

The Iranian Role in The Republic of Yemen and Peace Prospection

Saad Alshammari¹

Sity Daud²

¹Candidate PhD at University Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM).

Citation: Alshammari S. and Daud S. (2022) The Iranian Role in The Republic of Yemen and Peace Prospection, *Global Journal of Political Science and Administration*, Vol.10, No.5, pp.22-32

ABSTRACT: *Yemeni conflict is a power dominance between local tribes and the government, has been globalized by the participation of external countries. The coalition intervention launched by Saudi Arabia in early 2015, which attempted to reduce the Houthi rebels, has exacerbated the crisis. In addition, the conflict has become a proxy battleground between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The purpose of this study is to examine the elements that entice Iran to become involved in the Yemen crisis by helping the Houthi. This paper will also emphasize Iranian meddling and its ramifications for Yemen and Saudi Arabia's security. The study suggests that Shiism, anti-imperialism towards both the United States and Israel, and anti-Wahhabism are variables that encourage Iran to support the Houthis. In addition, Iran's engagement in Yemen is motivated by its desire to further its political and ideological national goals.*

KEYWORDS: security, intervention, Houthi, Iran, Yemen

INTRODUCTION

Until 2011, it was not easy to ascertain the extent of Iranian influence in Yemen, despite the clarity of some of its features that were limited to soft tools. Media, politics and cultural, but it began to reveal a catastrophe with the rushing of events in the right and the region in general, and he revealed a report (the experts of the follower of the Security Council), issued in January 26, 2018, was the one who is the one who is in the right of the time in the right of the time in the right of , while he stated that he “documented remnants of missiles and military equipment related to them, and military drones of Iranian origin that were brought to Yemen,” and that the team concluded that the Republic of Iran does not comply with Paragraph (14) (of Resolution 2216) 2015 (and it was provided). Al-Huwaith is equipped with short-range ballistic missiles of the Borkan-2h type, field storage tanks for the two-propelled liquid oxidizer for missiles, and military aircraft.

The General Context of the Iranian Role in Yemen

The Iranian strategy in Yemen was - and still is - somewhat different from it in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. As it is characterized by ambiguity and privacy towards Yemen, and this is due - in part - to two things; The first weakened the Shiite (Jaafari) popular base, and rejected the summary of it, even that the Al -Huwaithi group does not show many of its Shiite beliefs in fear of the popular rejection of it, in addition to the position of the drawing of the drawing that reject the interference in the right of the people in the right of And the apparatus of influence in the right, and for a long time, depends on the method of softness and the pure penetration, and avoiding any mosaic that the Riyadh has rushed to take my position or strategies of the judgment on its accomplishments, which is the right of the right to the authority of Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi on September 21, 2014, and the implementation of (military) maneuvers on the borders with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which led to Saudi intervention and the launch of Operation Decisive Storm, which many observers believe that if the project did not succeed in striking Yemen may give it a boost of influence stronger than it was, especially after the acquisition of the Houthis have a strong military arsenal, as well as an attempt at cultural and intellectual penetration, represented in changing the school curricula in the areas controlled by Al-Huwaithi group (Shehata &Nasser, 2019.), special courses for leaders and members of society, and controlling religious discourse. The strategy of Iranian influence in Yemen during the current century has gone through three critical phases, and each phase has its own specifics and characteristics (Shahram Akbarzadeh, 2015).

The first of these is the (soft positioning) phase, which lasted from 2001 until the outbreak of the revolution. Yemeni government against the regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2011, and this stage witnessed changes essential local, regional and international issues in the history of the Arab Iranian conflict, which has become Yemen One of its most important arenas, and the local factor at this stage is the weakness of the Yemeni state. As a result of the political impasse, and the conflict over the project to inherit power in Yemen, the Regionally, the American occupation of Iraq and the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime constituted a breakthrough. And opening the way for the Iranian project in the region, and on the international level, attacks September 11, 2001, an American turn around, the world is still living its facts.

