

## EFFECTS OF AUDIT COMMITTEE EXPERTISE AND MEETING ON AUDIT QUALITY OF LISTED CONSUMER-GOODS COMPANIES IN NIGERIA

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**ABSTRACT:** *The study examines the effects of audit committee expertise and meeting on audit quality of listed consumer-goods companies in Nigeria covering a period of eleven (11) years (2006 – 2016). Longitudinal panel research design was adopted for the study. The population of the study consists of the twenty-three (23) listed consumer-goods companies on the floor of Nigerian Stock Exchange as at 31<sup>st</sup> December, 2016. The census sample size consists of fifteen (15) companies. Eight (8) companies were filtered out of which five (5) companies were listed outside the period of study and three (3) companies were without complete data. Secondary data from published annual financial statements of the sampled companies in Nigeria were used. Descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum) and inferential statistics (correlation and multiple regression) were used for the study. The results show that audit committee expertise and meeting have positive and non significant effects on audit quality of listed consumer goods companies in Nigeria. The study concludes that audit committee expertise and meeting have no significant effect on audit quality of listed consumer-goods companies in Nigeria.*

**KEYWORDS:** Audit committee, Expertise, Meeting, Audit quality, Nigerian Stock Exchange

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### INTRODUCTION

Audit committees are regarded as contributing to auditing process since they are established to assist in improving audit quality. Audit committee's primary duties are to oversee the financial reporting, auditing processes and monitor management tendencies to manipulate earnings and other accounting malpractices. Part of the audit committee's attributes to facilitate monitoring activities over the auditor and to ensure greater audit quality are expertise of members and regular meetings of audit committee.

Audit committee expertise is an important attribute in fulfilling its oversight functions and protects shareholders' interests. It is imperative for all members in the audit committee to have some expertise (accounting, finance and supervisory) knowledge in order to understand the challenges of auditing practices. Accounting, finance and supervisory expertise of the members is the ability to contribute to auditing process in order to improve audit quality. Also, audit committees that meet frequently are always up to date on auditing challenges being faced by the auditor, proactive in discharging their oversight responsibilities and ensuring the expected audit quality.

Audit quality is the outcome of an audit conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards to provide reasonable assurance that the audited annual financial statements and related disclosures are presented in accordance with generally accepted accounting

principles. It is also an indication that these statements are not materially misstated whether due to errors or frauds.

Consumer-goods companies are companies producing consumable products like food, beverages, alcoholic drinks, salt, foam etc that are listed on the floor of Nigerian Stock Exchange. They were formally classified as listed food and beverages companies sector up till end of year 2015. In 2016, the name of the sector changed to listed consumer-goods companies by expanding it from eighteen (18) to the present twenty-three (23) companies that remain listed as at 31<sup>st</sup> December, 2016 on the floor of Nigerian Stock Exchange. The additional companies are: Unilever Nigeria Plc; P.Z Cussions Nigeria Plc; Nigerian Enamelware Plc; D.N Tyre & Rubber Plc and Vital Foam Nigeria Plc.

The study is conducted to critically examine how audit committee expertise and meeting affect audit quality of listed consumer-goods companies in Nigeria.

There are various studies conducted in Nigeria in relation to this study like Yadirichukwu and Ebimobowei (2013) that focused on audit committee characteristics and timeliness of financial reports, Ndubuisi and Ezechukwu (2017) examine determinants of audit quality, Nwanyanwu (2017) studies audit quality practices and financial reports in Nigeria and Dakata, Hasnah and Delima (2017) study audit committee attendance and earnings management in Nigeria. Hence, this study focuses on effects of audit committee expertise and meeting on audit quality.

On the domain of the study, Yadirichukwu and Ebimobowei (2013) use selected quoted companies in Nigeria, Ndubuisi and Ezechukwu (2017) adopt listed deposit money banks in Nigeria, Nwanyanwu (2017) studies selected audit firms in Nigeria and Dakata, Hasnah and Delima (2017) use listed industrial goods companies in Nigeria. In view of the above, this study uses listed consumer-goods companies in Nigeria.

The period of this study covers eleven (11) years from 2006 – 2016 to reflect current research result in auditing as against five (5) years (2007- 2011) used by Yadirichukwu and Ebimobowei (2013). Ndubuisi and Ezechukwu (2017) cover six (6) years from 2010 – 2015, Nwanyanwu (2017) use year 2017 only while, Dakata, Hasnah and Delima (2017) adopt only three (3) years (2012 – 2014).

It is against this background that the study answers these questions:

- a) Does audit committee expertise influences audit quality of listed consumer-goods companies in Nigeria?
- b) Does audit committee meeting affects audit quality of listed consumer-goods companies in Nigeria?

The specific objectives of the study are to:

- i) examine the effect of audit committee expertise on audit quality of listed consumer-goods companies in Nigeria; and
- ii) assess the effect of audit committee meeting on audit quality of listed consumer-goods companies in Nigeria.

