

**BOKO HARAM PHENOMENON: GENESIS AND DEVELOPMENT IN  
NORTH EASTERN REGION NIGERIA**

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**ABSTRACT:** *This research deals with the Yussufiyya Boko Haram sect as a social phenomenon. The group emerged as a response to Western cultural norms and value system, and viewed western education (Boko) as sin (Haram), and toxic, considering it 'westoxication'. The objective was an analytical survey of the genesis and developmental strength of hitherto simple students of the sect's founder, Mohammed Yusuf and how they metamorphosed into what is known today as Boko Haram/Yusufiyya (named after Yusuf) or by its much broader name, Jama'atul Ahalul Sunna Waljama'a Lidda a' wati Wal Jihadi (JASWAL JIHAD). Boko Haram, was once a social communal movement but gradually evolved into a full-blown destructive hydra-headed insurgency operating in some states of the north-east of Nigeria. Yusuffiyya was studied from an evolutionary qualitative survey perspective and 'interview technique' employed to illicit data; six states in the North Eastern region of Nigeria were sampled with relevant literature cited in the context while face-to-face interviews and focus group discussions (FGD) were carried out. Data collected was validated to ensure reliability of information among the study population with good background knowledge of Yussufiyya Boko Haram. The results showed Boko Haram dreamt of establishing a Marxist Utopian egalitarian society and to achieve this endeavour recruited gullible youth to stage Jihad or 'Unholy War' for the "Islamic Republic of Ibn Thaimiya" to replace the current democratic structure in Nigeria. The National and State assemblies would be replaced by Surah Council of Ulama. Yusufiyya's body of thought was a warped derivative of the 13<sup>th</sup> century early scholar, Ibn Thaimiya's doctrine. Findings also revealed that Boko Haram appeared to be a 'throwback' of another Muslim sect, Izalatul bidiya waikamatul sunna, which came to limelight in the early 1990s in Nigeria, but rejected the synthesised idea of Mohammed Yusuf believing it capable of creating an anomie condition. Historically, the socio-economic and political landscape of the region had been overwhelmed by the activities of immigrants and political Islamists; the Rahbeh, a Century ago, and the early 1990's Maitasine in the North, particularly Borno State, stronghold of the Boko Haram's Markas. These insurgencies occasioned by deep-rooted corruption, poverty and institutional decay resulted in the erosion of norms and cultural value system as some states were thrown into an anomie condition. The survey disclosed that the root cause of the Boko Haram phenomenon is the inherently self-sustaining nature of its driving force stemming from ignorance, poverty and illiteracy. Yussufiyya, in recent times, has evolved and proliferated to such a frightening point it can now engage the Nigerian military in full blown confrontations, which suggests that if the phenomenon is not contained, a number of ominous implications are imminent. It has the tendency to expand to other regions of Nigeria and as the phenomenon has been interwoven with religion, there is suspicion and attendant negative views surrounding Muslims and Islam in general in the country which could have devastating consequences for peaceful co-existence. Winning the war against Jama'atul Ahalul Sunna*

*Waljama'a Lidda a' wati Wal Jihadi (JASWAL JIHAD) in Nigeria, the research showed, needs strong political and diplomatic will by building global consensus with countries interested in combating insurgency within and outside the region, ameliorating or eradicating poverty and illiteracy and empowering the youth to improve quality of lives.*

**KEYWORDS:** Insurgency, Unholy War, Evolutionary, Kanuri, Unholy War

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## INTRODUCTION

The *Boko Haram* insurgency poses a severe threat to national security and socio-economic life in present day Nigeria. The consequences of its violent activities of wanton destruction of lives and property, suicide bombings, assassinations and the palpable fear and suspicion it generates among the citizens are weakening structures of the society causing Anomie condition as it affects every facet of life, threatening the social well-being of the Nigerian people in an already overstretched and over-taxed polity.

The *Boko Haram*, once referred to *Yusuffiya* after its founding leader, Mohammed Yusuf, also referred to as *Boko Haram* had established their stronghold popularly known as 'Markas' in Maiduguri the Borno State capital since 1992, (Muhammed, et al 2014) while outlining the dynamics of the phenomenon, corroborated that, the movement started in the Borno-Yobe axis in the 1990s but gained notoriety in 2001. *Boko Haram* is a home-grown insurgence that rose from among the sect of *Izalatulbidi'awaikamatul sunna* founded in 1992 when Mohammed Yusuf the founding leader of *Boko Haram* came up with a synthesized and different interpretation entanglewith Islam as social fact of deception to stage Jihad which was vehemently rejected by the *Izalatulbidi'awaikamatul sunna*. *Yusuffiya* was considered as throw back and rejection of majority of Muslim in Northern Nigeria.

It started as a group made up of perceived socially excluded, deprived and unemployed set of Islamic seminary students of late Mohammed Yusuf. *Boko Haram* in 1992 withdrew from the larger society, and established a camp in Kannamma Village of Yobe State and tagged themselves *ahalulsunnahwaljamahijirah* and/or the Nigerian 'Taliban' and launched several attacks on divisional police stations in January 1994.

'*Yusuffiyya*' later transformed and embraced the most extreme and advanced teachings from hijirah to *Jama'atul Ahalul Sunna Waljama'a Lidda a' wati Wal Jihadi (JASWAL JIHAD)* with significant number of members resigning themselves to fate and willing to die in planned attacks. Blum (2006) in his analysis of 'The Invisible Killers' as contained in his thesis '**Rogue State; A guide to the World only Super Powers**' described the nature of suicide bombings by the *Boko Haram* as 'involuntarily administered suicide' Furthermore, in recent times, *Boko Haram* has been variously described as a hydra-headed monster that inflicts pain, with every attack, on the structure of the Nigerian society in what Blum (2006), in his assessment of the 'periodic bombing', referred to as 'colossal collateral damage'.

**BOKO HARAM INSURGENCE: EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVE**

*Boko Haram* eventually waxed stronger and metamorphosed into the complicated phenomenon it is today. The transformation that brought about the differentiation and integration of the *Boko Haram* insurgence confirmed what Spencer, Simmel, Khaldun and Darwin (1968 [1859]) in the “Theory of Evolution” believed, and which was, supported by Durkheim (1965 [1912]). The sociological thoughts of the former described the phenomena of *Boko Haram* as ‘simple to complex and then later ‘mechanical to organic’. The *Boko Haram*, hitherto a relatively ‘simple’ and ‘mechanical’ group of socially excluded Islamic seminary students graduated to a violent, destructive, ‘complex’ and ‘organic’ one capable of creating Anomie condition.

