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SOME PROBLEMS OF REALIZATION OF HUMANITARIAN AID IN BORANA ZONE, ETHIOPIA

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ABSTRACT: *Disaster is a serious of the functioning community or a society. In response to disaster, Humanitarian Aid Agencies operates under challenging environment. Historically, Borana zone is among the area from the southern part of Ethiopia which is highly vulnerable to both natural and manmade disaster. The researcher aim to identify problem Humanitarian aid agencies faced during their operation. The researcher employed descriptive research design and purposive sampling technique. And data was collected from 139 respondents through questionnaire, FGD and interview. The finding revealed that; there is the serious prevalence of communication barriers, fund shortage and allocation problems, lack of physical infrastructure and facilities, lack of control and follow up among Humanitarian Aid Agencies and government bodies, lack of collaboration among humanitarian agencies, lack of coordination among government and None Governmental Organizations officials. And drought, disease and economic crises are the top three disasters that are being major cause for humanitarian aid. In general, based the findings the researcher recommended that HAAs, Government bodies and Pastoral communities should set solution for the issue at hand.*

KEY WORDS: disaster, humanitarian aid agency, disaster relief logistics, humanitarian aid and relief supply.

INTRODUCTION

The term disaster is defined by many institutions and scholars e.g. FEMA defined disaster as an event that causes 100 deaths or 100 human injuries or damage worth US$ 1 million. Usually, the term ''disaster'' refers to a ''disruption that physically affects a system as a whole and threatens its priorities and goals'' (Van Wassenhove, 2006).

In broad-spectrum, disaster classified into two major categories, these are; Manmade and Natural disaster. Manmade disaster also has two major features (i) Sudden onset disaster such as Terrorism attack, coups detat, industrial accident, etc. which are known by their collective name destruction action (ii) Slow onset disaster such as political and refugee crisis, civil war etc which are known by their collective name crises (Van Wassenhove 2006p. 476). Natural disaster like manmade disaster also has two major features (i) Sudden onset disaster such as; earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, flooding etc. which are known by collective name calamities (ii) Slow onset such as famines, drought, poverty etc which are known by their collective name plagues (Van Wassenhove, 2006).

Whether it is natural or manmade disaster causes destruction, displacement, affects community, death etc., and results in economic loss as well. In 2007 alone, 106 natural disasters killed 17,000 people and affected 201 million more. Between May and September 2007, the Red Cross responded to natural disasters in 18 countries in Africa, 16 in the Americas, 13 in Asia, and 10 in European Nations.

However, human vulnerability to disasters is linked to countries level of development and environmental quality Peduzzi et.al, 2009 cited in (Pamela et.al, 2011). Poor and socially disadvantaged group in developing countries are particularly impacted by disaster. As their possibly to adapt to the post disaster situation or recovery from possible damages limited, relief aid is particularly importance. Under relief operation logistics is critical topic in humanitarian aid process. In response to disaster humanitarian logistics needed as critical element of an effective disaster relief process. Since disaster relief is about 80% of logistics it would follow then that the only way to achieve this is through slick/professional, efficient and effective logistics operations and more precisely, supply chain management. In 2004, earthquake and resulting Tsunami in south Asia claimed approximately 230,000 lives and displaced 1.7 million people. Over 40 countries and 700 NGOs' provide humanitarian assistance (Van Wassenhove 2006p. 476) and USA companies alone mobilized more than US$565 million (cash and in kind). World responded by donating more than $13billion (Thomas, 2006).

But, relief operation faces a number of operational challenges under humanitarian logistics supply like lack of coordination, collaboration, visibility, and logistical information primarily. They are often high stakes life in depth operations, occurs away from major traffic paths in less developed and developing regions with inadequate infrastructure, locations are frequently unknown until demand occurs, short lead times dramatically affects inventory availability, procurement and distribution, transportation and supply information is unreliable, incomplete, or non-existent, and many relief operations are ad hoc and poorly structured. On the other hands, in countries facing chronic crisis, a dependence on aid can develop as communities and individuals come to expects international relief, they lose self-reliance and depend on aid (Edaward.R, 2005).

In Horn of Africa where Ethiopia is member USAID estimated that 12.4 million people in Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya require immediate lifesaving humanitarian assistance with the root cause of drought and climate change, population growth, deforestation and land degradation, conflict and political instability, low agricultural productivity and soaring food price (Terefe, 2012). Specifically drought is noticeable occasions in Ethiopia mainly in pastoral community where pastoralist is the livelihood of the majority of people living in the dry lands of Southern Ethiopia mainly living in arid and semi-arid areas where agriculture and other livelihoods are not viable options. They rely highly on livestock for economic and social purposes in "environment with dynamic, non-equilibrium ecologies" (Frank, Justin Gennetti and Travis, 2014).

Therefore, disaster is a serious of the functioning community or a society causing widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses which exceed the ability of the affected community to cope using its own resource. In response to disaster, victim community needs national and international community interference, which is mainly practiced through HAA aid

logistics supply to affected area. But, they face a number of operational challenges while supplying relief aid to the victim community:-

One among the challenges mentioned in Ethiopia by McLaughlin, 2004 as cited in (Russel, 2005) in contrary to its advantage, it affects the aid disrupt local economies, develop dependence, and create surpluses. Aid group brought in cooking oil as part of food program. This oil directly competed with local producers and drove them out of business, which are failures to operation mission of the organization engaging in supplying relief logistics.

In addition, by late 1984 some international relief assistance began to arrive Ethiopia in response to drought that has been occurred in northern Ethiopia, the Ethiopia government did not have the infrastructure/ or logistical capacity to effectively meet the needs of those more directly affected near their homes. Some walked for 50 or 60 miles in order to receive food, and on the way countless numbers died. In 1987, mainly because of armed conflict made it difficult to deliver relief assistance and from out of $50.50 per metric ton for all donors some truckloads of food intended for civilians' centers were diverted by military officials in order to meet their own soldiers and armed supporters (J.keller, 1992).

According to (UNDP, 2010), every year between June to November in Ethiopia Gambella region 2-4 month faces flooding. In 2009, particularly in eastern and northeastern parts of the country more than 6.4 million people are chronically food insecure, are being supported through emergency humanitarian assistance. These humanitarian agencies under operation faced the problem of contingency planning and funding, coordination with national policy and strategy, relief oriented program and knowledge base for disaster risk from both agencies and the government officials side.

Even though Ethiopia as a country and Oromia (Borana Zone) as the regional state encounter many disaster related events from year to year for a long period of time but, it gets less attention. For this reason, there are only few papers that have been done which are not directly related with this topic of study and areas under this case study. But, obviously there are operational challenges encountered HAA while supplying relief logistics as a worldwide. In addition, still there is no critical evidence identifies by study in Ethiopia. But, this challenge is originally beyond the community self-relief/aid ability except some papers mentioned above which have been studied before long period of time and which lacks relevance and also which might not be applied to this topic of study as well. Due to these facts, this study does assessed some problems of realization of humanitarian aid in Borana zone pastoral community. This area is known by numbers of international aid agency extensive operational related to disaster.

In the main aim of this study is assessing and identifying some problems of realization of humanitarian aid in Borana Zone. And specifically, the study aimed to address:

1. To assess operational difficulty HAAs faces in disaster relief logistics supply.
2. To identify the coverage of HAAs disaster relief aid supply trend in Borana Zone.
3. To identify the success and failure record of HAAs in operation in Borana Zone.
4. To determine the threat of external environment on HAAs in disaster logistics operation.

The study was able to identify the result for problems that hinder success of humanitarian agencies to achieve goal of relief logistics supply, it directly related with operations of HAAs,

DPPO, Pastoral Community and Pastoral office. I believe that, study could able to fill the research gap in the area, and provides the basis for further research which is rear in this field of study, particularly in Ethiopia.

Geographically the scope of the study was limited to humanitarian aid logistics operation in Oromia regional state specifically Borana Zone out of which 10 disaster vulnerable districts among which data was collected from 8 districts. It also focused only on challenges of humanitarian agencies face those which engaged in supplying humanitarians' assistance at post-disaster relief operations. Data that is used for the purpose for this have been collected from HAAs, DPPO, Pastoral Community and Pastoral office.

LITERATURE REVIEW

This part of the study incorporates basic theoretical/conceptual and empirical literature used for undertaking this study.

Introduction to disaster and humanitarian logistics

The definition of disaster is vast in its scope of application. Among the definition the one is a general definition of disasters that is given by the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) (UN, 2004) i.e. a disaster is a serious disruption of the functioning of society, posing a significant, widespread threat to human life, health, property or the environment, whether caused by accident, nature or human activity, and whether developing suddenly or as a result of complex, long-term processes. This is the general definition of disaster without separating natural disaster from the manmade disaster.

