in the Middle East, appears to be not to have happened in Palestine, unless we respect the formation of the state of Israel as a characteristic movement from Ottoman arrangement (Pappe, 2004).

However, leaving immense swaths of in the past Ottoman region in an administrative limbo when the Ottoman Empire broke down in the First World War and days were numbered. Into that vacuum stepped the recently overwhelming countries of Great Britain and France. Wildly intense due to their advanced histories, the previous partners came readied with the Sykes-Picot agreement in 1916, which had covertly attracted up transaction between the two throughout the war. They proposed to partition all previous Ottoman terrains into either French or British zones. The region known as Palestine was recompensed to the British (Mahler, 2010).

In short, toward the conclusion of World War I, the British and French in the Middle East had maps that related that related neither to the previous Ottoman territorial units nor to the developing yearnings of the Arab individuals. For both incredible forces, their inspiration was to separation domain in ways that guaranteed managerial comfort of their individual domains, while picking up as extraordinary a key preference as could reasonably be expected. The end of 400 years of Ottoman Empire in the Middle East was to see the start of a short yet conclusive European colonial interval (Strawson, 2010). As a case in point, under Ottoman standard, Syria alluded to a voting demographic much bigger than the Syrian Arab Republic of today, with fringes distinguished by France and England in 1920. With respect to this, Hertz (2009) stated that:

*"Syria was a region that prolonged from the borders of Anatolia to those of Egypt, commencing the perimeter of Iraq to the Mediterranean Sea. In conditions of today's states, the Syria of old encompass Syria, Lebanon, Israel, as well as Jordan, plus the*



*Gaza Strip along with Alexandria..... Syrian maps in the 21st century still co-opt most of Greater Syria, including Israel.”*

Essentially, external forces, and Great Britain specifically, had solid experience for remapping, refashioning, and rebuilding the Middle East. So throughout and after the First World War the circumstance meant:

*“All of the states that developed in the Middle East would have their borders drawn by both Britain and France. Similarly, the final accord of the Sykes-Picot Agreement stated, it is agreed that measures to control the importation of arms into the Arab territories will be considered by the two governments.....together, the British and French governments created the map of the modern Middle East. The spheres of dominance and influence first drawn by Sykes and Picot were reaffirmed in 1920 with the creation of the League of Nations and the establishment of the Mandate System. Out of the French territory, the nations of Lebanon and Syria emerged. Out of the British territory, the nations of Palestine, Iraq, and the Transjordan emerged” (Mitchell; 2007).*

After consequent investigation at the end of World War I, the League of Nations verified British authorization over Iraq and additionally Palestine and a French order over Syria and Lebanon. Transjordan was divided from the Palestine order and turns into an autonomous kingdom (Careter, 2006). At that point the San Remo Conference dead set on April 24, 1920 to appoint the commission under the League of Nations to Britain. Essentially, as stated by Liqueur and Rubin (2008), it came into being in September 1923. Underscoring for all showed above, Penziner (2004) contended that Great Britain would provide, when the circumstance concedes, recommendations for the Arabs and support them to build what may seem, by all accounts, to be the most suitable manifestations of government in those different regions. To the Arabs, this ambiguity inferred that the Ottoman Greater Syria (Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Jordan) might be totally in Arab hands, and that the British government might help them to secure it. These commitments were formalized in a mystery arrangement between Sir Mark Sykes of Britain and Charles Georges-Picot of France concerning the same territory. This understanding obliged the ports of Haifa and Acre be allotted to Great Britain, while France was ensured the region that is currently Syria/Lebanon. A further proviso in the arrangement set up Britain and France as the defenders of the Arab State in Syria who would not themselves procure or agree to a third Power securing regional areas in the Arabian Peninsula