The *Boko Haram* becoming so complex, defensive and offensive is due to what Mao Tse-tung (1972) in his study of the ‘**Strategic Defensive and the Strategic Offensive in Guerrilla Warfare**’ described as fluidity of (the *Boko Haram*’s) operations, taking advantage of interior line as against the Nigerian military personnel’s exterior line operation. He also argued that there is geometric increase, that is, sudden rise and fall of *Boko Haram*’s base stations, indiscriminate recruitment of members regardless of background affiliation, sophistication of weapons, changing nature of trend and pattern of its operations and *Boko Haram*’s bulding indigenous initiatives over the Nigerian military men of the joint task force deployed to restore peace in Borno State that has been in Anomie condition today.

These complexities of Boko Haram ‘Yusuffiya’ suggest what Hoffer (2005) in his study of ‘**the true believers; thought of the nature of mass movements**’ describing it as the ‘inter-changeability of Yusuffiya *Boko Haram* by substitution’ in support of the changing nature of the *Boko Haram* insurgence. Rahman (2012) argued and maintained that the United States of America (USA) disclosed that *Boko Haram*, *Al-Shabbab* and *Al-Qaeda* had jointly established a complex network of swapping funds, ammunition and training of members and the aim is to entangled the phenomenon with religion as social fact of deception to stage Jihad.

Again, this is in line with what Blum (2000) in his analysis of ‘Afghan-Terrorist’ referred to as ‘grand conspiracy’ between local/subsidiaries and parent headquarters beyond national borders. This assertion has also been reiterated by the notion that the *Boko Haram* is viewed as the ‘Third Grade Affiliate of Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghrib (AQIM) and a throw back and rejection of the Northern Muslim.

Against this background, the USA on Friday, June 22<sup>nd</sup> 2012 designated three (3) top ranking members of the *Boko Haram* namely: Abubakar Shakau, Abubakar Kamar Adam and Khalid Al-Bornowi as terrorists (Misbahu, 2012).

The Boko Haram ‘Jama’atul Ahalul Sunna Waljama’a Lidda a’ wati Wal Jihadi-JASWAL JIHAD’ Yusuffiya is also referred to as ‘Political Islamists’ as Susan (2000), while discussing ‘**Fundamentalist language and political Islam**’ argued that they were politically constructed to carry the garb of the Muslim faithful and launch violent and well co-ordinated attacks on people of other faiths and their centres with the sole motive of bastardising the name of Muslims whom Mamdani (2006) in his analysis of ‘**Good Muslim Bad Muslim**’ referred to as ‘the good Muslims’ perceived as ‘the bad Muslims’ in the eye of the society that has almost thrown to Anomie condition.

*Boko Haram* is also labelled an 'instrument of political re-engineering' being used by unscrupulous political elements to stage a proxy war in their quest for political power, thereby threatening government, institutions and targeted civilian populations in their insurgency to achieve their political end. The fact that Boko Haram emerged from a collapsed Borno Empire there is the notion that *Yusuffiya Boko Haram* is viewed as an 'instrument for resurrecting a dead empire' faced Anomie condition by fighting to bring back the lost glory of that empire for which they remained the 'residual fighters' despite they are viewed as throw back and rejection of that society.

Others see the *Boko Haram* as 'freedom fighters' from the perspective of their frequent prison breaks and freeing of inmates. This view supported the work of Wicker (1975), who observed that injustice, inequality and dehumanisation bred the crisis of *Yusuffiya Boko Haram* insurgency which Nigeria is facing today. Wicker (1975) argued while analysing '**Crime and Punishment: The Case of Attica Prison Revolt**' in his analysis of 'A time to Die' pointed out that the inmates of Attica Prison revolted because the system evolved into one of the most massive violations of human rights. The rebellion took hostages, and forced the authorities into four days of desperate negotiations, which he described as 'the grim sign of our dark times'.

#### **PRE-BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY IN BORNO**

From a historical perspective, Imam (1974) noted that in the 1890s, Kukawa, the Rome for the Kanuri then capital of Borno State, which collapsed to form what is known today as 'Maiduguri', where the present day headquarters of the Boko Haram sect is located, experienced serious devastation caused by Rabe-Ibn-Padul Allah.

Also, Kyari (2013) recalled that the *Maitatsine* sect-triggered violence in 1984 occurred mainly in the northern part of the country largely dominated by Muslims Maitasine like the *Yusuffiya Boko Haram* also, entangled with religion as social fact of deception to stage Jihad against humanity. The violence which consumed most parts of Borno, Yobe and Kano States led to Anomie Condition and massive destruction of many lives and critical public properties under the cover of religion. However, Boko Haram unlike *Maitatsine* in the 1980s was against all the indices of civilization; the movement was against western education but not its technology, believing that computers, cars and handsets were creations of God not human beings and therefore their usage was permissible.

The movement began to spread in 2003 after the insurgency in Yobe state. The main objective of the *Yusuffiya Boko Haram* sect was to remove and replace the existing political structure and established social justice in Nigeria and in doing so create Anomie condition. It was against the constituted authority and the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as a whole Imam, (2013). The leaders of the movement called for Jihad, encouraging their followers to be ready to die in the war against *Taghut* (infidels). The radical and revolutionary approach of the leaders highly indoctrinated the followers to the extent that they believed the time of the Jihad had come well ahead of the leader's prediction.

Boko Haram *Jama'atul Ahalul Sunna Waljama'a Lidda a' wati Wal Jihadi (JASWAL JIHAD)* is a reflection of what Rabe-Ibn Padul Allah did in the past. Rabe-Ibn, described by Imam (1974), was a powerful bandit warrior who was said to have emerged from the east and invaded the

Kingdom of Borno in 1893. Literatures suggest that when compared to Rahbeh, *Yusuffiya Boko Haram* has done little or nothing in terms of the magnitude and extent of its violence, mayhem and carnage in the north-eastern region of Nigeria in the name of religion.

The then *Shehu* of Borno, Shehu Kyari, Awart (2004) said, slaughtered his blood brother *Shehu* Hashemi who was then on the throne in 1893, and took over the mantle of kingship of Borno Kingdom from him. *Shehu* Kyari, Bell (2004) further revealed, had viewed his brother's action of succumbing to Rahbeh's conditionality as an act of cowardice when the latter (i.e. Rahbeh) wrote and threatened to launch an attack on Borno.

Rahbeh, just as in today's Boko Haram bombings and attacks on innocent souls under the cover of religion, declared war on Borno in 1893 and caused Anomie condition. Hamilton (1958) narrated that Rahbeh succeeded in demolishing the palace, capturing *Shehu* Kyari alive, and later slaughtering him alongside thousands of Kanuri who hailed from Borno Kingdom under the pretext of establishing some kind of religious order entangled his mission with religion as social fact of deception and stage Jihad against Borno.