The second phase of Iranian influence in Yemen extends from (2011-2014) (ie, the phase). What is between the revolution and the coup d'état, a phase in which many military tools were exposed and Iranian intelligence, in which Iran intensified its military support for the Houthi group in northern Yemen. During this period, the Iranians took advantage of the preoccupation of the Yemeni parties about the form of the state and its constitution, and Tehran worked on two tracks; The first relates to the convergence of points of view between the two sides of the deep state. The former Yemeni president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, from a side, and the Al -Huwthi group from another side , for the time of standing against what the other Yemeni frameworks seek, especially what is related to the implementation of the outputs of the comprehensive national dialogue, is the authority (Shahram Akbarzadeh, 2015).

Factors Helped Iranian Influence in Yemen

The combination of a number of factors and reasons that made Iran intensify its intelligence presence political and military affairs in Yemen, as one of the most important focal points in the strategy Iran, and one of the most important spheres of influence in the Arab region, (Iran has taken advantage of the state of The weakness of the Yemeni state, the internal political difference, and the absence of strategic projects to neighboring countries, especially the Gulf states, as well as the support provided by the United States America had it during the terms of President Obama and his predecessor George W. Bush, and while the details of the factors that helped Iran reach the depths of Yemen come at a time when Standard and capabilities that are not commensurate with the size of the achievement represented in controlling the capital, Sana'a. and its surroundings and reaching the southern border of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia through armed Al-Huwaithi group and the Republican Guard Brigades, with the support of advisors and experts affiliated with Tehran.

Elite conflict and the state's growing vulnerability

With the establishment of the unity in May 1990, Yemen had some sources of strength, but it took a long time to re-achieve its unity until it fell into the trap of regional polarization, as a result of its position on Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and its refusal to join the international coalition that adopted the war to expel the Iraqi army from Kuwait in 1991 , as its relations with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries were strained, and these countries adopted a number of sanctions against Yemen, as Yemenis were deprived of the exception they enjoyed in staying in Saudi territory without a local sponsor, which led to the return of nearly two million Yemeni workers in Saudi Arabia, as Yemen was deprived of economic aid, loans and assistance provided by the Gulf countries and Western donors, and this position had - and still is - disastrous results on Yemen in the economic, social, political and security aspects, reflected on its Gulf surroundings itself (Axworth., 2017).

In a later period and with a goal that facilitates the transfer of the authority to his older son, the former head (Ali Abdullah Saleh) directed to an attempt to weaken his allies from the political and transitional forces, especially Sheikh Abd Allah, Bin Hassan Al -Ahmar, the sheikh of the same The Yemeni for reforming, as well as the difference to the benefactor of Al -Ahmar, one of the most important pillars of his rule, and the major officers associated with him, and this has led to the disintegration of all political and army elites to the former president's regime, and the transformation of the reaction to the main and the referee, and the reaction is to the one who is in the authority of the president And socially severe in the Yemeni society.

And more than that was involved in some of the force of power within the system in providing the direct support of the Houthi, so many of the reports indicated that during the current Gold of the War, I clarify the existence of coordination in the two sons of the former, who is the one who takes the lead in the authority of the former, who takes the lead in And that the Houthis were being supplied with supplies and weapons in an attempt to exhaust the army units that were under the

command of Major General Ali Mohsen, commander of the First Armored Division, and the northwestern military region within which wars were taking place with the Houthis. And enabled them to expand militarily, politically, and intellectually in each round of the war.

Saudi Retreat

It was not only internal factors that helped the Houthis and then the Iranians extend their influence in Yemen. There were also regional factors, the most prominent of which is the decline in the Saudi role in Yemen. It is known that Yemen, especially the north of it, remained during the modern era, especially since 1970, an exclusive area of Saudi influence. Riyadh and the tribal and religious leaders in preventing the fall of northern Yemen under the rule of the communists, despite the great dangers that existed at that time (Muzaffar Khan, Yaseen, 2017).