The hypotheses formulated for tested in this study are:

H<sub>1</sub>: Audit committee expertise has no significant effect on audit quality of listed consumer-goods companies in Nigeria; and

H<sub>2</sub>: Audit committee meeting has no significant effect on audit quality of listed consumer-goods companies in Nigeria.

Firstly, the study is significant in providing management and board of directors of listed consumer goods companies' opportunities to understand the role of audit committee expertise and meeting in enhancing audit quality. Secondly, the outcome of the study is expected to increase existing knowledge in auditing and show how audit committee expertise and meeting affects audit quality of listed consumer-goods companies in Nigeria. The outcome of the study shall assist in audit committee policy framework in Nigeria.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

Audit committee is a group of persons selected from the members of board of directors and among shareholders also who are responsible for ensuring audit quality of external auditors (Arens, Elder & Beasley, 2009). In his own contributions, Marx (2008) posits that audit committee is a sub-committee of the board of directors that consists of majority of independent non executive directors tasked with an oversight role to assist the directors in meeting their financial reporting, risk management and control and audit related responsibilities. The above concept of audit committee is an indication that the committee is established to improve audit quality.

Audit committee members' financial and accounting expertise is an important attribute for its effectiveness in fulfilling their oversight role of ensuring audit quality. According to Dezoort and Salteerio (2001), audit committee members with previous experiences and knowledge in finance and accounting are more likely to make expert judgments and ensure audit quality. Audit committee's financial and accounting expertise reduce financial restatement or constrains the propensity of management to engage in creative accounting (Xie, Davidson & Dadalt, 2003 and Bedard, Chtourou & Courteau, 2004).

Frequent audit committee meetings with auditors to review their auditing processes and audit reports are to ensure continuous communication between external auditors and audit committee toward audit quality (Habbash, 2010). According to Vafeas (2005) and Persons (2009), frequent audit committee's meetings are significantly related to a lower incidence of financial restatement or fraudulent financial reporting as a reflection of audit quality.

On the concept of audit quality, Schauer (2002) states that higher audit quality increases the probability that the financial statements are more accurately reflect the financial positions and results of operations of the entity being audited. Audit quality would improve the reliability of financial statement information and allow investors to make more precise estimate of the firm's value (Behn, Choi, & Kang, 2008). Audit quality according to Clinch, Stokes and Zhu (2010) is part of the accounting information disclosed. According to Nwanyanwu (2017), audited financial statements should convey accurate and reliable information that are relevant to decision making processes for the benefit of various users of accounting information. All the above definitions of audit quality focus on the accuracy of the information reported by the auditors. In another vein, Chen, Hsu, Huang and Yang (2013) state that audit quality is a function of the auditor's ability to detect material misstatement (technical capabilities) and

reporting the errors (auditor independence). This definition is comprehensive by looking at audit quality from auditor's technical abilities and independence.

On the empirical studies on audit committee expertise and audit quality, Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2006) examine whether audit committee expertise is associated with audit quality. The study was conducted in Australia from data collected through questionnaires sent to 401 companies. Ordinary least square (OLS) regression models are used and the study finds that financial expertise of audit committee members was significantly related to audit quality. Besides, Yadirichukwu and Ebimobowei (2013) carry out a study on the effects of audit committee expertise and timeliness of financial reports that reflects audit quality of external auditors. The study was conducted in Nigeria using 35 listed firms from 2007 to 2011. The study uses multiple regression analysis and concludes that audit committee expertise was significantly related to external auditors' audit quality.

Hoitash and Hoitash (2009) study the association between audit committee meeting and audit quality. The study was conducted in Australia and data were collected using questionnaires on 2,393 public companies audited by large and small auditors in the year 2004. The finding reveals that frequency of audit committee meeting is positively associated with audit quality and that strong audit committee might choose to authorize less non-audit services in order to contribute to audit quality. Furthermore, Lifschutz, Jacob and Feldshtein (2010) examine the effect of audit committee meeting on audit quality in large public companies in Israel. The study uses multiple regression analysis on 100 largest public companies on the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange. The study finds that audit committee meeting is positively and significantly associated with audit quality.

This study is anchored on agency theory that states that interests of the principal and agent vary. As a result, agency theory assumes that the principal can control or reduce this by incurring expenses on activities designed to monitor and limit the self-interest activities of the agent. The principal ensures that the agent acts in the interest of the principal by giving him incentives and by monitoring his activities (Bonazzi & Islam, 2007). Establishment of audit committee is part of the measures taken by the board of directors to reduce the self-serving nature of the auditor (agent) by not being independent in carrying out his functions effectively. Audit committee members' expertise and frequency of meetings are to check the activities of the external auditor with the management in order to ensure the expected audit quality.

## **METHODOLOGY**

This study uses longitudinal panel research design. The population of the study consists of the twenty three (23) listed consumer-goods companies in Nigeria as reported by the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) Fact book as at 31<sup>st</sup> December, 2016 for a period of eleven (11) years (2006 – 2016). The whole population was adopted for the study but only fifteen (15) companies were used as census sample size as shown in Table 1.

