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SUPPLIER DELIVERY PERFORMANCE OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS IN UGANDAN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT PROCURING AND DISPOSING ENTITIES (PDES)

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ABSTRACT: *The purpose of this study is to establish the relationship between buyer-supplier collaboration, supplier induced corruption, contractual governance mechanisms, supplier opportunistic behavior, buyer-supplier trust and supplier delivery performance in central government Procuring and disposing entities (PDEs) contracts in Kampala. Despite buyer-supplier collaboration being expected to increase buyer-supplier trust over time, minimize supplier opportunistic behavior and the related transaction costs. This is not the case in Uganda. Instead, as the public procurement officers collaborate more with suppliers, corruption practices have increased. Supplier induced corruption has gained volume and momentum, with suppliers facilitating exchanges with bribes which have resulted in supplier favors and influences. This has adversely affected supplier delivery performance of contracts. A cross sectional and correlational survey was conducted using a sample of 121 PDEs from a population of 175 entities and data was collected from respondents using a self-administered questionnaire. Findings reveal that: buyer-supplier collaboration, supplier induced corruption, buyer-supplier collaboration, supplier opportunistic behavior, contractual governance mechanisms and buyer-supplier trust are significant predictors of supplier delivery performance. The results of this study have managerial and theoretical implications which are also discussed.*

KEYWORDS: Supplier, Delivery Performance, Public Procurement Contracts, Ugandan Central Government, Procuring, Disposing Entities (PDEs)

INTRODUCTION

Evidence from Uganda's public procurement reveals that contracted suppliers do not deliver goods and services on time, specifications are not being met as required (Auditor General report, 2010), and as a result, internal users complain of late deliveries (Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee, 2010). Procuring and Disposing Entities (PDEs) are suffering from long lead times (NIS, 2008), poor quality of goods and services delivered (PPDA, 2008, 2009a, 2009b), and high levels of contract violations (IGG, 2009, 2010). Buyers and suppliers are expected to benefit from collaboration which can be through the sharing of information, decision synchronization and incentive alignment that in turn builds trust, minimizes opportunism and the related transaction

costs; and ensure reliable, improved product quality and timely delivery of products to the organization (Ahimbisibwe, 2014). However, this is not the case in Uganda. Instead, as the public procurement officers engage in collaboration with suppliers from private sector, they have learnt more corruption (NIS, 2008). As a result, there is increased corruption due to collaboration and interaction between the private sector suppliers with the procurement officers who are from civil service exercising their duties, with the consequent traffic of favors and influences. As the suppliers respond to tenders advertised they have facilitated exchange of illegal money to win the tenders. As the level of collaboration and interaction increases, supplier induced corruption has gained volume and momentum, with suppliers calling bribes "facilitation money" and yet for the government it is an outright bribery (NIS, 2008). PPDA (2012) reported that more than $200 million is lost every year in public procurement corruption alone. According to the National Integrity Survey conducted by Inspector General of Government (2008), the high incidence of procurement corruption could be attributed to supplier induced corruption in form of supplier induced bribes among others. Most of Uganda's public sector suppliers tend to think less about client satisfaction and more about how to win the next contracts, make more money, and survive in the market using kickbacks (Ntayi, Rooks, Eyaa, & Qian, 2010). As a result, Ugandan public procurement has experienced some of the grave effects of corruption like high costs of goods and services, low standards of living as substandard goods and services are delivered, acquisition of inappropriate technology, loss of lives and increases in the country debt among others (PPDA, 2013). Even with the existence of formal contracts, most suppliers persistently fail to fulfill contract terms that they signed (PPDA, 2012). Yet, according to Williamson (1979), organizations use formal contractual governance mechanisms to structure their relationships to mitigate risks arising from contractual relationships. However, the implementation of contractual governance mechanisms in Uganda is difficult due to lack of trust and the widespread supplier opportunistic behavior, which has adversely affected contract negotiation, signing, and contract management (Ntayi, Namugenyi, & Eyaa, 2010). Public sector still lacks proper contract governance mechanisms to reduce supplier opportunism and the related transaction costs since the introduction of the PPDA Act, 2003 (PPDA, 2011, 2012). This practice has undermined the preparation of contract implementation plans for monitoring purposes which can possibly explain poor supplier delivery performance (Ntayi et al., 2010). The purpose of the study was to establish the relationship between buyer-supplier collaboration, supplier induced corruption, contractual governance mechanisms, supplier opportunistic behavior, buyer-supplier trust and supplier delivery performance in central government PDEs contracts in Kampala.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Buyer-supplier Collaboration and supplier induced corruption

Buyer-supplier collaboration is defined as a situation where there is broad sharing of information, resources, and power, broad participation by all buyers and suppliers, joint determination of goals and plans and decision making by consensus (Margerum, 2011). Bryson et al., (2009) describes it as the linking or sharing of information, resources, activities, and capabilities by organizations to achieve jointly an outcome that could not be achieved by the organizations separately. Buyer-supplier collaboration can lead to supplier induced corruption. Supplier induced corruption holds twofold meanings namely the narrow and broader perspectives. In a narrow perspective, it is used