Since the late sixties of the last century, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been the main supporter of the political system in Yemen, and the most influential party in it, and it enjoyed great influence in both official and popular circles, by the end of the eighties, the Saudi presence decreased due to the decline in security challenges that Saudi Arabia could face by Yemen (Ali Watkins, Ryan Grim. , 2018).

After the establishment of Yemeni unity in 1990, the position of the regime in Yemen on the Iraqi army's invasion of Kuwait had direct and sharp repercussions on Yemeni-Gulf relations, especially on Yemeni-Saudi relations, and as a reaction, the Kingdom and the rest of the Arab Gulf countries, with the exception of the State of Qatar, took negative positions on the Yemeni civil war that took place in the summer of 1994, where it adopted a sympathetic position and political and even military support for the leadership of the Yemeni Socialist Party, and cooperated with it in its endeavors. To force the secession of South Yemen, It worked to internationalize the Yemeni crisis and submit it to the Security Council to block the way for the Yemeni army, which was in a race to impose its presence, and to eliminate any opportunity to impose the secession project (Alam, 2016).

After the end of the 1994 war, the relationship between Yemen and Saudi Arabia tended to deteriorate further, and Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries imposed on Yemen something like a siege and isolation, and this situation continued until the Yemeni leadership made major concessions in the file of the common border with Saudi Arabia, by waiving historical Yemeni claims in large areas south of Saudi Arabia, and signing in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in 2000 an agreement that prepares borders The two states share international and final borders.

After the signing of the Jeddah Agreement, it improved to the limit of the relationships between the Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and Saudi Arabia returned to support some projects in the right, and with the support of Saudi Arabia, the right membership was in a number of economic institutions in the Gulf of the Gulf, For the right one, is keen on the observation of communication with the Yemeni parties, whether the painting or the popularity (tribes), and then

the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia established from the Saudi Coordination Council, which is headed by the Amir Sultan bin Abd al -Aziz. and Al-Salam Hospital in Saada Governorate (Michael Axworthy, 2017).

However, Saudi support for Yemen declined in early 2010, and by the end of that year The winds of the Arab Spring revolutions had blown over the region, and quickly moved to Yemen, however, due to the absence of the factor of surprise, and to the motivation and advance preparation of the regime, dominated the stalemate on the course of the popular revolution in Yemen. And to avoid the dangers of the country slipping into a furnace civil war may have serious security repercussions for Saudi Arabia and the region. Saudi interest in Yemen again, and Saudi Arabia, through the umbrella of the Council of the Gulf Cooperation Initiative was called the Gulf Initiative, and it exerted great pressure to translate it into reality through the transfer of power from the former president to his deputy.

Despite the efforts of the Saudi leadership to complete the political settlement, and its keenness not to slide Yemen into a destructive civil war, in order to preserve its security, it made a strategic mistake when it pressed to grant Saleh protection immunity and keep him in the political field and his participation in the government, which kept the country in a state of political and military division, and prevented the construction of a single authority to run the country, and created a security vacuum whose role was decisive in the Houthis' control of Sana'a and large areas of the Yemen in 2014.

External factors and developments

The transfers that the region witnessed the Iranian trends, and contributed to the increase in the influence of Iran in the region, the American occupation of Iraq led to the inclusion of Iraq with its capabilities and capabilities under the influence of the missionary, and the same thing happened to the Syrian revolution, which is not the matter of the Syrian revolution, especially the Bashar al-Assad, Iran and its extensions in the region, in addition to the strengthening of Iran's regional influence after it signed an agreement with major international powers on its nuclear program; In the stages of Hakam Barack Obama, and in the shadow of Iranian endeavors to expand influence and domination in the countries of the region, the signing of the United States and the major powers came to the nuclear agreement with Iran in 2015 to provide a political cover in the project, as we did not have a political coverage in the project The nuclear agreement is only on the Iranian nuclear issue rather, it included other direct and indirect understandings related to Iran's regional influence. The American leniency during the Obama era in the face of Iranian interference in Iraq and Syria contributed focusing on the goal of eliminating (al-Qaeda) organization in Yemen as a priority. supreme strategy at the expense of confronting the growing Iranian influence on the Yemeni arena, in providing an opportunity for Iran to intensify its intervention activities in Yemen (Mehdi & Bakhsh, 2018).

