

POLITICISATION OF THE COUNTER-INSURGENCE OPERATIONS IN NIGERIA: IMPLICATION FOR THE POLITICAL ECONOMY

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ABSTRACT: *Political partisanship is a very intriguing game. However, the tendency among some megalomaniacs to politicise sensitive national issues has undermined Nigeria's national interest as well as exacerbated its fragile security. Many political actors mainly from the two major political parties— PDP and APC— were more inclined to using incendiary utterances in order to score cheap political followership in the build up to the 2015 General Election. The study relied on documentary evidence through which data were generated for the validation of its hypothesis. It found that the inclination among these politicians and ethnic jingoists to politicise the counter-insurgency operations has not only sustained the insurgency but also undermined Nigeria's political economy. Basically, it recommended the adoption of a non-partisan counter-insurgency approach as a remedy for Boko Haram insurgency.*

KEYWORDS: Boko Haram, National Security, Politicisation, Common Good, Political Economy

INTRODUCTION

We accept the reality of terrorism as a global phenomenon. However, the peculiar trend of the Nigerian version which subsists on a welter of nebulous demands and masked identities...defies all reason and logic and only summarizes a well considered agenda of national destabilization for a purely selfish political cause— Oliseh Metuh, National Publicity Secretary, PDP.

The globalization of terrorism especially after al-Qaeda led attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 has accentuated the relative vulnerability of every state within the international community. Thus, no country of the world is utterly insulated from the direct or incidental effects of terrorism. While there have been concerted efforts in some quarters to unmask the faces behind global terrorism, such efforts are often whittled down by political wrangling between opposition political parties and ruling parties. According to the Centre for Global Research, a Canadian think tank on international affairs and security, the manner in which Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) took control of the oil-rich city of Mosul, without firing a single shot is questionable. The Centre reports that Iraqi government soldiers abandoned their gears and ammunition 'without any resistance' to ISIS fighters (*The Sun News Online*, August 31, 2014).

In Nigeria, the politicisation of Boko Haram insurgency has confined effort to uncover the forces behind the activity of the deadly sect into the realm of speculation. The initial transformation of Boko Haram sect from a moderate Islamic movement to a transnational

ultra-violent Salafist group is largely credited to its links with salafi-jihadi groups like the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa, Al-Shabab, Ansar-e-Dine and al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb. However, the seeming intractable status the sect has acquired since 2011 can hardly be understood outside the use of the insurgence and counter-insurgence campaign in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States— a hotbed of Boko Haram operations— as a political ping-pong.

Although it is inexorable that the current security record of Nigeria makes insecurity an electoral issue in the build up to the 2015 General Election, none of the political gladiators in the scenery has advanced an unambiguous alternative defence and security agenda for the country. Instead, the daunting security challenges occasioned by Boko Haram insurgence has been reduced into a blame game by both the ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP) and the leading opposition party— the All Progressives Congress (APC)— as well as their ever-surging army of apologists. These political parties are unrelenting in their quest to make political capital out of the insurgence which has primarily targeted innocent citizens, government institutions, security formations, telecommunications masts, banks, religious organizations, educational institutions, media houses, beer halls, markets and local communities (Mbah & Nwangwu, 2014; Mohammed, 2014). Accordingly, it is held that:

today we see Nigeria as a collection of separate roofs of diverse forms and character unwillingly joined together by the faulty thread of British colonialism and sheltered under one common larger colonial leaking roof called the Nigerian nation, with the people under their own respective roofs more concerned about accusing the other or others of being the cause of the leakages in the larger common roof, than the collective resolve to find solutions to its leakages (Oritsejafor, 2014:3).

Unarguably, the General Election has continued to deepen the political differences between PDP and APC. The politicisation of Boko Haram insurgence by both the incumbent and opposition parties continues to present a challenge to peace and nation building efforts. Thus, the unreasonable political divide in the country has become overly widened. Quite disgustingly, some of them have been unable to live above partisanship. For instance, the abduction of over 200 students from Government Girls Secondary School, Chibok on 14 April 2014 was made possible because the Borno State Government rejected the advice of the West African Examination Council (WAEC) officials to either move the girls to a safer place for the examinations or provide adequate security because of the volatile nature of the area known to be a major base of Boko Haram (Oghenesivbe, 2014). Hence, it has given credence to the widely held view that state governments whose parties are not in power at the centre tend to sabotage the counter-terror campaign in order to blame the federal government for any loopholes in the counter-insurgence operations.

Contrariwise, the August 2014 outbreak of Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) in Nigeria elicited an unprecedented demonstration of national unity against the scourge. In fact, never in the annals of the country have all Nigerians with their divergent ethno-religious and political leanings united against a common course as seen during the heyday of EVD outbreak in the country. In contrast to the unanimity of action against EVD, the counter-insurgence operations against members of Boko Haram have remained largely disjointed and politicised. In spite of the mass casualties that have continued to trail the sect's attacks in the country, it

has remained a basis for the pursuit and advancement of the political agenda of the members of PDP and APC.

It is pertinent to note that the Nigerian Armed Forces, particularly the Nigeria Army, have distinguished themselves right from Independence in terms of professionalism, discipline and successful operations. The army's performance in peace keeping operations in Congo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Lebanon, Somalia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Liberia and over a dozen more places is quite legendary. Nonetheless, it has been widely held that this venerated institution which was hitherto adjudged the best in West Africa and rated high in regional and global peace missions cannot guarantee the safety of its citizens and the integrity of its territory. The Boko Haram insurgents have carried out several operations with almost unchallenged string of tactical successes. Thus, some towns like Konduga, Bama, Dikwa, Ngala, Marte, Malam Fatori, Abadam, Gwoza, Madagali, Gulak, Michika, Bazza, Uba, Mubi, Maiha, among others, were captured and even renamed by the iconoclastic group (Onwuneme, 2014). According to this school of thought, Boko Haram insurgency has unduly exposed the weaknesses of both the Nigerian security architecture and indeed, President Goodluck Jonathan Administration. However, the adherents of the school usually ignore the role of the operating environment (which is characterised by sabotage, dearth of cooperation from local communities and politicisation of the insurgency) in the apparent underperformance of the security agents. For instance, Onwuneme examined the dwindling fortunes of the security forces *vis-à-vis* the Boko Haram insurgency within the framework of military leadership and command, military assets and review of its operational plan.

Contrary to the foregoing, the gallantry of the security personnel must be commended for significantly containing the ravaging assault of the terrorists. Thus, this paper holds that the dwindling fortune of the security agencies is not a culmination of tactical cum strategic deficiency of the Nigerian army relative to the daunting onslaughts of Boko Haram members. Instead, the paper, in line with Egbunik as cited in Oladimeji *et. al.* (2012:7) characterises Nigeria as “a plane on autopilot, a battle ground between those who vowed to make the country ‘ungovernable’ and a government that lacks the courage to put them behind bars”. The study, therefore, investigates the implication of the wanton politicisation of counter-Boko Haram insurgency on Nigeria’s political economy.