to mean those activities which stand for illegal practices in which the citizens or organizations bribe officials in charge for awarding permissions, contracts or escape punishment or fines for offenses they committed. In a broader perspective, it includes achieving several advances through personal networking, paying gratitude money or giving gifts for usual services but in other cases, it is simply viewed as misuse of public office for unofficial gains (Basheka, 2010) or the behavior of officials in the public and private sectors to improperly and unlawfully enrich themselves or those close to them, or induce others to do so, by misusing the position for which they are placed (Asian Development Bank, 2003). Though differently defined, it essentially entails deliberate failure to follow the expected minimum standard or procedures or behavior in managing the acquisition process by government agencies and departments. It's measured in terms of; supplier induced bribes, kickbacks, scams and conflict of interest. A bribe is usually defined as the giving or receiving of a "thing of value" to corruptly influence the actions of another, most commonly to influence a contract award or the execution of a contract. A "kickback" is a bribe paid by the contractor after it is paid. Corruption takes place once the procurement laws and regulations are broken for the benefit of an individual or group of individuals against the public interest and need of internal customers. The World Bank extends the definition of procurement corruption to include the offering, giving, receiving or soliciting; directly or indirectly, of anything of value to influence the action of a public official in the procurement process or in contract execution (World Bank, 2004). A broad definition public sector corruption is the abuse of authority by bureaucratic officials who exploit their powers of discretion, delegated to them by the government, to further their own interests by engaging in illegal, rent-seeking activities (Blackburn, Bose, & Haque, 2005). Public Procurement corruption can be classified to include (1) supplier induced corruption as a result of stringent competition for government contracts, (2) Public official induced corruption through creating bureaucratic hurdles that would necessitate seeking faster services. It may also be (3) politically induced corruption where contractors with political connections receive favors for the fear of political persecution. The most common forms of procurement corruption in Uganda include violations of procurement procedures by influential suppliers and procurement officers, the use of high-ranking officials to influence procurement decision making and bribery-induced violations of procurement procedures by government officials in collaboration with providers (Basheka, 2009). However, this study focuses on supplier induced corruption. This form of corruption is initiated by a supplier who engages in giving bribes and kickbacks to influence a contract award. Most cases of corruption scandals have been championed by suppliers who perpetuate the process of procurement and award of tenders through well-coordinated machinery in collaboration with government technical officials (Basheka, 2010). This in support with Basheka (2009) who revealed that when suppliers collaborate with government officials in the procurement decision making process procurement procedures are violated. When procurement officials deviate from the expected moral standards, they become less committed to procurement principles and they find themselves in a compromising situation leading to conflict of interests and this makes them unable to retaliate from receiving bribes from providers (Serra, 2004). Basheka (2009) posits that institutional policies are responsible for the high levels of supplier induced corruption since they provide suppliers and procurement officials with an opportunity and high level of involvement. The supplier's decision to take part in corruption is influenced by the competitive environment they operate within. To prepare for a tender is both time consuming and costly, and to offer a bribe may be seen as a short-cut to be awarded a contract therefore once

bribed, procurement officials willing share procurement related information with providers (Kauffman, 2007).

H1: There is a significant positive relationship between buyer-supplier collaboration and supplier induced corruption.

Buyer-supplier collaboration and supplier opportunistic behavior

Buyer-supplier collaboration has increasingly become a desired strategy that must be applied in solving opportunistic behavior of suppliers (Bryson et al., 2009). When different people and organizations engage in collaboration, they are aware that they receive some benefits from the collaboration. If there are no benefits, then the motivation to collaborate disappears and opportunism sets in (Gazley, 2008). Therefore, understanding the importance and the benefits of collaboration may play a crucial role in building healthy partnerships and motivating organizations to become involved in collaborations. A true partnership should create value for all partners involved in the collaboration (Grudinschi et al., 2013). The more firms share information about their goals, the more likely they are to reduce on level of the firm's opportunism (Wong et al., 2005). According to Ahimbisibwe (2014), opportunistic behavior is seeking gain for oneself at the expense of others. Where firms do not share information, opportunism is harder to detect and the situation favorable for breaking the contract is more likely to occur since suppliers will be unable to perform per the contract terms (Das & Kumar, 2011). Lummus, Duclos and Vokurka (2003), contend that the ideal need for buyer-supplier collaboration is to reduce suppliers opportunistic behavior brought about by the bullwhip effect. Collaboration enables firms to deal with such negative impacts of the "bullwhip effect" by making suppliers more responsive to the vagaries and turbulence of markets (Holweg, Disney, Holmstrom & Smaros, 2005).

H2: There is a significant negative relationship between buyer-supplier collaboration and supplier opportunistic behavior.

Contractual governance mechanism and buyer-supplier trust

Contracts specify the terms and arrangements for the parties involved (Ahimbisibwe, 2014).Therefore, contracts provide the framework for the economic exchange, detailing the nature and terms of the relationship, what is to be provided, and the rights and obligations of parties. Ahimbisibwe (2014) further postulates that for suppliers to deliver on a given contract there have to be service level agreements. These are formally written agreements developed jointly between the supplier and the buyer that specify a product or service to be provided at a certain level so as to meet business objectives. Service level agreements are therefore intended to specify responsibilities, strengthen communication, reduce conflict, build trust, and mitigate the supplier's opportunistic behavior (Ahimbisibwe, 2014). Contracts consist of governance characteristics which provide administrative procedures for implementing the party's roles and obligations in the given contract. They explain ways of how to manage the relationships through a clear statement of measurements, conflict arbitration, penalty, rewards and an agreed on means to facilitate communication. Foundation characteristics on the other hand explain the belief between organizations, which intends to build a spirit of agreement among those entities involved with its development. Elements under foundation characteristics include service level objectives, process

ownership plan, pricing schedules and service level contents. Many scholars agree that well designed formal contracts help to develop buyer-supplier trust by enabling open communication, joint problem solving and mutual support between parties (Ntayi, Namugenyi & Eyaa, 2010; Ahimbisibwe, 2014). Buyer-supplier trust refers to the firm's belief that another party will perform actions that will result in positive outcomes for the firm as well as not take unexpected actions that will result into negative outcomes (Ahimbisibwe, 2014). Trust is therefore reflected by honesty, predictability, credibility and friendliness, among others (Ahimbisibwe, 2014). Ahimbisibwe (2014) demonstrated that contract that are intensive in nature and that a trust between buyer and the supplier relies heavily on well-designed contracts.

H3: There is a significant positive relationship between contractual governance mechanism and buyer-supplier trust.

Supplier induced corruption and supplier delivery performance

Though Public organizations are mandated to serve the public interests through delivering desired services while in relation with suppliers, almost in all African countries corruption is a common and routine element of the functioning of the administrative machinery (Oliver de Saradan1999). Consistently, Basheka (2009) agrees with the above researcher by postulating that corruption is a vice that "eats'' the cultural, political and economic fabric of society and destroys the functioning of the entire system. He further explains that procurement officers collide with suppliers in the process of executing their tasks, which negatively affects delivery.

H4: There is a significant negative relationship between supplier induced corruption and supplier delivery performance.