Another broad definition is a disaster being "a disruption that physically affects a system as a whole and threatens its priorities and goals" (Van Wassenhove, 2006, p.476). In addition, another definition for disaster is in terms of its impact on human and economic. That is disaster impact is a notion that can be measured through both human and economic losses (Vaillancourt, 2009). Disaster has also economic impact such as losses of farmers in drought or a number of people killed and affected Barnett, 1999 and Stromberg, 2007 cited in (Vaillancourt, 2009). The event becomes a disaster when the community's capacity to cope is overwhelmed and the status quo becomes untenable. The situation is then declared an emergency and assistance is requested (Blaikie., 1994).

Many authors divided disaster into two based on the cause of disaster i.e Natural and Man-made. The word "natural" implies that disasters are caused by nature. The term "natural disaster" is commonly used when describing the impact of natural hazard on the community. While, manmade disaster are disaster created by human being like civil war, terrorist attacks, coups d'état, industrial accidents, spread of HIV AIDS, political and refugee crises. All of them are categorized under two events of disaster whether it natural or manmade i.e. slow onset occurrence and sudden onset occurrence.

Accordingly to some authors' divides natural disaster into two forms based on the consequence on natural environment i.e. slow-onset disasters such as droughts and famines, and rapid-onset

disasters, such as earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, landslides, and volcanic eruptions. Natural disasters are common in the developing world (Geetha Nagarajan, 1998).

Dealing disaster is not easy task, since disaster by its nature is something beyond the ability of community that needs internal and external party to engage themselves to help the community that face disaster. So that, disaster needs proper management to save current life and future life of people and economy. That is possible if and only if there disaster management which is often described as a process composed of several stages, even though there is disagreement among authors as to the structure and nomenclature of the stages (Cozzolino et al. 2012). These are; Mitigation, Preparation, Response and Reconstruction (Apte, 2009)

Humanitarian logistics and its importance for relief

This topic deals with two important points' i.e. humanitarian logistics definition and the importance of humanitarian logistics for relief operation.

Humanitarian logistics definition

The following are among the operational definition that is given by different scholars and organizations for humanitarian logistics:

Humanitarian Logistics is defined as the process of planning, implementing and controlling the efficient, cost-effective flow and storage of goods and materials, as well as related information, from the point of origin to the point of consumption for the purpose of alleviating the suffering of vulnerable people (Pettit, 2008). This author has defined humanitarian logistics from the general scope of logistics and humanitarian logistics to the specific goal of humanitarian logistics.

In addition, the humanitarian logistics definition given by Thomas (2007) refers to "the processes and systems involved in mobilizing people, resources, skills, and knowledge to help vulnerable people affected by natural disasters and complex emergencies. It encompasses a range of activities, including procurement, transport, tracking and tracing, customs clearance, local transportation, warehousing and last mile delivery". In this case humanitarian logistics beyond the deal with logistics supply that it is the process and system of dealing with people and mobility of people affected by disaster. And it includes all activities needed to address people under humanitarian needs. Based on this idea Thomas (2007) developed supply chain for humanitarian relief logistics. See figure 2.3.

Based on figure 2.3 the supply chain of humanitarian logistics is not an easy task to be done overnight, rather it is time taking long term process to accomplish the task and aim of humanitarian relief. It involves at least eight step excluding evaluation which is done after the delivery of relief logistics to the target community and to achieve the objective of humanitarian logistics and agencies.

In order to address the humanitarian logistics objective, humanitarian or emergency supplies are need. These emergency supplies are the part of humanitarian logistics which includes those goods, materials, and equipment used by organizations to provide relief in a disaster, particularly those required to meet the essential needs of the affected population. Such supplies cover an enormous spectrum in types of relief logistics needed based on the condition of disaster relief needs i.e. food, drugs, and clothing to rescue equipment, electric generators, construction materials, and tools (Health, 2001).

In addition, humanitarian logistics during emergencies requires; delivery of the appropriate supply in good condition, when and where needed, a wide range of transport reach and local level, limited, rapid, and specific deliveries from outside the area affected, a system of prioritizing various relief inputs, storing, staging, and moving bulk commodities and moving people, coordination and prioritization of the use of limited and shared transport assets (UNJLC, 2008). Humanitarian logistics also encompasses the relocation of the disaster affected people, transfer of causalities, and the movement of relief workers.

The definitions of humanitarian logistics given by different organizations are listed below:

A. GHD: This is from the Stockholm in 2003 definition of humanitarian assistance which defined based on the distinctive purpose and principles of humanitarian action. The purpose of humanitarian assistance is to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity. While the objective of humanitarian logistics are autonomous/independent from political, economic or other objectives.
B. DAC: According to DAC humanitarian aid is assistance designed to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain and protect human dignity during and in the aftermath of emergencies. And also humanitarian aid should be consistent and fit with the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence".
C. United Nations: This organization definition for humanitarian assistance support the first three DAC humanitarian principles namely:
   i. Humanity: The dignity and rights of all victims must be respected and protected.
   ii. Neutrality: Humanitarian assistance must be provided without engaging in hostilities or taking sides in controversies of a political, religious or ideological nature.
   iii. Impartiality: Humanitarian assistance must be provided without discriminating as to ethnic origin, gender, nationality, political opinions, race or religion and to the most urgent needs.
D. FEWER: This definition is also different in scope and goal from the above three. It emphasized on the "The range of activities designed to reduce human suffering in emergency situations, especially when local authorities are unable or unwilling to provide relief. Actions includes; the provision of food, shelter, clothing, medication through organized facilities; evacuating the innocent and vulnerable from conflict or emergency zones; restoring basic services (water, sewage, power supplies);and burying remains". See figure 2.4.

The purpose of humanitarian relief chain is to rapidly provide the appropriate emergency supplies to people affected by natural and man-made disasters so as to minimize human suffering and death" (Balcik & Beamon, 2008, p. 51). It is also central to disaster relief for several reasons. First, it is crucial to the effectiveness and speed of response for major humanitarian programs, such as health, food, shelter, water, and sanitation. Second, it can be one of the most expensive parts of a relief effort (e.g. procurement and transportation). Third, it is often the repository of data that can be analyzed to provide post-event learning (Pettit, 2008).

Furthermore, the potential of humanitarian logistics can be seen from two perspective of the players or organization i.e. from a national view point, for the economic and humanitarian development of a country and its population Baumgarten 2010b, .p.461 cited in (Kessler, 2013). See figure 2.4.

The importance of humanitarian relief logistics

But, the effectiveness of humanitarian aid for people in emergency and crisis situations is essentially dependent on logistics capabilities (Fritz, 2005). In relation with economic it has a significant economic importance (Thomas and Fritz, 2006), and official development assistance alone accounted for US $ 103.7 billion in 2007 according to (OECD, 2008), without including private donors.Logistics can also be a success factor for aid agencies in the competition for donations; it facilitates or accelerates the whole chain of humanitarian operations, from purchasing and storage to distribution of aid goods (Howden, 2009). Logistics costs 60 to 80 percent of the total cost of humanitarian aid. On the cost side, logistics is the most important tool to making humanitarian aid more efficient (Kessler, 2013). In addition, according to (Thomas A.P., and Kopczak, L.R., 2005), the importance of logistics for aid agencies have been seen in three ways; the 1st, logistics is the bridge between preparation measures and coping with humanitarian emergency situations, between purchasing and distribution, between headquarters and operative fieldwork. 2nd, logistics is decisive for efficiency and effectiveness for the supply of food, healthcare, sanitation, water and accommodation, which one of the biggest cost component. 3rd, logistics provides a wide range of essential data and statistics to enable lessons to be learned from the future mistakes made in the past. See figure 2.5.

Logistics is the most important element in any disaster relief effort, and it is the one that makes the difference between a successful and a failed operation (Van Wassenhove, 2006). But, it is also the most expensive part of any disaster relief: it has been estimated that logistics accounts for about 80% of the total costs in disaster relief (Van Wassenhove, 2006). According to Balcik and Beamon (2008, p. 102) cited in Spens (2009) summarize crucial characteristics of humanitarian logistics (as different from business logistics) to consist of the: unpredictability of demand, in terms of timing, location, type, and size, suddenness of the occurrence of demand in large amounts but with short lead times for a wide variety of supplies, high stakes associated with the timeliness of deliveries; and lack of resources in terms of supply, people, technology, transportation capacity and money.

In general according to Thomas (2007) the importance of humanitarian logistics is classified into three relevant levels:

- Logistics operate as a link between two areas the disaster preparedness linked with the quick response; procurement flow with the distribution of the selected items that need to work together. Finally, logistics also connect the headquarters with the resources on field.
- Logistics are essential for an effective, efficient and positive response. Right items, sent to the right beneficiaries at the right time. Water, food, shelter, health and sanitation items are covered thanks to the logistics functions.
- The information kept by logisticians over the track of items sent to the disasters zones, becomes a very useful tool to be used during the conflict as well as in future worldwide disasters. It becomes an enormous source of information, which is called by the mentioned author as a post-event learning process. As Thomas explains, this data reflects all aspects of execution, from the effectiveness of suppliers and transportation providers, to the cost and timeliness of response, to the appropriateness of donated goods and the management of information.