**Table I: Population and Census Sample Size Frame of the Study**

S/No	Name	Census Sample	Year of Listing
1.	Champion Brewery Plc	✓	1983
2.	Golden Guinea Brewery Plc		1979
3.	Guinness Nigeria Plc	✓	1965
4.	International Brewery Plc	✓	1995
5.	DN Tyre & Rubber Plc		2001
6.	Nigerian Breweries Plc	✓	1973
7.	Nigerian Enamelware Plc	✓	1979
8.	7 Up Bottling Company Plc	✓	1986
9.	Vita Foam Nigeria Plc	✓	1978
10.	Dangote Sugar Refinery Plc		2007
11.	Flour Mills Nigeria Plc	✓	1979
12.	Honeywell Flour Mill Plc		2006
13.	P. Z. Cussons Nigeria Plc	✓	1974
14.	Multi – Trex Integrated Foods Plc		2010
15.	Nascon Allied Industries Plc	✓	1992
16.	Northern Nigeria Flour Mills Plc	✓	1978
17.	Dangote Flour Mills Plc		2008
18.	Union Dicon Salt Plc	✓	1993
19.	U.T.C. Nigeria Plc		1972
20.	Mcnichols Plc		2009
21.	Unilever Nigeria Plc	✓	1973
22.	Cadbury Nigeria Plc	✓	1979
23.	Nestle Nigeria Plc	✓	1976.

Source: N.S.E. Fact Book (2016).

Census samples from the population were selected based on two criteria. Firstly; five (5) companies from the population were removed for not falling within the period of study since they were listed after 1<sup>st</sup> January, 2006 and secondly, three (3) companies were also dropped due to incomplete data during the period of the study. The census sample size of fifteen (15) consumer-goods companies that were listed as at 1<sup>st</sup> January, 2006, remain listed as at 31<sup>st</sup> December, 2016 and having completed data during the period under review were used for the study. Secondary data from published annual financial statements of listed consumer-goods companies in Nigeria were used for the study because the data are reliable and verifiable.

Descriptive statistics (minimum, maximum, mean and standard deviation) and inferential statistics (correlation and regression analysis) were used. The study uses multiple regression technique to determine the effect of audit committee expertise and meeting on audit quality. This technique is used in line with the studies of Hudaib and Haniffa (2011) and Ilaboya and Ohiokha (2014). Hausman specification test was conducted to determine the appropriate regression to use between Fixed Effect (FE) regression and Random Effect (RE) regression. Diagnostic tests (heteroskedasticity test, multicollinearity test and normality test) were carried out to test data quality.

The two models used to test the hypotheses of the study as demonstrated by Ghafran (2013) and Ndubuisi and Ezechukwu (2017) are presented thus:

**Model 1**

$$AQ1_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 ACE_{i,t} + \beta_2 ACM_{i,t} + \beta_3 CS_{i,t} + \beta_4 CC_{i,t} + \mu_{i,t} \dots \dots \dots (1)$$

**Model 2**

$$AQ2_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 ACE_{i,t} + \beta_2 ACM_{i,t} + \beta_3 CS_{i,t} + \beta_4 CC_{i,t} + \mu_{i,t} \dots \dots \dots (2)$$

Audit fees and auditor's tenure are used as proxies for dependent variable audit quality. The independent variables are audit committee expertise and meeting, while, control variables include company size and complexity.

AQ1 is measured by the annual audit fees paid (Hoitash and Hoitash, 2009). AQ2 that stand for auditor's tenure is measured by the number of years spent as external auditor to the client. Auditor's tenures of above three years equal one (1) and zero (0) if otherwise as used by Okolie, Izedonmi and Enofe (2013). ACE stands for audit committee expertise is measured by the number of members with financial and accounting expertise over total audit committee members (Bradbury & Cahan, 2009). ACM which is audit committee meeting is measured as number of audit committee meetings per year as used by Singh and Newby (2010). CS stands for company size and is measured by the natural logarithm of company's total assets (Goodwin-Stewart & Kent, 2006 and Amar, 2014). CC that stand for company complexity is measured by total number of manufacturing plants of the companies as used by Singh and Newby (2010).  $\beta_0$  stands for intercept;  $\beta_{1-4}$  stands for coefficient of independent variables;  $\mu$  stands for error term;  $i$  stands for company; and  $t$  stands for year.

**RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

This section deals with the presentation, analysis and discussion of results of the processed data collected for the purpose of testing empirically the hypotheses of the study. Results of descriptive statistics, correlation matrix, diagnostic and post estimation tests; regression results and their interpretation for the two models are presented in this section.

Descriptive statistics for all variables (dependent, independent and control) of the study is shown in Table 2.

**Table 2: Descriptive Statistics**

Variable	Observation	Mean	Std Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
AQ1	165	19.163	17.777	2.2	125.95
AQ2	165	0.703	0.458	0	1
ACE	165	0.561	0.162	0.17	0.83
ACM	165	3.861	0.573	3	5
CS	165	9.576	1.995	4.220	12.815
CC	165	3.279	3.169	1	12

Source: STATA 11 Outputs based on study data (See appendix I).