Supplier opportunistic behavior and supplier delivery performance

The increasing competition for the same contracts in the market affects the performance of suppliers. Suppliers are likely to exhibit trickery in their operations as a way to minimize transaction costs (PohLean, 2010). Members of traditional chains have reason to be suspicious of each other's motives. Trying to predict each member's actions becomes key in identifying opportunistic behaviors in an exchange relationship. A firm behaves opportunistically to increase its short-term, unilateral gain (Brown, Dev, & Lee, 2000). As a result; opportunism by one party can erode the long-term gains potentially accruing to both parties in a dyadic channel relationship. For this reason, the restraint of opportunism is critical to enhancing both channel performance and channel member satisfaction. Ntayi et al. (2010) found out that the potential for opportunistic behavior was a major source of transaction costs in inter-organizational partnerships and supply chains. This means that organizations which perceive the existence of opportunism are faced with a greater need for screening, negotiating, and monitoring partners' behavior, resulting in increased transaction costs which affect supply chain performance. Wathne & Heide (2000) found that that any form of opportunistic behaviors has the potential to restrict value creation in the supply chain and cause redistribution of costs and hence affecting the upstream supply chain performance. Failure by upstream members to see beyond the short-term gains of self-interest by suppliers hinders supply chain performance through opportunistic behaviors such as cheating, contract re-negotiation, increased prices and incomplete service provision among others (Ahimbisibwe,

Nangoli & Tusiime, 2012. In line with this notion, Chang, Tsai and Hsu (2013) suggest that partner relationships, information sharing and supply chain integration represent the reasons for the relationship between opportunism and supply chain performance. It is recognized that acting opportunistically has long-term negative implications to any supply chain. A supplier that is viewed as self-serving may find itself excluded from supply chains unless it offers a product or service that is very unique. Such exclusion represents economic costs that wise firms are unwilling to risk. Thus opportunism behavior practiced by an individual firm in an exchange dyad can be punished by the entire upstream supply chain. Opportunism has a negative influence on the performance of a supplier, regardless of whether the supplier is measured against his or her cost-based or revenue contribution to the firm (Luo, 2007). If a supplier suspects that his partner is unable to detect his or her opportunistic behavior he or she might take an advantage of him by withholding information relating to his or her ability to make informed decisions or reducing the investments. Such opportunism is known under the term of shirking (Handley & Benton, 2012). This results from initial screening and with frequent quality monitoring; the costs related to default are systematically transferred to suppliers, which increases the prices of goods.

H5: There is a significant negative relationship between supplier opportunistic behavior and supplier delivery performance.

Buyer-supplier trust and supplier delivery performance

For a firm to be competitive and successful there is need to extend its networks to the trusted trading business associates and in general, this becomes the strength of all participants (Gunasekaran et al., 2008). This argument is supported by Jantan, (2010), who reveals that the suppliers and buyers ought to build a buyer-supplier trust in their relationship in order to improve product quality, and innovation, enhance competitiveness and increase market shares. Taskin, (2012) articulates that buyers build trust in suppliers with an objective of eliminating wastes in their business activities. However, the adoption of a lean mentality approach to drive out waste and excess inventory through partnering with suppliers has yielded increased inter-firm dependency. The concept of buyer-supplier trust replaces a number of costly governance mechanisms including complex legal contracts and conditions, superfluous quality control and assurance, time consuming communication and duplication of effort in planning, forecasting and replenishment (Taskin, 2012). Therefore, the establishment and nurturing of trust between suppliers and buyers is consistent with a cost minimization strategy.

H6: There is a significant positive relationship between buyer-supplier trust and supplier delivery Performance.



Figure 1: Conceptual framework

Explanation of the Conceptual framework

The conceptual framework above shows the hypothesized relationships between buyer-supplier collaboration, supplier induced corruption, contractual governance mechanisms, supplier opportunistic behavior, buyer-supplier trust and supplier delivery performance. As shown in the model, it is theorized that buyer-supplier induced corruption and supplier opportunistic behavior are influenced by buyer-supplier collaboration while buyer-supplier trust is influenced by contractual governance mechanisms. In turn, supplier induced corruption, opportunistic behavior and buyer-supplier trust are also theorized to directly influence supplier delivery performance.

METHODOLOGY

This chapter presents the methodology that was employed by the researcher in conducting the study. It covers the research design, the study population, the sampling procedure and sample size, the variables and their measurements, reliability and validity of the research instrument, data collection methods, data processing and analysis procedures and techniques.

Research Design

This study used a cross sectional and correlational survey research design in carrying out the relationships between buyer-supplier collaboration, buyer-supplier trust, supplier induced corruption, supplier opportunistic behavior and supplier delivery performance in the central government PDEs in Uganda.

Sampling Procedure and Sample Size

The study population composed of a total of 175 PDEs (Ministries, Departments and Agencies-MDAs). The list of these PDEs was obtained from the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Authority (PPDA Authority, 2017). From this population, a sample of 121 PDEs was determined using Krejcie and Morgan (1970) table and this was intended to generate enough information and to have a well- represented sample for the study. The sample of 121 PDEs was selected using simple random sampling whereas the respondents within PDEs were selected using stratified sampling. For each PDE, the chairman contracts committee and Head of procurements were selected as respondents. These were considered to be more knowledgeable in the issues of the study because they are responsible for managing contracts. In addition, one head of any user department was considered because they constitute the main users of the services provided. Accordingly, in terms of descriptive statistics, the individual respondents' characteristics in terms of respondents' positions were as follows: Majority of the respondents were procurement officers (81%) followed by contracts officers (9.5%), Assistant procurement officers (5.8%), Evaluation Officers (1.9%), Senior Procurement officers (1%) and members of contracts committee (1%) respectively. In terms of gender: most of the respondents were males (53.3%) and females were 46.7%. Employment duration was in four categories with most of the respondents having worked for 4-7 years (45.7%) followed by 8-11 years (31.4%), 0-3 years (21%) and 12 years and above (1.9%). Results indicate majority respondents as degree holders (67.6%) followed by masters (18.1%), diploma (13.3%) and PhD (1%). Most of the respondents were aged between 30-39 years (53.3%) followed by 40-49 years (32.4%), 19-29 years (12.4%) and 50-59 years (1.9%). Majority of the respondents had professional qualifications of CIPS (59%) followed by ACCA/CPA (1%) and 40% did not possess any professional qualification. PDEs characteristics were as follows: The PDEs were mainly from government Agencies (38.1%) followed by government Parastatals (22.9%), Ministries (18.1%), government Authorities (18.1%) and referral Hospitals (2.9%). Most of these PDEs had existed for over 15 years (86.7%) followed by 10-15 years (11.4%) and 5-10 years (1.9%). Results show PDEs had over 200 employees (59%) followed by 101-200 employees (23.8%) and 51-100 employees (17.1%).