METHODOLOGICAL UNDERPINNING

This study is a qualitative research which has to do with a set of non-statistical inquiry technique and processes used to gather data about social phenomena. The qualitative technique is most desirable because this paper relies essentially on non-statistically-based and numerically immeasurable data which nevertheless can be empirically studied. In other words, the aim of this methodology is not to establish numeric or statistical relationship between variables. This is because although qualitative data may cover a few numbers of cases, the target is to establish relationship and validity within the social or concrete reality.

The research utility of this technique cannot be over-emphasized. The technique is usually applied to obtain in-depth information, concept/variable clarification to facilitate instrument designs and in the conduct of pilot studies (Biereenu-Nnabugwu 2006). This data gathering technique enables access into the inner recesses of group life, organizational structure, bureaucratic processes as well as motivations for the individual behaviour. In relation to the

study, data was gathered from documentary sources such as books, official documents, journals, newspaper articles, conference papers, among others. Consequently, the study was able to argue that the wanton politicisation of counter-Boko Haram insurgency has not only accounted for its escalation but largely undermined Nigeria's political economy.

Theoretical Framework of Analysis

Orthodox scholarship conceptualises national security purely as politico-military phenomenon. It is used to refer to the capacity of a ruling group to use state power to protect its interest or values from external threats as well as maintain order internally (Nnoli, 2006; Nwangwu & Ononogbu, 2014). As a public good, everyone shares the benefits of national security or the threats of its absence whether as individuals, groups, state, region or even the world as a whole. The idea of 'public good' as an explanatory tool can be traced to David Hume's 1739 thesis of the 'common good' presented in his publication, the *Treatise of Human Nature*, and Adam Smith's *Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. In his distinction between the 'right' and 'perverted' types of constitutions, Aristotle maintains that the 'right' type of constitution pursues the common good—the good of the whole society.

Public good is closely associated with other terms such as 'common good', 'common interest', 'public/national interest' or Jean Jacques Rousseau's idea of the General Will. Although these terms are used interchangeably, they are not identical in their meaning and scope. The common good embodies a normative concept. It is concerned with moral standards which are the subject of philosophical discussion. The common interest embodies an empirical concept. It is concerned with the understanding of the persons likely to be affected by a proposed decision. It can be empirically ascertained. Then, the public interest is a matter of judgement by a competent authority that is expected to be sensitive to the needs and aspirations of the people. Those likely to be affected by a decision yet to be taken can make appeals to the competent authority in the name of public interest (Gaubá, 2003).

The notions of the common good and the public interest are based on the same logic. What is described as the common good in moral philosophy becomes the public interest in the realm of politics and administration. The common good is more comprehensive than the public interest. In other words, all references to the public interest imply the common good but all references to the common good cannot be expressed in terms of public interest. The idea of the common good is frequently invoked in order to focus on certain political demands or to vindicate certain acts, decisions or policy measures.

Although it is difficult to identify the good of the community apart from the narrow interests of different individuals and groups, one possible interpretation of the common good could be equated to the good of the community. Accordingly, Gauba (2003:407) opines that "the common good points to a goal which does not give precedence to the interests of a class, party or faction but gives due regard to the interests of all members of society". In other words, it stands for the goal which is regarded by the consciousness of the community as conducive to the welfare of the whole community, transcending the immediate interests of different individuals and groups. If its realization entails some loss or benefit to a particular individual or group, that loss or benefit is not treated as a matter of settling individual claims. While disputes may still arise as to whether a particular measure conforms to the common good or not, if people are genuinely interested in the pursuit of the common good, their

disputes will never take a violent form. In the case of a conflict between different groups, the common good shall not coincide with the interests of a particular group.

The responsibility to preserve and guarantee the common good (in the form of collective national security) squarely resides with the state. In Nigeria, Section 14(2) (b) of the 1999 Constitution states that “the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government”. In reality, however, the complexity of modern societies makes the preservation of national security too important to be left exclusively within the framework of government machinery. This is because, once attained, whether in a state, region, or global scene, the advantages of being secure are distributed equally to all within the public space they relate to.

The counter-terrorism campaign against members of Boko Haram sect has not enjoyed the desired cooperation of key stakeholders. The doctrine of common good or public interest as an underlying guideline for the pursuit of political ambitions has remained alien to the politicians. Following the foregoing analytical tradition, the Governor of Kano State and presidential aspirant of the APC, Rabiun Kwankwaso, avers that:

...there are two theories for the Boko Haram insurgency in the North. If you talk to many people on the streets, they will tell you it is the Federal Government that is behind the insurgency to destroy the North.... The second theory by those who choose to be more charitable is that while the presidency may not be instigating the violence, it has the capacity to deal with it but refuses to do so because it simply doesn't care whether or not the North is destroyed (Adeniyi, *ThisDay*, November 20, 2014).

However, what compounds the situation is that there is also a counter-narrative for the insurgency within the Presidency. Thus, Kwankwaso also cited in Adeniyi holds that:

if you go to the Villa, the theory there is that it is we Northerners that created Boko Haram and are instigating all the violence against our own people, killing thousands, destroying the means of livelihood of millions of our people and causing all these mayhem just because we don't like President Jonathan. While that is also ridiculous, many people believe such nonsense, and it may actually inform the lack of adequate response to the madness that is now destroying our country.

To buttress Kwankwaso's position, the South-South Consolidated Forum on 18 November 2014 in Calabar accused the Northern elite of sponsoring the violent activities of Boko Haram in its bid to destabilise the administration of President Jonathan. According to the group, it is not out of place to say that the insurgents are being sponsored by some highly placed desperate politicians from the North, who felt that the presidency is their birth-right. They do this just to discredit the efforts of the federal government (Adeniyi 2014a). Arising from the foregoing, therefore, it is noteworthy that the defeat of the insurgents on the battlefield begins from the political front. Thus, until we deal with the penchant to use sensitive national issues as a political ping-pong and eradicate the diversionary scourge of mutual ethno-religious distrusts, it will be extremely difficult to defeat Boko Haram insurgence on the battlefield.

Politicisation of National Security

The word ‘politicisation’ is derived from ‘politics’. According to Nnoli (2003:12), politics refers to “all activities that are directly or indirectly associated with the emergence, consolidation and use of state power”. However, politicisation in this context is used pejoratively to indicate that a given phenomenon which is meant to serve an altruistic and populist objective is perverted for the advancement of the private and self-seeking goals of certain individuals, groups, classes, parties, etc. Thus, the politicisation of national security here means the use of Boko Haram insurgency and the counter-insurgency operations as a basis for the pursuit and advancement of the selfish political agenda of some politicians and political parties.

This study, therefore, seeks to demonstrate, using some specific incidents, the various ways in which the counter-terror campaign has been trivialised and politicised. Thus, the analysis shall be drawn from the following incidents that have continued to undermine the counter-insurgency operations of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in Nigeria: the offensive statements by megalomaniac politicians from Northern Nigeria, abduction of Chibok Girls and the emergence of the *Bring-Back-Our-Girls* campaigners, Murtala Nyako’s genocide letter, failed ceasefire pact between the government and Boko Haram members, Governor Chibuike Amaechi’s (APC’s) encouragement of mutiny, the reluctance of northern senators to extend the emergency rule in preference for 2015 General Election, the assertion by Governor Kashim Shettima of Borno State that Boko Haram members are more equipped and motivated than Nigerian soldiers, the position of the defunct Action Congress of Nigeria that the proscription of Boko Haram is illegal and unconstitutional.