In comparing Rabeh and *Yusuffiya Boko Haram*'s ideological disposition, Dwight (1958) pointed out that the former's vested interest of violent attacks on Borno was due to the subjective imposition of Islamic laws, extortion, looting of public properties and bastardization of political power by the monarchy in Borno, unlike the latter, Boko Haram led by Mohammed Yusuf, who championed the sect's extreme doctrine since its emergence in 1992, and whose driving objectives largely relates to waging war against the Nigerian law enforcement agents with a view to establishing a wrongfully perceived 'pure religious state' with their so-called brand of *Shariah* which most Muslims do not actually subscribe to and perceived their action to describe them as rejection and throw back.

Moreover, *Yusuffiya Boko Haram*'s wishful thinking, Walter (2009) pointed out, is to overthrow the constitutional government in Nigeria, with the aim of replacing it with their own brand of Islam in a *Shariah* state. He went on to say that the national and state assemblies according to *Boko Haram*'s doctrine are to be headed by a *Shurah* Council of *Ulamas*. Both *Boko Haram* and Rahbeh forces that fought the then headquarters of Borno (Maiduguri) and Kukawa at different historical periods of human development had some things in common. One is that they were both drawn from peasant families and secondly they were said to have been given pieces of land to reside as settlers when they arrived in Borno and in the end created Anomie situation that has almost consumed the people.

Furthermore, Imam (1974), tracing the background of Rahbeh, noted that he was an adopted child of Zubhr Abdulrahaman Pasha. Rahbeh was born in 1838 to Fadul Allah, his father was a brick maker and a servant to Zubhr Pasha. Rahbeh was sent to Qur'anic School (*Khalwa*) and he showed remarkable intelligence, chanting and committing to memory the Holy Qur'an, becoming a *Hafisat* at age 15. Sikes (1951) maintained that in those days the distinction between a master and servant was a matter of academic excellence.

Rahbeh, unlike his servant father was freed by Zubhr Pasha, and that automatically placed him on an elevated position of a free-born and he became very powerful in the coast of the Lake Chad. Furthermore, Shettima (1976) pointed out, in 1889 Rahbeh established a mobile government and also developed a character of strength and bravery. He was said to have commanded an army of 960 troops, well-trained and armed with rifles and other sophisticated weapons of that time.

While narrating Rahbeh's strategy for the invasion of Borno, Shettima (1976) reiterated that he succeeded in flooding Borno (Kukawa), which collapsed and rose to form what is known as Maiduguri today, with secret agents who penetrated most settlements fomenting trouble and causing confusion all round. This created a favourable situation that enabled him to firmly secure his position for the purpose of attacking Borno.

Rahbeh succeeded in his mission under the guise of religion as social fact of deception and succeeded to launch Jihad. He entered Kukawa, the then capital of Borno in 1893, sacked the city over a period of three days and carried out the mass massacre of its civilian population. Pointing out the severity of the attack and booty stolen by Rahbeh and his militants, Ngurno (1946) confirmed that the number of dead bodies recorded the next day after the carnage was approximately 30,000 with the palace of Borno Kingdom also demolished. He was said to have also carted away 950 horses, 3,800 slaves, 4,500 grammes of gun powder, 260 rifles, 1,000 large elephant tusks, 1,000 heads of cattle, 70,000 Maira Theresa Dollars, 50,000 camels, 30,000 sheep and goats, and 70,000 bundles of black hand-woven clothes, among other things.

## **FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH *BOKO HARAM* INSURGENCY**

Socio-economic factors were the major influences responsible for the insurgency; these ranged from poverty, joblessness, bad governance occasioned by leadership deficit, corruption, deception and injustice were seen as the root causes of the *Boko Haram* insurgency, said the interviewees of the research. 68% of those interviewed lamented the neglect of the government not just in the dispensation of justice under democracy to its citizenry. One of the respondents interviewed pointed out that:

*Our right to practice our religion has been denied, the law enforcement officials attack us in the first instance. We were peaceful and minding our businesses when suddenly we were attacked and killed, our brothers killed, leaders killed yet they want us to be quiet about it.*

-Musa Ibn Muhammed

However, this was what Albert Cohen (1955) described as the attitude of the lower class delinquency toward the upper class, and noted that the lower class delinquency was capable of creating more conflicting youth sub-cultures such as the Boko Haram 'Jama'atul Ahalul Sunna Waljama'a Lidda a' wati Wal Jihadi-JASWAL JIHAD' Yusuffiya whose ages ranged from 20-35. The theory assumed that the sub-culture of Yusuffiya *Boko Haram* always viewed the upper class culture dominated by Western values as dissenting against the lower class minority culture, and this supposed injustice may have fuelled their desire to strive to deliberately close the gap created by the elite who were favoured by Western education. The theory further stressed that they

sought for a means to 'right this wrong' but in the process failed as their socialization did not prepare them for such challenges like cultural deprivation. Hence, they became 'status frustrated'. One of the interviewees was of the belief that:

*One of the factors responsible for the Yusuffiya Boko Haram was that the parents were not conscious of their children's movements and the kind of clerics they contacted in their quest to learn. The children follow groups like the Boko Haram in good faith to learn more about their religion.*

-Mohammed Ali

*However, they end up being trapped and used, and their thinking changed into something else like the Yusuffiya Boko Haram". In those days clerics who taught children were those established by the community as those whose line of thinking and ideologies were known and accepted as non-violent. The most extreme clerics we see nowadays preach in the name of religion but exploit the youths.*

-Baa Alaji Umar

About 57% of the interviewees in the research carried out were of the opinion that porosity of Banki, Gamboru Ngala and Jilbe towns bordering Cameroun, Chad and Niger Republic respectively were some of the factors responsible for the growth of the *Boko Haram*. One of those interviewed maintained that:

*Borders around Borno remained vulnerable to all sorts of vices because people come in to perpetrate their crimes and go back to hide in the neighbouring countries as their safe haven. Most of those you call the Yusuffiya Boko Haram were aliens. They are strangers as noticed during their attacks on the law enforcement in 2009. Most of the dead bodies evacuated after the clashes were that of foreigners. Some come in and co-opted the down-town indigenes to get to their targets and perpetrate crimes, and some of them speak foreign languages.*

- Umar Gaji

About 24% of the respondents who filled in the questionnaire at Shehuri North and Lawan Bukar Wards observed that the present challenges that led to further entrenchment of the *Boko Haram* in Borno was the culmination of a festering systemic dysfunction, which included crumbling family structures, value system and discipline. This finding has been supported by Galtimari (2011) who noted that in addition to differentiation of cultural value system there was also blatantly weak governance, existence of private militias, as well as the large presence of *Almajiris* who were usually used as cannon-fodders to ignite and sustain crises in Borno.

