

Strategies and Diplomacy in the Nigeria's War of Unity, 1967-1970

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ABSTRACT: *This study examines the aim and strategies of the Nigerian Civil War 1967-1970, emphasizing the diplomatic positions and war strategies adopted by the two sides involved. It agrees that series of researches have been carried out as regards the Nigerian Civil War but only a few viewed it on the ground of diplomatic maneuvering and strategy. The various literatures laid more emphasis on the causes, dimensions and effects of the war without a thorough analogy on the use of tact and strategy in the context of the war. The study examines the use of propaganda, military tact, media, peace talks and summits in the context of the Nigerian civil war. This study is divided into two parts; the use of strategies by the Nigerian government and the Biafra people, as well as the peace talks and summits that took place during the war. Both primary and secondary sources are employed in this research.*

KEYWORDS: Diplomacy, Propaganda, strategy, Nigeria, Biafra, Civil War, Maneuvering, Peace talks

INTRODUCTION

According to Clausewitz, War is the continuation of politics, in other means, a failure of diplomacy.¹ He further opines that war is nothing more than a larger-scale fight. War according to him is made up of countless duels, but an image of it as a whole may be constructed by seeing a couple of wrestlers. Each of these wrestlers tries to force the other to fulfil his will by using physical force; his immediate goal is to throw his opponent, rendering him incapable of further resistance. This however portrayed Clausewitz's understanding of war as an act of force, used in compelling an adversary to obey one's will. Force equips itself with art and scientific creations in order to counteract opposing force. Certain self-imposed, hardly detectable limits, known as international law and custom, are attached to force, but they rarely diminish it. Thus, force—physical force, because moral force does not exist except as represented in the state and the law—is the instrument of war, and the aim is to impose our will on the adversary. To achieve that goal, we must render the adversary impotent, which is the actual goal of combat in principle. That goal takes the place of the target, dismissing it as something unrelated to combat.

¹C. V. Clausewitz, *On War*, Princeton University Press Princeton, New Jersey, 1976, p. 75. See also H. J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. USA: Donnelley & Sons Company. 1993

Strategy is also a weapon of war; it is a tool used by the strategist to increase the efficiency of the whole operational side of the conflict in order to achieve its goals. This implies the strategist will create the war strategy as well as the goal, which will define the course of action he intends to take.² The two sides involved in the Nigerian war of unity adopted strategies with the intent of winning the war. These strategies vary from propaganda, weapon acquisition, war plans, and internationalising the war to positioning and formation of military personnel.³ Hence, this study examines the strategy adopted by both the federal military government and the Biafra secessionists in order to either win the war or put a stop to it.

The Nigerian Government War Strategies

The then-eastern region's declaration of independence, led by Ojukwu, rendered the Nigerian civil war not just unavoidable, but near.⁴ This declaration was prompted by the failed Aburi Accord which Aremu and Osadola described as the last straw that broke the camel's back.⁵ The first gunshot was fired on July 6, 1967, signalling the start of the brutal thirty-month conflict.⁶ By May 1967, the Nigerian side had already begun making preparations for war. All soldiers from the North, West, and Mid-West had been removed and redeployed from the East. Four of the Army's regular infantry battalions were transferred to the 1st Brigade and renamed - Area Command. The Commander-in-Chief ordered the mobilisation of ex-servicemen. Four more battalions were established from the approximately 7,000 men who were called up. It was decided to increase recruiting from the Nigerian Police Force's employees. This was described by Aremu and Osadola as a means to an end – focusing on the value attached to the secession move of the Eastern region in the sight of Gowon's led federal government of Nigeria.⁷

The Federal Government had to portray the war as a *just cause*⁸ aimed at preventing the country's fragmentation in order to mobilise the Nigerian people. In doing so, the phrase "To keep Nigeria

²C. V. Clausewitz, *On War*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press Princeton, 1976, p. 177.

³ J. Oluleye, *Military Leadership in Nigeria 1966-1979* (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1985), p. 131. See also, E. Ibeadi, "Looking beyond Inanities in the Nigerian Civil war", *Journal of African Studies*, (vol.14, No.2), p. 134.

⁴ G. S Emah, and O. S Osadola, The Indifferent Attitude of The Ibibio to The Biafran Enterprise in The Context of The Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970, *International Journal of History and Philosophical Research* 9 (03), 2021

⁵ J. O. Aremu, and O. S. Osadola, The Organization of African Unity and Its Mediatory Role in the Nigeria Civil War: A Historical Assessment. *International Journal of Research*, Vol. 5, Issue 15, 2018, pp. 214-238

⁶ The war is widely known in civil war literature as the Nigerian Civil War, the Biafran War, the War of Biafran Secession, the Nigerian-Biafran War and the War of Nigerian Unity. See also Zdenek Cervenka, *A History of the Nigerian War, 1967-1970* (Ibadan: Onibonje Publishers, 1973), p. 123.

⁷ J. O. Aremu, and O. S. Osadola, The Organization of African Unity and Its Mediatory Role in the Nigeria Civil War...

⁸ Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars. A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1977). See also James T. Johnson, *Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and Political Inquiry* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981)

one is a work that must be done" was coined. Gowon's letters was tagged "Go on with One Nigeria," which became a powerful propaganda tool.⁹

Army Offensive

The Nigerian government began its offensive operations in the northern part of the country. On the 2nd of July 1967, the 1st Area Command, backed by an Artillery Brigade, Armoured forces armed with British Scorpion tanks, Saladin armoured vehicles and ferrets, and Engineer units, issued operational instructions for OPUNICORD, the code name for the "police action" against the rebels. The command was split into two brigades, each of which had three battalions. The 1st Brigade moved along the Ogugu-Ogunga-Nsukka road, while the 2nd Brigade advanced along the Gakem-Obudu-Ogoja route. The onslaught was effectively repelled by the rebels. However, with the numerous friends the command had acquired while concentrating on the border waiting for the order to strike, they began to recruit guides and informants, and with this came knowledge about the Biafran forces' disposition, strength, and plans, as well as a breakthrough.