The Offensive Statements by Megalomaniac Politicians from Northern Nigeria

One of the factors that have sustained the Boko Haram insurgency is the rash and unpatriotic utterances of some ethno-religious bigots and psychopathic politicians. One of these utterances that have continued to stimulate Islamic militancy and insurgency in Nigeria includes the statement credited to the late Premier of Northern Nigeria and Sardauna of Sokoto, Sir Ahmadu Bello on 12 October 1960. As reported in the *Parrot Newspaper*, the Premier cited in Oritsejafor (2014:21) avers that:

the new nation called Nigeria should be an estate of our great grandfather Othman Dan Fodio. We must ruthlessly prevent a change of power. We use the minorities in the North as willing tools and the south as a conquered territory and never allow them to have control over their future.

Similarly, the promise by members of the Northern Political Leadership Forum (a group of PDP candidate consensus campaigners) led by Mallam Adamu Ciroma to make Nigeria ungovernable for President Goodluck Jonathan if the presidency fails to return to northern region after the 2011 General Election has intensified the insurgency. In the same vein, the former Vice President, Alhaji Atiku Abubakar, (apparently quoting from Frantz Fanon’s *The Wretched of the Earth*) stated that “those who make peaceful change impossible make violent change inevitable”. However, the most recent anti-nationalistic speech that has continued to fuel the Boko Haram insurgency can be gleaned from the assertion of General Muhammadu Buhari (rtd.) that the military offensives against the Boko Haram insurgents are anti-north. While featuring as “Guest of the Week”, a Hausa programme of the Kaduna-based Liberty

Radio on 2 June 2013, General Buhari criticised the declaration of state of emergency in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States and the subsequent military offensive against the Boko Haram sect.

In his comparison of Boko Haram sect and Niger Delta militants, Buhari opines that the federal government's action against the former is a gross injustice against the north. According to him, "unlike the special treatment the federal government gave to the Niger Delta militants, the Boko Haram members were being killed and their houses demolished" (Shiklam, *ThisDay*, March 3, 2013). Arguing further, the General as captured by Shiklam notes that:

in the case of the Niger Delta militants, the late President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua sent an airplane to bring them, he sat down with them and discussed with them, they were cajoled, and they were given money and granted amnesty. They were trained in some skills and were given employment, but the ones in the north are being killed and their houses demolished.... This is injustice.

It is, however, pertinent to note that Boko Haram insurgency is utterly dissimilar to Niger Delta militancy. Both are different in ideological conviction as well as modus operandi. While the latter was largely necessitated by the ecological despoliation, environmental degradation and development-gap in the region, the former is fuelled by a dangerous mix of unbridled or megalomaniacal frenzy and religious extremism. Boko Haram insurgency is much more complicated. The insurgents are not asking that roads be tarred or jobs be provided but are challenging the legitimacy of the state. They are anti-establishment. Although the Nigerian government granted the members of the sect amnesty, the insurgents flatly rejected it, arguing that the government should be pardoned for the atrocities it had committed against Muslims.

The Abduction of Chibok Girls and Emergence of *Bring-Back-Our-Girls* Campaigners

The Boko Haram sect shot into international notoriety on 14 April 2014 following the abduction of about 275 students from Government Girls Secondary School, Chibok. The incidence generated an unprecedented global outcry over the flippant manner in which the security agencies handled it. It was alleged that the military was informed prior to the arrival and subsequent abduction of the school girls. The general opinion is that the kidnapping would have been prevented if the military had moved in swiftly to engage the terrorists or that the girls would have been rescued if the military responded early enough to chase the abductors with a view to overpowering them. These allegations heaped at the door step of the military and other security agencies are worthwhile in the light of government's constitutional responsibility to provide security, protect life and properties of citizens.

Besides the apparent complicity of security agents in the abduction, there are many other questions begging for answers. In the first place, why was it that none of the children of the members of staff of the school were around during the abduction? Second, why was it possible that no member of staff of the school was available when the girls were kidnapped? Third, how did some of the girls 'escape' from the water-tight security of their kidnappers? Fourth, why did the Borno State Government reject the advice of WAEC officials to either move the girls to a safer place for the examinations or provide adequate security? Moreover, why and how did some adult male 'students' (some of who are above 30) get enrolled to

write exams with the Chibok girls in a school that is wholly a girls' college? Lastly, why was it possible that none of the male 'students' was abducted by the insurgents? In other words, some conspiracy theorists tend to see the abduction as part of the fulfilment of the threat by some ambitious and disgruntled politicians of northern extraction in 2011 to make the country ungovernable for President Jonathan should the presidency fail to return to the region.

Perhaps, more worrisome is the manner in which relevant authorities have (mis)handled the abduction. For instance, President Jonathan's government was silent over the girls' kidnap for over 15 days. Similarly, within a month of the abduction, defence spokesmen announced that most of the girls had been rescued. This cheery statement was withdrawn shortly after it was made in a way that was bereft of accountability to the public. On 26 May 2014, exactly forty three days after the abduction, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), Air Chief Marshal Alex Badeh, while addressing members of the Citizen Initiative for Security Awareness notes *inter alia*: "the good news for the girls is that we know where they are but we cannot tell you. We cannot come and tell you the military's secret here. Just leave us alone, we are working...." (Soriwei, *Punch*, May 26, 2014; *Vanguard*, May 27, 2014; cf. Komolafe, *ThisDay*, December 31, 2014).

Without prejudice to the secrecy of military operational procedures, there is hardly any official briefing or update to the public on the matter of the Chibok girls. The last time there was a categorical statement in respect of the Chibok girls was when the public was fed with the tales of a botched ceasefire with Boko Haram members. The military authorities owe the public more explanations on this matter which does not necessarily amount to discussing their operational strategies on the pages of newspapers and other media platforms. Thus, defence briefings should be humanised as is the case in most advanced democracies. In the same vein, the claim of locating where the girls are by the CDS is preposterous; an unnecessary outburst and a breach of military tactics which has frustrated the rescue effort.

Lastly, the *Bring-Back-Our-Girls* campaigners— an advocacy group which came into being with largely altruistic and progressive agenda following the abduction of more than 200 Chibok girls— have been exploited by the APC in the pursuit of its political agenda. Using the hash tag, *#bringbackourgirls*, the group became a rallying platform for the mobilisation of support to secure the release of the kidnapped girls. Accordingly, world leaders from the United States, United Kingdom, France, China, Canada and Israel offered assistance to Nigeria to free the schoolgirls but to date no diplomatic or military action has secured their release.