History of disaster and relief aid in Ethiopia and Borana Zone

In African developing countries, 70% of the total population live in rural areas, but also, as a result of the poor accessibility of these areas, the effects of hunger and disease are particularly extreme there (Kessler, 2013). In Rwanda, small country mountainous and landlocked state, due to civil war of 1990s, two million refugees had to provide humanitarian logistics, but country have no railways there is only one airport and transporting logistics aid were possible only through using route of other neighborhood country which takes long period of time. This is among the remarkable experience of humanitarian logistics in Africa.

History of disaster and relief in Ethiopia

In Ethiopia, even though country is not among the top five countries of which are dependent on food aid (i.e Eritrea, Somalia, Mauritania, Zimbabwe and Lesotho). But, Ethiopia is among the leading countries which receives the largest quantities of humanitarian aid (approximate one million tons/annum) followed by Sudan (approximate 430,000 tons/annum), Kenya (approximate 230,000 tons/annum) and Uganda, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Eritrea (each over 100,000 tons/annum). Overall states of sub-Saharan Africa in which is the part receives around 60 percent of global food aid (Tschirley, 2010).

As the history, the relief aid comes to existence in Ethiopia by late 1970s' when horn of Africa was hate by the hunger and war. Natural disaster is not new phenomena to the region and recorded at least seven major droughts each century. But, in current era they have been increasing in part due to massive deforestation and the changing pattern of weather. Ethiopia alone lost 30,000 million tons of soil each year due to deforestation, the severity of famine and intensity of civil nowhere more than in Ethiopia (J.Keller, 2002).

The government of Ethiopia was aware of the severity of the drought and the needs of relief aid and accepted outside assistance by mid of 1973. At the time international relief aid donors/Humanitarian agency such as World Food Programme, UNICEF and the USAID provided relief aid. By this year one million people were at the risk of starvation in Ethiopia region of Wollo and Tigray only. Relief camps set up by August 1973 mainly administered by the Ethiopia Red Cross to provide for 60,000 victims, nearly 200,000 had died of famine, disease and malnutrition before the end of the year. At the time 20% of inhabitants, 90% Animals in Wollo and 80% crop had been lost (J.Keller, 2002).

After fourteen years by 1987 the same history have been repeated with widespread cause of people under need of relief aid which is 2.5 million people famine due to the shortage meher rains. By the end of 1987 drought had returned more than 5 million people were at risk in Eritrea, Wollo and Tigray (J.Keller, 2002).

According to 2007-2008 Human Development Report of UNDP, Ethiopia ranked 169th out of 177 countries signifying the massive challenge facing in achieving the MDGs. A large number of people are vulnerable to natural and man-made crisis. The nature of the economy makes the country exposed and vulnerable to environmental shocks which often translate into disaster. Floods, epidemics, drought and conflict are the most frequent hazards and on average 1.6 million people are affected. Flood affected 428,800 people nationally in 2006 of which 211, 100 were displaced, especially in Gambella region 2-4 months of the flooding every year which result in immediate disease outbreaks. In 2009 in eastern and northern part of the Ethiopia more

than 6.4 million people chronically food in secure are being supported through emergency humanitarian assistance. See figure 2.6.

History of disaster and relief aid Borana Zone

The history of disaster in Borana Zone highly tied with recurrent drought. It goes back to early 1969. According to Fassil et.al (2001), the slow-onset natural disaster has been divided into five major seasons which is categorized based on the earlier Borana Gada ruler period. 1st, during Gada Goba (1969-1976), drought did not cover the whole Borana, duration of the drought was short and people escaped from drought except few cases death. At the time the Ethiopian government was not aware of the drought. Only Norwegian Church Aid was helping the people during this period. 2nd, during Gada Jilo (1977-1984), for three there was no rainfall, drought was acute and covered the whole Borana. Among remarkable occasions that were happened due to the disappearance of humanitarian agency were many animals died and people were forced to eat died animals. Later on relief aid reached and saved people lives. Children died even after acquiring relief aid. 3rd, during Gada Boru Guyo (1985-1992), even though drought affects some parts Borana, during their movement from one place to the other movement were affected by conflict between Geri Clan and the Borana death were recorded. 4th, during Gada Boru Medha (1993-2000) drought occurred in Yabello and Teltelle areas. Many mobility was hindered by conflict, but people move to Arero area where better grazing. However, no any aid mentioned. 5th, during Gada Liban Jeldessa (2001 on) even though there was good rain, but due to effects of previous drought some household still depend on relief aid.

Moreover according to Angasse A. & Oba G., 2007, 2006, 2008 and 2010–2011 (USAID, 2011) cited in RAN evidence on drought-related events in Borana Zone (Birhanu, Zewdie, May 2015). Making source of information Napier, A. and Desta, S. 2011 paper done on the review of pastoral rangeland enclosures in Ethiopia, they identified seven drought events with different consequences from 1961–2011 by classifying to Borana Gada administrators (Abbaa Gadaa) at the time. See table 2.1 and figure 6.

In relation with the history of relief aid, it has been channeled to Borana pastoralists since 1974 by food aid which organized by local mission financing NCA (Fassil Kebebew, 2001). Since 1984, the Dikicha Villages were totally depends on relief aid for 12 months in each year uninterrupted except 1997 and 2001 where the relief assistance was only for 8 months. The main suppliers of the relief aid are Care and Mekane Yesus Church supported by NCA. By year 2000, 90% of population (around 81,000) of Dire district were said to require relief assistance. After two month figure of the some district showed 64,000 people required relief assistance. Out of this figure of population Care was requested to feed 18,000 populations in the month of August and September 2001. They face problem to select from 64,000 people due to disagreement between local NGO's on information from DPPC's (Geetha Nagarajan, 1998).

Recently in Borana Zone by 2014 only 2.7 million people were required emergency food assistance due to the inter clan conflict and recurrent drought. People were displaced from 14 kebeles of Guji and Borana Zone, provision of public social service was disrupted in the affected kebeles. At the time humanitarian agencies like UNICEF, ERCS, DRMFSS, IOM, Mercy Corps, and (OCHA, 2014).

Challenges of humanitarian agencies in disaster relief supply

As the effect of disaster on the life of society continue it needs the continue involvement and engagements of humanitarian agencies. So that, humanitarian agencies have both role and challenges at addressing disaster. The next two sub-topics deals with the role and challenges of humanitarian agencies in addressing relief supply.

Operational challenges of Humanitarian Aid Agencies

Even though the degree of challenges differs from country to country, the humanitarian agencies are operating with diverse community with diverse need for addressing the issues of relief supply.

In Ethiopia as mentioned under literature part of "history of disaster and relief aid in Ethiopia"**,** there were millions of people under the coverage of emergency humanitarian assistance. At that time National disaster management policy was operating under a number of drawbacks which is categorized under unable to address the issue of reducing vulnerability and disaster risks, continued reliance on relief as means of addressing disasters and inability to undertake recovery activities (Ethiopia government and United Nation development report, 2010).

The humanitarian agencies under the operation were also faced the problem of contingency planning and funding, coordination with national policy and strategy, relief oriented program and knowledge base for disaster risk is weak (Ethiopia government and United Nation development report, 2010).

As identified by (Thomas A.P., and Kopczak, L.R., 2005) there are certain common challenges face the field of humanitarian logistics.

A. **Lack of Recognition of the Importance of Logistics:** Most humanitarian organizations have two broad categories of activities: programs and support services. A program refers to the front-line activities in relief and development, the provision of services such as food, water, shelter, sanitation, etc. Support services refer to the activities of the "back room", which support the front line: logistics, technology, finance, communication, human-resources, etc. Funds are usually allocated by donors to programs with a certain percentage allowed for administration, which includes support.

Thus, the focus is on short term direct relief rather than investment in systems and processes that will reduce expenses or make relief more effective over the long-term. As a consequence, logistics and other support services may not have adequate funding for strategic disaster preparedness, and investing in infrastructure, such as information systems, is discouraged.

A related challenge has to do with the fact that most decisions during a relief operation are made by the program staff who control the budget. The assessment team sent to determine the needs of the population affected by a disaster or humanitarian crisis often does not include a logistician. Based on the assessment, the program staff determines the supplies that need to be procured in order to provide relief services, and then inform logistics that they are responsible for the immediate procurement and transport to the field. Our survey of the largest aid agencies after the Tsunami showed that 42% of the assessment teams did not include a logistician. Since, as seen in the Tsunami response, logisticians are often not consulted in the decision process,

some of the logistics bottlenecks are not anticipated and planned for causing unnecessary delays in delivering relief.