By the 10th of July 1967, the 1st Brigade had taken all of its initial targets, and if they had possessed the Biafran army's detailed intelligence on this day, they would have moved on to seize Enugu, the Biafran capital. In respect of this, Njoku posits that:

...many of the withdrawing troops were wounded by themselves. Malaria, headaches, and a variety of other ailments were reported by senior executives. If the Nigerian Army had known what was going on on the Biafran side on that fateful day, they would have seized Enugu that day without opposition.¹⁰

Obasanjo affirmed that the 2nd Brigade had taken Obudu, Gakem, and Ogoja by July 12th. On the 26th of July, 1967, a division created from the Lagos Garrison Organization launched a naval landing on Bonny, launching a second front, the southern sector (LGO). After a hard sea and land fight, the division secured a beach head with the help of the Navy and exploited north. Biafra invaded the erstwhile Mid-Western Region on August 8, 1967, with the goal of relieving strain on the northern sector and threatening Lagos, the Federal Capital. While the LGO was preparing for future operations beyond Bonny, word of the rebel infiltration into the Mid-West reached the commander, who was ordered to leave a battalion in Bonny, suspend all operations there, and move to Escravos with two battalions in order to dislodge the rebels and clear the Mid-West riverine area. These manoeuvres were made with the help of the Nigerian Navy and a merchant from the National Shipping Line. Another division was established to assist the LGO in removing the rebels from the Mid-West. The formations were renamed at this stage. The 1st Area Command was redesignated as the 1st Infantry Division, the newly formed division as the 2nd Infantry

⁹ J. Korieh, Chima. "Biafra and the Discourse on the Igbo Genocide," *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 48 (6), 2013

¹⁰ Hilary M. A Njoku, *Tragedy Without Heroes: The Nigeria-Biafra War*. Enugu: Fourth Dimension, 1987 see also, John J. Stremlau, *The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 220.

Division, and the LGO as the 3rd Infantry Division. As a result, the "police action" became a full-fledged military operation.¹¹

By the end of September 1969, the separatists had been driven out of a large portion of the Mid-West. Because of the division's unique riverine and creek activities, the commander of the 3rd Infantry Division was granted permission to alter the designation of his unit to 3rd Marine Commando. This was the first time in the Nigerian Army's history that something resembling a Marine organisation was tried. Amphibious operations were not taught to the division. In actuality, the forces were made up of soldiers from the Lagos Garrison Organization (LGO), the Federal capital's administrative structure. The division, however, became the most feared and successful during the conflict after some intensive training.¹²

In line with Obasanjo's position, Madiebo also affirmed that the Nigerian government perceived Enugu as a hotbed of secession and rebellion, and they hoped that capturing it would put an end to the insurgency. On September 12, 1967, the march from Nsukka to Enugu began in earnest. The rebels counterattacked, firing their "Red Devil" tanks for the first time. These are pre-World War II French armoured personnel carriers that have been modernised. They were hazardous, sluggish, blind, clumsy, and difficult to manoeuvre. Anti-tank recoilless weapons and a daring infantry charge made them easy prey. Enugu was taken on the 4th of October 1967, and the 1st Infantry Division took time to reorganise and repair. The division was under the mistaken impression that the fall of Enugu would mark the end of the revolt. The 1st Infantry Division decided to allow the secessionists some time to give up their cause, despite the fact that the flame of revolt was still burning brightly in the hearts of most Easterners.¹³

Ojukwu was stoking the fire and riding high on the emotions of his apparently hurt and enraged people, who felt betrayed and sought vengeance for the events of 1966. It took another six months for the division to restart the offensive, allowing the rebels the time they needed to reorganise and collect additional ammo, weapons, and equipment to continue their fight.¹⁴

On the south/southeast boundary, the 3rd Marine Commando created a new front. Calabar was taken on October 13, 1967, with the help of the Navy. The Federal Government established sovereignty in Nigerian seas and international waters surrounding the Nigerian coast with the conquest of Calabar, Warri, Escravos, and Bonny. Biafra was cut off from the rest of the world, leaving Port Harcourt Airport as the main method of international contact and transit. At this time,

¹¹ Olusegun Obasanjo, *My Command: An Account of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970* (Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., 1980), p. 16.

¹² Ntieyong U. Akpan, *The Struggle for Secession, 1966-1970: A Personal Account of the Nigerian Civil War* (London: Frank Cass, 1971), p. 90. See also Zdenek Cervenka, *A History of the Nigerian War, 1967-1970* (Ibadan: Onibonje Publishers, 1973), p. 125.

¹³ Alexander A. Madiebo, *The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War* (Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1980), p. 382.

¹⁴ Ibid.

the Biafran leadership resolved to seek for alternate channels for the entrance of military hardware and medical supplies into the enclave. Awgu, Uga, and Ulli are three straight road segments that have been turned into airstrips. Portharcourt was seized on May 19, 1968. The outside world was left in no question about the Federal superiority in the war with the conquest of Enugu, Bonny, Calabar, and Portharcourt. Mercenaries fighting for Biafra have begun to desert. Biafra began smuggling photos of hungry children overseas and accusing Nigeria of genocide. This resulted in Biafra receiving military, economic, and political aid from foreign groups, prolonging the conflict and the suffering of the people of Biafra.¹⁵

After numerous failed efforts to cross the Niger River at Asaba, the 2nd Infantry Division crossed the river at Idah in early 1969 and pushed through the previously freed districts of Nsukka and Enugu to seize Onitsha. The division pushed further towards Owerri. The 1st Infantry Division advanced on Umuahia at the same time. The 3rd Marine Commando was now marching on three fronts: the Oguta-Owerinta-Ulli airstrip-Umuahia axis, the Portharcourt-Aba-Owerri-Umuahia axis, and the Calabar-Uyo-Umuahia axis. The aim was to meet up with the 1st Infantry Division in Umuahia and encircle the rebels, either forcing them to surrender or destroying their fighting spirit. Using guerilla tactics, Biafra attempted but failed to stave off the Nigerian Army's attack.¹⁶

On the 10th of January 1970, Lt. Col. Ojukwu, the self-proclaimed Head of State of Biafra, realising the situation was completely chaotic and hopeless, he handed over the administration of Biafra to Commander Biafran Army Maj. Gen. Phillip Effiong and flew out of the enclave with his immediate family in search of peace. Maj. Gen. Effiong discussed the issue with the Biafra Strategic Committee, and they concluded that enough was enough and that surrender was the only honourable way out.