The Palestine Mandate framework was advertised as a mechanism intended to avoid from the customary European practice of isolating the riches around the victors in a war. Lamentably for local individuals, external forces were dispatched to parcel the area into divide domains with little respect for the local stakeholders on the grounds that universal law had not banned pioneers in the times of the First World War. Modestly, the successful forces tried to acculturate the individuals of the frontier domains they obtained throughout the war. For the British specifically, the thought of a colonizing company was not a novel wonder (Kattan, 2009). Be that as it may, the British government made an series of clashing vows to both Arabs and Zionists over the portion of area and assets in the Middle East that were naturally conflicting. Thus, Britain sowed

the seeds of future strife, when it guaranteed to distinguish the autonomy of an Arab state in the Middle East, without expressly rejecting Palestine from its limits, whilst additionally guaranteeing the Zionists government toward oneself in Palestine.

In the comparative setting, there the states of the Balfour Declaration and additionally those articles in the sanction concerning the national home procedure might not be important. In this companionship, the contradiction was higher in specific articles; by separating Palestine in 1922, Britain was fulfilling its promise to both the Zionists and additionally the Arabs by offering Palestine to the Jews and also Transjordan to the Arabs.

It is additionally significant to note that the place where there is Palestine had partitioned into two states specifically. The Great Britain made the place known as Palestine an Arab state on 1 September 1922, which was called "Jordan", for a few Arabs alongside the interesting Palestinians. They made Israel for Jewish individuals in 1948, and in addition the remaining bit of the ground got the indigent domains of Palestinian. Nonetheless, Hertz (2009) put less emphasis on arranged noteworthiness of making a novel Arab state; for example, see Jordan in this area in the point of reference written works. Acknowledging these, this specific study underscores on Britain acknowledged production of the state Jordan as the division of geo-political model and scenario to create a Jewish homeland, accordingly Jordan would be (later on occurred) the magical and practical solution to the problem of displaced Palestinians after the founding of Israel through resettlement them in alternative state and providing them a (new) Jordanian nationality.

In other words, British administration randomly separated the thinly-inhabited area east of the Jordan River from the Jewish homeland - as emphasized by Stern (2011) - as well as twisted it into a unit called the emirate of Transjordan, with Abdullah (the eldest child of the sheriff of Mecca) as Emir. Pioneer secretary Winston Churchill boasted that "with the stroke of a pen," he had molded a new country and additionally crowned a king. Forever after, Jews restricted determining any piece of Transjordan. Four-fifth of the exceptional Palestine approval now got to be Judenrein.

Though, some Palestinian eminent personalities – such as Nashashibis - depended on Abdullah in Transjordan. Transjordan became Jordan in March 1948, preceding the affirmation of the autonomy of Israel in May 1948, to aid them in countering Jewish power and to impact British arrangements in Palestine's favor. They did not delay, and considered it important to follow the sober-minded stance of Abdullah who, from the 1920s, was readied to partition Palestine between himself and a Zionist state under the British umbrella. Ultimately in the 1940s, he became the leader of Greater Syria. Furthermore, the Hashemites began mysterious transactions with the Jewish organization on the division of Palestine between themselves and the Jewish leadership, which as pronounced in a gathering held in America in 1942 might not be fulfilled by less than the entire of command Palestine as a Jewish state. Throughout the work of UNSCOP in the 1948 war, King Abdullah followed an exceptionally muddled strategy of brinkmanship between warlike talk and mystery transactions aimed at putting off any international determination. Abdullah, who with British favor started genuine arrangements again with Jewish pioneers, sought isolation for Palestine between his kingdom and the Jewish state. The arrangement was acknowledged in rule by the Jewish side and actualized throughout the 1948

war itself, guaranteeing a protected extension of eastern Palestine to Jordan in exchange for constrained support by the Hashemite legion in the in general Arab war effort (Pappe; 2004).