Audit quality (AQ1) measured by audit fees in Table 2 indicate mean value of 19.163; standard deviation value of 17.777; minimum value of 2.2 and maximum value of 125.95. It means on average the audit fees paid by a company was N19.163 million with a close dispersion of

N17.777 million as standard deviation per listed consumer goods companies in Nigeria. The minimum and maximum audit fees are N2.2 million and N125.95 million respectively.

Audit quality (AQ2) measures by auditors' tenures with dichotomous variables of 0 and 1 showing minimum of three (3) years and above three (3) years respectively. The mean of 0.703 indicates that 70.3% of the auditors of listed consumer goods companies in Nigeria spent above three (3) years in office. Standard deviation of 0.458 indicates little wide dispersion from mean.

On the audit committee expertise (ACE), the mean value of 0.561 is an indication that on the average 56.1% of the audit committee members of listed consumer goods companies in Nigeria has financial expertise with wide dispersion of 0.162 from mean as indicated by standard deviation. ACE has minimum and maximum values of 0.17 and 0.83 respectively. Audit committee meetings (ACM) on the other hand indicate minimum and maximum meetings of 3 and 5 per year respectively. On the average about 4 meetings being held as shown by mean value of 3.861 with standard deviation value of 0.573 indicating wide dispersion from mean.

The control variable of natural logarithm of company size (CS) indicates minimum and maximum values of 4.220 and 12.815 respectively. The mean value of 9.576 and standard deviation value of 1.995 indicates wide dispersion from mean. On the company complexity (CC), the minimum and maximum values are 1 and 12 respectively. The mean and standard deviation values of 3.279 and 3.169 show no dispersion from mean.

The association between variables of the study is shown by correlation matrix in Table 3.

**Table 3: Correlation Matrix**

	AQ1	AQ2	ACE	ACM	CS	CC
AQ1	1.0000					
AQ2	0.1035 0.1860	1.0000				
ACE	0.0847 0.2795	-0.1078 0.1681	1.0000			
ACM	0.2337 0.0025	-0.0425 0.5876	0.0694 0.3754	1.0000		
CS	0.6679 0.0000	0.0343 0.6615	0.1035 0.1857	0.1787 0.0216	1.0000	
CC	0.4738 0.0000	-0.0098 0.9004	0.0214 0.7854	0.0316 0.6868	0.4702 0.0000	1.0000

Source: STATA 11 Outputs based on study data (See appendix I).

Based on Pearson Correlation Coefficient of the variables presented in Table 3 at 5% level of significance, AQ1 has positive relationship with AQ2; ACE; ACM; CS and CC which are all significant except with AQ2 and ACE which are not significant as shown by coefficient values of 0.1035; 0.0847; 0.2337; 0.6679; 0.4738 and P values of 0.1860; 0.2795; 0.0025; 0.0000; and 0.0000 respectively. AQ2 on the other hand has positive relationship with CS with coefficient value of 0.0343 and P-value of 0.6615 which is not significant. It also has negative relationships with ACE, ACM and CC as indicated by coefficient values of -0.1078, -0.0425 and -0.0098 which are not significant.

ACE has positive correlation coefficient values of 0.0694, 0.1035 and 0.0214 with ACM, CS and CC respectively which are not significant as indicated by P values of 0.3754, 0.1857 and 0.7854 to ACM, CS and CC respectively. ACM has positive correlation coefficient values of 0.1787 and 0.0316 with CS and CC respectively which is significant with CS ( P-value 0.0216) but not significant with CC ( P-value 0.6868). CS on the other hand has positive correlation coefficient value of 0.4702 with CC which is significant (P-value 0.0000).

Table 4 shows the values of VIF and 1/VIF of independent and control variables of the study.

**Table 4: Variance Inflation Factor**

Variable	VIF	1/VIF
CS	1.34	0.745192
CC	1.29	0.775415
ACM	1.04	0.962082
ACE	1.01	0.985823

Mean VIF 1.17

Source: STATA 11 Outputs based on study data (See appendix I).

Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) values which should be between 1 and 4 and tolerance values (1/VIF) of less than 1 test multicollinearity in data. The VIF values of 1.34; 1.29; 1.04 and 1.01 are for variables CS; CC; ACM and ACE respectively. The tolerance values indicate 0.745192; 0.775415; 0.962082 and 0.985823 for CS; CC; ACM and ACE respectively. The VIF mean is 1.17. The VIF and tolerance values indicate that autocorrelation level of the data within the period under review may not have any statistical significant impact.

**Table 5: Shapiro-wilk W Test**

Variable	Observation	Prob>z
AQ1	165	0.00000
AQ2	165	0.28265
ACE	165	0.24869
ACM	165	0.68273
CS	165	0.00000
CC	165	0.00000

Source: STATA 11 Outputs based on study data (See appendix I).

Shapiro–Wilk test in Table 5 for normal data at 5% level of significance indicate z values for all variables. Data sets for AQ2, ACE and ACM were normally distributed as shown by values of Prob>z 0.28265, 0.24869 and 0.68273 respectively which were not significant. On the other hand, AQ1, CS and CC data sets were not normally distributed as indicated by values of Prob>z 0.0000 for the three variables which are significant. The lack of normal distribution of variables data sets call for robustness of regression technique.