Diplomacy

The Federal Government of Nigeria waged a diplomatic effort to persuade other nations, notably superpowers such as the United States of America, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom, not to recognise the secessionists. An person portrayed the conflict as an adventure. The Lagos administration continued to represent the entire country in international institutions, where a vigorous propaganda campaign was undertaken to depict the conflict as a fight to bring the country back together. This allowed them to gain the backing of superpowers while continuing to denigrate Biafra. Nigeria was able to acquire additional guns and equipment from all over the world as a result of this assistance. Nigeria continued to participate in international peace negotiations in order to demonstrate that she was ready for a peaceful resolution to the war.¹⁷ Some of the peace

¹⁵ John J. Stremlau, *The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 72. See also Zdenek Cervenka, *A History of the Nigerian War, 1967-1970* (Ibadan: Onibonje Publishers, 1973), p. 124.

¹⁶ 22Frederick Forsyth, *The Making of an African Legend: The Biafra Story* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1977), pp. 114-115.

¹⁷ John J. Stremlau, *The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 73. See also, Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press), 1966.

talks include Kinshasa Peace Talks, Kampala peace talks, Addis Ababa peace talks, Algiers summit, etc.¹⁸

Biafra Strategy

Biafra Military

When the troops of non-Eastern origin departed from Enugu in August 1966, Biafran war preparations sprang into high gear. Thousands of individuals applied for the job. Officers and troops, the majority of whom were professors and university students, received training. The Eastern Region lacked adequate weaponry prior to the beginning of conflict since all troops who returned to the region did so without their guns, but soldiers who were removed from the East did so with their weapons. The Nigerian Army's remnants in Enugu barracks numbered around 240 troops, the bulk of whom were technicians and craftsmen who lacked firearms. The Eastern Region, on the other hand, had succeeded in obtaining guns and ammunition from France, Spain, and Portugal prior to the beginning of the war. When more weaponry arrived in May 1967, the decision was made to establish two new battalions, the 9th and 14th Battalions, according to Madiebo.¹⁹

The Biafran Air Force was formed after several pilots and technicians from the Nigerian Air Force of Eastern descent returned to the region (BAF). With the purchase of new helicopters, two vintage planes, a B26 and a B25, were purchased. The two bombers were armed with machine guns and rockets and explosives produced in the United States. Minicon aircraft were also purchased by the BAF.²⁰ Calabar developed a tiny navy with three patrol boats that were formerly used by the Nigerian Navy. More boats were eventually built in the area, which were armoured and equipped with light and machine guns.²¹ The Biafra Militia, a people's army, was established. Local leaders and ex-military personnel taught young men and women how to utilise any weapon they possessed. These weapons were mostly short firearms that were imported or produced locally. The militias were supposed to offer a fast source of personnel re-enforcement for the regular army, aid with military administration immediately behind the frontlines, garrison any regions won or reclaimed from the enemy, and help educate the populace about why Biafra was fighting.²²

¹⁸ See J. O. Aremu, and O. S. Osadola, The Organization of African Unity and Its Mediatory Role in the Nigeria Civil War: A Historical Assessment. *International Journal of Research*, Vol. 5, Issue 15, 2018, Z. Cervenka., *The Unfinished Quest for Unity: Africa and the OAU*. Julian Friedmann Publishers. 1977

¹⁹ Alexander A. Madiebo, *The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War* (Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1980),

²⁰ G. S Emah, and O. S Osadola, The Indifferent Attitude of The Ibibio to The Biafran Enterprise in The Context of The Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970, *International Journal of History and Philosophical Research* 9 (03), 2021

²¹ Raph Uwechue, *Reflections on the Nigerian Civil War: Facing the Future* (Britain: Meier & Holmes Ltd., 1971). See also Suzanne Cronje, *The World and Nigeria: The Diplomatic History of the Biafran War, 1967-1970* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1972).

²² John de St. Jorre, *The Nigerian Civil War* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1972), p. 323.

The Administration Support organisation was established. Prior to the declaration of hostilities, the tiny Biafran Army was virtually entirely funded by contributions from the general public. Since all the young and able-bodied men and women were to be involved in the war, this structure was to gather essential support, notably logistical necessities for the army, and to manage the government. A Food Directorate was established, which was in charge of purchasing and distributing all food, drink, and cigarettes to the military forces and the rest of the country. There is a Transportation Directorate that has been formed. For the acquisition, management, and distribution of POL, a Petroleum Management Board was created. The board developed and constructed a large, efficient fuel refinery that produced gasoline, diesel, and motor oil at a rapid rate.²³

Clothing, Housing, Propaganda, Requisition and Supply, and Medical were among the other directorates formed. Clothing was especially important because uniforms were scarce in Biafra. The Eastern Region's textile mills have been revived to create uniform bails for the military troops and citizens. It was decided to form a Research and Production Board. Rockets, mines, tanks, grenades, launchers, bombs, flame throwers, vaccinations, biological and alcoholic drinks, and other items were all studied and created by this group.²⁴

In the grand scheme of things, women were not forgotten. Women were taught how to acquire intelligence and infiltrate the Nigerian side. The Women Voluntary Service was established to aid in the education of Biafran women on the causes of the problem, to keep women informed of events, to assist in the rehabilitation of war casualties, to establish nurseries, orphanages, civil defence corps, and to provide chefs for the troops. An Advisory Committee was formed to organise and conduct the war, as well as to provide political and military advice to the Head of State.²⁵

Political / Diplomatic

The Biafrans were well aware that the odds were stacked against them, and that their survival hinged on the amount of foreign assistance they could garner. The Biafrans conducted a robust campaign and propaganda for worldwide recognition of Biafra, as well as the procurement of guns and equipment, through many of its compatriots living overseas. This effective propaganda resulted in her being recognised by countries such as Tanzania, Zambia, Gabon, Ivory Coast, and Haiti, as well as covert French support and double dealing by countries such as West Germany, Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, Sweden, Republic of Dahomey, Sierra Leone, and secret arms and ammunition importation into the region.²⁶

²³ John J. Stremlau, *The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 222.