The finding noted above has been corroborated by the report of the Presidential High-powered Committee on Sectarian Crisis in the North, headed by Galtimari (2011). About 34% of the respondents also pointed out that most of the *Boko Haram* who sold their properties, wives' jewellery and households items, and handed over their resources to Mohammed Yusuf to enrich their post for the 2009 'Jihad', were those actually asked by their parents not to participate in such activities but who had gone ahead and joined the group in outright disobedience to take their parents. 34% of the respondents added that some *Yusuffiya Boko Haram* members declared that

the spilling of the blood of any person who tried to stop them from declaring war on the society was legitimate as they would leave no stone unturned in their fight to achieve their goals.

About 72% of the respondents to the research also said that the bulk of the Boko Haram members were people from relatively lower social standings or members of the lower class in the state. Some were settlers while others were descendents of the *Shehu*'s slaves who were not privileged to have acquired some form of Western education, and had settled around the 'troubled spots' few metres away from the *Shehu*'s palace. The same percentage of respondents, that is, 72% believed that as at today no single *Yusuffiya Boko Haram* member whose parents were known could easily be reached by those in the authority. They were intruders and settlers whose parents were either dead or living outside Borno State.

However, a theoretical position of the differential opportunity structure theory that has supported this finding is the Robert K. Merton 'Anomie theory' which argued that the *Boko Haram* were people perceived to have been prevented by the society from achieving their set goals, thus, as far as the element of Merton theory was concerned, the 'socio-politico' structure of Borno as a society had suffered from dysfunction and crumbling family structures, value system and discipline.

Such a situation, Merton believed, produced frustrations, pressure and, of course, strain on the lower class to use whatever means possible even if such means were illegitimate with the aim of finding solutions to blocked opportunities. This is the kind of condition Merton described as the 'Anomie Condition'. Members of the society are socialized through Western education, as far as modern society is concerned, to aspire to higher opportunities, but the lower class or minority groups were relatively blocked from getting free conventional education, good occupations and basic social amenities, health care and other basic needs required to achieve legitimate goals. Hence, the lower class who were 'blocked' lose confidence in the society, and as a reaction to the structure of the society that denied them these basic needs, formed a radical group that could never see anything good with the Western philosophy that had modernized their hitherto relatively simple traditional culture and social life, where members were more or less the same to a more dominant institutionalized capitalist society where every man is for himself, and hence felt compelled to join the campaign of Boko Haram.

46% of the respondents pointed out that the activities of *Yusuffiya Boko Haram* had created a lack of social standard of control in the society. People were confused as to what next to do, especially in Borno State, they said, in spite of the existence of government and traditional institutions, referred to as formal and informal control mechanism in the society. The formal control mechanism which includes the law enforcement agencies such as the police, courts and prison and other security institutions like the State Security Service (SSS), Civil Defence Corps, and quasi-organized groups such as the Peace Corps, vigilante groups, have failed to deliver what is expected of them. While the informal ones mostly under the control of his Royal Highness, the *Shehu* of Borno, are the district heads, village heads and ward heads who also have informal ways of resolving conflict to ensure peace and stability for the maintenance of law and order, and further sustain the societal structure in a chaotic situation 'Anomie condition' created by the Boko Haram *Jama'atul Ahalul Sunna Waljama'a Lidda a' wati Wal Jihadi (JASWAL JIHAD)* 23% of the interviewees in the course of the research wondered what happened to those institutions for the

bloody clash between the members of Yusuffiya *Boko Haram* and the law enforcement agents to have caused severe destruction to the structure of the society causing Anomie condition. This question can be properly and adequately answered by the structural functionalist theories that normally see functions of an institution as *sine-qua-non* in the analysis of a social system. Differential opportunity structure theory argued that the behaviour of the *Boko Haram* could be attributed to a number of social conditions and their reaction to such conditions defined their behaviour as deviance and or a crime in sociological or criminological parlance.

Glassen (1956) argued that the theory has been silent as to whether the Yusuffiya *Boko Haram* sect deviated from the societal norms and values due to any severe emotional psychological stress they might have experienced. Shout (1957) also argued that the nature of the learned behaviour of Yusuffiya *Boko Haram* and its pattern cannot be accurately measured. Moreover, a strongly socialised individual will always and at most times obey the laws and orders of the society quite independent of specific consequences of doing wrong.

Akens (1966), in the principle of differential reinforcement: an operate learning theory, holds that it is all a matter of how weak or well reinforced individual socialisation is to differentiate the ‘dos’ and ‘don’ts’ of the society. His perspective has correlation with Evans Pavlop and B.F. Skinner’s theory of operate and classical condition on learning behaviour. Learning behaviour of any kind is not limited to Yusuffiya *Boko Haram*, it is largely determined by the frequency of identification, association, reinforcement duration tendency, preponderance and probability of occurrences of sub-culture behaviour capable of producing any strain that might result in an anomie condition.

The deviance theory believes that individuals cannot deviate, but it is the culture or sub-culture which the Yusuffiya *Boko Haram* values passed on to individuals that has deviated with regard to the culture of the larger societies. Culture not person is deviant; Smah (2007), Burges and Parks (1935) urban zonation, the concentric zone theory explained the city as Maiduguri where there are traditional rulers at the core (centres) controlling affairs of his people informally.

The theory though explains ‘city’ in concentric and gives an explanation to each layer, how and where crime is prevalent. In criminological parlance, the concentric is further classified as lower rate area and higher rate area. The theory emphasised that some members of the society, irrespective of their positions on the strata, who live where the *Boko Haram* converged and identified with their behaviour might soon become one of them.

## **POLITICAL CONDITIONS THAT LED TO *BOKO HARAM* INSURGENCY**

At Bulabulin, Shehuri North, Gamboru, Limanti and Ngarannam Wards, 53% of the respondents in the field described the Yusuffiya *Boko Haram* group as ‘dumped political thugs’. After the 2003 general election, they argued, private militias engaged by political aspirants such as ‘ECOMOG boys’ in Borno, ‘Sara-Suka’ in Bauchi, ‘Yan-Kalere’ in Gombe states, remained heavily armed and were used extensively as political thugs. They further added that after the elections, and having achieved their primary purpose, the politicians left them to their fate since they could no longer continue funding them.

As a consequence, they teamed up to fight back at the society as *Boko Haram*. From his writing, Mohammed (2011) also supported this finding. Godson (2010), traced the genesis of the *Boko Haram* to 1994 and challenged Mohammed's (2011), position as it was seen as adding to the already existing of *Yusuffiya Boko Haram* than to its establishment after the 2003 general elections, he argued. Gadosinki (2010), in his contribution, stated that the *Yusuffiya Boko Haram* had been in existence since 1994, long before the return of democracy in 1999. Nur Gummil (1998) also pointed out that *Yusuffiya Boko Haram* were radical youths, educated in Islamic theory (the Qur'an) but lacking in jurisprudence and *Hadith* as practice. He added that they were migrants who moved from the villages of Borno to the state capital and were easily snared by Mohammed Yusuf to believe in the *Boko Haram* 'Jama'atul Ahalul Sunna Waljama'a Lidda a' wati Wal Jihadi-JASWAL JIHAD' *Yusuffiya* doctrine and operations based on misunderstood Ibn-Thairmiya's philosophy.