The heteroskedasticity test for appropriateness of OLS regression for the study model is shown in Table 6.



**Table 6: Breusch-pagan / Cook-weisberg Test**

Variable	Chi2 (1)	Prob>chi2
AQ1	118.17	0.0000
AQ2	98.00	0.0000

Source: STATA 11 Outputs based on study data (See appendix I).

Breusch-pagan / Cook-weisberg test for heteroskedasticity rule of thumb states that data is heteroskedastic when Prob>chi2 value is significant, and there is absence of hettest if the P-value of Chi<sup>2</sup> is not significant. Model 1 heteroskedasticity test indicates Chi2 (1) value of 118.17 which was significant with Prob>chi2 value of 0.0000. Hence, the AQ1 data was heteroskedastic. Model 2 heteroskedasticity test shows Chi2 (1) value of 98.00 which was also significant at Prob>chi2 value of 0.0000. In the same vein, AQ2 data was also heteroskedastic. The results show presence of hettest indicating OLS regressions are not appropriate for the two models.

The Hausman specification tests in choosing between FE and RE for the two models are shown in Table 7

**Table 7: Hausman Specification Tests**

Model	Chi2 (4)	Prob>chi2
AQ1	3.10	0.5419
AQ2	20.08	0.0005

Source: STATA 11 Outputs based on study data (See appendix I).

Hausman tests were conducted in choosing between FE and RE regressions for the two models. The decision rule indicates that if the value of Hausman P>chi2 is significant FE regression is used. But if otherwise, that is, P>chi2 is not significant RE regression is applied. Model (AQ1) Hausman test reveals Chi2 (4) value of 3.10 with Prob>chi2 value of 0.5419 which is not significant, hence, Random Effect (RE) regression was used. On the other hand, model (AQ2) Hausman test shows Chi2 (4) value of 20.08 with Prob>chi2 value of 0.0005 which is significant. Fixed Effect (FE) regression was adopted.

Model 1 in Table 8 show audit quality (AQ1) measures by audit fees as dependent variable. Independent variables made up of audit committee expertise (ACE) and audit committee meeting (ACM), while control variables include Company Complexity (CC) and natural logarithm of Company Size (CS).

**Table 8: Model 1 RE Regression Result**

AQ1	Coefficient	Robust Std. Error	Z	P> z
ACE	2.377194	2.769122	0.86	0.391
ACM	2.468495	2.042714	1.21	0.227
CS	6.236129	2.150592	2.90	0.004
CC	0.5617678	0.6268561	0.90	0.370
Constant	-53.26092	22.90991	-2.32	0.020

<b>R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.6599
<b>Adj R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.4805
<b>F-Statistics</b>	27.29
<b>Prob&gt;F</b>	0.0000
<b>Hausman Specification Test</b>	
<b>Chi2 (4)</b>	3.10
<b>P&gt;Chi2</b>	0.5419

Source: STATA 11Outputs based on study data (See appendix I).

Table 8 shows Hausman specification test value of P>chi2 (4) 0.5419 which was not significant at 5% level of significance, RE regression is the most appropriate for model 1. The RE regression was also robust due to lack of normal distribution of all variables data based on Shapiro-wilk test (See Table 5) conducted.

The robust RE regression result shows multiple coefficient of determination R-squared value of 0.6599 indicating that independent and control variables explained 65.99% of the variations in audit quality (AQ1). In addition, the robust RE was also fitted as evidenced by F-Statistics value of 27.29 with Prob>F value of 0.0000 which was significant at 5% level of significance.

The independent variable ACE of the model has z-value of 0.86 and P>|z| value of 0.391 at 5% level of significance. It means audit committee expertise (ACE) has positive non significant effect on audit quality measured by audit fees in listed consumer-goods companies in Nigeria during the period under review. In the same vein, ACM has z-value of 1.21 with P>|z| value of 0.227 at 5% level of significance. This is an indication that audit committee meeting also has positive non significant effect on audit quality measured by audit fees in listed consumer-goods companies in Nigeria.

Table 9 shows model 2 that has audit quality (AQ2) measured by auditors' tenures as dependent variable. Independent variables include Audit Committee Expertise (ACE) and Audit Committee Meeting (ACM). Control variables are Company Complexity (CC) and natural logarithm of Company Size (CS).

**Table 9: Model 2 FE Regression Result**

<b>AQ2</b>	<b>Coefficient</b>	<b>Robust Std. Error</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>P&gt; t </b>
ACE	2.187781	2.824642	0.77	0.451
ACM	1.290198	1.274868	1.01	0.329
CS	7.467178	3.208391	2.33	0.035
CC	-0.3561719	2.898209	-0.12	0.904
Constant	-57.38449	26.54741	-2.16	0.048

<b>R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.5805
<b>Adj R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.4341

<b>F-Statistics</b>	3.71
<b>Prob&gt;F</b>	0.0291
<b>Hausman Specification Test</b>	
<b>Chi2 (4)</b>	20.08
<b>P&gt;Chi2</b>	0.0005

Source: STATA 11 Outputs based on study data (See appendix I).