²⁴ Emma Okocha, *Blood on the Niger: An Untold Story of the Nigerian Civil War*, Port Harcourt: Sunray Publications Ltd., 1994.

²⁵ H. B. Momoh (ed.), *The Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970: History and Reminiscent*, Ibadan: Sam Bookman Publishers, 2000.

²⁶ Ibid

Biafra's use of Propaganda

Indeed, one thing remarkable about the Nigerian war of unity was the role of propaganda during the war of unity.²⁷ Although it might be unvoiced as a cause of the war but it is pertinent to note that propaganda was the salient element behind the immediate causes of the war of unity and it also played a prominent role in the course of the war.

In the course of the war, the sway of the war was too devastating on the Biafran side that the Nigerian government cut off the supply of relief materials from the international community. By this, the Biafrans resorted to the use of propaganda as an instrument of war by claiming that the Nigerian government who had earlier on engage on human right abuse had denied the Biafrans right to international aids.

Most scholars argue that the message and organisation of the Biafran propaganda was better and more effective than that of Nigeria. For example, Uche, argued that during the Nigerian War of unity of 6th July 1967- 12th January 1970, Radio Biafra was literally seen as the Biafran Government, per se.²⁸ He goes on to say that even when the Biafran leadership departed the enclave before the war ended, people believed in the notion of Biafra since the Biafran Radio Station identifications remained "This is Radio Biafra Enugu." When Radio Biafra finally went silent, the thirty-month war was officially over.²⁹

In the Biafran conflict, radio is by far the most potent weapon. Channel 6 in Enugu and Channel 4 in Aba were the only two television stations in Biafra by 1967.³⁰ The Eastern Nigeria Broadcasting Corporation in Enugu, on the other hand, went out to the entire area and beyond. There were additional repeater stations in all of the Region's province headquarters. Apart from local newspapers in Aba, Calabar, and Onitsha that only had circulation in the provinces, the Biafran government owned and controlled the major newspaper, which had a regional readership.³¹

There were also a lot of official propaganda flyers. Despite the fact that the inhabitants of Calabar, Ogoja, and Rivers Provinces were slaughtered with the Igbo in the north, they did not wish to be a part of Biafra. As a result, the Eastern Region as a whole did not speak with one voice. As a result, propaganda from Lagos was focused to the people in the three dissident areas in order to destroy Biafra. On the other hand, the Biafran media put out a lot of propaganda to keep people in the fold.³²

27 National Archives Enugu, CW/A/20/CP/X9/CW21/4, *Introducing Biafra*, (Vol. 1. 1967) , pp 6-26.

28 L. U. Uche. *The Politics of Nigeria's Radio Broadcast Industry: 1932-1983*. Gazette (Leiden, Netherlands). 1985;35(1):19-29. doi:10.1177/001654928503500102

²⁹ Ibid

30 Samuel Ukpabi, "White Soldiers, Mosquitoes and the Whitman's Grave" *Nigerian Defence Academy Journal*, (Vol. 2, 1992), 78.

31 P. Mbaya, *Biafra, Civil war and Genocide*, (Syracuse: Syracuse publishers, 1999), p.23.

³²Accusations of genocide can be found in numerous Biafran documents. Notable examples include: Ministry of Information, *Genocide Breaks Up Nations* (Enugu: 19 November 1968), accessed at Butenschon, *Material*

Because Biafra held military control of the area at the time, the Biafran media dominated. Listening to Radio Nigeria and reading Nigerian newspapers were declared illegal and considered as sabotage to further solidify the government's grip. It is unclear whether the Biafran government ever caught and punished anyone for violating this law, but there were reports that some of those who were apprehended were mobbed to death by angry crowds or summarily shot by soldiers, despite the fact that this was clearly not at the command or with the knowledge of Biafran government superior officers.³³

The Biafran administration took control of Radio Nigeria Enugu, an extension of Federal Radio Nigeria, at the start of the conflict. For better management, all of the broadcast systems were placed under one roof. The Ministry of Information was renamed The Propaganda Directorate, which is led by university lecturer Dr. Ifegwu Eke.³⁴ Because to the Federal Nigerian Government's air and sea embargo against Biafra, importing and exporting from the Biafran area became difficult, if not impossible. Biafra then founded the Voice of Biafra in order to reach out to the rest of the world and ask for help.

The tempo of the conflict was determined by propaganda. On the radio, territories were conquered and lost. Newspapers couldn't be printed because of a scarcity of paper and spare parts. The radio relied on a repair culture to survive. Biafra was sometimes only heard on the radio. Even when Nigerian military took control of Enugu, the station located underground in a bunker in Umuahia continued to announce Enugu's retention. People were urged to make more radio from junk, which helped the stations. Radios were urged to be purchased and carried. Bushes and woods served as transmitters, with palm and cotton wool trees serving as antennas.³⁵

The Biafran media was utilised to create solidarity, confidence, and spirit among the Biafran people before to the battle of unification. Images of easterners being slaughtered in Kano and other areas of the North were often shown on what was then known as Eastern Nigeria Television and published in the region's media. This infuriated the entire East, not just the Ibos. The massacres had an impact on most Eastern households, either directly or indirectly. Bicycles, trucks, aircraft, trains, and these guys who lay on top of trains were all used to transport people from the North to the East. Images of Igbo casualties flooded Eastern television channels such as Channel 6 and 4, as well as certain publications.³⁶

Concerning the Nigeria-Biafra Conflict [microform], Reel 5 of 5, "The Ahiara Declaration: principles of the Biafran Revolution," and a number of international press releases in Markpress News Feature Service, such as "Call to Halt Genocide," Markpress News Feature Service, *Press Actions: abridged edition covering period July 1st to December 31st, 1969* (Geneva: Biafran Overseas Press Division, 5 July 1969).

³³ P. Mbaya, *Biafra, Civil war and Genocide*, (Syracuse: Syracuse publishers, 1999) p. 24

³⁴ Ibid

³⁵ P. Mbaya, *Biafra, Civil war and Genocide*, (Syracuse: Syracuse publishers, 1999), p.25

³⁶ Donald Smock, "Conflict Resolution in Africa: The Mediation of Africa's Wars," Paper delivered at the 1991 Annual Meeting of the America Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., Aug. 29-Sep. 1, 1991.