Data Collection instrument

Primary data was collected from respondents using a self-administered questionnaire, this created anonymity leading to more valid responses as well as allowing respondents to fill them at their convenience. The questionnaire was designed according to the objectives and study variables and responses to the questions were anchored on a five (5) point Likert scales ranging from 5– strongly agree to 1-strongly disagree. The responses were provided from 197 usable questionnaires representing an 86% response rate; the responses were analyzed using SPSS version 22.0 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL). The high response rate can be attributed to the researcher's professional networks, teaching public procurement in a major public university and his involvement in consultancy in public procurement in Uganda, East Africa and with the World Bank.

Data Reliability and Validity

Reliability analysis of scales in the research instrument was carried out by performing Cronbach's alpha coefficient test (Cronbach, 1951). Alpha coefficients were found to be of above 0.7 for individual test variables and accepted. Prior to the survey administration, the researcher was distributed fifty questionnaires for pre-testing which help improve the validity of the instrument.

Table 3.1 Reliability

Reliability Statistics			
Variable	**Anchor**	**Number of Items**	**α coefficients**
Buyer supplier collaboration	5 point	11	.731
Long term orientation	5 point	6	.763
Buyer supplier trust	5 point	30	.867
Supplier Induced corruption	5 point	4	.779
Contractual governance mechanism	5 point	21	.914
Supplier delivery performance	5 point	35	.896

Measures and operationalization

Buyer-supplier collaboration was measured using the works of Wang and Archer (2010) and dimensions like information sharing, joint decision making and long term orientation were used. Buyer-supplier trust was measured using Ahimbisibwe (2014) to capture dimensions such as reliability or dependability, honesty, competence, orientation and friendliness. Contractual governance mechanisms was measured basing on research of Ahimbisibwe (2014) and such dimensions like service level objectives, process ownership plans, service level contents, measurement charter, conflict arbitration charter and enforcement plan were captured. Opportunistic behavior was measured basing on research works of Ahimbisibwe (2014) and such dimensions like withholding or distorting information and shrinking or failing to fulfill promises or obligations and replace-ability of providers, evasion, refusal to adapt, violation, and forced renegotiation were adopted. Supplier induced corruption was measured basing on the works of Basheka (2010) and focused on measures like; buyer-supplier collusions, supplier induced bribes, kickbacks, scams and conflict of interest. Supplier delivery performance was measured basing on the works of Ahimbisibwe (2014) which focuses on purchasing efficiency and effectiveness aspects such as lead-time, satisfaction, matching specifications, costs and user complaints.

Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA)

Factor analysis using principal component method and varimax rotation was used to extract the most important factors and items that measured the study. Exploratory factor analysis is a procedure for learning the extent to which individual constructs measure the abstract variables. Factor analysis is mostly done to see underlying pattern in data and how much individual constructs contribute to the study variables; it was also carried out to reduce data to a manageable level and identify items that explain variables better. EFA was conducted using the Principal Components Analysis (PCA) approach with varimax rotation to establish the underlying pattern in the data where factors with Eigen values greater than 1 were retained. PCA was chosen because it is the simplest approach that reveals the internal structure of the data in a way that best explains the variance by providing the user with a lower-dimensional picture when viewed from its most informative viewpoint. Varimax rotation generally yields more stable results and is easier to interpret (Ahimbisibwe & Nangoli, 2012). A number of meaningful factors explaining a larger percentage of the common item variance emerged and all items loaded cleanly on the hypothesized constructs exceeding 0.50 as presented in Table 4.1. Three factors explaining 52.181% of buyer supplier collaboration were extracted namely; Joint decision making (1), Information sharing (2), Long term orientation (3). One factor with four items was extracted explaining 60.649% of supplier induced corruption. Four factors namely; forced negotiation (1), refusal to adapt (2), evasion (3) and violation (4) were extracted explaining 83.396% of Supplier Opportunistic behavior. Four factors were extracted namely; measurement character (1), enforcement plan (2), conflict arbitration charter (3) and communication plan (4) explaining 65.256% of Contractual Governance Mechanism. Three factors namely; benevolent (1), credibility (2) and honest (3) were extracted explaining 56.804% of Buyer Supplier Trust. Six factors namely; speed (1), Quality products (2), lead time, (3) cost (4) and matching specification (5) were extracted explaining 50.409% of Supplier delivery performance.

Table 4.1: Exploratory Factor Analysis

Rotated Component Matrix for buyer supplier collaboration	***Component***		
	1	**2**	**3**
In this PDE, we involve our suppliers in making procurement plans	.826		
Our suppliers provide us with sale forecasts for the products our company buys from them	.808		
Our company makes its procurement plans for the next seasons together with its suppliers	.801		
We Jointly develop demand forecasts with our suppliers	.789		
We are willing to invest in suppliers specific assets so as to keep the current relationship.	.770		
Our suppliers always consult us on pricing policy	.725		
In most aspects of the relationship, the responsibility for getting things done is shared	.473		
We share information on expected frequency of orders with our suppliers	.469		
We share information on quality and performance of the contract with our suppliers.		.731	
We are always afraid of what might happen if we stooped dealing with our suppliers		.616	
We share information on supply disruption with our suppliers		.612	
Our suppliers identify themselves with our company's aims and objectives		.593	
We share information on price changes with our suppliers		.348	
If suppliers objectives changed, we would not be attached to them			.723
We value the objective of our suppliers			.689
We have been collaborating with our major suppliers for a long time			.596
Eigen Value	**4.524**	**2.45**	**1.896**
% of variance	**26.6**	**14.4**	**11.155**
Cumulative % variance	26.6	41.0	52.181

Rotated Component Matrix for supplier induced corruption	***Component***
Most suppliers lose bids due to corrupt officials handling the bidding process	.889
In this PDE, we believe interactions between government officials and contractors increases the likelihood of corruption	.780
In this PDE, we experience situations where competing firms relied on bribes to improve their position in bidding process	.756
this PDE has created anti-corruption measures to benefit the organization	.675
Eigen Value	2.426
% of variance	60.649
Cumulative % of variance	60.649