The Hausman specification test  $P > \chi^2$  value of 0.0005 which was significant at 5% level of significance indicated appropriateness of Fixed Effect (FE) regression for model 2 which was robust due to lack of normal distributions of all variables data based on Shapiro-wilk test (See Table 5) for normal data conducted.

The robust FE regression result shows independent variables ACE and ACM t-values of 0.77 and 1.01 respectively that signified positive effects of audit committee expertise and meetings on audit quality. Also ACE and ACM have  $P > |t|$  values of 0.451 and 0.329 at 5% level of significance. These are indications that audit committee expertise and meetings have non significant effects on audit quality measured by auditors' tenures in listed consumer-goods companies in Nigeria.

On the test of hypothesis ( $H_1$ ), the findings of the two models show positive and non significant effect of audit committee expertise on audit quality. Therefore, the study has no sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis that state, audit committee expertise has no significant effect on audit quality of listed consumer-goods companies in Nigeria. The result did not agree with the studies of Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2006) and Yadirichukwu and Ebimobwei (2013) but agreed with the study of Rainsbury, Bradbury and Cahan (2009). The positive and non significant effect of audit committee expertise on audit quality may be attributed to lack of accounting expertise by majority members of audit committees of listed consumer-goods companies in Nigeria, as minimum of one member is required to have finance expertise in the committee.

Furthermore, the second findings of the study which are used to test hypothesis ( $H_2$ ) also revealed positive and non significant effect of audit committee meeting on audit quality measured by audit fees and auditors' tenures. Hence, the null hypothesis of audit committee meeting has no significant effect on audit quality of listed consumer-goods companies in Nigeria is hereby accepted. The result agrees with the study of Hoitash and Hoitash (2009) but disagrees with the study of Lifschutz, Jacob and Feldshtein (2010). This is an indication that audit committees' meetings have no significant effect on audit quality of listed consumer-goods companies in Nigeria.

The study is conducted due to wide criticisms on the importance and relevance of audit committee in improving statutory audit quality of public companies in Nigeria. Hence, we undertake to examine the effects of expertise and meeting characteristics of audit committee on audit quality using listed consumer-goods companies in Nigeria as our research domain.

In view of the above findings, this study contributes to debate on how audit committee attributes of expertise and meeting affect audit quality of published financial statements of companies in Nigeria. It is also an indication to regulatory authority for necessary amendment

to code of corporate governance in Nigeria by improving and setting minimum bench mark of members' qualifications above the present required only financial experience and number of meetings of audit committees respectively. This is to enhance and improve on audit committees contributions to statutory audit quality of listed consumer-goods companies in Nigeria.

## CONCLUSION

The specific objectives of the study are to examine the effect of audit committee expertise on audit quality of listed consumer-goods companies in Nigeria and assess the effect of audit committee meeting on audit quality of listed consumer-goods companies in Nigeria. As a result of the stated objectives, the study concludes that audit committee expertise and meeting have no significant effects on audit quality of listed consumer-goods companies in Nigeria.


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## Appendix I



(R)  
11.2 Copyright 1985-2009 StataCorp LP  
StataCorp  
4905 Lakeway Drive  
College Station, Texas 77845 USA  
800-STATA-PC <http://www.stata.com>  
979-696-4600 [stata@stata.com](mailto:stata@stata.com)  
979-696-4601 (fax)

Single-user Stata license expires 31 Dec 9999:  
Serial number: 71606281563  
Licensed to: STATAForAll  
STATA

Notes:  
1. (/m# option or -set memory-) 50.00 MB allocated to data  
2. (/v# option or -set maxvar-) 5000 maximum variables

. edit

. \*(8 variables, 165 observations pasted into data editor)

. describe

Contains data

obs: 165  
vars: 8  
size: 3,630 (99.9% of memory free)

variable name	storage type	display format	value label	variable label
firm	byte	%8.0g		Firm
year	int	%8.0g		Year
aq1	float	%8.0g		AQ1
aq2	byte	%8.0g		AQ2
ace	float	%8.0g		ACE
acm	byte	%8.0g		ACM
cs	float	%8.0g		CS
cc	byte	%8.0g		CC

Sorted by:

Note: dataset has changed since last saved

. summarize aq1 aq2 ace acm cs cc

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
aq1	165	19.16303	17.77654	2.2	125.95
aq2	165	.7030303	.458314	0	1
ace	165	.5614546	.1615068	.17	.83
acm	165	3.860606	.5727232	3	5
cs	165	9.576046	1.994926	4.219508	12.81486
cc	165	3.278788	3.169188	1	12

. swilk aq1 aq2 ace acm cs cc

Shapiro-wilk w test for normal data

Variable	Obs	W	V	z	Prob>z
aq1	165	0.72446	34.797	8.087	0.00000
aq2	165	0.98981	1.287	0.575	0.28265
ace	165	0.98933	1.347	0.679	0.24869
acm	165	0.99357	0.812	-0.475	0.68273
cs	165	0.93737	7.909	4.712	0.00000
cc	165	0.87978	15.182	6.197	0.00000