At this point, the images were shown on Western Nigerian television and newspapers. Interviews with the throngs of people coming into the East were broadcast on the radio. Easterners were outraged by the images of the evacuation. The resettlement of the refugees, often known as "returnees" in the East, had an impact on everyone's lives in the region.

Drama and skits in celebration of Biafra and edifying of Ojukwu were commissioned by the Biafran media. Nigeria, on the other hand, was shown in a negative light, and Gowon was mocked. At Ikot Ekpene, Aba-Azumini-Ekpat Akwa, notably at Ogbor Hill, and Port Harcourt, Abagana, and Umuahia-Uzuakoli, the war's heaviest engagements were fought. The media lauded the Biafran leaders on various battlefronts for their ability, intellect, and bravery. The battle was able to continue in this fashion.³⁷ The media instilled in the Biafran people a sense of security. It gave them optimism that they would be adequately safeguarded and defended from annihilation. Colonel Archibong of the Ikot Ekpene front, Colonel Achuzia of the Port Harcourt front, and Colonel Ananaba of the Adazi front were lauded for magical powers that could not be pierced by opposing forces.³⁸ Colonel Archibong was said to be immune to enemy gunfire, he was presumed to be invincible. These were part of the propaganda aimed at putting fear in the heart of the Nigerian Armies. This was similar to statements made throughout the Ukpum Ete/Okon wars, proving propaganda's consistency.

Even after Colonel Archibong was ultimately murdered by Gowon and given a military burial in Lagos, the Biafran people did not believe it, just as they did not think Aguiyi Ironsi could be assassinated effectively.

Markpress

For the course of the conflict, Markpress acted as Biafra's public diplomacy arm. The public relations agency took on the Biafran client in late 1967 and had an immediate impact on the war's outcome. Despite the fact that none of the content issued by Markpress was created by the company, it made full use of its understanding of the worldwide media system to provide Biafra with an efficient means of reaching out to the world's media. Markpress' achievement was recognised by Time Magazine, which stated:

Mark-press has actually conducted Biafra's war through press releases since January [of 1968] — more than 250 of them. They're jam-packed with information on upcoming arms transfers meant to humiliate European politicians, as well as dire warnings about hunger. More than 70 journalists from every West European country were flown into Biafra by the company, and eyewitness reports were sent to their newspapers.³⁹

³⁷Interview with Dr. Terwase Dzeka, 66 years, A Lecturer, Benue State University Makurdi, 2nd October, 2017

³⁸Interview with Professor Armstrong Adejo, Professor of History, Benue State University, Makurdi, 2nd Oct. 2017

³⁹ NAE/XX65/1968/2216 "Nigeria's Civil War: Hate, Hunger and the Will to Survive," *Time Newspaper*, August 23 1968. Retrieved from Nation Archive Enugu, 15th August, 2018

Despite the fact that Markpress issued hundreds of press releases until Biafra's capitulation in 1970, its owner, American H. W. Bernhardt, made few comments about why he accepted the position of Biafra's news department. Bernhardt stated in a letter to editors receiving Markpress releases that his company had never accepted an account like Biafra's before, and that they had only accepted Biafra's account after investigating the situation and concluding that:

Our company felt it had no choice but to put its communications network at Biafra's disposal, thus the Biafran people and their government. People from all around the globe are currently donating money to help the Biafrans buy food and medical supplies. As a gift to this great cause, our firm is providing services at a reduced rate.⁴⁰

Markpress helped to the Biafran war effort by opening the nation to reporters, sponsoring their trip to Biafra, and acting as a centre for the publication of their articles, photos, and films, rather than by producing press releases. The firm was so successful in its efforts that they were commended and chastised in the same breath. "The [Nigerian] Federal Government concedes that it has come out second best in the war of words," *Time Magazine* wrote in the same edition.⁴¹ Indeed, the Nigerian government recruited the British advertising agency Galzine, Grant & Russell in reaction to Markpress' work with Biafra.⁴²

The British House of Commons heard criticism of Markpress' efficacy, with conservative John Cordle telling the House that "sincere people in this country accept the misinformation and filth which Markpress has put out about Nigeria, "when I compare this misinformation to what Nigerians say for themselves, my blood boils."⁴³ "The photos that have emerged in the Press are all shot by entirely independent press photographers, not by Markpress or the Biafran Government," Bernhardt said in the sole other open letter confirming Markpress' connection with Biafra. Bernhardt then accused Cordle of hypocrisy, claiming that Markpress was performing the same work that the Nigerians had contracted out to other public relations firms, with the added benefit of having their own official government offices and British Commonwealth offices assisting their public diplomacy efforts.⁴⁴

Because of the Nigerian military's attempt to terminate the conflict in January 1970, most of Biafra's media blitz across the world began to fade in the second part of 1969. In October 1969, the British government issued a brochure titled *Conflict in Nigeria*:

⁴⁰ John de St Jorre, *The Nigerian Civil War* (London, 1972), p. 354:

⁴¹ NAE/XX65/1968/2216 "Nigeria's Civil War: Hate, Hunger and the Will to Survive," *Time Newspaper*, August 23 1968. Retrieved from Nation Archive Enugu, 15th August, 2018

⁴² A. B. Akinyemi, *The British Press and the Nigerian Civil War*. Oxford University Press, *African Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 285 (Oct., 1972), pp. 408-426

⁴³ NAE/XX76/1968/ 345 "Open letter from H. W. Bernhardt to John Cordle 24 Dec, 1969" Releases. 25 June, 1968. Retrieved from Nation Archive Enugu, 15th August, 2018

⁴⁴ R. S. Doron, "Forging a Nation while losing a Country: Igbo Nationalism, Ethnicity and Propaganda in the Nigerian Civil War 1968-1970", A dissertation supervised by Toyin Falola, The University of Texas, Austin, 2011 p. 144

The British View, which was extensively distributed among its European delegations. The Foreign Office sent a letter to many of its embassies around the world in advance of its release, with the British embassy in “Switzerland important because of Markpress would have liked something more detailed.” Many European capitals, including those thought to be pro-Biafra, had lost interest in the civil war. The necessity for [special envoys sent to European meetings over Biafra] may be slightly reduced, according to John Wilson of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Even in Scandinavia, the Biafrans appear to be on the defensive [...]