Meanwhile, the *Bring-Back-Our-Girls* campaigners have been heavily criticised by PDP chieftains and the Presidency for working for APC. Although the group initially denied the allegation, the strong relationship between its key leaders like Hadiza Bala Usman and Dino Melaye and the party is a valid proof that the group is an appendage of the party. As a further confirmation of the group's affiliation with APC, the former National Chairman of PDP who is now a leading chieftain of APC, Chief Audu Ogbeh, not only commended the campaigners for sustaining global attention on the missing Chibok girls but also disclosed that the *Bring-Back-Our-Girls* group is led by APC members. During the 2015 presidential bid declaration of Muhammadu Buhari, Mr. Ogbeh notes *inter alia*:

we send our greetings to the Chibok parents. We believe that one day they will be reunited with their children. We commend the

Bring-Back-Our-Girls movement led by members of our party for their commitment. They remain the only living witnesses that Nigeria still has a conscience (*Scan News*, October 18, 2014).

Arising from this affirmation of APC's sponsorship of the movement, therefore, the activities of the *Bring-Back-Our-Girls* campaigners have called to question, the genuineness of the group's intentions. It is indeed another tragic low in making Chibok girls pawns on the political chessboard.

Ex-Governor Nyako's 'Genocide' Letter

The politicisation of national security is evident in the hate-laden, incredibly divisive, inciting and utterly subversive memo addressed to the Northern Nigeria Governors Forum (NNGF) on 16 April 2014 by the then Governor of Adamawa State, retired Vice Admiral Murtala Nyako. Among other things, Nyako states that the counter-terror operation against Boko Haram insurgents is tantamount to a "full-fledged genocide" against the North. He avers that Northerners are being massacred by federal forces at the instance of President Jonathan; that it is part of a plot to eliminate Northern elite, including Senator David Mark. Nyako further claims that majority of those security forces being massacred in the war against Boko Haram are northerners, who are trained only to be eliminated by the agents of the federal government. In other words, he conceptualises Boko Haram as a grand pretext designed for the perpetuation of genocidal onslaught against the North.

In the memo which was not addressed to President Jonathan but his regional governor colleagues, Nyako ostensibly wants to mobilise and incite the northerners against the Federal Government and its security agencies who are engaged in the counter-terrorism operation in the north-east. An excerpt from the letter states as follows:

Fulani communities in parts of the North who have been in their locations for over 100 years are now being raided and uprooted by paid killers within the Nigerian Army for the satisfaction of the Federal administration instead of being protected as citizens with their rights and dignity safe-guarded. This has happened to those communities at Keana L.G. in Nasarawa State and Laddoga and Kachia in Kaduna State. It is presently extended to Benue, Zamfara and Katsina States. Furthermore it is a well-known fact that virtually all the soldiers of Northern Nigerian origin recently recruited to fight Boko-Haram have been deceived in that aspect. They are being poorly trained, totally ill-equipped, given only uniform and are killed by their trainers in Nigerian Army training centres as soon as they arrive in the Nigerian Army camps being used by so-called Boko-Haram insurgents. Virtually all the Nigerian soldiers killed/murdered in these operations so far are of Northern Nigerian origin.... (Odunsi, *Daily Post*, May 19, 2014).

It is pertinent to note that the then Governor's vituperation derives expressly from his strong opposition to the emergency rule and subsequent deployment of military personnel in the troubled states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. Such call which is not supported by any credible alternative security roadmap is an open endorsement of the activities of the Boko Haram insurgents. Thus, Nyako's criticism is not only diversionary but clearly shows his

poverty of understanding of the fact that the operational tactics of the insurgents go beyond ethnic, religious, political and ideological considerations. By virtue of career antecedents and exposure, it is obligatory for Mr. Nyako to display an unmatched commitment to nationalism. Alas, the extremely divisive letter which is meant to create disaffection among Nigerians, incite one section of the country against the other and polarise the country along ethnic lines exposes his dearth of history and inability to rise above parochial sentiments.

Failed Ceasefire Pact between the Federal Government and Boko Haram Sect

The news of a ceasefire deal between the Federal Government of Nigeria and members of the Boko Haram sect was received with much elation and enthusiasm across Nigeria and beyond. The deal was announced on 17 October 2014 by the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), Air Chief Marshal Alex Badeh, at the end of the coordinating conference on Nigeria–Cameroon Trans-Border Military Operations. According to the CDS, “without any prejudice to the outcome of our three-day interactions and the conclusions of this forum, I wish to inform this audience that a ceasefire agreement has been concluded between the Federal Government of Nigeria and the *Ahlul Sunna Li Daawa Wal Jihad*” (Adeyemo *et. al. Thisday*, October 27, 2014). This announcement was corroborated by the Director of Defence Information, the Director-General of the National Orientation Agency and Coordinator of National Information Centre as well as the Senior Special Assistant to the President on Public Affairs, Major-General Chris Olukolade, Mr. Mike Omeri and Dr. Doyin Okupe, respectively. Consequently, the service chiefs were directed to ensure immediate compliance with this development in the field by stopping all hostilities with the sect.

Dr. Okupe linked the ceasefire agreement to President Jonathan’s diplomatic shuttles to Chad and Niger Republic. According to online news site, *The Cable*, between July and August 2014, some Boko Haram commanders wrote two letters to Idriss Déby Itno, the President of Chad, asking him to broker a ceasefire deal with the Nigerian government. On confirming the genuineness of the letters, President Déby met with President Jonathan on 9 September 2014 during the ICT Conference in N’Djamena. *The Cable* further reports that the Federal Government’s main demand was the release of Chibok Girls and others in Boko Haram captivity. The sect did not only demand the release of its incarcerated members but also not to be put on trial for the over 10,000 people it had killed for the past five years since the heinous campaign began.

Nonetheless, a critical examination of the manner in which the botched ceasefire pact was handled by the authorities shows that it was particularly employed in order to advance the re-election bid of President Jonathan and the overall interest of the ruling party. Aside the news that the government and Boko Haram had signed a deal, there was no more information revealing the exactness of the agreement signed by both parties. The demands of the Boko Haram sect were not disseminated through their usual *Youtube* video channel. In fact, neither the sect nor its representatives gave corroborative information on the alleged ceasefire. Moreover, the letter containing Badeh’s announcement was unsigned, undated and not on any official letter head! (Adeniyi, 2014b).

On a more shocking note, the Federal Government confirmed after a Council of State meeting on 4 November 2014 that there was indeed no ceasefire agreement. In a media briefing after the meeting, the National Security Adviser (NSA), Col. Sambo Dasuki (rtd) and Governor Godswill Akpabio note that a high level contact with the Republic of Chad was made and that there were some persons who acted on behalf of Boko Haram and that no

agreement had been reached yet as discussions were ongoing. In a similar vein, Abubakar Shekau, the sect leader in a video obtained by AFP on 31 October described the Nigerian government's claims of a ceasefire as a lie and also said that the remaining 219 abducted Chibok Schoolgirls had been converted to Islam and married off (Adeniyi, 2014b).