. pwcorr aq1 aq2 ace acm cs cc, sig

	aq1	aq2	ace	acm	cs	cc
aq1	1.0000					
aq2	0.1035 0.1860	1.0000				
ace	0.0847 0.2795	-0.1078 0.1681	1.0000			
acm	0.2337 0.0025	-0.0425 0.5876	0.0694 0.3754	1.0000		
cs	0.6679 0.0000	0.0343 0.6615	0.1035 0.1857	0.1787 0.0216	1.0000	
cc	0.4738 0.0000	-0.0098 0.9004	0.0214 0.7854	0.0316 0.6868	0.4702 0.0000	1.0000

. regress aq1 ace acm cs cc

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs =
Model	25668.6946	4	6417.17365	165
Residual	26156.1847	160	163.476154	F( 4, 160) = 39.25
Total	51824.8793	164	316.005361	Prob > F = 0.0000

R-squared = 0.4953  
Adj R-squared = 0.4827  
Root MSE = 12.786

	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
ace	1.64857	6.226085	0.26	0.792	-10.64733 13.94447
acm	4.002178	1.777274	2.25	0.026	.4922362 7.51212
cs	4.834089	.5797546	8.34	0.000	3.689131 5.979048
cc	1.202302	.3577586	3.36	0.001	.4957642 1.90884
_cons	-47.44695	8.227865	-5.77	0.000	-63.69618 -31.19773

. regress aq2 ace acm cs cc

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs =
Model	.581774891	4	.145443723	165
Residual	33.866671	160	.211666937	F( 4, 160) = 0.69
Total	34.4484848	164	.210051737	Prob > F = 0.6019

R-squared = 0.0169  
Adj R-squared = -0.0077  
Root MSE = .46007

	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
ace	-.315802	.2240342	-1.41	0.161	-.7582474 .1266435
acm	-.0372856	.0639519	-0.58	0.561	-.1635844 .0890132
cs	.0168125	.0208614	0.81	0.421	-.0243867 .0580117
cc	-.0058401	.0128733	-0.45	0.651	-.0312635 .0195834
_cons	.8824349	.2960646	2.98	0.003	.2977365 1.467133

. vif

Variable	VIF	1/VIF
cs	1.34	0.745192
cc	1.29	0.775415
acm	1.04	0.962082
ace	1.01	0.985823
Mean VIF	1.17	

. hettest

Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity

Ho: Constant variance  
Variables: fitted values of aq1

chi2(1) = 118.17  
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

. hettest

Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity

Ho: Constant variance  
Variables: fitted values of aq2

chi2(1) = 98.00  
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000



```
. xtset firm year
      panel variable:  firm (strongly balanced)
      time variable:  year, 2006 to 2016
      delta: 1 unit

. xtreg aql ace acm cs cc, fe
Fixed-effects (within) regression
Group variable: firm
Number of obs   =   165
Number of groups =   15
R-sq:  within = 0.2207
      between = 0.5805
      overall  = 0.4341
Obs per group: min =   11
              avg  =  11.0
              max  =   11
corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.3045
F(4,146)       =   10.34
Prob > F       =   0.0000
```

aql	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
ace	2.187781	5.346649	0.41	0.683	-8.379046	12.75461
acm	1.290198	2.57394	0.50	0.617	-3.796797	6.377192
cs	7.467178	1.256279	5.94	0.000	4.984337	9.95002
cc	-.3561719	1.212707	-0.29	0.769	-2.7529	2.040556
_cons	-57.38449	14.04868	-4.08	0.000	-85.14953	-29.61945
sigma_u	9.7699848					
sigma_e	10.464624					
rho	.46571116	(fraction of variance due to u_i)				

F test that all u\_i=0: F(14, 146) = 6.63 Prob > F = 0.0000

```
. est store fe

. xtreg aql ace acm cs cc, re
Random-effects GLS regression
Group variable: firm
Number of obs   =   165
Number of groups =   15
R-sq:  within = 0.2161
      between = 0.6599
      overall  = 0.4805
Obs per group: min =   11
              avg  =  11.0
              max  =   11
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed)
wald chi2(4)   =   61.89
Prob > chi2    =   0.0000
```

aql	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
ace	2.377194	5.290494	0.45	0.653	-7.991985	12.74637
acm	2.468495	2.275201	1.08	0.278	-1.990817	6.927807
cs	6.236129	.9579748	6.51	0.000	4.358533	8.113726
cc	.5617678	.6935996	0.81	0.418	-.7976624	1.921198
_cons	-53.26092	11.33571	-4.70	0.000	-75.4785	-31.04334
sigma_u	8.680007					
sigma_e	10.464624					
rho	.40758543	(fraction of variance due to u_i)				

```
. est store re

. hausman fe re
----- Coefficients -----
      (b)      (B)      (b-B)      sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
      fe      re      Difference      S.E.
-----+-----
ace      2.187781    2.377194    -.1894128    .7728695
acm      1.290198    2.468495    -1.178297    1.203589
cs       7.467178    6.236129    1.231049    .8127246
cc      -.3561719    .5617678    -.9179396    .9947753

      b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
      B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg

Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic

      chi2(4) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
              = 3.10
      Prob>chi2 = 0.5419
```