Apart from that, pro-Biafran efforts are no longer uncontested, and we believe the pinnacle of criticism of our policies in Germany and Switzerland has passed, and Markpress is no longer widely seen as an authoritative source.⁴⁵

Interest in Biafra in general had waned across Europe by the latter half of 1969, and most British missions were in general agreement with the fact that Markpress was no longer as effective as it had been in the earlier stages of the war. Further, the general consensus among British diplomatic staff was that the public opinion campaign for Biafra had waned enough that there was no need to stir up attention with either the booklet or and special envoys. The embassy in Rome stated simply that:

in Italy, the Biafran propaganda campaign is now fairly muted and receives scant publicity [...] but if the situation deteriorates again, we shall probably want to take up your offer.

Similarly, the embassy in Copenhagen reported that: *Danish interest in Biafra is not at the moment acute*⁴⁶ and the embassy in Brussels concurred, saying at present Biafran propaganda is neither very noticeable nor effective in Brussels” and that “we do not think [engaging the Belgian press] would be useful and it could even work against our purposes by drawing attention to a situation which does not at the moment get much attention from the local press.”⁵¹ Just as the war was turning against the Biafrans, it appeared that Markpress’ reach as a media source lost much of its luster.⁴⁷

In January 1970, when Biafra finally surrendered, Markpress released a notice on the closure of the “Biafran Overseas Press Service”. Titled Signing Off, Markpress defended their support of Biafra by saying:

⁴⁵ R. S. Doron, “Forging a Nation while losing a Country: Igbo Nationalism, Ethnicity and Propaganda in the Nigerian Civil War 1968-1970”, A dissertation supervised by Toyin Falola, The University of Texas, Austin, 2011, p. 145

⁴⁶ R. S. Doron, “Forging a Nation while losing a Country: Igbo Nationalism, Ethnicity and Propaganda in the Nigerian Civil War 1968-1970”, A dissertation supervised by Toyin Falola, The University of Texas, Austin, 2011, p. 145

⁴⁷ Ubong Essien Umoh, “The Making of Arms in Civil War Biafra”, *The Calabar Historical Journal*, Vol. 5, Nos. 1&2, December, 2011, pp. 339-359.

We have been repeatedly asked since the surrender whether we thought we had done the right thing in accepting this account. We are even accused of having prolonged the war. To answer this, one has only to ask some simple questions, such as “Does one believe in the freedom of the press?”, and “Does one believe that everyone has a right to be heard?” Negative answers can only mean press censorship and, in effect, a rejection of basic human rights. The Biafran people, no one can deny, fought bravely and from the highest motives. We are proud that we were afforded the opportunity of helping them.⁴⁸

PEACE TALKS AND SUMMITS

Despite the guarantee of non-intervention in the internal affairs of its member nations, the OAU made frantic efforts to broker peace between the warring sides in the Nigerian civil war between September 1967 and December 1969, according to available documents. Despite this, Aremu and Osadola argue that the OAU intervened in the Nigerian crisis to maintain peace on the African continent, prevent the Nigerian nation-state from becoming divided, prevent the crisis from escalating into a full-fledged war in accordance with the OAU's principle of peaceful settlement of disputes, and prevent extra-African intervention in the conflict, among other things.⁴⁹

The OAU made a number of steps to address the inconsistencies in the Nigerian Civil War. The first was the Kinshasa summit, which took place between September 11 and 14, 1967. It was delivered by Congo's President Joseph Mobutu, who utilised the effort to promote Congo's image as a peaceful nation.⁵⁰

Emperor Haile Selassie, the former Ethiopian leader, presided over the talks and representatives from seventeen independent African governments attended the summit.⁵¹ The meeting focused on three specific issues affecting Nigeria: halting the supply of arms and ammunition to Biafra and Nigeria by major foreign powers such as the United Kingdom, Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, France, and Portugal, among others; official recognition of Biafra by some members of the organisation such as Tanzania, Zambia, Gabon, and Ivory Coast; and the potency or lack thereof of the Nigerian military.⁵²

The Kampala peace talks” were organised by Arnold Smith, a Canadian diplomat and Commonwealth Secretary-General, and George Thomas, the Commonwealth Secretary of State.⁵³

⁴⁸ Ubong Essien Umoh, “The Making of Arms in Civil War Biafra”, *The Calabar Historical Journal*, Vol. 5, Nos. 1&2, December, 2011, pp. 339-359.

⁴⁹ J. O. Aremu, and O. S. Osadola, The Organization of African Unity and Its Mediatory Role in the Nigeria Civil War: A Historical Assessment. *International Journal of Research*, Vol. 5, Issue 15, 2018,

⁵⁰ T. Bello., “In Search for Peace in Africa: Organization of African Unity and the Nigeria-Biafra War, 1967-1970”. *Journal of Humanities and Social Policy*. Vol. 3 No. 3. 2017

⁵¹ Ibid p. 20

⁵² Z. Cervenka., *The Unfinished Quest for Unity: Africa and the OAU*. Julian Friedmann Publishers. 1977, pp. 97-98

⁵³ John de St Jorre.. *The Brothers' War: Biafra and Nigeria*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 1972, p. 193

Preliminary discussions between Nigeria's Federal Commissioner for Information, Chief Anthony Enahoro, and Sir Louis Mbanefo, representing Biafra, were conducted in London on May 6, 1968. It was decided that peace talks would begin on May 23, 1968, in Kampala, Uganda, and that the agenda would include topics such as international observer questions, conditions for halting hostilities, and preparations for a lasting solution.