It therefore raises serious questions why the troops were asked to commit themselves to passivity while the insurgents were allowed to operate freely based on negotiations that were yet to be concluded or totally non-existent? Needless to say, the insurgents who understood the unilateral ceasefire to mean surrender on the part of Nigeria military cashed in on it and seized several towns, including that of Badeh. Shekau had declared the annexed territories a Boko Haram Islamic caliphate with Gwoza as the headquarters while Mubi, the second largest town and commercial nerve centre of Adamawa State was renamed *Madinatul Islam* by the insurgents (Adeniyi, 2014b) While it must be acknowledged that the war on terror is very arduous and prosecuting it may sometimes involve elements of calculated risks, the idea of a unilateral ceasefire to an enemy that is not seeking truce is not different from a political gambit.

As a consequence of the foregoing gratuitous politicisation of national security in Nigeria, the counter-insurgency operations of MNJTF have remained a wild goose chase. This is amply demonstrated in Table I and the Appendix which show incidents of suicide bombings and major Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria since 2011 respectively.

Table I: Incidents of Suicide Bombings in Nigeria, June 2011- July 2014

| S/N | Year | Death Toll by Months | | | | | | | | | | | | Death Toll | Total Number of Incidents |
|--------------|------|----------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|------------|------------|---------------------------|
| | | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | | |
| 1 | 2011 | | | | | | 7 | | 25 | | | 2 | 46 | 80 | 7 |
| 2 | 2012 | 180 | 6 | 10 | 41 | | 92 | 5 | 3 | | 9 | 50 | 2 | 398 | 22 |
| 3 | 2013 | | | 22 | | | | | | | | | | 22 | 1 |
| 4 | 2014 | 30 | | 77 | | 47 | 14 | 90 | | | | | | 258 | 18 |
| Total | | | | | | | | | | | | | 678 | 48 | |

Source: Onuoha, F. C. (2014). *A Danger not to Nigeria alone: Boko Haram's Transnational Reach and Regional Responses*. Abuja: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

Implication for Nigeria's Political Economy

The stability of the security architecture of any country is widely upheld as a prerequisite for political and economic sustainability by development theorists. Besides the human casualties that have attended Boko Haram insurgency in the country, Nigeria's political economy has remained the most adversely affected by the politicisation of national security in the country. Since 2011, Nigeria has experienced an unprecedented diversion of humungous scarce capital in the national budget for the procurement of hi-tech equipment. Thus, the proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) devoted to military spending, especially purchasing of arms has increased exponentially. This has correspondingly denied capital projects in the education, health, agriculture and construction sectors the needed attention as shown in Table II. In other words, a rise in military spending exerts a negative impact on the rate of

investment in productive fixed capital. This occurs because of well-known crowding-out effects: an increase in military spending must be financed either by raising current taxes or by borrowing (future taxes). Thus, Deger & Smith (1983:335) opine that such tendency ‘lowers the expected after-tax return on productive fixed capital, while simultaneously reducing the flow of (domestic plus foreign) savings that is available to finance productive fixed capital formation in the domestic economy’. In a similar vein, it has weakened the infrastructural base of the economy and decelerated the growth rate of GDP. “The different levels of government” according to Nwangwu & Ononogbu (2014:130) “have also committed large chunk of their monthly allocations into rebuilding of public and private infrastructural facilities destroyed by the insurgents as well as the rehabilitation of victims of the attacks”.

The 2012 Report of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) indicates that in the 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011 fiscal years, the total expenditure earmarked for both internal security and defence in the approved budgets were N164.5 billion, N276.5 billion, N422.9 billion and N563.2 billion respectively (CBN, 2012). Official statistics provided by the apex bank from 2000 to 2011 in Table II lends credence to the fact that national spending on security is not economically sustainable. In a related report, Mohammed (2014) chronicled the total security sector spending (covering Defence, Police, Office of National Security Adviser, Road Safety Corps, and security-related service-wide votes like the Amnesty Programme, internal security operations, etc.) between 2010 and 2014 to stand at US\$32.88 billion. As shown in Table III, the Boko Haram insurgency has fuelled increases in security spending to average of 25% of annual federal government budget. In line with the rebasing of Nigeria’s GDP (put at N80.3 trillion or US\$509.9 billion), the yearly average 2010-14 of US\$6.58 billion is equal to 1.3% of GDP. Accordingly, the total for the five budget years amounts to 6.5% of Nigeria GDP (Mohammed 2014).

Table II: Federal Government Recurrent Expenditure (N’ Million)

| Year | *Security | Education | Agriculture | Health | Construction | GDP |
|------|-----------|-----------|-------------|----------|--------------|-----------|
| 1961 | 9.47 | 4.52 | 0.42 | 1.81 | 0.59 | 2361.2 |
| 1965 | 27.73 | 10.61 | 6.08 | 1.88 | 25.29 | 3110.0 |
| 1970 | 135.18 | 24.44 | 1.92 | 12.48 | 14.28 | 5205.1 |
| 1975 | 610.11 | 126.5 | 22.48 | 52.85 | 31.97 | 20957 |
| 1980 | 595.13 | 155.81 | 17.14 | 52.79 | 46.03 | 49632.3 |
| 1985 | 1430.2 | 258.60 | 20.36 | 132.02 | 151.11 | 70633.2 |
| 1990 | 6540.2 | 2402.80 | 258.00 | 500.70 | 643.40 | 271908 |
| 1995 | 11855.2 | 9746.40 | 1510.40 | 3320.70 | 1699.10 | 1934831 |
| 2000 | 68556.99 | 57956.64 | 6335.80 | 15218.08 | 4991.09 | 4727523 |
| 2001 | 85922.29 | 39882.60 | 7064.55 | 24522.27 | 7202.04 | 5374335 |
| 2002 | 132369.9 | 80530.88 | 9993.55 | 40621.42 | 7452.14 | 6232244 |
| 2003 | 119444 | 64782.15 | 7537.35 | 33267.98 | 16951.37 | 6061700 |
| 2004 | 174117.5 | 76524.65 | 11256.15 | 34197.14 | 14897.01 | 11411067 |
| 2005 | 153618.1 | 82795.06 | 16325.60 | 55661.63 | 17914.96 | 15610882 |
| 2006 | 202200 | 87294.56 | 17212.81 | 62300.00 | 20100.00 | 18564595 |
| 2007 | 253400 | 107529.39 | 21202.73 | 81900.00 | 71300.00 | 20657.317 |
| 2008 | 164500 | 164000.0 | 65400.0 | 98200.00 | 94500.00 | 24296329 |
| 2009 | 276490 | 137156.6 | 22435.2 | 90200.00 | 80630.00 | 24794238 |
| 2010 | 422900 | 170800.00 | 25200.00 | 99100.00 | 138050.00 | 29205782 |

| | | | | | | |
|------|--------|-----------|----------|-----------|-----------|----------|
| 2011 | 563200 | 335800.00 | 41200.00 | 231800.00 | 195900.00 | 33994612 |
|------|--------|-----------|----------|-----------|-----------|----------|

Sources: Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazettes, Central Bank of Nigeria (1961, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000–2011)

**Security column is the summation of expenditures for Defence and Internal Security for 1961-2011*

Table III: Total Security Sector Spending between 2010 and 2014

| Year | Amount (N) | Dollar value (N165= \$1) |
|--------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------|
| 2014 | 1,174,897,477,334.00 | 7.12 billion |
| 2013 | 1,178,832,576,309.00 | 7.14 billion |
| 2012 | 1,154,857,159,110.00 | 6.99 billion |
| 2011 | 1,080,894,801,178.00 | 6.55 billion |
| 2010 | 836,016,773,836.00 | 5.07 billion |
| Total | 5,425,498,787,767.00 | 32.88 billion |

Source: Mohammed, L. (2014) “Politicization of Boko Haram Insurgency, bane of Nigeria’s Anti-Terror Fight”, *Vanguard*, September 11, 2014.