Rotated component Matrix for Supplier Opportunistic behaviour	***Component***			
	1	2	3	4
Our suppliers leave us with no option but to accept the prices they want	.858			
We are always losing in negotiations to our suppliers	.809			
our suppliers don't give us a chance to negotiate on the price set by them	.781			
Our supplier force us to accept the prices they have set without our consent	.746			
Our supplier refuses to adopt our contract terms and conditions	.674			
Our supplier drags us into forced negotiations	.664			
Our supplier gives us wrong information about goods and services.	.578			
Our supplier does not inform us when it is going to replace its suppliers	.567			
The supplier changes prices without our knowledge.	.525			
Our suppliers slightly alter facts in order to get what they want		.825		
On occasion, the supplier has lied about certain things in order to protect its interest		.810		
Supplier in this sector do anything within their means to further their own interests		.766		
Supplier of this firm give us wrong information about their goods and services most of the time		.689		
Sometimes the supplier slightly alters facts in order to get what it wants			.756	
Sometimes the supplier presents facts in such a way that the supplier looks good			.667	
Our supplier does not give us truthful information			.661	
In this PDE, suppliers normally give wrong information about their costs of production			.639	
Our supplier evades the performance of some duties			.614	
Our supplier keep renegotiating contracts with us in order to get a good deal				.789
The supplier changes prices without our knowledge				.597
Promises made by our supplier are not all fulfilled				.540
Eigen value	**5.794**	**4.146**	**3.878**	**2.794**
% of variance	**27.593**	**19.743**	**18.467**	**17.593**
Cumulative % variance	27.593	47.336	65.803	83.396

Rotated Component Matrix for Contractual Governance Mechanism	***Component***			
	1	2	3	4
Our contracts contain definition of what is to be measured e.g. price, customer satisfaction.	.842			
Contracts contain definition of the processes to periodically measure the defined categories.	.820			
Our contracts contain a statement of measurement methodology.	.688			
Contracts show identified communication initiatives/ initiative owners and recipients for various	.544			
Contracts contain a statement of the practices and conduct rules required to preserve the independence of the independent.	.476			
Our contracts contain penalty definitions and formula		.812		
Contracts contain statement of exit responsibilities		.787		
Our contracts contain conditions under which termination may occur.		.771		
Contracts contain a schedule for regular interaction and timetables for resolving issues between us and the providers.			.771	
Our contracts contain a statement of the parameters for involving the third party in discussions between us and providers.			.718	
Contracts show organizational reporting structure.			.689	
The contract contains a statement of the communication policy.				.843
Eigen Value	2.581	2.203	1.861	1.185
% of variance	21.505	18.362	15.512	9.877
Cumulative % of Variance	21.505	39.867	55.379	65.256

Rotated Component Matrix for Buyer Supplier Trust	**Component**		
	1	2	3
The suppliers we collaborate with always keep their promises	.824		
The suppliers we collaborate with are very competent	.782		
The suppliers we collaborate with are always cooperative	.756		
The suppliers we collaborate with always provide information we require	.696		
Our suppliers are friendly in dealing with our company	.659		
We perceive that our suppliers are always telling the truth	.607		
We always receive a good response from the suppliers we collaborate with	.595		
Our suppliers are always open in all their transactions	.567		
The suppliers we collaborate with are always obliging	.475		
This supplier is knowledgeable regarding his/her products.		.692	
Our suppliers provide us with high quality product		.688	
We rely on the promises made by this supplier.		.647	
This supplier has no problems answering our questions.		.590	
This supplier is open in dealing with us.		.546	
When un expected situations arise, our suppliers always act in a manner that is favourable to us			.772
Our suppliers are oriented towards collaborative arrangements with us			.755
We perceive that our suppliers are reliable in their collaborative arrangements with our company			.623
Eigen Value	5.113	2.721	2.39
% of variance	28.408	15.116	13.28
Cumulative % Variance	28.408	43.524	56.804

Rotated Component Matrix for Supplier delivery performance	*Component*				
	1	2	3	4	5
Supplier delivers complete orders as required	.713				
Supplier delivers as per the specifications	.648				
We evaluate suppliers based on quality requirements in this PDE.	.615				
Supplier delivers as many times as required	.591				
We do not doubt the quality of services provided by our suppliers	.586				
We acquire our products from suppliers approved by PPDA	.566				

Conforming to specifications is a must for all our suppliers	.552				
Supplier delivery speed is good	.510				
In this PDE we keep optimal inventory.	.481				
Our suppliers package their products in a way that minimizes on damages	.399				
All contracts are completed within the set duration.		.811			
Approvals in this PDE are made on time.		.747			
Usually suppliers deliver as per the contract stipulated time.		.743			
Supplier delivery is reliable		.479			
All our staffs are trained in quality management			.783		
For every procurement we carry out a due diligence			.684		
We always carry out quality audit.			.629		
We always inspect every product delivered from our suppliers			.475		
In this PDE, we use framework contracts for routine items				.684	
Whenever we need more services, our providers deliver on time.				.663	
Outsourced providers perform their tasks promptly.				.657	
In this PDE suppliers charge fair prices.				.494	
The outsourced services are free from defects					.818
Supplier makes fine deliveries without faults					.628
Supplier has been consistent					.456
In this PDE costs of acquisitions keep on rising.					
In this PDE we experience high contract management costs.					
In this PDE the contract award criteria is lowest price.					
Eigen Value	4.305	3.	2.646	2.186	2.11
% of Variance	14.844	372 1	9.125	7.539	7.275
Cumulative % Variance	14.844	1.627 26.471	35.595	43.134	50.409

Common Methods Bias and Nonresponse Bias

Common method variance is a potential problem when all measurements are provided by a single respondent. Common method variance is the portion of the correlation between two variables that results from sharing a common method of measurement (Kearns & Sabherwal, 2007). Because self-reporting, consistency motif, acquiescence, social desirability, affectivity, and transient mood state lead to common method variance, it is of concern in survey research when sampling perceptual data. Common methods was addressed in two ways: first, using the strategies to ameliorate the problems of self-report data by designing a questionnaire to avoid implying that one response is better than the other, paying attention to wording, avoiding socially accepted responses, avoiding vague concepts, keeping questions simple, specific, and concise, avoiding double-barreled questions, decomposing questions relating to more than one possibility, and avoiding complicated syntax. Common method variance was further assessed using Harman's one-factor test (Podsakoff et al., 2003). The underlying logic for this test is that if common method bias accounts for correlations among variables, then a factor analysis should yield a single factor when all the items are analyzed together. No single factor emerged or one general factor accounted for most of the variance, implying that no substantial common method variance was present. On close examination of the output from unrotated factor solution, discriminant validity was also present. Nonresponse bias was established in two separate t-tests. First, the average values for each of the constructs for the first quartile completed questionnaires received were compared with the last quartile completed questionnaires, allowing the late questionnaires to proxy the perceptions of non-respondents. Mean differences for each of the constructs did not reveal any significant

difference between the early and late questionnaires (*two tailed t-tests, p<.05*). This comparative test depicted the absence of nonresponse bias in this study.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Table 4.1: Zero order Correlations matrix for study variables