In this regard, the researcher observes and presumes that the duplicate and copy right of the historical disloyalty or authentic unfaithfulness in Arab world and the Palestinian cause specifically branded/marked under the name of the former Jordanian king Abdullah (and surely all children and relatives of Sheriff Hussein ben Ail are same attitude/conduct). Surprisingly, Arabs never condemned or censured that the Hashemite family would be settled new state in the south Syria (formerly the land of Palestine) for some Arab tribes and clans without any authentic or historical rights in this area! In spite of this the Arabs battled with the Jews when they re-established their historical state in Eretz-Israel, despite the fact that the Israelis had religious and recorded rights in the place known as Palestine!

As a general rule, the Palestinian catastrophe was the dispersal of political and economic wellbeing around them, which showed up in conflicting gatherings, different political patterns, scattered deliberations, and disagreeing targets, motivation and agendas. These shortsighted ideological and political divisions weakened and devitalized the Palestinian national movement and cause.

In a statement, by fifteenth may in 1948, where the re-establishment or re-born of new-old Jewish state "Israel", consequently, in one worry, the land of "Southern Syria" refashioned to; Jordan, Israel and Palestinian territories "West Bank and Gaza Strip". While, previously, the entire area which known formerly " Greater Syria", recently re-mapped into four nations; Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Israel, in addition two little Palestinian cantons, all for five people groups or nationalities. For this reason and others, the researcher portrays this area as an "Extraordinary/unique Historic-Geopolitical Case".

### **WHICH “PIECE OF LAND” DO YOU MEAN? WHICH PALESTINE EXACTLY IN “SOUTHERN SYRIA”?**

In the Arab-Palestinian quandary/dilemma, the significant muddled issue –in my conclusion- is their culture and attitude toward the (concept of) land; the joined and longing to the area. In other word, as stated by Arab advanced history and the Palestinian cause, no one knows - even the Palestinian moderators - which specified parcel or piece of land the Arabs/Muslims are longing to come back to in Palestinian? What's more, which Palestine precisely are the individuals in the West Bank or Gaza need referring to in the peace talks or negotiations? Have the Palestinian authorities in the West Bank and Tunnel's government in Gaza a correct or serious "Map" for their future borders with the Hebrew state? Alternately, what is the dream of the remaining individuals in the Palestinian territories; backtracking to be a part from south Syria, Ottoman-Mamluk province, Byzantine “Palaestina”, Roman “Syria Palaestnia”, or the Greek “Philistia”? In this matter, the analyst concurs with Hertz (2009), when he said:

*“For decades, the primary frame of reference for most local Arabs was the clan or tribe, religion and sect, and village of origin. If Arabs in Palestine defined themselves politically, it was as “southern Syrians.” Under Ottoman rule, Syria referred to a*

*region much larger than the Syrian Arab Republic of today, with borders established by France and England in 1920”*

Economically, on the ground, the two Palestinian (Brothers/Enemies) governments and their people groups in Palestinian cantons, West Bank and Gaza, rely on Israel state (their old foe yet the present supplier and supporter) in their daily life matters. This includes Israeli currency (the Shekel), electricity, merchandises, and so on. At this point, at long last, as Arabs-Palestinians were all unable to answer any inquiry in this study, so the researcher recommends that the Palestinians must acknowledge one of the current peace proposals to live in whatever is left of their property, in peaceful coexistence, cooperation and concurrence with their neighbor "Israel" under an alliance or confederacy government, before they arouse one morning to find the actuality that they are officially “Vanished and Removed everlastingly from the World Map”.

## CONCLUSION

This study details the primary explanation for the "Palestinian Dilemma" and acknowledged three incessant imperfections in Arab culture and their attitudes; Islamization of the Palestinian cause, Palestinianization of the Muslim-Arab Mentality, and Cantonization of the (concept of) Land. Likewise the Palestinian (individuals, leaders and negotiators) have no single response regarding the exact straightforward inquiry: "Which piece of land do they mean and is it indistinguishable?" Along with the real blame that the Palestinians have a “Double Standards”; they have a stereotype (rogue and evil) for Jews in their imaginations - perhaps from religion - while truly, the Palestinians rely on Israeli administrations/services and products, which appears to eyewitnesses as a state of "Mental Schizophrenia”.

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