Apparently, the security challenges have not completely deterred investments inflow into the country. Meanwhile, the 2011 World Investment Report prepared by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Investment (UNCTAD) confirms the decline in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). According to the report, FDI capital to Nigeria declined to US\$6.1 billion in 2010 from US\$8.28 billion in 2009 (UNCTAD, 2011). Umejei as cited in Nwangwu & Okoye (2014:41) attributed this development to the fact that:

most of the foreign missions have advised their citizenry to be wary of doing business in the country because of what they believe is a high security risk...hence, with travel advisories by most of the foreign missions warning their citizenry of the risk of doing business in Nigeria, it remains to be seen how the government can muster US\$33 billion as projected.

However, data from the CBN in 2012 shows that portfolio investment stood at US\$4.6 billion while FDI stood at US\$1.44 billion. Foreign investors also controlled an average of 60% of all trading done on the Nigerian Stock Exchange in 2012 despite rising insecurity. At a press conference in Abuja on the 2014 World Economic Forum on Africa held in Nigeria, the Minister of Finance and Co-ordinating Minister for the Economy, Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, told Nigerians that the insecurity in the North-eastern part of the country had not reduced FDI. According to her, Nigeria’s FDI has risen to over US\$20 billion in the last three years (Okonjo-Iweala, 2013). The paradox, however, is that unlike those nations that attract FDI because of their relatively strong performance in competitiveness, their business environment, or their minimal corruption, Nigeria garners FDI despite its vulnerabilities. Nonetheless, the opportunity cost of the current insecurity which has been ignored by political economists and the government is how much investments would have flown into the country without the insurgency.

Furthermore, the insurgency has weakened Northern Nigeria’s once prosperous textile industry, thereby leaving thousands of people unemployed. Similarly, major consumer goods’ companies have seen their distribution chains destabilised as the distributors of their goods in

the northern part of the country have been forced to relocate to the south. The telecommunication companies have seen their facilities destroyed while bank branches have been attacked and robbed. Several road construction companies have seen their expatriate staff kidnapped and in some cases killed. The economic cost of the violence may however be difficult to evaluate immediately in terms of lost investment opportunities and actual cost of damage done to existing infrastructure and human lives.

Similarly, the agricultural sector which is over 75% northern-based and contributes almost 40% of the country's GDP has been devastated by the insurgency. The 24 hours curfew imposed on Kaduna and Yobe States in June 2012 following the escalation of the insurgency led to increase in post-harvest losses from 40% to more than 50% (Sobowale, 2012). Apart from being pivotal to the success of agriculture in Nigeria, Kano and Kaduna are vital trans-shipment points for produce from the Northwest while Yobe performs the same role for transport of agricultural produce from the Northeast. Owing to the fact that most farm produce are raw materials, any delay between farm gate and markets increases the post-harvest loss incrementally with the days spent on the road.

This prevailing state of insecurity has lowered agricultural outputs as farmers flee to safer territories. Second, those who still brave the odds to go farming find it difficult to evacuate their farm produce now that transporters are reluctant to go to the northern region. Narrating his ordeal in his bid to secure the services of transporters from Lagos (Iddo and Apapa) to Maiduguri, Sobowale (2012:16) laments that:

only one out of 35 was willing to go; and that was because the company's headquarters is in Maiduguri. Even, that "willing" driver set conditions that would have been considered insane only two years ago. Apart from charging three times the normal rate for the trip, he could not guarantee reaching Maiduguri in less than two weeks...and at the sign of great trouble, he would abandon the consignment and run for dear life.

The ripple effects of the foregoing are enormous. Despite our over-dependence on imported raw materials as a nation, there are some agro-allied manufacturing businesses which depend on local agricultural input for production. For instance, NESTLE and Cadbury, the world's largest food marketers purchase millions of tonnes of onions, soybean and sorghum from local farmers. Similarly, the United African Company of Nigeria Feed Processor Grand located in Jos, is perhaps the country's largest consumer of groundnut and soybean; so does Livestock Feeds. These are only a few of the manufacturers whose fortunes and ours are inextricably tied with the fate of farmlands in the northern region.

Significance of the Study

This study has both theoretical and practical significance. At the theoretical level, the study is relevant to researchers with special interest in national security, terrorism, party politics and political economy. The study, therefore, is justified because of its ability to substantially fill a gap in the extant literature. Contrary to the widespread argument that the tactical cum strategic deficiency of the Nigerian army accounted for the escalation of Boko Haram insurgency, this study posited that the perpetuation of Boko Haram insurgency is implicated in the wanton use of the counter-terror campaign as a political ping-pong. In other words, the campaign has remained elusive because the measures aimed at defeating terrorism are

embroiled in politics, religion and ethnicity. Consequently, the Nigerian political economy has remained in the doldrums because of rise in military spending on hi-tech equipment, fluctuation in FDI inflow and dwindling fortunes of the agricultural sector which is over 75% northern-based.

At the practical level, the significance of the study rests on its ability to constitute a guide to policy-makers and administrators charged with the onerous responsibility of formulating and/or implementing policies aimed at arresting Boko Haram insurgence in Nigeria. Thus, the study is justified practically because of its capacity to re-orientate and re-awaken the consciousness of the key stakeholders like the National Assembly, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Information, National Orientation Agency, the Independent National Electoral Commission and the general public, on the need to be at the vanguard of the campaign against securitization of politics in Nigeria.

CONCLUSION

This paper analysed the interface between the politicisation of the counter-insurgence operations of the MNJTF and the perpetuation of Boko Haram insurgence in Nigeria. Contrary to the widespread argument that Boko Haram insurgence has exposed the tactical cum strategic deficiency of the Nigerian army relative to the daunting onslaughts of the sect members, the study found that the perpetuation of Boko Haram insurgence is implicated in the wanton use of the counter-terror campaign as a political ping-pong. In other words, the campaign has remained elusive because the measures aimed at defeating terrorism are embroiled in politics, religion and ethnicity. Lastly, the study found that Nigeria's political economy has remained in the doldrums because of rise in military spending on hi-tech equipment, fluctuation in FDI inflow and dwindling fortunes of the agricultural sector which is over 75% northern-based.