	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**
BSCO (1)	1					
SOBEH (2)	.397**	1				
SICOR (3)	.396**	.579**	1			
COGME (4)	.094	-.317**	-.135	1		
BSTRUST (5)	-.022	-.454**	-.301**	.379**	1	
SDPERF (6)	.113	-.297*	-.267*	.269**	.758**	1

BSCO: Buyer Supplier Collaboration
SOBEH: Supplier Opportunistic Behavior
SICOR: Supplier Induced Corruption
COGME: Contractual Governance Mechanism
BSTRUST: Buyer Supplier Trust
SDPERF: Supplier Delivery Performance
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

The results indicated significant relationships between all the predictor values and supplier delivery performance supporting *HI, H2, H3, H4, H5* and *H6*. The results indicate that there is a significant positive relationship (r=.396**, p<.01) between buyer-supplier collaboration and supplier induced corruption. This means that when buyer-supplier collaborations increases there is also an increase in supplier induced corruption. This is true for the case of Uganda because as the public procurement officers engage in collaboration with suppliers from private sector, they have learnt more corruption practices (NIS, 2008). More often as the suppliers respond to tenders advertised they have facilitated exchange of illegal money to win the tenders. As a result, there is increased corruption due to collaboration and interaction between the private sector suppliers with the procurement officers who are from civil service exercising their duties, with the consequent traffic of favors and influences. Subsequently, as the level of collaboration and interaction increases, supplier induced corruption has gained volume and momentum, with suppliers calling bribes "facilitation money" and yet according to the law it is an outright bribery. This finding is consistent with Basheka (2010) who found that most cases of corruption scandals have been championed by suppliers who perpetuate the process of procurement and award of tenders through well-coordinated machinery in collaboration with government technical officials. This is also in support with Basheka (2009) who further revealed that when suppliers collaborate with government officials in the procurement decision making process procurement procedures are violated. When procurement officials deviate from the expected moral standards, they become less committed to procurement principles and they find themselves in a compromising situation leading to conflict of interests and this makes them unable to retaliate from receiving bribes from providers

(Serra, 2004). Consistently, Basheka (2009) posits that institutional policies are responsible for the high levels of supplier induced corruption since they provide suppliers and procurement officials with an opportunity and high level of involvement.

The correlation results above indicate that there is a significant positive relationship (r=.397**, p<.01) between buyer-supplier collaboration and supplier opportunistic behavior. This means that when buyer-supplier collaborations increases there is also an increase in supplier opportunistic behavior. In Uganda's public sector, the more buyers and suppliers collaborate the more opportunistic tendencies seem to grow. In most cases suppliers are taking advantage of the government to cheat and supply air because they are familiar with the procurement officers with whom they bribe. Even with the existence of formal contracts, most suppliers persistently fail to fulfill contract terms that they signed and nothing has been done to them (PPDA, 2012).

The correlation results above indicate that there is a significant positive relationship (r=.379**, p<.01) between contractual governance mechanisms and buyer-supplier trust. This means that when contractual governance mechanisms increases there is also an increase in buyer supplier trust over time. This finding is consistent with Ahimbisibwe (2014) who found that contracts that are intensive and clear in nature can help to build trust between buyer and the supplier over time.

The correlation results above indicate that there is a negative significant relationship (r=-.267*, p<.05) between supplier induced corruption and supplier delivery performance. This means that when supplier induced corruption increases there is a decrease in supplier delivery performance. This is consistent with the Basheka (2010) which revealed that Ugandan public procurement has experienced some of the grave effects of corruption like high costs of goods and services, low standards of living as substandard goods and services are delivered, acquisition of inappropriate technology, loss of lives and increases in the country debt among others.

The correlation results above indicate that there is a negative significant relationship (r=-.297*, p<.05) between supplier opportunistic behavior and supplier delivery performance. This means that when supplier opportunistic behavior reduces there is an increase in supplier delivery performance. Findings of this study collaborate well with those of Ntayi et al. (2010) who found out that the potential for opportunistic behavior was a major source of transaction costs in inter-organizational partnerships and supply chains. Consistently, Ahimbisibwe et al., 2012) found that organizations which perceive the existence of opportunism are faced with a greater need for screening, negotiating, and monitoring partners behavior, resulting in increased transaction costs which affect supply chain performance, i.e., delivery performance in this case.

The correlation results above indicate that there is a positive significant relationship (r=.758**, p<.01) between buyer-supplier trust and supplier delivery performance. This means that when buyer-supplier trust increases there will also likely to be an increase in supplier delivery performance. The above finding is supportive of what other researchers like Jenda and Sheshadri (2001) who found that long-term relationships between trading partners increase the financial, operational, and strategic efficiency of the involved organizations, and that trust act as a cornerstone of these relations

(Krause, 1999). Likewise, Ryu, et al. (2007) carried out a study and concluded that existence of trust between buyer and supplier relationship has a positive effect on the long-term orientation and that trust is one of the facilitators of the supplier performance.

Hierarchical regression Analysis

Hierarchical Regression Analysis of BSTRUST, COGME, SOBEH and SDPERF

Consistent with the results above, the Hierarchical regression model shown in Table 4.1 revealed that Buyer supplier trust (beta=.774, sig<0.01) significantly and positively predicted 45.5% of supplier delivery performance while supplier opportunistic behaviour (beta=.152, Sig<0.05) significantly and positively predicted 1.8% of supplier delivery performance. However, Contractual governance mechanism (beta=-.004, Sig>0.05) did not significantly predict supplier delivery performance.