However, in a study conducted by David (2011), the findings of his research reveal that the raise of *Yusuffiya Boko Haram* in Nigeria lies in the Islamic history of Northern Nigeria. David, a Briton, conducted his research among a 300-population of 201 men and 99 females in Northern Nigeria. Nevertheless, David (2011) did not provide a clear methodological approach to his study neither did he give the precise scope covered in the North nor state the limitations of his research as a foreigner. He further added in his findings that for some 800 years powerful Sultanate centred in Kano and Borno constituted high Muslim civilisation and these Sultanate were challenged by *Shehu* Usman Dan Fodio from 1802-1812 which created a unified Caliphate stretching across Northern Nigeria into the neighbouring countries. He concluded that Dan Fodio's legacy of Jihad is seen as normative by most Northern Nigerian Muslims.

Unlike David (2011), who traced the root of *Yusuffiya Boko Haram* to the hitherto Jihads staged in the North particularly, Sokoto and Borno, Carew (2000) did a comprehensive psychological study of the Jihadist in his work, 'The Secret War in Afghanistan' on weapons handling, fighting skills and extractions of weapons of the insurgent recruits. Although Carew (2000) conducted his participatory observational studies in Afghanistan he had visited all 1-7 *Mujahedeen* camps and held a series of meetings and contacts with their leaders, the *Mullah*. Carew unlike David (2011), who conducted a survey using a population of 300 in Northern Nigeria, Carew (2000) did a participatory observational study and concluded that the *Mujahedeen* of Afghanistan were used by the war lords because of their vulnerability as a potent population, ignorant of their own actions. They were brainwashed to believe that Jihad was good and done for the sake of Allah, while the warlords aimed to achieve their political goals by giving them all the necessary support and logistics. Carew (2000) also narrated in his findings that the insurgents were not only used to carry out mayhem and destruction by the warlords, but used to carry out illegal activities across the borders. He noted that some of the Afghanistan *Mujahedeen* despite their attacks were seen pushing Opium across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and were fully protected by these warlords.

On the activities of the warlords, Cooley (2002), unlike Carew (2000), who established in his participatory study that the insurgents' activities mostly took place close to the border where there was potent population of homogeneous Muslims. The warlords coaxed the ignorant youth with misplaced perception of Islam into believing that Jihad was good and done for the sake of Allah. Cooley (2002), in his study showed how drugs played a significant role in the initiation of

insurgents recruits for insurgency. He gave a classical example of the use of cocaine and heroin on the recruits to kill and carry out any assignment for the war and drug lords. Cooley (2002), described the 'Jihad' as an Un-Holy war in his study of international terrorism. He further pointed out that those used for insurgency were drawn from the lower social standing in society, and poverty entrenched population who were indoctrinated to stage a proxy war against the perceived enemies of the warlords.

A survey by Trofimov (2005) on comprehensive evaluation of insurgents' perception of faith at war discovered that the recruits easily believed and developed a hatred for the society and its ills. The level of poverty and injustice by those in leadership, he said, made it easier for the warlords with very little effort to convince the populace to declare war against the society. He conducted a purely scientific study, the scope of which was wide enough to lead comprehensively to a conclusion of his findings. He studied the Middle-East and some parts of the African continent and ended his research in Tumbuku; *'Faith a War a Journey on the front line of Islam form Baghdad to Tumbuku'*

However, in his findings Trofimov (2005) noted that the Arab World had developed intense hatred against the West and Western ideals and believed it had nothing to do with improving their lives but rather created hardship and poverty. He also established the fact that the population of those areas he studied were of the opinion that poverty and injustice in their immediate communities were creations of the West and they were all out to fight those Western ideals. While citing example of an interview conducted in Lebanon, Trofimov (2005), pointed out that 'even the goats come from *Hezbollah*', the insurgents of Lebanon, like the Nigerian *Boko Haram*. However, he did not provide a consistent population sample to draw a clear-cut conclusion by generalising that those communities studied had declared faith at war against the West and its modernity.

Cooley (2002), Carew (2000), David (2011), Trofimov (2005) in their studies did not establish any logical connections on how insurgents' background knowledge influenced the recruits' view of the world as real, and the tendency of these views to cause colossal collateral damage to the social, economic and political structure of the society. Zarabozo (2003) did a classical study of the kind of knowledge that influenced the thinking of the insurgent recruits. He traced the background knowledge of the *Boko Haram* members to the teaching and influence of Mohammad Ibn-Abdulwahab dubbed from 13<sup>th</sup> century scholar, Ibn-Thaimiyya. Zarabozo (2003) argued that Yusuffiya *Boko Haram*'s kind of knowledge is in conflict with the present day kind of knowledge and is the root cause of the insurgency.

On the other hand, Baker III (2006) pointed out that the Iraq group study conducted by a team of 14 researchers revealed that solution to insurgency had a dual approach. He presented the group study report in **'The Way Forward - A New Approach'**. Baker III (2006) argued that there are two major approaches to end insurgency thus: external and external approaches. The external approach, he noted, is to build an international consensus with countries that have interest in insurgent attacks.

The finding of the study was also particular about the policies and actions of the neighbouring countries which are linked to the stability and prosperity of the country greatly affected by

insurgent activities. In the report, therefore, Baker III (2006) advocated for a diplomatic defensive to build an international consensus for stability.

The internal approach, according to the study, had much to do with the responsibility of the country to work for its future. Baker III (2006) noted that the study suggested national reconciliation, and urged the country under insurgent attacks to take control of their own destiny and the government accelerate to assuming responsibility for national security. Kyari et al (2013) posits that since the state is formed on the basis of a political system to establish justice, the leaders produced the circumstances upon which the thinking, behaviours and perception of the people were directed. Nigeria is democratic state operating secularism which provides freedom of religion and beliefs. It is the responsibility of the state to regulate the actions of the people within the context of the law, freedom and equality. Similarly the state is charged with the responsibility of safeguarding the lives of the citizens, the social, economic and their security needs. Unfortunately, the leaders who were supposed to be transparent and trusted rather accumulate wealth through illegal means, corruption and manipulation to the extent that the state became personal expression of the ruling elites in the country.

Iman et al (2013) further added, In Nigeria today, education has become a privileged of the few, our lives insecure, social amenities broken down, political freedom restricted and no enabling environment for economic growth and development. The deprivation of the majority of the people in the state has the effect of producing quantitative population with no corresponding qualitative man power. The 'Yan Boko most wake up and understand that the more they flourish in affluence while the children of their neighbours wallow in poverty and ignorance the more we see deviant groups like Boko Haram emerging.