Importance of Iran toward Peace in the Republic of Yemen

It will take time for Yemen to regain its security and stability. Successful peace talks leading to a truce and confidence-boosting measures can only be the first step towards achieving that more general goal. To put an end to the conflict, both the government, supported by a coalition led by Saudi Arabia, and the Houthis, who are backed by Iran, must admit that there is no lasting military solution. But none of the parties has acknowledged that fact in the lead-up to U.N.-led peace negotiations that are expected to take place in Sweden in early December 2018.

Most of this fight is a civil war. Although other regional countries have intervened to defend their own interests, the issue can only be resolved by Yemenis themselves. Iran could be able to encourage its Houthi allies to take part in a political process to put a stop to the war and resume talks in such situation. However, neither the Saudis nor the Iranians have the power to compel a settlement (Al-Bastaki, 2013).

Iranian Roles Played in Yemen

Historically, Iran has not played a prominent player in Yemeni affairs. It has always maintained a diplomatic presence in Sanaa, although its influence during the two decades preceding the conflict was negligible. During the six Saadah battles between 2004 and 2010, former President Ali Abdullah Saleh said that Iran was helping the Houthis, but U.S. investigators found no evidence to substantiate his assertions (Safwa, 2013).

In 2011 and 2012, Iran's position began to shift amid the Arab Spring movement and the accompanying political instability. Tehran's backing for the Houthis intensified in that era, but Iran was not a partner in discussions that led to Saleh's resignation. Ironically, once he was toppled, Saleh turned to the Islamic Republic as he analyzed possibilities for returning to power. The Iranians definitely had a role in building the Houthi-Saleh cooperation that led to the present civil conflict (Mehdi & Bakhsh, 2018).

Roles Played by Regional Nations in Yemen

By contrast, Yemen has always associated politically and economically with its neighbors on the Arabian Peninsula. For that reason, the Gulf nations primarily Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman and Kuwait took a significant role in developing the 2011 the GCC Initiative and Transition Mechanism, which outlined the political transition. Over the years, the nations in the Gulf Cooperation Council have also offered vital economic help for Yemen, the poorest Arab nation (Hamad. 2019).

Arms, Economic and Political Support to the Houthis

In 2012, evidence of Iranian backing for the Houthis, including military help, began to increase. In January 2013, the United States Navy, along with the Yemeni Navy, captured an Iranian dhow, the Jihan I, carrying about forty tonnes of military supplies for the Houthis. The shipment was comprised of Katyusha rockets, surface-to-air missiles, rocket-propelled grenades, explosives, and

ammunition. In the Saadah governorate, the United States also followed Iranian Revolutionary Guards giving training and aid to the Houthis (Ibrahim, 2020).

After the successful military offensive by Houthis and Saleh loyalists in the summer of 2014, Iran's assistance for the Houthis got more open and transparent. The Houthis seized control of the Yemeni government and the capital city of Sanaa. Leaders of the Houthis came to Tehran, where they inked agreements to create regular air service between the two capitals and to expand Yemeni Iranian cooperation (Axworthy, 2017).

Yemen began receiving Iranian supplies and troops, including Hezbollah friends from Lebanon. Additionally, the Iranians promoted their own version of Twelver Shiism over Yemen's native Zaydi religion. Their activities exacerbated sectarian differences, an additional aspect of the conflict. Since 2014, the frequency of Houthi rhetoric (which echoes Iranian propaganda) and provocations that endanger Saudi Arabia's security has increased. Since then, the Houthis have launched many ballistic missiles against Riyadh (Al-Bastaki, B., 2013).