Arising from the foregoing, therefore, the paper recommends that the preservation of national security, which the paper upholds as a common good, should constitute the fundamental plank for the pursuit of any political ambition. Thus, a non-partisan counter-insurgence approach should be adopted in order to win the war against Boko Haram terrorism as well as ameliorate the cruel fate being suffered by Nigerians in the pursuit of their socio-economic wellbeing. There should be a limit to politicking. Every stakeholder must also eschew the sentiments of religion, region and politics if the war on terror must be won. Lastly, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and other concerned agencies should moderate political campaigns by ensuring that politicians and various political parties conform to the relevant articles of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) as well as Electoral Acts, 2010 (as amended).

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APPENDIX**Showing Major Boko Haram Attacks in Nigeria since 2011**

| S/N | Date | Nature and Place of Attack | Number of Casualties |
|------------|----------------|--|---|
| 1 | Apr. 8, 2011 | A bomb exploded at the office of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) in Suleja, Niger State | 16 people were killed |
| 2 | May 29, 2011 | Bomb explosion in Bauchi military barrack | 14 people killed |
| 3 | Jun. 1, 2011 | Attack on Police Station in Maiduguri | 5 people killed |
| 3 | Jun. 16, 2011 | A suicide car bomber detonated a car bomb in the parking lot of the police headquarters, Abuja | At least 2 persons were killed |
| 4 | Jul. 9, 2011 | Clash between Boko Haram and the military in Maiduguri | 31 people killed |
| 5 | Jul.12, 2011 | Attack on a military patrol vehicle with IED in Maiduguri | 5 people killed |
| 6 | Aug. 26, 2011 | A suicide car bomber attacked the United Nations House in Abuja | 25 persons killed and more than 100 persons got injured |
| 7 | Sept. 12, 2011 | Bomb explosion in a Police Station in Misau, Bauchi State | 7 people killed including 4 policemen |
| 8 | Sept. 17, 2011 | Attack on Mohammed Yusuf's brother-in-law two days after playing host to former President Olusegun Obasanjo | 1 person – Babakura Fugu – killed |
| 9 | Oct. 3, 2011 | Attack at Baga market in Maiduguri | 3 people killed |
| 10 | Nov. 4, 2011 | Attack on government security targets, banks, and churches in Damaturu, Yobe State | More than 100 people were left dead |
| 11 | Dec. 24, 2011 | Bomb explosion in Jos | About 80 people killed |
| 12 | Dec. 25, 2011 | A Christmas day suicide bomber detonated a car bomb outside St. Theresa Catholic Church Madalla, Niger State | 26 worshippers and 17 bystanders were killed |
| 13 | Jan. 6, 2012 | Attack in Christ Apostolic Church, Yola, Adamawa State | 17 people killed |
| 14 | Jan. 6, 2012 | Also, attack at Mubi, Adamawa | 20 Igbo traders were killed |
| 15 | Jan. 20, 2012 | Coordinated attacks on police facilities in the city of Kano | The attacks left 185 people dead |
| 16 | Jan. 30, 2012 | Attack in Maiduguri metropolis | 6 killed including 2 air force officers |
| 17 | Feb. 16, 2012 | Prison break in Koton Karji Prison, Lokoja, Kogi State | 119 prisoners released and 1 warder killed |
| 18 | Feb. 19, 2012 | Bomb explosion near a church in Suleja, Niger State | 5 people injured |
| 19 | Mar. 8, 2012 | A British rescue mission against Boko Haram hostages, Franco Lamolinara | The 2 foreign hostages were killed |

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| | | and Christopher McManus failed | |
| 20 | Apr. 8, 2012 | A suicide car bomber detonated a bomb on Easter Day along a busy street in the city of Kaduna | At least 41 people were killed |
| 21 | Apr. 26, 2012 | A suicide car bomber detonated a bomb at the <i>ThisDay Newspaper</i> Offices in Abuja and Kaduna | At least 7 people were killed |
| 22 | Apr. 29, 2012 | Gunmen attacked two churches at Bayero University, Kano | At least 19 people were killed, including 2 professors |
| 23 | Sept. 2012 | Series of attacks on more than 24 mobile phone towers in at least 7 northern States | Severing of telecoms services in the states |
| 24 | Oct. 1, 2012 | Attacks at Adamawa State University, Federal Poly, and the school of Health Technology and also University of Maiduguri in Borno State | About 43 students killed |
| 25 | Oct. 3, 2012 | Boko Haram members attacked the town of Mubi in Adamawa State during a night-time raid | 46 people were killed |
| 26 | Oct. 7, 2012 | Confrontation between the military and the sect members in Damaturu, Yobe State | About 32 people killed including 30 members of the sect and 2 civilians |
| 27 | Oct. 28, 2012 | Suicide bomber struck at St Rita's Catholic Church in Angwar Yero, Kaduna State | 8 people killed |
| 28 | Oct. 29, 2012 | Attack at a drinking bar in Gindin Akwati Barkin Ladi, Plateau State | 6 people killed |
| 29 | Nov. 22, 2012 | Attack on ladies believed to be on mini-skirts in Maiduguri | 20 women killed |
| 30 | Nov. 24, 2012 | Bomb explosion in St Andrew's Anglican church at the Armed Forces Command and Staff College Jaji, Kaduna State | 15 people killed |
| 31 | Nov. 26, 2012 | Attack on SARS Headquarters in Abuja | 2 officers killed and 30 detainees freed |
| 32 | Jan. 2, 2013 | Attack of a police station in Song town of Adamawa State | 4 people were killed, including 2 policemen and 2 civilians |
| 33 | Jan. 4, 2013 | Attack on a military check-point in Marte town of Adamawa State | 7 people killed including 5 sect members, a soldier and a policeman |
| 34 | Jan. 19, 2013 | A bomb attack on a contingent of Mali-bound Nigerian troops in Kogi State by Boko Haram splinter group, Ansaru | 2 soldiers were killed while 5 others were seriously injured |
| 35 | Jan. 19, 2013 | Attack on the convoy of the Emir of Kano, Ado Bayero in Kano | 5 people mostly the Emir's security guards were killed |
| 36 | Feb. 8, 2013 | Gunmen carried out 2 separate attacks on 2 clinics in Kano | 10 polio immunization workers were killed while 3 others were injured |