### ***BOKO HARAM; ITS GENESIS AND DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA***

While discussing the '**Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity**', Tariq (2002) dwelt extensively on Islam and the roots of Islamism, as well as the formation of Western attitudes toward the Arab and Muslim Worlds. Tariq (2002) opined that the political root of the present precarious state of the Yusuffiya *Boko Haram* insurgence the Nigerian society finds itself in today is as a result of what he described as the 'clash of civilization.' Rival fundamentalisms - Islamism on one hand and imperialism on the other - are the forces directing much of the world today. He provided a historical context in which modern Islamism and imperialism arose, while noting that the remarkable expansion of Islam in Asia and parts of Europe and subsequent decline of empires was concomitant with a massive rise in the power of the West, women in Islam and *Wahhabism*. The role of political Islam, Tariq (2002) added, whether religious or political had greater influence in the separation of Pakistan from India. This separation and resultant fall out gave birth to Bangladesh, and the crisis over Kashmir incorporated elements of the background of imperialism.

The Nigerian Boko Haram of the North Eastern State which was the focus of this research had several names given to it based on the differential perception of people, beliefs and ideologies. Imam et al (2013) argued that the founding leader of Yusuffiya *Boko Haram*, Muhammad Yusuf, claimed that people were calling them by different names associated with some sects like

Khawarism, Shi'ism or Qura'aniyyunism. Also they called themselves or were referred to the Nigerian Taliban to differentiate it from that of Afghanistan. It is believed that they once wrote 'Taliban' on their Toyota van that was snatched from the police in Geidam, Yobe State. Kyari et al (2013) noted that after the uprising in Bama and Gwoza in 2004, the name of the movement was changed and replaced with either *Yusufiyya* or '*Yan Boko Haram*', which came to be more popular during the mayhem in Bauchi, Maiduguri and some states in Northern Nigeria in July 2009. The opportunity of Boko was made open to Mohammed Yusuf the then leader of *Boko Haram* at Indimi Mosque, Maiduguri in which his colleagues in the Izala were operating. In addition to preaching and translation of sermons, he was at one time an Imam at the Indirni Mosque even though there were more qualified Imams who had undergone conventional Islamic training at University of Madina, the likes of Malam Modu Mustapha, the late Ja'afar Mahmud Adam and Imam Abuya, among others. In a face-to-face interaction with Shara in 2008 the then second in command a position of Imam Abubakar Shakkau the leader of Boko Haram *Jama'atul Ahalul Sunna Waljama'a Lidda a' wati Wal Jihadi (JASWAL JIHAD)* today confirmed Yusuf as a desperate 'power thirsty personality' with exploitative tendencies.

Hitherto, Yusuf was an unpopular figure struggling for survival but at the same time desperate for recognition and popularity with thirst for leadership. His concern with political Islam rather than the spiritual, made him appear too ambitious and radical in his approach and interpretation of Islam. He subsequently broke ties with the scholars in Indimi Mosque and later with the Daggash Mosque because of differences on issues concerning the establishment of Islamic state, liberal democracy as well as his other weird personal interest. It was at this point that the movement began to grow and the leader becoming popular particularly because of his approach to issues affecting the state and the society.

Yusuf was successful in forming the movement because he was very good in presentations of arguments and manipulating the ignorance. His approach was to direct his attack against the state and the leaders whom he accused were behind the sufferings and deprivation people were suffering from. He also accused them of being the agents of international conspiracy to perpetuate misrule, corruption, (vices, moral and financial) in the society as dictated by the Western world. As he was speaking the reality of the situation in Nigeria and the call for implementation of Islamic Shariah as the solution, many people, particularly the youths, who were evidently in the midst of poverty and hopelessness, easily fall prey to his exposition of their suffering and whom they viewed as courageous and frank. This was at a time that the political class, traditional rulers in the country as well as the so-called religious leaders either hobnobs with each other to perpetuate the rape on Nigeria's resources, or look the other way as elites perpetuate in corruption while the mass of the people wallow in extreme poverty and social quagmire. For the working class, many were attracted to Yusuf out of ignorance of the Islam and some hoped to gain political opportunity on the basis of Shariah agitation. For example, some people unknown in the political arena emerged as elected Governors In some Northern States in Nigeria. The youths believed that they found the solution to their problems, and that, they either live under good governance guided by Shariah or die in the process of struggling for good governance under the Shariah and as another aspect of jihad, they would then go to heaven in the event they died doing so. On several occasions, the leader emphasized to his followers that is better for a Muslim to die than survive under Taghut. Similarly, it is forbidden for a Muslim to respect constitution, which is manmade law.

The anxious and enthusiastic members of Boko Haram moved to Kanarnrna not only to migrate and steer away from vices of the cities and towns in Nigeria, but also to train their members as Jihadist Civilian soldiers. Imam et al (2013) argue that, it is believed that the group camped at Jaijin biri, thick forest in November 2003 to give their members military training to prepare them for Jihad. The group called Taliban after the Afghanistan based Muslim organization attacked police stations at Geidam, Babban Gida and Damaturu, Yobe State. Later in 2004, they attacked police stations in Bama and Gwoza, Borno State, killing police officer, a commandant in Barna town.

Security investigation and public opinion confirmed that the Taliban were followers of Yusuf operating under his guidance but tactically Yusuf denied any link with the group and the insurgence after his return from Saudi Arabia. Corroboration to this, It was discovered at the Yusuffiya *Boko Haram* strong hole a communication room well equipped with internet-linked computer and other gadgets on 30<sup>th</sup> of July 2009 when the military force demolished their strong hole (Markaz) Periodically, Yusuf continued to preach the same idea calling for Jihad and isolations from the people in government and cities. His preaching was against the state and its operatives. Blum (2002) in his analytical examination of global crisis and the stand of the US has provided an answer to this question. Terrorists, of whatever nature anywhere in the world, Blum (2002) argued are rational human beings and in their mind they must have rational justification for their actions.

Blum (2002) went on to say further that most terrorists are people deeply concerned by what they see as deprived social, political, economic or religious injustice and hypocrisy; immediate grounds for their terrorism is often retaliation for an action against Western imperialism. The position of Blum (2002), established Wicker's (1975) observation of injustice and dehumanisation that breeds the type of insurgence such as the *Boko Haram* Nigeria is facing today. Wicker (1975) while analysing '**Crime and Punishment: The Case of Attica Prison Revolt**' in his analysis of '**A time to Die**' pointed out that the inmates of Attica revolted because the system evolved into one of the most massive violations of human rights. The rebellion took hostages, and forced the authorities into four days of desperate negotiations.

Wicker (1975), observed that deprivation, injustice and dehumanisation breeds revolt not only of inmates in prisons but also of a sort of deprived group cut-off from the society like the *Boko Haram* group in Nigeria.