Lack of Professional Staff: In general, humanitarian organizations are defined by their personnel, who share a common value system based on alleviating the suffering of those affected by disasters and humanitarian emergencies. People who choose a career in this world come from diverse and varied backgrounds and are driven by a desire to resolve crises and do good in the world. They achieved their positions by trial and error and have honed their valuable skills through experience in multiple disaster theaters over several decades. However, the vast majority of people with logistics responsibilities do not have training in logistics.

Inadequate Use of Technology: Our survey of logisticians that participated in the Tsunami relief operations showed that only 26% of the respondents had access to any tracking and tracing software. The remainder used Excel spreadsheets or manual processes for updates and tracking of the goods arriving in the field. Despite this, 58% stated that they received accurate and timely information of what was in the pipeline!

Lack of Institutional Learning: The intensity of relief efforts, high turnover and the crisis-oriented nature of disaster response creates an environment in which there is a lack of institutional learning. Once a crisis is dealt with, aid workers are immediately assigned to the next mission, rather than taking the time needed to reflect and improve.
Input from the organizations we interviewed suggested that turnover of field logistics personnel was as high as 80% annually. Thus, while logisticians have a remarkable track record for getting the job done under the most adverse and extreme circumstances, the lessons learned from one disaster to the next are often lost. The experience of the occasional veteran logistician is largely tacit and difficult to communicate to the next generation, nor is it transferred from one field context to another.

Limited Collaboration: With the emerging competition for funding among major relief organizations, the heads of logistics tend to each fight their own battles with little collaboration. Although many of them face the same challenges and know each other, or of each other, they do not often meet or talk to one another except during an actual disaster response operation.
After hurricane Katrina, the challenges faced by FEMA are across all the stages of planning, management, and sustainment (W.Smith, 2009).

ARC faces numerous challenges in their logistics system in the process of responding to natural disasters, preparing communities through education for safety in health, delivering blood, and many such services. Lack of visibility of supplies once they leave the warehouse, damages and lost physical infrastructure; such as roads and communications. Managing personnel capacity and assistance from local communities give rise to challenges in assigning right people to right tasks at right time (R.Parnell, 2009).

Bureau for Global Health, USAID, believes that there exists a need for strong public sector pharmaceutical supply chain that is managed well. Current supply chain systems are multiple and hence complex with diverse sources of supply. This is a challenge for managing inventory and distribution which subsequently dictates more research. Another complication in this

supply is counterfeit medicines, which create issues such as contamination and disruption in a supply chain though there exists some research in this field, more is needed (B. Emrey, 2009). As a country Ethiopia faced the number of challenges in such as a disconnect between DRR (Disaster Risk Reduction) and climate change institution, partly due to overlapping mandates, lack of responsiveness at the local level, there is significant gaps in capacity continue to exist within all government bodies at federal and district level, knowledge and communication remains considerable hurdle at the lower levels of government administration (NGO SWISS, 2015).

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This section sets out various phases that have been followed in completing the study. It involves a blueprint for the description of the study area, research approach and design, sample design, sampling techniques, data source and collection, data codifying and analysis. This is an overall scheme, the structure conceived to help the study in answering raised research questions. Specifically, the following subsections are include; research methodology and methods, data source and collection instrument, sampling procedure and finally data Analysis/processing.

Description of study area

The fieldwork of this study focused on Borana Zone of Southern Ethiopia. The elevation varies from 500 to 2500 m. Over 95,000 km2 in size, it is home to over 350,000 people with a livestock population fluctuating around a million. The climate is largely semi-arid with relatively cool annual temperatures (19-24°C) and a mean annual rainfall ranging from 300 mm in the lowland up to 1000 mm in highland. It is worth pointing out that the annual precipitation distribution is bimodal, with 60% from April to May and 30% from October to November. Vegetation in Borana is mainly comprised of a mixed savanna, which is dominated by perennial grasses (*Cenchrus*, *Pennisetum*, and *Chrysopogon spp.*) and woody plants (*Acacia* and *Commiphora spp.*). This makes the livelihood of the Borana difficult and mainly based on the aid from the international aid agency in addition to man-made disaster like civil war (CSA, 2007).

Relief aid has been channeled to this pastoral area since 1970s. Food aid to pastoralists in Ethiopia and indicated that the first food aid to pastoralists, and food aid to Borana pastoralists, organized by local missions with financing from NCA (Norwegian Church Aid). Thereafter, food aid to pastoralists became a regular feature of Ethiopia's and specifically Borana. This study tried has addressed the relief aid situations as perceived by the local communities and other stakeholders in the study areas of Borana Zone. In addition, the Borana area has been politically unstable, characterized by unrest and confrontation between competing pastoralists and other groups. See figure 7.

Research Approach and Design

Mixed research approach has been used; because it involves both qualitative and quantitative data which often relies on data in the form of descriptions that study takes out sample(s) and then wishes to make statement about the population on the basis of the sample analysis or analyses. Qualitative approach is used to analysis of primary data like perception/public opinion survey, focus group discussion, interviews and observations without formal measurement. Concurrently, quantitative approach is used in analyzing secondary data and data

collected in the form of questionnaire and semi-structured questionnaire applying statistical tools.

Concerning research design, since the study aim to identify challenges of supplying disaster relief logistics this would help to identifying the coverage of humanitarian relief logistics, the extent to involvement of humanitarian agency, their success and failures as well and to determine degree to which these challenge may occur. So, descriptive research design is appropriate to be used for this study. It sets out to describe, interpret and necessitate having a clear picture of the phenomena on which researcher collected data as well as used to examine the state of affairs as it exists at present, since the objective of the study was examining challenges of Humanitarian Agencies. In addition descriptive research design advice the study to make enough provision to protect against bias and must maximize reliability.

Sample design and Sampling Procedures

This study adopted non-probability or purposive sampling a method of collecting information through questionnaire, interview, public opinion survey, FGD and observation to a sample of individuals. The target populations for the study were all humanitarian organizations; public organizations in the sector like DPPO. Pastoral Office and victim community live in ten (10) district from Borana Zone of Oromia regional state. These districts have been selected based on their needs for annual humanitarian assistance within past five years since 2011.Hence research sample in qualitative research are usually purposive, sample size/sampling participants are selected because they are likely to generate useful data for the study. To ensure that this sample is credible, and covers the main groups we are interested according to Tom Beauchamp and Jim Childress (1983). Since population of the study was involve major humanitarian agencies operating in Borana Zone of Dillo, Moyale, Miyo, Dhas, Arero, Yabello, Teltelle, Dire, Melka Soda, Dugda Dawa woreda's. Melka Soda and Dugda Dawa districts were left out of the sample due to their low vulnerability to humanitarian assistance in comparison with others. So that, data have been collected from 8 woreda's Disaster Preparedness and Prevention offices, Pastoral office, pastoralists' communities and 18 NGOs/HAAs' involved in humanitarian aid. It has been collected in the form questionnaire of open and close ended, focus group discussion, interview and personal observation. Here 20 (Twenty) individuals were participated in interview, 85 (eighty five) peoples in focus group discussion, and 34 (thirty four) respondents were participated in questionnaire response. Here due to limitation we were faced during collecting information through questionnaire we have added 45 (forty five) additional participants to what was planned to be collected through focus group discussion in proposal part. We also found this as opportunity to discuss and address the issue more. Totally, data was collected from 139 (one hundred thirty nine) respondents participated in questionnaire, FGD and interview responses.

Data Sources and Collection Instruments

For purpose of this study, data was obtained both from primary and secondary sources. The primary data was collected in the form of public opinion survey, focus group discussion, interviews and observations. The secondary data was collected in the form of a reviewing key document on the subject includes humanitarian logistics articles, official documents and organizational reports, newspapers and books. This source of data is mainly used for elaborating information collected through primary source.

Data Analysis Techniques

First data reduction, data display, conceptualization, coding, categorizing conclusion drawing and verification were done. Due to the nature of the study, we have used mixed approaches of research design and data is presented in form of numeric and no-numeric. The study employed both qualitative and quantitative data analysis techniques (Excel, Percentage and Frequency for analysis).

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

This part of the paper presents research discussion and findings.

The presentation and analysis of organizational and personal Data

This part of the data analysis and presentation contains information regarding source of information i.e organizational and personal who were during the collection of data.

Organizational Data
See table 4.1 and figure 8.

Personal data/Background of the respondents
As indicated in table 4.2 the main interview and FGD informants are from four type of sources (HAAs, DPPO, Pastoral office and Pastoral community). The large number of interview and FGD we made with HAAs and Pastoral Community leaders in 8 woredas'. For the rest two sources (Pastoral office and DPPO) interview and FGD made with their managers and expert is limited to few respondents which is around 20 percent (21 respondents only) due to their population limitations.