Table 4.1: Regression Analysis of BSTRUST, COGME, SOBEH and SDPERF

	Model 1		**Model 2**		**Model 3**		**Model 4**	
Variable	**Beta**	**t**	**Beta**	**t**	**Beta**	**t**	**Beta**	**t**
Constant		8.593**		3.598**		2.178*		2.025*
Operational Duration	.361**	3.950**	.240**	3.845**	.217**	3.508**	.217**	3.488**
Number of employees	.162	1.762	.053	.845	.065	1.051	.065	1.047
Buyer supplier trust			.701**	11.153**	.773**	11.150**	.774**	10.725**
Supplier opportunistic behaviour					.153*	2.262*	.152*	2.203*
Contractual governance mechanism							-.004	-.064
R^2	0.178		0.634		0.652		0.652	
Adj R^2	0.154		0.619		0.634		0.630	
R^2 Change	0.178		0.455		0.018		0.000	
Sig F Change	.000		.000		0.026		0.949	
F	7.307		43.269		37.063		30.576	
Sig	.000		.000		.000		.000	

Hierarchical linear Regression of COGME, BSTRUST and SDPERF

There was a linear significant relationship between contractual governance mechanism, buyer supplier trust and supplier delivery performance (F=7.307, 43.269, 34.383; Sig<0.001). Buyer supplier trust (beta=.712, sig<0.01) significantly and positively predicted 45.5% of supplier

delivery performance However Contractual governance mechanism (beta=-.030, Sig>0.05) did not significantly predict supplier delivery performance.

Table 4.2: Regression of COGME, BSTRUST and SDPERF

	Model 1		**Model 2**		**Model 3**	
Variable	**Beta**	**T**	**Beta**	**t**	**Beta**	**t**
Constant		8.593**		3.598**		3.520**
Operational Duration	.361**	3.950**	.240**	3.845**	.240**	3.841**
Number of employees	.162	1.762	.053	.845	.054	.864
Buyer supplier trust			.701**	11.153**	.712**	10.509**
Contractual governance mechanism					-.030	-.457
R^2	0.178		0.634		0.635	
AdjR^2	0.154		0.619		0.616	
R^2 Change	0.178		0.455		0.001	
Sig F Change	.000		.000		.649	
F	7.307		43.269		34.383	
Sig	.000		.000		.000	

Hierarchical linear Regression of BSCO, SOBEH and SDPERF.

There was a linear significant relationship between buyer supplier collaboration, supplier opportunistic behaviour and supplier delivery performance (F=7.307, 6.828, 6.926; Sig<0.001). Supplier opportunistic behaviour (beta=-.290, Sig<0.01) significantly and negatively predicted 3.6% of supplier delivery performance while buyer supplier collaboration (beta=.234, Sig<0.05) significantly and positively predicted 4.5% of supplier delivery performance.

Table 4.3: Regression of BSCO, SOBEH, and SDPERF

	Model 1		**Model 2**		**Model 3**	
Variable	**Beta**	**t**	**Beta**	**T**	**Beta**	**t**
Constant		8.593**		9.004**		7.007**
Operational Duration	.361**	3.950**	.374**	4.152**	.381**	4.338**
Number of employees	.162	1.762	.133	1.456	.098	1.091
Supplier opportunistic behaviour			-.193*	-2.147*	-.290**	-3.013**
Buyer supplier collaboration					.234*	2.442*
R^2	0.178		0.215		0.259	
AdjR^2	0.154		0.183		0.222	
R^2 Change	0.178		0.036		0.045	
Sig F Change	.000		.034		.016	
F	7.307		6.828		6.926	
Sig	.000		.000		.000	

Hierarchical linear Regression of BSCO, SICOR, and SDPERF.

There was a linear significant relationship between buyer supplier collaboration, supplier induced corruption and supplier delivery performance (F=7.307, 6.137, 5.953; Sig<0.001). Supplier induced corruption (beta=-.221, Sig<0.01) significantly and negatively predicted 3.6% of supplier delivery performance while buyer supplier collaboration (beta=.204, Sig<0.05) significantly predicted 4.5% of supplier delivery performance.

Table 4.5: Regression of BSCO, SICOR, and SDPERF

	Model 1		**Model 2**		**Model 3**	
Variable	**Beta**	**t**	**Beta**	**t**	**Beta**	**t**
Constant		8.593**		8.688**		7.049**
Operational Duration	.361**	3.950**	.361**	3.975**	.362**	4.053**
Number of employees	.162	1.762	.146	1.593	.120	1.314
Supplier induced corruption			-.138	-1.529	-.221*	-2.267*
Buyer Supplier Collaboration					.204*	2.094*
R^2	0.178		0.215		0.259	
AdjR^2	0.154		0.183		0.222	
R^2 Change	0.178		0.036		0.045	
Sig F Change	.000		.034		.016	
F	7.307		6.137		5.953	
Sig	.000		.000		.000	

Hierarchical linear Regression of COGME and BSTRUST

There was a linear significant relationship between contractual governance mechanism and buyer supplier trust (F=2.634, Sig>0.05; F=6.099; Sig<0.001). Contractual governance mechanism (beta=.355, Sig<0.01) significantly and positively predicted 12.4% of buyer supplier trust.

Table 4.6: Regression of COGME and BSTRUST

	Model 1		**Model 2**	
Variable	**Beta**	**t**	**Beta**	**t**
Constant		7.496**		4.312**
Operational Duration	.173	1.786	.141	1.547
Number of employees	.156	1.596	.118	1.280
Contractual governance mechanism			.355**	3.921**
R^2	0.073		.196	
AdjR^2	0.045		.164	
R^2 Change	0.073		.124	
Sig F Change	.054		.000	
F	2.634		6.099	
Sig	.054		.000	

Hierarchical linear Regression of BSCO and SOBEH

There was a linear significant relationship between Buyer Supplier Collaboration and Supplier Opportunistic Behaviour (F=.907, Sig>0.05; F=5.982; Sig<0.001). Buyer Supplier Collaboration (beta=.413, Sig<0.01) significantly and positively predicted 16.7% supplier opportunistic behaviour.