His analysis of the Attica Prison revolt is more timely used to describe neglected groups in the society whose fundamental rights are abused and revolted as is the classical case of Boko Haram today. Although Wicker's (1975) analysis is limited to prison revolt, it can equally be reflected to describe the case of wider society as is the case of insurgency and unrest in the present day situation. The society he argued which makes an art out of destroying human beings through deprivation and injustice meted on its members created phenomena like the Yusuffiya *Boko Haram*, one of the great historical tragedies, and described such a condition as 'the grim sign of our dark times'.

In line with Wicker's (1975) thoughts, *Boko Haram* insurgence was created out of perceived injustices of our time, and of a state that has no compunction about 'murdering' people in the name of justice. The celebrated cases of the dehumanising extrajudicial killings of the *Boko Haram* leader and members in Nigeria between Wednesday 29<sup>th</sup> and 30<sup>th</sup> of July 2009 are classical cases that resulted in *Boko Haram* revolts and expansions and leading to what Blum (2002) referred to as 'colossal collateral damage' to the society.

According to Wicker (1975), the *Yusuffiya Boko Haram* phenomenon is an account of a massacre that dramatised some weaknesses in the social structure of the society and the law enforcement agents in particular. This is the thought behind Wicker's most telling points of Attica's placement of 'human warehouses'. Cabral (1969) writing on '**revolution in Guinea-Bissau, with regard to colonialism, neo-colonialism, the role of the petty bourgeoisie vis-à-vis the role of the peasantry/working class**' wondered if people would exist in history if they did not meet the Marxist criteria. The immediate cause of the July mayhem was the shooting of the 17 members of the *Boko Haram* by the Borno state security squad Operation Flush in Maiduguri in June 2009. The respond of the leader, Muhammad Yusuf after the incident was very direct indicating a moment of war.

The warning was made in a lecture on 12th June 2009 at Anguwar Doki in Maiduguri in which the leader told the State that they would react and they will never forgive or agree. The mayhem was very much avoidable if the state was very mindful of its responsibilities towards the security of the people. The state was always waiting for the group to attack and then organized response. This approach suggested that the state was surprised to the attack on the major state establishment in Maiduguri, like the central prison and the police headquarters, resulting into killing of senior police officers.

The lukewarm attitude on the part of the State was also evident during the so-called encounter with *Boko Haram*, which was regarded by many people as 'war' between the proponents of an Islamic State for Nigeria against secular State that was *Thagut* characterised by corruption, and injustice being led by a moral leaders with the least fear of God and love for the people they led in particular and the nation in general. The State was thus put on the defensive as the security operatives were caught unaware and pants down as police stations and other government establishments were destroyed and many people got killed in places like Kano, Yobe and Borno.

Borno State capital, Maiduguri was the centre of the operations where the Markez Ibn Taymiyya *Boko Haram* headquarters was located and where the fighting force of the *Yusuffiya Boko Haram* was based. The 'war' was a major military operation in which few available modern weapons were rampantly deployed and used. Despite the military power of the State and the large number of soldiers at its disposal, *Yusuffiyya* movement held the country and Maiduguri at bay for some days (25<sup>th</sup>-29<sup>th</sup> July, 2009) with no qualms. In Maiduguri, social, economic and political activities were paralysed during the period. In fact, prior to that, the dislodgement of *Yusuffiyya* at that period was mainly due to lack of arms and ammunition to engage the State, despite the fact that some parts of Maiduguri were effectively under the *Yusuffiyya Boko Haram* proclaimed "Islamic State" controlled under the leadership of late Muhammad Yusuf.

The impact of this encounter with Yusufiyya in terms of human casualty, properties, social values and the stigma experienced by people in Maiduguri were unspeakable. The number of human lives lost in Borno and other Northern Nigerian States cannot be accurately established, but suffice to say that many lost relatives and friends in the encounter.

The encounter ended with the capture of the Markaz Ibn Taymiyya, the centre of the Boko Haram movement, and subsequent gruesome and extra-judicial killing of Muhammad Yusuf, whose death was to generate controversies at national and international levels, because security agents despite evidences of judicial murder of Yusuf kept giving contradictory statements. At a time the military operatives in Maiduguri confirmed that they had captured Yusuf alive and handed him over to the police, but to cover up the extra-judicial killing, the Police Command stated that Yusuf was killed during a shoot out between the police and his armed followers.

This action deprived the public of considerable information, as to his sponsors, network, and source of funds and weapons, if he had been put to trial. As a result, Yusuffiyya *Boko Haram* became more daring, militant and deadly in their operations; their claim to have masterminded most of the bomb blasts across the country goes to show how deadly and daring it had become and a source of security concern for peace and development. If care is not taken in handling the *Boko Haram* phenomenon, more daring terrorist groups may move into the country and either continue the reign of terror or reinvent the deadlier nature the Boko Haram is taking.

### **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF MOHAMMED YUSUF: THE FOUNDER OF *BOKO HARAM* IN NIGERIA (29<sup>TH</sup> JANUARY 1970 - 30<sup>TH</sup> JULY 2009)**

The founding leader of Boko Haram Mohammed Yusuf, was born on 29<sup>th</sup> January, 1970 at Girigiri Village in Jakusko Local Government Area of Yobe State, North Eastern Nigeria. Shettima (2009), Muhammed et al (2014) pointed out that Yusuf had four wives and twelve children and was once enrolled in a western school but later dropped out to join a Qur'anic teacher in Ngelzarma. Sani, Imam (2013) noted that in 1981 the founder of *Boko Haram* in Nigeria, Mohammed Yusuf moved to Damaturu to study under the tutelage of Malam Abubakar and Goni Dauda from where he moved to Maiduguri as a student to further study under different orientations and scholars such as Malam Ibrahim Goni, Malam Mustapha Baga and Sheikh Atom.

Buba et al (2013) posits, that unlike Mohammed Yusuf, the recent leader of the terrorist group, Imam Abubakar Shakkau, was taught by Goni Tewu kalwa of Mafoni Ward of Maiduguri, the Borno State Capital. During the researcher's interview with the second-in-command after the late Yusuf in the leadership hierarchy, Baba Gana Sharah, in the year 2008 at his residence in Ummarari (Kanti Goma Shabiu) he disclosed that Imam Abubakar Shakkau who occupied an exalted position at the helm of affairs of the *Boko Haram* perceived Jihad-unholy war against humanity and its post modernity such as democracy, was the 5<sup>th</sup> in the leadership hierarchy of then *Boko Haram*. He further noted that Imam Abubakar Shakkau was by far his Junior and to the likes of Mallam Mohammed Auwal, (who was assassinated by *Boko Haram* Jihadists due to internal conflict from within the leadership), Al-Amin (who died in one of the clashes with the Nigerian Military) and Kullakam (a Niger national arrested and deported to his country by the Nigerian Government).