Data analysis and interpretations
This part contains information collected in the form of questionnaire from the respondents and this information is supported by FGD, interview and observation from the field during analysis. And it has four sub-parts developed from the objectives of the study in order to address the research question.

Operational difficulty HAAs faces in disaster relief logistics supply operation
Information collected on this part is emphasized on the challenges that humanitarian organizations face during their field and office operations. This is highly supported by FGD and interview made with the humanitarians organizations, pastoralist community, facts observed by researcher during data collections and information collected from Disaster Preparedness and Prevention offices.
As indicated in table 4.3, the evidence from the respondents illustrate on communication barriers. In relation with this, 58.82 percent of the respondents agree humanitarian agencies face lack communication. But around 41.17 percent of the respondents disagree that humanitarian logistics operation is not affected by communication barriers.

In supporting this challenge, the interview respondents have mentioned some points which influenced the communication in their humanitarian operations. These are, the obstacle of network to use electronic banking, distorted flow of information from federal to kebele level and lack of documentation among government office i.e. lack of proper documentation of beneficiary data are among setback mentioned. In similar fashion, WFP during their

humanitarian logistics supply in Zimbabwe "some operations were hampered by lack of information and communication technology (Mbohwa, 2012)".

As indicated in the table 4.3, the information related to appropriate monitoring and evaluation is also collected from the respondents. And, 100 percent response have shown that, there is proper monitoring and evaluation in relief supply operation. This information is supported by interview made with DPPO "the monitoring and evaluation activities of relief supply operation is undertaken through cooperation among pastoralist office, water supply emergency, health office, disaster management and BoFED". But, here basic the problem is to what extent the result of joint work have seen in practice? This is far from reality mention by the interview respondents since gaps have been mentioned by victims' community.

Regarding fund allocation effects on disaster relief logistics operation, 94.12 percent of the responds from humanitarian agency agree as allocation of funds is a basic problem to disaster relief logistics operation. But, 5.88 percent of the humanitarian organizations are not among those challenged by fund allocation problem. This indicates the majority of humanitarian logistics operations are operating under fund shortage. In addition, data collected from interviewee source also supported the majority (94.12 percent) response that, the fund allocation is basic challenge to humanitarian organization due to; high demand for relief logistics and limited funds to cover it. This result in failure to address target victims, inaccessibility of funds on time, sometimes funds are purely allocated for administrative cost instead using for relief supply to victim community, humanitarian organizations are significantly influenced over where to prioritize and how aid is distributed. While victims' communities are third party with insignificant voice in the manner, and funding for organizational support and infrastructure cases are often neglect under the donors.

As experienced by many disaster relief operations, funding constraints were almost happened everywhere recurrent drought happened. This happened due to donations aim only to specific disaster affected areas, and fulfilling donor's desires. In addition donors demand for transparency and accountability among the funding allocation requirements (Mónica, 2011). As mentioned above the same circumstances were faced humanitarian logistics operation in Borana Zone.

The other information is directly related with the facility/infrastructure. Information collected on this problem is also presented as follows; there is co-existence on the facility problem, which is not solved by government. This indicated by questionnaire respondents 94.12 percent. The left 5.88 percent which is insignificant to the interpretation in comparison with the 94.12 percent said there are no facility problems. We understood that, those 5.88 percent respondents operation area is among improved infrastructure areas and around local cities in Borana Zone. Here, in relation with facility problem the interview respondent voiced that this facility question is raised for a long period of time by NGO's and still remain question. There is also high problem of clarity on identifying the role of development and emergency facility which can be responded with in the long period of time and within the long period of time. This contradicts with the aim of addressing the basic question of humanitarian response.

In addition, there are so many indicators regarding lack of facility to achieve proper logistics operations. These are; store or warehouse shortage, particularly at Kebele and Village level; lack of rural road; insufficient transportation; lack of pure drinking water; very weak grass root level cooperation, linkage, support, information and prioritization are basic facility problem

observed in addition to physical facility mentioned above. NGO's overcome such store facility and long distance delivery of relief logistics from the main warehouses location. The standard is at least locating distribution center/warehouse 5km away from the victim society location. But, they couldn't fit to this standard. This is basically related with the major facility problem estimated to be fulfilled by the government (e.g. road) etc. As a consequence of this, currently many of the HAA are forced to transport relief logistics more than 50km in order to reach the victims community location. In average, this will take 2 days and more for delivering the aid logistics.

Besides the facility and or infrastructural challenges most developing nations like Ethiopia both in development and humanitarian operations are under high pressure. In other Africa country in similar way, i.e. according to UNJLC the main factors which shape the response to humanitarian crises are capacity of the infrastructure, availability and quantity of the transport assets in the country, politics situations and civil conflict in the operations (UNJLC, 2008).

The other point, intervention of government during the relief operation. In relation with this, information collected from the NGO's respondents, 70.59 percent indicates there is government intervention during NGO's/HAA humanitarian logistics operation. The rest 29.41 percent of the total NGO's indicates there is no government intervention during relief operation (See table 4.3).

Interview source data:
"There is government intervention to HAA's relief aid operation. This intervention are through; screening the needs of victim community, identifying and reporting areas in need of relief aid, supervising the relief aid supply, participating and leading rehabilitation work to resettle the affected community, conducting impact follow up and repairing community contingency plan. In general, the role of government is totally facilitation through feeding information, creating cooperation with HAAs', supervising, monitoring and looking for high spotted location. Without government intervention the work done cannot kept sustainable. The extent of government support is to preparing plan in collaboration with pastoral office. But, in action it lacks basic coordination and consistency in keeping sustainability it is mainly focused on time activity".
In addition, to the above result problem encountered the Ethiopian government is evaluated as contingency planning and funding, coordination with national policy and strategy, relief oriented program and knowledge base for disaster risk is weak (Ethiopia government and United Nation development report, 2010).

The other challenge is store facility problem for relief aid and logistics; in percentage the rate of response for store facility problem is 61.76 percent and 38.23 percent for 'Yes' and 'No' response respectively. This implies, as there is high shortage of store facility amongst many HAA. This is due to the content of the relief, which is mainly food item to be kept in proper storage. But, for few HAAs' storage place is insignificantly affect their operation. According to the interview source, store facility problem is affected by other facility like road accessibility. But, this is not given due concern by the NGOs.

Among facility operations, acquisition and distribution is another points of challenge that Humanitarian Aid Agencies were evaluated against. It is one of the intensive and extensive operations in relief logistics. The success and failure in this relief logistics operation (acquisition and distribution) will aggravate the disaster victims. So that, the information

collected from HAAs', society and DPPO is helped to know the level of operations and its impact on the success of humanitarian logistics operations.

Besides, the response from the questionnaire respondents' source had shown that 29.41 percent and 70.59 percent for 'Yes' and 'No' answer respectively. As indicated in table 3 above majority of the respondent from HAAs office said that there is no distribution and acquisition problem. But still, some of the HAAs' indicate that there is challenge in acquisition and distribution of relief logistics operation. On the other hand, information collected through interview and FGD from HAAs' higher official, DPPO and community shown that as there is basic acquisition and distribution problem. These are; incorrect beneficiary data, "obviously kebele leaders neglect the poorer family". Example; one elder in Dillo kebele was not receiving the aid for two year due to negligence and wrong data recorded by kebele. The mismatch between field workers assigned to the given case with the scale of disaster happened and numbers of beneficiaries have been mentioned as one of the problem of the distribution and acquisition.

According information from FGD held with Dillo Woreda residents, "over a long period of time due to the shortage of rain fall we failed under daily support". Due to this, we are weekly taking Wheat and Oil in the form of "Saftneetii Dullatii meaning Old Seftenet progrman". But, in 2014/15 G.C the support was interrupted for six month". As they voiced, in Dillo Woreda, those immigrants comes from the neighborhoods countries (Borana Kenya meaning Borana of Oromo clan from kenya) are basic reasons for continuous support for the past one year. The researcher heard also, the case in which full store/warehouse prepared for supporting society was stolen by unknown body.

FGD source information:

"Waggaa dheera dura loon irraa hirkanna ture amma garuu loonis hin qabnu jireenyi keenya erga gargarsa namummaa irraati hirkatee ture jira". Dur midhaan illee ni ta'aa dhagaheen jira garuu umurii kiyya keessatii ni yaala malee nuuf tahee hin beeku (From 75 year old Man named Guyo Jarso) Oromo Language (Afaan Oromoo).

Translated us:

"Before a long period of time we were supporting our livelihood with our cattle now days we total living depend on humanitarian support. Before long period of time I heard that around Dillo people were live through cultivating crops. But throughout my live I didn't saw crop cultivation here in Dillo woreda (From 75 year old Man named Guyo Jarso)."