Humanitarian Relief

Iran reaffirms its willingness to contribute to the shipment of humanitarian supplies to Yemen, and Tehran calls on foreign groups to assist it in delivering Iranian aid to the Yemeni people via the Iranian Red Crescent Society. This is in perfect conjunction with the relief and supply organisations of the United Nations, but there are questions that it is bringing guns and ammunition to the Houthis and that it is targeting Houthi-affiliated localities.

Military Support:

Although Yemen is not a top priority on the Iranian foreign policy agenda, the Iranians have not been able to purchase the Houthis' unwavering support. As the United States deepens its intervention in Yemen and the White House amplifies its rhetoric against Iran, Yemen may become a battleground for the increasing tensions between Washington and Tehran, and the Houthis have been pushed into the Iranian corner. Moreover, the continuance of the same Iranian strategy to the Yemeni problem is evident. This is shown by the continuous Iranian assistance for the Houthis with additional ballistic missiles and ammunition, despite Iranian leaders' assurances to halt their expansionist agenda in the area in response to the Iranian people's objections. It is the absence of change in Iranian foreign policy against Yemen, in particular. The future of Iranian influence in Yemen will continue to depend on the characteristics that make Yemen an accessible target for penetration and influence, as well as the existence of internal environment variables that foster Iranian influence in Yemen.

The Position of Iranian Regime on the Peace in Yemen

At the time, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad stated that Iran would help an end to the Yemeni crisis. He stated that Iran would accept the parameters presented by former Secretary of State John Kerry in 2016, which he and Kerry had discussed. Kerry's plan would have necessitated

the resignation of Yemeni President Abd Rabo Mansour Hadi prior to a Houthi military departure from Sanaa. The proposals, however, were rejected by the Yemeni government supported by Saudi Arabia.

Zarif has consistently emphasized in public that Iran's "four-point plan" is the only possible solution to the Yemeni civil war. In 2015, he tweeted, "We encourage a ceasefire, humanitarian aid, intra-Yemeni dialogue, and the building of a broad-based administration." In December 2018, Tehran declared its support for the Stockholm negotiations. The Foreign Ministry urged "all Yemeni parties to implement trust and confidence-building measures, laying the groundwork for negotiating a comprehensive deal to relieve the suffering of all Yemenis, including the terrible embargo they are forced to" (Rajab,2018).

Zarif's assertion that Tehran would accept a political accord to end the conflict is not supported by facts, nor does his viewpoint reflect the views of the Iranian government as a whole. Extremists tend to view the continuance of the struggle as a relatively low-cost and low-risk strategy for maintaining political, economic, and military pressure on Saudi Arabia. According to reports, Saudi Arabia's participation has cost between \$5 and \$6 billion per month, while Iran's expenditures in Yemen likely amount to millions per year (Mabon 2013).

The difference Between Iranian Roles and Arab Gulf State Roles in Yemen

Iran's historical presence in Yemen has been minor, especially in comparison to that of Yemen's close neighbours, the GCC nations Saudi Arabia and Oman. Iran has not supplied Yemen with major economic assistance, nor has it been politically involved. Tehran has not contributed significant aid to solve Yemen's devastating humanitarian catastrophe, nor has it guaranteed future aid to aid Yemen's reconstruction following the conclusion of hostilities. The majority of the economic expenses of restoration will almost definitely be paid by Yemen's longstanding GCC partners. Consequently, Yemen's destiny will likely stay intimately connected to those of its Arabian Peninsula neighbors rather than the Islamic Republic (Rajab,2018).