President Obote of Uganda started the peace negotiations in Kampala, calling for an early agreement on a stop of hostilities as a precondition for a larger understanding. While both plans provided a lot of room for manoeuvre, there was one major difference: the federal government's key requirement was that Biafra give up its right to secede before a ceasefire, but the Biafrans sought an immediate ceasefire with no such restrictions. The following are the basics of the Biafra ideas for a settlement:

- I. An unconditional cease-fire and army retreat to pre-war positions;
- II. The administration of Biafra should continue to be in charge of maintaining order and upholding the law.
- III. The Biafran army should be under the direction and command of the Biafran people rather than the federal government.
- IV. Biafra would become a full member of international organisations and retain the ability to sign international treaties and accords.
- V. Biafra would have authority over its currency and economic resources, as well as its own economic development strategies.

The following is a summary of the federal government's conditions for a settlement:

- I. The Eastern Region's withdrawal of its proclamation of independence;
- II. Acceptance and acknowledgment of the federal military government's power over the Eastern Region by the general public;
- III. Public approval of Nigeria's newly established twelve states;
- IV. Acceptance of civilians as commissioners of the federal executive council and members of state executive councils as a key step toward the restoration of civil rule; and
- V. Acceptance of accredited and equal representatives from each of the twelve states to hold negotiations on the future of Nigeria.⁵⁴

Meanwhile, the difficulty of reconciling the three objectives implicit in the Nigerian crisis – ending the fighting, preserving Nigerian unity, and providing effective assurances of safety to the Igbo people – appeared to be an insurmountable obstacle to any settlement, both before and during the war.

⁵⁴ J. O. Aremu, and O. S. Osadola, *The Organization of African Unity and Its Mediatorial Role in the Nigeria Civil War: A Historical Assessment*. *International Journal of Research*, Vol. 5, Issue 15, 2018, see also, J. Streamlau, *The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War 1967-1970*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977

Emperor Haile Selassie started the Addis Ababa peace negotiations on August 5, 1968. The meeting took place in a closed room.⁵⁵ Despite the fact that Biafra and the Federal Government were unable to achieve a political accord, Emperor Haile Selassie used the occasion to persuade the two parties to agree on some feasible procedures for delivering relief supplies to the war-torn territories. Pope Paul praised his efforts and humanitarian approach to the struggle, and the International Red Cross backed him up. August Lindt, a special envoy for the Red Cross, travelled to Addis Ababa to try to persuade the two parties to agree on a "mercy lane" that would expedite relief deliveries.⁵⁶ The meeting was delayed for a week on August 15th due to a lack of consensus, allowing the delegations to consider alternative ideas.

When the talks began on August 22, all parties agreed in principle to the Emperor's compromise proposal for an air and land mercy corridor to aid the war's civilian victims. The Federal Government had asked the Biafrans to hand up control of one of their critical airfields to the Red Cross so that freighter planes carrying food and medical supplies could land at a demilitarised federal airport. All rays of optimism, however, were short-lived, as General Gowon declared the start of a last attack on August 25, 1968, without waiting for the conclusion of the Addis Ababa discussions.⁵⁷ As a result, on September 4, 1968, Aba, one of the few remaining Biafran towns, came into federal control, increasing the strain on the Biafrans in Addis Ababa. They, on the other hand, were adamant in their refusal to give up. After nearly five weeks of discussions, the Addis Ababa peace talks were finally called off on September 9, 1968.⁵⁸

On September 4, 1968, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government gathered at the Club des Pins in Algiers. Houari Boumedienne presided over the event. Algeria's President, Boumedienne. It is important to note that this meeting appeared to have sealed Biafra's political fate. Nigerian and Biafran representatives, like in previous meetings, were uncompromising in their respective submissions. The Nigerian federal administration pushed on the idea of a unified country, although acknowledging the need of preserving the rights of the country's minorities, whilst the Biafran delegation insisted on independence. They argued that the Igbos could no longer live in Nigeria peacefully. By voting, the question was eventually settled in favour of a unified Nigeria. Thirty-three (33) African nations voted in favour of Nigeria; two (Rwanda and Botswana) did not vote; and the four (Tanzania, Zambia, Ivory Coast, and Gabon) that recognised Biafra voted against Nigeria.⁵⁹ Many African leaders sympathised with the humanitarian motivations underlying the four OAU members' recognition, but they disputed President Nyerere's theory that conquest-based unity is meaningless. Despite President Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast's support for President Nyerere's arguments, the fear of similar minority conflicts in their own countries was a deciding

⁵⁵ Z. Cervenka., *The Unfinished Quest for Unity: Africa and the OAU*. Julian Friedman Publishers. 1977

⁵⁶ Z. Cervenka., *The Unfinished Quest for Unity: Africa and the OAU*. Julian Friedman Publishers. 1977

⁵⁷ J. O. Aremu, and O. S. Osadola, *The Organization of African Unity and Its Mediatory Role in the Nigeria Civil War: A Historical Assessment*. *International Journal of Research*, Vol. 5, Issue 15, 2018

⁵⁸ Ibid

⁵⁹ O. S. Osadola., *A Historical Reassessment of Foreign Interests in Nigeria's War of Unity, 1967-1970*. PhD thesis, Ekiti State University, Ado Ekiti, 2019

factor on the disposition of nearly all delegates to the Algiers summit;⁶⁰ especially since most African states have similar tribal and ethnic problems. The summit also passed a resolution urging Biafran leaders to work with federal authorities to restore Nigeria's peace and unity via the cessation of hostilities. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) suggested that Nigeria's Federal Military Government proclaim a broad amnesty and cooperate with Biafra. The goal was to protect the physical safety of all Nigerian citizens until mutual trust could be rebuilt. The resolution also urged all UN and OAU members to "refrain from any action that might jeopardise Nigeria's peace, unity, and territorial integrity"⁶¹

President Tubman of Liberia, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, President Ahidjo of Cameroon, and I.K.W. Harlley of Ghana attended the last meeting of the OAU Consultative Mission on Nigeria on April 17, 1969, in Monrovia, Liberia. Diallo Telli, the OAU Secretary General, was present. The team concluded its three-day conference on April 20, 1969, without making any significant headway toward Nigeria-Biafra reconciliation. The OAU's commitment for a unified, indivisible Nigeria was reiterated in the final conclusion of the Monrovia peace talks. The Consultative Mission decided that 'in the ultimate interest of Africa, the two sides to the Civil War embrace an unified Nigeria, which provides all types of security to all inhabitants'.⁶² 'Within the parameters of this agreement, the two parties accept an immediate stop of combat and the prompt beginning of peace discussions,' it added. Following that, the consulting mission volunteered their services to help the discussions. The Biafran delegation, on the other hand, was unwilling to debate the OAU's idea of territorial integrity without first discussing what this meant.