The basic gap researcher observed during data collection is that, there is no awareness among the society '*as there is alternative way of livelihood rather than herding cattle'*. But, livelihood is highly risky in Borana desert areas, as researcher have been experienced from informants, there is different drought occasion in this zone. This is also basic cause for the dependency of the society, since there are also lacks of different development infrastructure. For instance; the researcher talk with people engaged in small business. But, small business owners are those who came from the other remote areas of country for filling small business gaps. But, the native residents are the user and buyer only. Beyond that, they are looking for support from the Government and NGOs. There is almost similar condition in this perspective in the others

districts of the Borana Zone. But, relatively the number of needy people during recurrent drought is high in Miyo, Dillo and Dhas districts.

As many scholars agreed up on the aid distribution challenges (Spens, 2009, Andrew K-Y Choi, Anthony K. C. Beresford , Stephen J. Pettit and Fahd Bayusuf, 2010, Balcik, B. and Beamon, B.M., 2008, Martin Christopher, p. undated and Mbohwa, 2012), gravel roads and their condition, lack of bridges, storage and distribution facilities, lack of information and communication technology, lack of formal training for humanitarian logistics workers, lack of coordination among agencies, geographical barrier with donor countries, cultural norms, and unpredictable transit schedules are major. The researcher could witness that, these factors are among major factors which hinders aid distribution success in developing nation like Ethiopia and specifically in Borana Zone.

There is also lack of control and follow up of beneficiaries. "After distributing, most of the relief aid is taken to the market". In Yabello, Moyale, Dire and Dillo the researcher witnessed that; the relief aids particularly food items are at the hand of small shop holders' e.g. oil and wheat branded USA. As per response from HAAs, there is ways to control the use of relief aids through making meal market survey, evaluation and report, but it is not effective to control relief aid transaction. Among question beneficiary asked, why you take meal to the market? Beneficiaries answer "we took relief aid to the market in search of two things i.e. cash and need for other type of meal". Usually, exchange of meal or cash is not equivalent in quantity and duration of use with the relief aid exchange vice versa.

Regarding quantity and quality of relief aid**,** these concerns of relief support are among the basic factors that be able to show the success and failure of relief operation. So that, information is gathered on this issues from the target respondents and their response shows 91.17 percent, 8.82 percent 'Yes' and 'No' respectively as indicated in table 3, even though few disagree with this idea. This indicates the aid reach the victims on quantity and quality.
As indicated by interview informants, the quantity and quality of relief aid is affected with other factors i.e. the late deliveries and road problems despite long distance delivery to the instable areas like Moyale and Miyo woredas'.

From the experience of the past studies, political context is among the factor affecting disaster relief logistics operations. Data also collected on this factor to check whether it work in Borana Zone relief operation or not. Besides, the response from the humanitarian agencies indicated 26.47 percent and 73.53 percent response as agree and disagree respectively. This indicates the political situation has affected the relief logistics operation but it is not significantly affecting the relief logistics operation in this zone (see table 4.4).

In relation with the government policy, the data was collected as indicated in table 4 above. This information indicates 61.70 percent of the respondents agree that the influences of government policy hinder relief supply operation while the left 38.23 percent of the respondent disagree with the idea. This shows as the most of the HAAs relief operation is influenced by the government policy.

This finding on government policy influence is supported by the fact that; lack of coordination with national policy and strategy, relief oriented program and knowledge base for disaster risk is weak in Ethiopia and national disaster management policy was operating under a number of

drawbacks like unable to address the issue of reducing vulnerability and disaster risks, continued reliance on relief as means of addressing disasters and inability to undertake recovery activities (United Nation development report, 2010).

Finally, religious, environmental and cultural features are also among the factors to be influence/hinder relief supply operation. Data collected on these factors from HAAs shows that, religious influence is among the factors that hinder the relief supply operation which is supported by 100 percent respondents. But, no one mentioned which religion is strict against receiving the relief aid or not. So that, this data is invalid for making conclusion on this findings. On the other hand in relation with Environmental and Cultural feature the response rated 11.76 percent and 88.23 percent agree and disagree respectively. Even though there environmental and cultural feature influence that is not as reflected by respondents during FGD and Interview session we had with informants.

In general, taking under consideration the result of response indicated in the above table 4, government policy the top ranked factors hindering HAAs relief supply operations. This data is supported by information source from interview made with HAA leaders, DPPO office and Victim societies.

The coverage of HAAs disaster relief aid supply trend in Borana Zone

Under this research question and or objective, the focus of information collected is indicated in table 4.5 revolves around the six basic question. These are analyses in detail as following:

Does the relief aid cover all those that are under the need of relief aid? As response collected from the respondents indicated 85.29 percent and 14.70 percent responded ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ respectively. This indicates as the relief aid was not covering all people under the need of relief aid. Depending on the scale of disaster, the cause of vulnerable animal and human life is different from time to year, it is obvious after the happening of disaster; response to the relief logistics needy is very crucial for saving the life and livelihood. Therefore, the loss and severity of case will be to extent of unaddressed victims.

For example: let us see what was happened in Borana Zone due the absence and/ or shortage of relief aid as experience; According to (Fassil et.al 2001) during Gada Jilo (1977-1984), for three years was no rainfall; drought was acute and covered the whole Borana Zone woredas. Among remarkable occasions that were happened due to the disappearance of humanitarian agency were many "animals died and people were forced to eat died animals". Children died even after acquired relief aid.

The second question, does the relief aid undertaken as per your organization plan? The reaction from the respondent indicated that ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ by 52.94 percent and 47.05 respectively. This means, in some of HAAs operations are not as per organization could plan, even though most of them addressed it. The third question, Is there any coordination problem with the concerned government body and NGOs? The response rated as 76.47 percent and 23.53 percent ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ respectively. As mentioned above, under table 4.5, the problem of coordinating relief aid supply due to lack of coordination among humanitarian agencies, national policy and strategy, contingency planning, and lack of collaboration among government and NGOs officials are basic for unsuccessful operation of humanitarian relief operations.

The other is regarding expedition and effectiveness of project activity. This information is rated with 'Yes' and 'No' by 61.76 percent and 38.23 percent respectively. As we know, the quality of project to be done depends on the how the responsible bodies follow the ongoing constructions of project. Hence, these project activities on one hand contribute the community resilience which will minimize the severity of natural disaster beyond emergency relief operations. It is obvious that, in Borana Zone many projects are undertaking which are leading by both government and NGOs. Their basic goals are improving the pastoral livelihood. The result of the projects are not as such successful and couldn't able to improve the community out of this sever livelihood condition. From this anyone can simply understand as there is weak expedition, particularly from the government side. The researcher also witnessed that, many projects left on their beginning stage and some of them are not operating even after accomplished e.g. water pounds, school, animal and human health care centers etc.

The goal and effectiveness of emergency relief is restoring victims to normal social and economic condition after the happening of event. Data collected from HAA, Pastoral office and DPPO office indicated that 79.41 percent and 20.59 percent shown 'Yes' and 'No' respectively. This implies most of the emergency relief supplies couldn't meet the expected target of restoring victims to normal social and economic life. Rather it contribute to the continuous waiting for aid than establishing their own livelihood even post disaster and this is what currently observed in most of the Borana pastoralists' areas. In addition these contribute the society not to use their livestock resource wisely as told by officials.

On the other hand, there is evidence for success resilience works that people could built assets by saving their resource at the time of relief aid, where the relief aid is successfully undertaken from the HAA agencies. But, this has been failed to do from the government side.

This relief aid coverage information is supported with interview and FGD made with society, HAA, Pastoral office and DPPO offices. This source of information includes; the problem why the NGOs couldn't cover the relief aid needs is basically due to the unmatched needs for relief aid and existing resources i.e. usually the number of victim is very much higher that the relief supply capacity. For example; most of the time 25 percent of the targeted victims couldn't responded as information from DPPO informants. This was happened due to different coordination and victim's data problem from Kebele to Zone office. And, in some case due to the impartiality of NGOs' operations. On the other hand, the number of needy households increase from time to time. And most of the NGOs' only could cover 10 percent of the total victims as the information from the HAAs officials. Whether it is 25 percent or 10 percent it is easy to predict that what victim community will lost in the absence of relief aid.

According to interview source information the relief aid supply have been undertaken in different items in terms of food in the form of meal and sometimes medicine support. As resilience/recovery means, some NGOs support the victim society through providing in kind support such as hen, Goat, etc. They told that, there is success from this in kind support than that of food items. The problem is lack of understanding what will be sustainable or timely solution to address target beneficiary.