Dimensions of Iranian Soft Power

Iran employs strategies that seek to utilize the religious factor in forming its policy frameworks toward several nations, including Abran, and Tehran intends to promote the Shiite sect and subsequently develop different sectarian organisations. In the Yemeni environment, several factors related to the spectacular and political conflict, the marginalization of Zaydism, the spread of illiteracy, the low level of education, and the exploitation of tribal conflict provided engines to strengthen the Houthis, which provided Iran with an indication of the possibility of the success of its soft power and the strengthening of its relationship with the Houthis, and it relied on these factors as a fertile ground for the latent Iranian influence. Al Masirah TV, which is connected with the Houthis and broadcasts from Beirut, is one of the most effective Iranians that the Houthis have acquired (Michael, 2018).

Iran's Goals and Motives in Yemen

Recalling the past to be able in the future, Iran as a country with its distant historical depth the Empire of Persia still calls for its past and tries as much as it can to extend its influence to gain leadership over the Islamic world, and gave it the opportunity to show the success of the Khomeini revolution of 1979, where Iran sought to export its revolution to the countries of the Arab and Islamic world, but the export of the revolution was one of the objectives of Iranian foreign policy and from these countries Yemen, but the differentiation of the Iranian situation from Yemen in terms of the nature of sectarian and social society has hindered the success of the revolution in Yemen although Iran considered what the Houthis did on September 21, 2014.

As a revolution inspired and an extension of its blessed revolution, and Iran moves in its orientation towards the Republic of Yemen from several platforms and objectives seeking to achieve it in order to achieve its major objectives at the regional level, Iran, which understands the importance of the Yemeni geographical location, which represents a gain for it in many aspects, the first in terms of the fact that Yemen has a position to control the navigator the International Navy through its views on Arab and red Bahrain and its control over Bab al-Mandab, which is of strategic importance to international policies, which Iran seeks to have a foothold in the Red Sea, especially in Bab al-Mandab to control the strategic fjords and to have a presence in anticipation of any war, and the second is that Yemen represents the strategic depth for Saudi Arabia, Iran's arch enemy of Iran, and therefore Iran's presence in the southern side of Saudi Arabia through its Houthi allies represents a gain for Iran that continues to threaten and provoke the kingdom and may compromise it (Emami,2020).

The Effect of the War on Yemen's Political Stability

Since Yemeni unification began on May 22, 1990, the Republic of Yemen has experienced political instability, such as the Iranian revolution, the Iraq-Iran war, and the Iraq war. Iran's position represents "its political and media advocacy of the Yemeni revolution against the individual rule of Ali Abdullah Saleh, and this advocacy continued until Saudi Arabia crystallized its Yemeni objectives within the framework of the United Nations Security Council. Due to Iran's position on the Gulf initiative, tensions are escalating between Saudi Arabia and Iran (Winter, 2011).

Iran may reserve the initiative in an effort to promote the Saudi agenda at the expense of the Yemeni revolution and remove Yemenis from the equation. The Houthis refused to participate in President Hadi's elections, which were held in conformity with the Gulf plan, and the term of President Hadi, who was supported by Saudi Arabia and even internationally, was marked by instability, conflicts in Damaj and Omran. On the level of government stability, there were explosions in the Yemeni capital Sana'a and the other provinces. During the presidency of President Hadi, Yemen experienced government instability, as evidenced by the change of the government of reconciliation brought about by the Gulf initiative and many ministerial amendments and continuous appointments to leadership positions, as well as a deterioration of the economic situation and a rise in the price of oil derivatives, which culminated in a new price dose,

and the rise of the Iran-backed Houthi movement. Since assuming power in February 2012, he has approximately seven times urged Iran not to meddle in Yemen, he added. Iran existed and affected the development of the Yemeni political process as a result of the power struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran's allies (Beverly 2013).