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| 37 | Feb. 16, 2013 | An attack on a construction firm in Jama'are, Bauchi State by Boko Haram splinter group, Ansaru | 7 expatriate construction workers were kidnapped |
| 38 | Feb. 21, 2013 | A suicide blast targeting a military patrol vehicle in Maiduguri | A section of a market and adjoining shops as well as a petrol station were burnt |
| 39 | Apr. 16, 2013 | Attack of JTF personnel, Lance Corporal Olomoja, in a local convenience in the Bulabulin Ward of Baga town | The death of Lance Corporal Olomoja |
| 40 | Apr. 16, 2013 | Clash between the JTF and the sect members in Baga, Borno state | Over 200 people killed mostly civilians |
| 41 | Apr. 25, 2013 | Attack on Bama town by suspected Boko Haram insurgents | Death of 21 suspected Boko Haram members, 6 policemen, 14 prison officials, 2 soldiers, and four civilians comprising three children and a woman |
| 42 | Jul. 6, 2013 | Sporadic shooting and throwing of explosives on government boarding school in Mamudo village Borno State | At least 43 people were killed, mostly, students |
| 43 | Jul. 29, 2013 | Coordinated bomb blasts at Sabon Gari, Kano State | At least, 6 people died and 6 others injured |
| 44 | Aug. 4, 2013 | Attacks at military base and police post in Bama, Borno state | 12 soldiers and 7 police officers were killed |
| 45 | Aug. 11, 2013 | Coordinated attacks including shooting and throwing explosives in a Mosque in Konduga, Borno State | 44 worshippers killed and 26 others injured |
| 46 | Nov. 28, 2013 | Attacks on residents of Sabon Gari village in Damboa District, Borno State | More than 17 people were killed |
| 47 | Nov. 30, 2013 | Coordinated attacks at Ningi villages in Baga | Scores of people were killed including 7 fishermen |
| 48 | Dec. 2, 2013 | Around 200 Boko Haram gunmen dressed in military uniform launched coordinated attacks on an air force base in Maiduguri | Scores of people killed |
| 49 | Feb. 20, 2014 | Coordinated attacks at Bama | More than 115 people killed |
| 50 | Feb. 22, 2014 | Coordinated attacks at Izge village | More than 100 people were killed |
| 51 | Feb. 25, 2014 | Attacks on Federal Government Boarding School at Buni/Yadi | About 59 people mostly students were killed |
| 52 | Mar. 15, 2014 | Boko Haram clash with the military at 21 Armoured Brigade, Nigerian Army, Borno | More than 350 people were killed |
| 53 | Apr. 9, 2014 | Multiple attacks on Dikwa, Kala Balge, Gambulga and Gwoza villages in Borno State | More than 210 people killed |
| 54 | Apr. 14, 2014 | Bomb blast at Nyanya motor-park, Abuja | More than 100 people killed and over 200 others fatally |

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| | | | injured |
| 55 | Apr. 15, 2014 | Attack at Government Girls Secondary School, Chibok, Borno State | Over 275 girls were abducted |
| 56 | Apr. 26, 2014 | Attack in Military Unit at Blabili and Dandoa in Borno State | More than 44 people killed |
| 57 | May 1, 2014 | Bomb explosion in a Taxi park at Nyanya, Abuja | More than 25 people killed and about 71 others injured |
| 58 | May 5, 2014 | Boko Haram attack in Gamboru village, a border town with Cameroon | About 300 hundred people killed and 11 girls abducted |
| 59 | May 20, 2014 | Bomb blasts at Jos Terminus market, Plateau State | About 150 people killed |
| 60 | Jun. 3, 2014 | Boko Haram attacks at Attagara, Agapalawa and Aganjara, Gwoza Local Government Area of Borno State | More than 100 people were killed |
| 61 | Jun. 17, 2014 | Bomb blast at football viewing centre at Damaturu, Yobe State | About 21 killed and others seriously injured |
| 62 | Jun. 23, 2014 | Suicide bomb attack at Kano School of Hygiene Technology, Kano State | About 8 people killed and many others injured |
| 63 | Jun. 25, 2014 | Bomb attack at a shopping mall in Abuja | About 24 people killed and many others badly injured |
| 64 | Jul. 24, 2014 | Suicide bomb attack on Muhammadu Buhari's convoy in Kaduna | More than 82 people were reportedly killed |
| 65 | Sept. 2014 | The sect launched coordinated attacks in several towns in Borno and Adamawa States | Captured some towns like Damboa, Gwoza, Bama and most Nigeria's border towns with Cameroon in Borno State and Mubi, Madagali and Michika in Adamawa State |
| 66 | Sept. 2014 | The sect claimed it shot down a Nigerian military jet | One of the pilots was captured alive and beheaded |
| 67 | Sept. 19, 2014 | Attack at a busy market in Mainok, Borno State | Around 30 people were killed |
| 68 | Nov. 2, 2014 | Kogi prison break | 99 inmates were freed |
| 69 | Nov. 27, 2014 | Attack in Damasak, Mobbar Local Government Area of Borno State | Around 50 people were killed |
| 70 | Nov. 28, 2014 | 2014 Kano bombing | At least 120 Muslim followers of the Emir of Kano, Muhammad Sanusi II, were killed during a suicide bombing and gun attack. The 4 gunmen were subsequently killed by an angry mob |
| 71 | Dec. 1, 2014 | 2 female suicide bombers detonated explosions at a crowded market place in Maiduguri, Borno State | 5 people were killed |
| 72 | Dec. 11, 2014 | Attack of Gajiganna, Borno State | 30 people were killed and many houses destroyed |
| 73 | Dec. 13, 2014 | Gumsuri kidnappings | 35 persons were killed while |

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| | | | between 172 and 185 persons were kidnapped |
| 74 | Dec. 22, 2014 | Gombe bus station bombing | 27 people were killed |
| 75 | Jan. 3, 2015 | Baga massacre | The entire town of Baga was razed while as many as 2,000 people were killed |
| 76 | Jan. 12, 2015 | A failed Boko Haram raid on Kolofata in Cameroon | 1 officer killed while the insurgents lost between 143-300 rebels |
| 77 | Jan. 25, 2015 | a large offensive launch against Nigerian forces in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State | 8 civilians, up to 53 insurgents, and an unknown number of soldiers died. The strategic town of Monguno was also captured |
| 78 | Feb 2, 2015 | A female suicide bomber attacked minutes after President Goodluck Jonathan left an election rally in the city of Gombe | 1 person was killed while eighteen others were injured |
| 79 | Feb. 6, 2015 | Raids on the towns of Bosso and Diffa, both in Niger Republic | 5 Nigeriens were killed while the government claimed 109 Boko Haram militants were killed as well |
| 80 | Feb. 9, 2015 | A raid on a prison in the town of Diffa in Niger Republic | No casualties as Authorities repel the attack |
| 81 | Feb. 15, 2015 | A suicide bomber attacked Damaturu, the Yobe State capital | 16 persons were killed while 30 others were wounded |
| 82 | Feb. 20, 2015 | Attacks across Borno State | 34 people were killed; 21 from the town of Chibok |
| 83 | Feb. 22, 2015 | A suicide bomber attacked a market in Potiskum | 5 persons were killed and dozens got wounded |
| 84 | Feb. 24, 2015 | Two suicide bombers attacked bus stations in Potiskum and Kano | At least 27 people were killed |
| 85 | Mar. 7, 2015 | Five suicide bomb blasts in the city of Maiduguri | 54 people died and 143 wounded Afterwards, the sect formally declared allegiance to ISIS |
| 86 | Mar. 28, 2015 | Election day attack in Gombe State | At least 15 voters including a House of Assembly candidate for Dukku Constituency were killed |

Source: Adapted from Mbah & Nwangwu (2014:72-73); Onuoha & Ugwueze (2014:33-38); *The Nation*, Thursday, July 24, 2014 and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_Boko_Haram_insurgency