In addition, due to the actual funds mobilized is much less than the proposed and requested fund to address the entire needs people, and little attention from government and partnership. The government officials highly busy with meeting, even during serious disaster happen in Borana Zone according action FAIM and Save the children. As principle the central goal of

humanitarian logistics is "working first for human dignity and observing Life saved" seen during our data collection in the office of the agencies but this doesn't achieved. (See figure 9)

During preliminary survey for developing the questionnaire we have identified five different reason/occasions which either be a direct cause or indirect cause for the humanitarian assistance need in Borana Zone. These are; drought, instability/war, disease, floods, and economic incapability. From information presented in table 4.6. The researcher identified top three cause for humanitarian assistance need i.e. are drought, disease and economic incapability which are indicated by 100 percent respondents through agree with their causes.

On the 2nd categories of cause for humanitarian assistance a need are floods, and instability/conflict indicated by respondents rating 91.17 percent agree and 8.82 percent disagree, 88.23 percent agree and 11.76 percent disagree, 52.94 percent disagree and 47.05 percent agree respectively.

So that, drought, disease, economic incapability, floods, and instability/inter clan conflict are cause for need of humanitarian assistance in Borana Zone respectively.

In favor of this findings some of the past 115 year causes' humanitarian aid have been mentioned below:-

- During Gada Jaldesa Liben (1961– 1969), Conflict between Somali, Guji and Borana pastoralists and displacement of some communities and Cattle disease outbreak.
- During Gada Goba Bule (1969–1976), their economics question was addressed by first restocking and large livestock programs, construction of a tarmac road, which improved market access and crop cultivation and Excavation of large ponds.
- During Gada Jilo Aga (1977–1985), severe drought and conflict between Borana and Somali.
- During Gada Bora Guyo (1985-1993), humanitarian assistance cause by Drought, conflict and disease (human and livestock)
- During Gada Boru Meda (1993–2001), humanitarian aid due partial drought and major Borana-Somali conflict over grassing land.
- During Gada Liban Jaldessa (2001–2009), the main reasons for relief aid was drought which results in economic question of feeding their livestock through purchasing grass. This increases the market value of grazing land. Shrinkage of Borana rangelands and loss of pasture and water resources leading to conflict in regional border areas.
- During Gada Guyo Goba (2009-2011), the basic reasons for the relief aid were severe drought and conflict.
- Recently in Borana Zone by 2014 only 2.7 million people were required emergency food assistance due to the inter clan conflict and recurrent drought (HRD, 2014).

The success and failure record of HAAs in operation in Borana Zone

This data have been collected through FGD and interview sources. According to the response from the Goal Ethiopia during their operation some of the humanitarian logistics are procured by government. For instance, the procurement of drug logistics is undertaken by government since it is mainly the responsibility of government to undertake such kind of logistics. During this operation, due to the complexity of government procurement that takes a long period of time the supply of drug is late to address the victim society. But, in case the Goal Ethiopia,

what we procures and supplies are easy to undertake. Due to this problem, the Saftenet programs were transferred from government to NGO's. On the other hand, logistics supply funded by organization like USAID needs approval from USAID to deliver after procurement of the materials. This by itself has taken a long time which is contrary with addressing the emergency need of the humanitarian logistics. (See figure 10)

The other concern which directly related with the failure and success of the humanitarian logistics operation is the issue of collaboration among humanitarian organization and government offices. The lack of initiation to work collaboratively from the government office remains basic reason for the failure to meet humanitarian logistics. Because, more than half of the operation is done with the support of the government organizations starting from federal to kebele level officials engagements for successful operations. In addition, data of victim society mainly comes through government officials of woreda and kebele representatives.

Limitation of potential suppliers is another factor contributes to the failure of humanitarian logistics operation. In particularly for those logistics to be procurement from the local and national markets since it is one of the ways to address humanitarian needs with short period of time.

As indicated in table 4.7 three expected external threat on humanitarian agencies are identified from the on ground context in the zone and experience from different research findings. These are; challenges from the donor, from government and victim society. Based on this information, the researcher collected from a respondent which is figured in the table 4.7. This indicated by the respondents as 64.79 percent agree and 35.29 percent disagree on the challenge from government and 58.82 percent agree and 41.17 percent disagree on the challenge from victims' community respectively. As the source of challenge/threat which is external from the above mentioned stakeholders are also elaborated by interviewers with HAA, DPPO and pastoralist society. Among the source of challenge from the donors, problem of responding on time to fund needs, HAAs faced difficulty to meet donors' requirement for fund relief, some donors are not interested with the case of relief aids, and inflexibility and shortage of budget are basics.

On the other hand source of challenge from victim society/community are also listed out by respondents as following; lack of interest on some aid commodity, segregation of appropriate victims/families from the needy data, pastoralist mobilizations, misplacement of communication with community representative, and victims community exchange of food support with different items. This exchange of food support with different item is highly criticized by HAA. Because, this could create shortage of the food that couldn't serves for how long the aid is intended to serve.

As source of challenge from the government side high criticism have risen on the government officials and different level starting from the kebele. Most of the time they are busy with meeting and personal cases, usual delay in signing different support agreement and not approving on time and since they are concerned body to be responsible for community but there is no even enough support.

As information from the interview source, aid dependency in the eyes of government, the NGO operation is basically based on the emergency, the expense of NGOs are also more of based on administrative costs and more of them are self-based than doing for change.

According to information from Goal Ethiopia officials, "in addition to our own operation sometimes there is case which based on the government request for the disaster relief logistics supply call (need)". In this case the organization faces challenges from two sides. The 1st challenges from donors to approve the fund for the case which took times. The other is from the government of Ethiopia side which results in the late response and very weak collaboration with the organization in supplying the supportive materials. Example there is a case (re-current drought that has happened in Dillo and Teltel woreda's of Borana zone during 2012) in which the Goal Ethiopia request for the clarity of a case requested. But, it took more than 8 months for approval and proper response almost after the record of death on human to some extent and large number of animals. So that, you can easily image to what extent it is less concerned with the issue of relief supply by government of Ethiopia.

CONCLUSION

Based on findings identified and analyzed the researcher set down the following conclusions:

- Communication barrier are among basic factors that challenges HAAs operations.
- Even though there is cooperation among concerned bodies (Pastoralist office, Water supply emergency, Health office, Disaster management office and BoFED) in monitoring and evaluation humanitarian aid operation, but their operation is not as effective as planned.
- Allocation of funds for disaster relief logistics operation is among basic challenge for HAAs response to disaster cases. This does happen due to insufficient budget/budget shortage is observed to address needy victims due restrict requirement from source of fund/donors.
- The victims' data mismatch among the demand and response in quantity of logistics to address woreda's and kebele of Borana Zone pastoral community is also another problem HAAs encountered.
- The lack facilities and or infrastructure are challenges for HAAs operation in most Borana Zone remote areas.
- The intervention of government body in HAAs operation crucial. But, it lacks coordination and consistency in keeping sustainability.
- HAAs which are supplying food item couldn't keep food items in proper storage due to road access and other facility troubles.
- Acquisition and distribution relief are observed as problem only in few HAAs operations.
- Lacks of control and follow on aid beneficiary at post operations are observed among HAAs and government bodies in some woredas' under study.
- No problem found in aid distribution quantity and quality but late delivery exist in Moyale and Miyo woredas'.
- Ethiopia government policy hinders community resilience on disaster due to weak national disaster management policy and continued reliance on relief as means of addressing disasters.
- In Borana Zone religious and cultural features are not among factors hindering HAAs relief aid supply operations.
- Most of Borana pastoral community lacks knowledge and awareness for alternative way of livelihoods than herding cattle.
- In most cases HAAs operation in Borana Zone relief aid was not covered all people under the need of relief aid.
- Some of HAAs operation lacks to fit their organization plan.
- There is lack of expedition and effective control on project activities.

- Most of the emergency relief operation couldn't meet the expected target of restoring victims to normal social and economic life.
- In Borana Zone humanitarian aid operation 10-25 percent of targeted victims were not addressed due to shortage of fund and little attention from government and its partnership.
- In Borana Zone drought, disease and economic crises are the top three disasters that are major cause for humanitarian aid operation followed by Floods, Good governance and inter clan conflict.
- In most HAAs operation lack of initiation to work in collaboration, expedition and coordination with government bodies are being the reason for the failure of their operation.
- In HAAs national and local procurement there is lack of potential suppliers is another factor contributes to the failure of humanitarian logistics operation.
- Donors, victims and government are among external challenges that exert pressure on HAAs operation through:-
    - Unable to responding on time to fund needs and by being not interested with the case of relief aids
    - Lack of interest on some aid commodity, segregation of appropriate victims/families from the needy data, pastoralist mobilizations, misplacement of communication, and victims community exchange of food support with an none-equivalent items and
    - By being less responsive to collaborative works and late response are major respectively.