In general, it can be said that the Saudi-Iranian conflict exacerbated the Yemeni political crisis and spawned numerous partial identities within Yemen, as well as loyalty to the sect, region, tribe, party, and individual. However, the appearance of loyalty abroad affected the universal Yemeni identity of all identities, and it can be said that the province of Egypt affected the universal Yemeni identity of all identities. Yemen has been hampered by any possible political solutions, as the negotiations held (Geneva 1, Geneva 2) failed, Yemen became the scene of the Saudi-Iranian conflict, which impeded the democratic transitions Yemen had begun in the last decade of the 20th century when the South united with the North," and the conflict created division at the level of political organisations and political and cultural elites, but left Yemen with two governments. A Saudi-backed government in Aden and an Iranian-backed government in Sana'a pose a threat because it could pave the way for the issue of north-south separation and increase the intensity of the internal conflict, thereby prolonging the conflict that leaves Yemen in a state of chaos and provides fertile ground for extremist terrorist groups and armed militias (Beverly, 2013).

References

- Abdallah, Khaled, and Sami Aboudi (2015). "Yemeni Leader Hadi Leaves Country as Saudi Arabia Keeps up Air Strikes." Reuters. Thomson Reuters. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/26/us-yemen-security>
- Alam, S., 2016. Iran's policy towards the Houthis in Yemen: a limited return on a modest investment. *International Affairs*, 92(3), pp.647-663.
- Al-Bastaki, B., 2013. *victory, Gulf security from the invasion of Kuwait to the invasion of Iraq*, Beirut: Arab Institution.
- Ali Watkins, Ryan Grim. (2018). Iran warned Houthis against Yemen takeover.
- Axworthy, A., 2017. Iran's Foreign Policy: From Khatami to Ahmadinejad. *Iranian Studies*, 45(1), pp.145-149.
- Beverly, M., 2013. Yemen and the Western World, *Yemen: The Unknown War and South Arabia: Arena of Conflict*. *International Affairs*, 44(4), pp.808-809.
- Hamad, M. Hassan, T. 2019. Iranian Policy towards the Palestinian Issue and Its Reflection on the Arab Regional System, Ph.D. Thesis, Cairo University, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, 2012-2013, pages 245-246.
- Ibrahim, F. (2020). *Iran and Saudi Arabia Taming a Chaotic Conflict*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Mabon, S. (2013). *Saudi Arabia & Iran: Power and Rivalry in the Middle East*. London: I.B.Tauris.
- Mehdi & Bakhsh, 2018. *Religion, politics and ideological trends in Iran*" (Abu Dhabi: Emirates Center for Studies and Research)

- Michael A, A., 2017. Iran's Foreign Policy: From Khatami to Ahmadinejad. *Iranian Studies*, 45(1), pp.145-149.
- Michael A., 2018. The Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran: Prospects for Change and Continuity. *All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace*,
- Muzaffar, M. Khan, R. Yaseen, Z. (2017). Saudi - Iran Strife: Complexities for Pakistan. *Global Regional Review*,II(I),119-134, doi:10.31703/grr.2017(II-I).09
- Ross. 2011. A Tribal Order: Politics and Law in the Mountains of Yemen. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 47(2), pp.435-436.
- Seyyed, S., Safwa, 2013. Cultural and Artistic Diplomacy, *Iranian Anthology*, Issue 160, December 2013, p. 69.
- Seyyed, S., Safwa, 2013. Cultural and Artistic Diplomacy, *Iranian Anthology*, Issue 160, December 2013, p. 69.
- Shahram Akbarzadeh, 2015. Iranian Foreign Policy during Ahmadinejad: Ideology and Actions/Iranian Foreign Policy since 2001: Alone in the World. *Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs*, 9(1), pp.109-115.
- Shehata &Nasser, 2019. The Shi'A phenomenon in the Middle East, international politics, *Al-Ahram Foundation*, issue 176, April 2019.
- Sinkaya, B. (2015). Implications of the Arab Spring for Iran's Policy towards the Middle East. *Ortadoğu Etütleri*, 54-78.
- Winter, L., 2011. Conflict in Yemen: Simple People, Complicated Circumstances. *Middle East Policy*, 18(1), pp.102-120.
- Yahya Hilmi Rajab,2018. The security of the Gulf in light of regional and international changes, (Cairo: Arab Renaissance House).
- .