The latest OAU effort for resolving the Nigerian issue was made on September 6, 1969, during the 6th Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. In addition to Sierra Leone, the four nations that had recognised Biafra (Gabon, Ivory Coast, Tanzania, and Zambia) abstained. Despite this, the conference passed a resolution urging the belligerents to accept the ceasefire agreement and negotiate for a united Nigeria. The resolution urged the belligerents to 'agree solemnly and urgently to preserve, in the overriding interests of Africa, the unity of Nigeria and accept immediately the suspensions of hostilities and the opening without delay of negotiations for a united Nigeria.' The OAU also urged all governments, international organisations, humanitarian institutions, and political, moral, and religious bodies around the world to refrain from taking any action that would sabotage its efforts to find a long-term solution to the Nigerian crisis.⁶³

⁶⁰ Ibid

⁶¹ G. Mwakikagile, *Africa, 1960-1970: Chronicle and Analysis*. Dar es Salaam: New Africa Press. 2009 see also T. Bello, "In Search for Peace in Africa: Organization of African Unity and the Nigeria-Biafra War, 1967-1970". *Journal of Humanities and Social Policy*. Vol. 3 No. 3. 2017 p. 30

⁶² N. U. Akpan, *The Struggle for Secession, 1966-1970: A personal Account of the Nigerian Civil War* (2nd ed.), London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1976

⁶³ Z. Cervenka, *The Unfinished Quest for Unity: Africa and the OAU*. Julian Friedman Publishers. 1977

As predicted, Ojukwu was dissatisfied with the OAU's conclusion on Nigeria's indivisibility. As a result, in a speech to the Biafran Consultative Assembly on November 1, 1969, he repeated his willingness to meet with federal officials at any time and in any location, but ruled out the OAU as a viable venue. Biafra had lost trust in the OAU, he claimed, because of its lack of vision, objectivity, bravery, and conviction.⁶⁴

Biafra and the Federal Government decided to have their last round of peace negotiations in December 1969. The Emperor Haile Selassie invited both groups to Addis Ababa. The question of whether the Emperor was acting on his own initiative or as the head of the OAU consultative mission on Nigeria sparked significant debate. Biafra's perspective was that it was a private effort because Biafra had refused to cooperate with the OAU in any way.⁶⁵ The Nigerian Ambassador to Addis Ababa, Olu Sani, requested clarification, and on December 17, 1969, he stated that the Ethiopian foreign minister, Ketema Yifru, had assured him that the discussions were convened by the Emperor inside the framework of the OAU. The discussions were never held as a result of this deadlock, and the Biafran delegation, led by Pius Okigbo, who had already arrived in Addis Ababa, went home on December 18, 1969.

By the end of 1969, the Biafran Army's morale was quickly deteriorating, and desertions were common.⁶⁶ The starving troops put down their weapons and vanished into the jungle or among the throngs of frightened refugees. Refugees jammed the highways in little remained of Biafran land, and refugee camps and communities were congested. The Nigerian Air Force's MIGs (Mikoyan Gurevich aircraft of Russian origin) were strafing the escape routes frequently, adding to the terror that was growing by the day.

CONCLUSION

The two sides involved in the war; Nigerian government and the secessionist, provided several diplomatic strategies in winning the war as well as sympathy of the international community. These strategies further prolonged the war and cause more damages. France's support for the Biafran separatists during the Nigerian Civil War was a major source of contention for Anglo-French relations in the late 1960s, particularly in the final eighteen months of the Biafran war when French involvement directly opposed British policy in the region.

The OAU made valiant attempts to bring the Nigerian civil war to a peaceful conclusion. Indeed, it made efforts that were not only timely, but also sporadic and concentrated. However, their efforts to mediate in the Nigerian civil war failed to end the conflict. The last meeting of the Biafran cabinet took place on the morning of January 10, 1970. Colonel Ojukwu stated that he would

⁶⁴ G. O. Ojukwu., *Biafra: Selected Speeches with Journal of events*. New York: Harper and Row. 1969

⁶⁵ J. O. Aremu, and O. S. Osadola, *The Organization of African Unity and Its Mediatory Role in the Nigeria Civil War: A Historical Assessment*. *International Journal of Research*, Vol. 5, Issue 15, 2018

⁶⁶ Z. Cervena., *The Unfinished Quest for Unity: Africa and the OAU*. Julian Friedmann Publishers. 1977, p. 107

depart Biafra 'in pursuit of peace,' and named Colonel Phillip Effiong as his Chief of Staff to run the country while he was gone (Cervenka, 1977:207). Colonel Effiong offered General Gowon the unconditional surrender of Biafra the on January 12, 1970. Thus, on Thursday, January 15, 1970, the event took place at army headquarters in Dodan Barracks, Lagos. Colonel Phillip Effiong presented General Gowon with a paper in front of the Supreme Military Council, the Administrators of the Central Eastern State, A.U. and other high-ranking military and political leaders.

Findings further revealed that the two sides involved in the war adopted strategies with the intent of winning the war. These strategies are for the purpose of manoeuvring; varying from propaganda and weapon acquisition, to positioning and formation of military personnel.⁶⁷ The study concluded that the intervention of foreign nations, bodies and organisation did both harm and good to the process of disintegration. It further concludes that there is need for government to invest more in reducing the mistrust that the war caused. They should further ensure a peaceful settlement and reconciliation of the leading ethnic groups in Nigeria to curb the new dimensions (IPOB & Oduduwa)⁶⁸ targeted at disintegrating the nation.

⁶⁷ J. Oluleye, *Military Leadership in Nigeria 1966-1979* (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1985), p. 131. See also, E. Ibeadi, "Looking beyond Inanities in the Nigerian Civil war", *Journal of African Studies*, (vol.14, No.2), p. 134.

⁶⁸ J. Ibrahim, "Resolving the Igbo Question," Premium Times, 30 November 2015, <http://blogs.premiumtimesng.com/?p=169859>. 2015