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. xtreg aq1 ace acm cs cc, robust re

Random-effects GLS regression  
 Group variable: firm  
 Number of obs = 165  
 Number of groups = 15  
 R-sq: within = 0.2161  
 between = 0.6599  
 overall = 0.4805  
 Obs per group: min = 11  
 avg = 11.0  
 max = 11  
 corr(u\_i, X) = 0 (assumed)  
 Wald chi2(4) = 27.29  
 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000  
 (Std. Err. adjusted for 15 clusters in firm)

aq1	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
ace	2.377194	2.769122	0.86	0.391	-3.050185	7.804572
acm	2.468495	2.042714	1.21	0.227	-1.535152	6.472141
cs	6.236129	2.150592	2.90	0.004	2.021046	10.45121
cc	.5617678	.6268561	0.90	0.370	-.6668476	1.790383
_cons	-53.26092	22.90991	-2.32	0.020	-98.16352	-8.358322
sigma_u	8.680007					
sigma_e	10.464624					
rho	.40758543	(fraction of variance due to u_i)				

. xtreg aq2 ace acm cs cc, fe

Fixed-effects (within) regression  
 Group variable: firm  
 Number of obs = 165  
 Number of groups = 15  
 R-sq: within = 0.1217  
 between = 0.1775  
 overall = 0.0048  
 Obs per group: min = 11  
 avg = 11.0  
 max = 11  
 corr(u\_i, Xb) = -0.9060  
 F(4,146) = 5.06  
 Prob > F = 0.0008

aq2	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
ace	-.3558221	.2292144	-1.55	0.123	-.8088291	.0971848
acm	-.128059	.1103465	-1.16	0.248	-.3461418	.0900239
cs	.2315311	.0538575	4.30	0.000	.12509	.3379721
cc	-.0813544	.0519896	-1.56	0.120	-.1841037	.0213949
_cons	-.5532148	.6022761	-0.92	0.360	-1.743521	.6370911
sigma_u	.42144183					
sigma_e	.44862543					
rho	.46878737	(fraction of variance due to u_i)				

F test that all u\_i=0: F(14, 146) = 1.59 Prob &gt; F = 0.0881

. est store fe

. xtreg aq2 ace acm cs cc, re

Random-effects GLS regression  
 Group variable: firm  
 Number of obs = 165  
 Number of groups = 15  
 R-sq: within = 0.0244  
 between = 0.0003  
 overall = 0.0169  
 Obs per group: min = 11  
 avg = 11.0  
 max = 11  
 corr(u\_i, X) = 0 (assumed)  
 Wald chi2(4) = 2.75  
 Prob > chi2 = 0.6007

aq2	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
ace	-.315802	.2240342	-1.41	0.159	-.7549009	.123297
acm	-.0372856	.0639519	-0.58	0.560	-.1626291	.0880579
cs	.0168125	.0208614	0.81	0.420	-.0240751	.0577001
cc	-.0058401	.0128733	-0.45	0.650	-.0310712	.0193911
_cons	.8824349	.2960646	2.98	0.003	.302159	1.462711
sigma_u	0					
sigma_e	.44862543					
rho	0	(fraction of variance due to u_i)				

. est store re

```
. hausman fe re
```

	Coefficients		(b-B) Difference	sqrt(diag(V_b-v_B)) S.E.
	(b) fe	(B) re		
ace	-.3558221	-.315802	-.0400202	.0484555
acm	-.128059	-.0372856	-.0907734	.089925
cs	.2315311	.0168125	.2147186	.0496531
cc	-.0813544	-.0058401	-.0755143	.0503706

b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg  
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg

Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic

chi2(4) = (b-B)'[(V\_b-v\_B)^(-1)](b-B)  
= 20.08  
Prob>chi2 = 0.0005

```
. xtreg aq1 ace acm cs cc, robust fe
```

Fixed-effects (within) regression  
Group variable: firm  
Number of obs = 165  
Number of groups = 15  
R-sq: within = 0.2207  
between = 0.5805  
overall = 0.4341  
Obs per group: min = 11  
avg = 11.0  
max = 11  
corr(u\_i, Xb) = -0.3045  
F(4,14) = 3.71  
Prob > F = 0.0291

(Std. Err. adjusted for 15 clusters in firm)

aq1	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
ace	2.187781	2.824642	0.77	0.451	-3.870475	8.246036
acm	1.290198	1.274868	1.01	0.329	-1.444121	4.024517
cs	7.467178	3.208391	2.33	0.035	.5858648	14.34849
cc	-.3561719	2.898209	-0.12	0.904	-6.572211	5.859867
_cons	-57.38449	26.54741	-2.16	0.048	-114.323	-.4459453
sigma_u	9.7699848					
sigma_e	10.464624					
rho	.46571116	(fraction of variance due to u_i)				