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Appendixes

Table 2.1: Drought-related events in Borana Zone (1961–2011)

Period	Abbaa Gadaa	Main events
1961– 1969	Jaldesa Liben	➢ Conflict between Somali (Guji) and Borana pastoralists and displacement of some communities ➢ Cattle disease outbreak
1969–1977	Goba Bule	➢ Excavation of large ponds ➢ Construction of a tarmac road, which improved market access and crop cultivation ➢ First restocking and large livestock programs
1977–1985	Jilo Aga	➢ Severe drought and conflict between Borana and Somali ➢ Increase in wildlife hunting ➢ Southern Rangelands Development Unit (SORDU) sub-project of the Third Livestock Development Project funded by the African Development Fund and World Bank ➢ Expansion of *kebele*-based "communal enclosures," replacing *seera yabbii**
1985–1993	Bora Guyo	➢ Drought, conflict and disease (human and livestock) ➢ Support from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to establish fenced *kallos*** ➢ Weakening of customary institutions as *kebele* leaders gained authority
1993–2001	Boru Meda	➢ Partial drought, major Borana-Somali conflict over land ➢ Massive deforestation from fire ➢ Expansion of cropland and large ponds ➢ Increasing bush encroachment to clear land ➢ Stronger links between government and traditional leadership
2001–2009	Liben Jeldesa	➢ Drought; start of feed purchasing for livestock as a drought response. This increases the market value of grazing land ➢ As a result of elections, transfer of almost one-quarter of Borana rangeland from Oromia to Somali region and the Guji clan; shrinkage of Borana rangelands and loss of pasture and water resources leading to conflict in regional border areas ➢ Huge expansion of privately and semi-privately owned, fenced *kallos* and cooperative and government *kallos*
2009–2011	Guyo Goba	➢ Severe drought and conflict ➢ Continued expansion of cropland ➢ Increased value of enclosed lands from increased feed purchasing ➢ Dismantling of informal/unofficial settlements and definition of settlement and grazing areas (community *kallos* and open common grazing lands) in government land use ➢ Dismantling of some private enclosures

Source: Horn of Africa Resilience Innovation Lab (HoA RILab), Jimma University, Ethiopia, 2015.

Table 4.1. Humanitarian Aid Agencies, their intervention Woredas' and types of humanitarian aid in Borana Zone.

S.n	HAAs'/NGOs'	Intervention Woreda	Humanitarian Aid type
1	Save the Children International	Arero, D/Dawa, Yabello, Dhas and Dillo	Food Aid, drug supplies both for emergency and development supply
2	Care Ethiopia	Teltele, Yabello, Dire and Miyo	Emergency Nutrition Water and Health
3	AFD (Action for Development)	Dillo, Dire, Arero Dhas and Miyo	Emergency drought response and Disaster risk reduction
4	Goal Ethiopia	Yabello, Teltele, Dillo and Dire	Emergency (AWD, cholera Oil, pulse, bean and Pumplet) and development.
5	GPDI	Dire, Yabello, Dhas, Teltele, Dillo and Moyale	Health service, food and treatment malnourished children
6	ACF	Dhas, Dire, and Miyo	Community resilience or Drought (Emergency)
7	IAS	Miyo	Emergency
8	CIFA	Dillo	Emergency
9	Dorcas Aid International	Moyale and Arero	Emergency
10	CISP	Moyale, Dire and Arero	Emergency
11	CORDAID	Arero, Dhas, Dillo, Dire, Miyo and Moyale	Emergency
12	Action FIAM	Yabello, Miyo, Dire, Dhas and Moyale	Emergency (Health, Nutrition, and Disaster Risk Reduction)
13	Action Aid	Yabello, Moyale and Dire	Poverty
14	Merlin	Moyale, Dillo, and Miyo	Provision of healthcare, including nutrition services
15	World Vision	Moyale	Water supply (Emergency and development project)
16	ACORD	Dire and Miyo	Both emergency and development
17	Ethiopian Red Cross	Arero, Dhas, Dillo, Dire, Miyo, Yabello, Moyale, Dugda Dawa,	Mostly Health
18	Mercy Corps	Dire, Miyo, Yabello, Moyale, Dugda Dawa,	Emergency and development

Source: Own survey August 2016

Table 4.2. Interview and FGD respondents' information

S.No	Method of data collection	Woreda of respondents	Respondents in quantity	Respondent organization and or categories
1	FGD	Moyale, Miyo, Dhas, Arero, Yabello, Teltelle, Dillo, and Dire	85	HAAs, DPPO, Pastoralist office and Pastoral community
2	Interview	Moyale, Miyo, Dhas, Arero, Yabello, Teltelle, Dillo, and Dire	20	HAAs, DPPO, Pastoralist office and Pastoral community

Source: Own survey August, 2016

Table 4.3. Questions designed to collect response on the challenges of humanitarian agencies in disaster relief logistics operation and respondents feedback.

S.No	Item	Response	Response frequency	Percentage
1	Is the communication barriers is challenge for your organization during humanitarian aid services?	Yes	20	58.82%
		No	14	41.17%
2	Is there appropriate monitoring and evaluation for relief supply operation?	Yes	34	100%
		No	0	0
3	Do you think that allocation of funds is a problem to disaster relief logistics operation?	Yes	32	94.12%
		No	2	5.88%
4	Do you think necessary facility fulfilled by government?	Yes	2	5.88%
		No	32	94.12%
5	Is there any government intervention in relation to aid, especially after the aid planned to be funded?	Yes	24	70.59%
		No	10	29.41%
6	Is there any facility problem concerning store for relief aid logistics aid?	Yes	21	61.76%
		No	13	38.23%
7	Is there any problem on acquisition and distribution of relief aid supply?	Yes	10	29.41%
		No	24	70.59%
8	Is the material supposed to support victims reach at the hand victim society in quantity and quality?	Yes	31	91.17%
		No	3	8.82%

Source: Field survey August 2016

Table 4.4. Factors hindering relief supply operation.

No	Items	Response	Frequency	Percentage
1	Political context/Instability	Agree	9	26.47%
		Disagree	25	73.53%
2	Government policy	Agree	21	61.76%
		Disagree	13	38.23%
3	Complex emergency	Agree	14	41.18%
		Disagree	20	58.82%
4	Religious influence	Agree	0	0%
		Disagree	34	100%
5	Environmental and cultural features	Agree	4	11.76%
		Disagree	30	88.23%

Source: Field survey August 2016

Table 4.5. The coverage of disaster relief logistics operation

S.no	Items	Response	Frequency	Percentage
1	Does the relief aid cover all those that are under the need of relief aid?	Yes	5	14.70%
		No	29	85.29%
2	Is the relief aid undertaken as per your organization plan?	Yes	18	52.94%
		No	16	47.05%
3	Is there any coordination problem with the concerned government body and NGO's?	Yes	26	76.47%
		No	8	23.53%
4	Does the projected activity carried out expeditiously and effectively within the required time framework?	Yes	21	61.76%
		No	13	38.23%
5	Since the goal of the emergency relief assistance is restoring to the degree of normality in both social and economic life, is your organization activity is to this extent?	Yes	27	79.41%
		No	7	20.59%

Source: Field Survey August 2016

Table 6. The cause for need of humanitarian assistance in Borana Zone

S.no	Item	Response	Response frequency	Percentage
1	Drought	Agree	34	100%
		Disagree	0	0%
2	Civil war/Instability	Agree	16	47.05%
		Disagree	18	52.94%
3	Disease	Agree	34	100%
		Disagree	0	0
4	Floods	Agree	31	91.17%
		Disagree	4	8.82%
5	Economical incapability	Agree	34	100%
		Disagree	0	0%

Source: Own survey August 2016

Table 4.7. The threat of external environment on HAAs in disaster logistics operation

S.no	Item	Response	frequency	Percentage
1	Is there any challenge from donor?	Yes	22	64.70%
		No	12	35.29%
2	Is there any challenge from government?	Yes	20	58.82%
		No	14	41.17%
3	Is there any challenge from victim community?	Yes	18	52.94%
		No	16	47.05%

Source: Own survey August 2016



Figure: 2.1 Humanitarian Logistics and Disaster Relief Operations by Van Wassenhove, 2006



Figure 2: Humanitarian Logistics and Stages in the Emergency Supply Chain (Cozzolino et al. 2012)



Figure 3: The Supply Chain for Humanitarian Relief Thomas, 2007



Figure 4. The Humanitarian Space Tomasini and Wassenhove, 2009



Figure 5. Humanitarian Logistics framework (Baumgarten et al.2010, page.453 with minor modification by Researcher)

Figure 2.6: Drought Case in Ethiopia in 2009

Figure 6. Recent drought Case in Borana Zone (Internet source drought cases in Borana Zone by 2016)



Figure 7. Borana Zone Map (Google Map access by 2016)

Figure 8: Photo taken during data collection from GPDI and CISP Borana Field Coordination Office head office August, 2016

Figure 9: Photo taken from save the children intervention area Dillo City August, 2016

Figure 10. Photo captured by researcher in Teltele area during data Collection August, 2016