Table 4.8: Regression of BSCO and SOBEH

	Model 1		**Model 2**	
Variable	**Beta**	**T**	**Beta**	**t**
Constant		2.494*		-.001
Operational Duration	.066	.660	.068	.745
Number of employees	-.150	-1.504	-.185*	-2.018*
Buyer Supplier Collaboration			.413**	4.547**
R^2	0.026		0.193	
AdjR^2	-0.003		0.161	
R^2 Change	0.026		.167	
Sig F Change	.440		.000	
F	.907		5.982	
Sig	.440		.000	

Hierarchical linear Regression of BSCO and SICOR.

Table 4.9: Regression of BSCO and SICOR.

	Model 1		**Model 2**	
Variable	**Beta**	**T**	**Beta**	**t**
Constant		3.362**		.867
Operational Duration	-.001	-.005	.002	.017
Number of employees	-.113	-1.123	-.147	-1.585
Buyer Supplier Collaboration			.404**	4.409**
R^2	0.02		0.179	
AdjR^2	-0.009		0.147	
R^2 Change	.020		.160	
Sig F Change	.566		.000	
F	.680		5.464	
Sig	.566		.001	

There was a linear significant relationship between Buyer Supplier Collaboration and Supplier Induced Corruption (F=.680, Sig>0.05; F=5.464; Sig<0.001). Buyer Supplier Collaboration (beta=.404, Sig<0.01) significantly and positively predicted 16% of supplier Induced Corruption. The variance inflation factor (VIF) was less than 4 and tolerance ratio was above 0.1, indicating that multicollinearity in this study was not a problem. As such, the interpretations of the *b* weights and R-square values were reliable.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE AND RESEARCH

This study examines supplier delivery performance of public procurement contracts in Ugandan Central Government Procuring and Disposing Entities (PDEs). As earlier mentioned, buyer-supplier collaboration through effective sharing of information is a key strategic resource that PDEs and their suppliers should engage in. Buyers and suppliers are expected to benefit from collaboration which can be through the sharing of information, decision synchronization and incentive alignment that in turn builds trust, minimizes opportunism and the related transaction costs; and ensure reliable, improved product quality and timely delivery of products to the organization. However, this has not been the case in Uganda. Instead, as the public procurement officers engage in collaborations with suppliers from private sector, they have learnt more corruption practices and taken advantage. Public sector still lacks proper contract governance mechanisms to reduce supplier opportunism and the related transaction costs since the introduction

of the PPDA Act, 2003. Most public contracts documents are hidden from the general public and the key stakeholders are not aware of their terms. This has undermined effective contract monitoring and control. There is a need of creating a database and information bank about prospective PDEs and their suppliers and their respective contracts. Information banks should be made public for transparency purposes and their contracts should be availed to the key stakeholders. This information should include the past performance of the suppliers. It is also necessary to establish a national data base for all providers to ensure that information on providers is more transparent and available to all actors in the procurement process. This will serve as a basis for monitoring their performance and ensuring compliance with the law. Control over information may help PDEs to identify appropriate suppliers. This can easily help overcome potential information asymmetries when governing suppliers.

PDEs and suppliers who are known to each other tend to share information and maintain high levels of trust and openness. This helps contracting parties to take advantage and involve in corrupt practices. These corrupt practices include influence peddling, clannishness favoritism networks, lying, solicited kickbacks, removing documents from files, fraudulent use of public procurement office, information leaks, promising to do certain things and failing to do them later, self-interests and failure to keep word. There is a need to blacklist and suspend providers who do not comply with the Public Procurement and Disposing Agency (PPDA) rules and regulations. The powers vested in the PPDA Authority to suspend a provider from participating in public procurement or disposal proceedings are found under Regulation 351 of the PPDA Regulations. Unfortunately, blacklisting alone does not stamp out unethical conduct. In addition to blacklisting, such supplying companies should be deregistered by the registrars of companies for a certain period, depending on the gravity of unethical behavior. These sanctions are likely to deter perpetuation of corrupt practices in procurement.

There is a need to develop a professional body that promotes code of conduct for all procurement practitioners in Uganda. The government of Uganda through PPDA should come up to pass a bill that forms and recognizes the National Professional Institute for Procurement Professionals in Uganda (IPPU). This body will raise professional ethics through an accreditation and certification mechanism to ensure that entry into the profession is restricted to suitably qualified professionals. Additionally, serious deterrent measures against procurement practitioners should be implemented in such a way that public procurement officers who engage in unethical behavior contrary to the procurement code of conduct are suspended and/or expelled from the profession. Additionally, government can permanently prohibit a public procurement officer convicted of corrupt practices from holding any public office, issue a restitution order to seize his/her assets, and even pay informers/whistleblowers on conviction of offender.

Similarly, the amount of money lost by PDEs through corrupt procurement practices can be recovered from responsible officers who cause such a loss. Thus corrupt procurement practices will be less attractive. Additionally, there is need to create awareness through training and sensitization of the community about the various ways to constrain corrupt procurement behaviors. This can be achieved by involving community organizations. Community organizations should be made aware of the threat corrupt procurement practices has to society and encouraged to engage in work to prevent it.

Community based groups can foster sensitivity through whistle blowing intervention training in which individuals increase their sense of usefulness. In order to achieve results, each individual in Ugandan society must be sensitized to play the role of 'a whistle blower'. Such training can be supplemented by other methods such as drama, seminars and workshops.

Lastly, as earlier noted, most contracts are missing on file. It is advisable that all PDEs implement the PPDA provision that requires them to appoint contract managers. This will help solve the problem of not having records on file in PDEs. Adequate staffing of the PDUs will ensure implementing a deliberate systematic contract- monitoring mechanism. Contrary to Regulation 259 of PPDA which requires PDEs to put in place a contract monitoring mechanism, apparently, there is no system in place in PDUs to show that certification of goods received was done. This makes contract enforcement difficult.

Limitations of the Study and Areas for future research

This study seeks to adopt a cross sectional research design which is defective in critically analyzing the behavior of the variables under study therefore this has an implication on the conclusion of the study. Only central government PDEs in Kampala were sampled and studied without the foreign missions and the results are expected to be different as compared to when all the central government PDEs are studied. The study used a questionnaire for data collection and this has a weakness of limiting the amount of data collected. There is likelihood that relevant data may not be captured because of use of close ended questionnaire. Future studies can conduct longitudinal studies. Additionally, since foreign missions were not covered, they can be another area of future study. More studies using qualitative approaches could be conducted further in the future to under more some of these behavioural variables.

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