Furthermore, (Ajiri 2008) confirms Yusuf's Islamic background saying, he was in Kaduna State where he studied under Malam Shuaibu and Malam Muhammad. His affiliates then included membership of Shi'a, which may have shaped his perception and views on the society and later prompted him to form his own movement the *Ahalul Sunnah wal jama'ah* that gradually transformed to include *lidda await wal Jihadi*. His affiliation to Shi'a had given Yusuf the platform to gain experience and gather enough radical training through his persistent but periodic interaction with leaders of different *Boko Haram*-like organisations in the Middle East and beyond in their calls for the implementation of Shariah Government in Nigeria.

Yusuf adopted a radical approach to preaching directed at attacking not only the state and its operatives but also some Islamic scholars, organisations and groups that seemed to him to have compromised true teaching of Islam especially; against injustice, corruption occasioned by leadership-deficit as it appears in Nigeria today. He was of the belief that it was only through Shariah that a better Nigeria can emerge ruled with justice equity and fairness. To achieve that, Yusuf maintained, Jihad was sacrosanct and must be accompanied by honest mobilization and deployment of a member's hard earned resources physical, mental and material infrastructure needed and necessary to stage Jihad against the entrenched ills of the Western cultural values and Western informed institutions as represented by security operatives. Mohammed Yusuf referred to this kind of arrangement as 'Taghut' (the infidels).

Marx (1818-1883), alluded to a dialectic sense, as the Nigerian society was filled with ills teleguided by corrupt western-oriented elites-bourgeoisies whose vested interest of perpetual injustice had created impetus of looting state resources which transcended to favour their yet unborn generations, at best uncomfortable and at worse, down right objectionable. The ruling class taking advantage of democratic setting and dispensing iron law of oligarchy against the teaming proletariat populace formed the cardinal "Thesis" of Boko Haram 'Jama'atul Ahalul Sunna Waljama'a Lidda a' wati Wal Jihadi-JASWAL JIHAD' Yusuf's *Boko Haram*-Jihad in Nigeria while describing living in such a society as "Haram". His background as a drop-out from western school coupled with the practical benefits harnessed by his peers in attending western schools, made Yusuf not only sceptical but very critical of the modern system and its seemingly lackadaisical accommodation of corruption and injustice.

Yusuf's father was said to have come from Niger Republic, from among the Dora speaking tribe, while his mother came from Gashua in Yobe State. His father had moved from Jakusko to a village called Nganjarma close to Damagum, a major town of Potiskum in Yobe State. While at Nganjarma, Bukar (2008) narrated, his father became a respected person in the village, being a learned scholar. However, he eventually had a quarrel with the community over 'Imamship' of the community mosque, which had led to his ejection from Nganjerma town and eventual settlement in Maiduguri.

Sociologists suggest that the society is in a concentric shape, made up of layers, and the last layer usually housed the settlers. Yusuf's father had resided at Railway Terminus. Burges et al (1975) posited that the Railway Terminus and beyond Jajiri, Ummarari, London-Ciki, Bulumkuttu-Ngomari, Bulabulin-Ngarannam and Yirsune Wards of Maiduguri were red zones and can better

be described as the *Boko Haram* hubs dominated by immigrants who came and settled in Maiduguri. It is also generally believed that the outer concentric zone has always been weak in terms of security. Emphasis is therefore being laid on the inner layer at the expense of outer zone and, therefore, the outer zone remained vulnerable to all sorts of social vices with serious security implications.

Subsequently, as Kyari (2010) said, Yusuf's father established a relationship with a highly influential Maiduguri-based businessman, Alhaji Baba Fugu.

Kyari reiterated that Fugu gave out his daughter's hand in marriage to Yusuf, which made him an in-law to the business tycoon; this union brought the two families together in a strong and formidable relationship. Shettima (2009) pointed out that Yusuf, who was to become the *Boko Haram* leader, was never taught via the Western system of education as some writers have claimed. He dropped out at the early stage of primary education. Shettima's position has been corroborated by Galtimari (2011) who asserted that Yusuf's background was purely Islamic not Western. Galtimari went on further to mention that Yusuf attended traditional Islamic schools and was later trained under renowned scholars, two of whom were Sheikh Mohammed Abba Aji and Sheikh Ja'afar Mahmud Adam. Shettima affirmed that he was rather an Islamic based scholar and *Hafis* Qur'an. Zakariya (2009) pointed out that Yusuf later parted ways with his mentors' ideology of *Sunnah* when he embraced the 'Taliban-like' ideology to start his own sect the *Ahlul Sunnah Wal Jama'a Hijira*. His movement, according to Usman (2008), was called *Yusufiyya*. This, Zakariya noted, was the same method used by the *Mujahedeen* of Afghanistan to establish the well-known Taliban of that country which was later led by *Al-Qaeda*.

Mohammed (2011) was able to capture the highest stage of the sect as *Yusufiyya Boko Haram* later transformed and embraced the most extreme and advanced teachings from *Yusuffiyya* to *Jama'atul Ahalul Sunna Waljama'a Lidda a'wati Wal Jihadi (JASWAL JIHAD)* *Yusuffiyya* with a significant proportion of its members resigning to fate and willing to die in planned attacks.

## CONCLUSION

Most parts of Nigeria, over the last ten years, have witnessed a growing sense of despondency and restlessness among the jobless youth. The emergence of *Yusuffiyya Boko Haram* came on the heels of the volatile activities in the Niger Delta region in the south-south which has been a trouble spot for quite some time, with violent militant groups, made up mostly of youths, kidnapping oil workers and attacking oil installations. There have also been incessant killings and destruction of properties in Plateau and Kaduna States, as a result of heightened ethnic and religious crises.

As a social problem, the *Boko Haram* insurgency, in particular, has engaged the attention of the society in recent times and government has established a number of controls to try and curtail the excesses of the group, ranging from declarations of state of emergency, deployment of the military, house-to-house raids as well as mounting of security check points at designated spots along major highways.

These controls, however, did not record any noticeable degrees of success as it was apparent that there was no effective co-ordination among the security networks to deal with the insurgents and

poor synergy between the public in not reporting these insurgents to law enforcement agencies for fear of being attacked. The spate of killings by the Boko Haram is gradually eroding and wiping out the age-old trust and confidence among Nigerian people who have for so long lived in relative peace and harmony as a nation.

Their activities have harmfully touched all spheres of life, people have been displaced from their homes; families have lost loved ones and wives have become widows and children made fatherless and in some cases orphans; children have been denied education as their schools are constantly targeted and destroyed; police stations and the police have been rendered almost non-functional, and arms and ammunition catered away after most attacks; prisons have been attacked, bombed and inmates set free. Even the academia has felt the brunt of the senseless killing and destruction of property.

On May, 9<sup>th</sup> 2013, *Boko Haram* attacked and destroyed Bama Battalion Barracks; killed 6 police, 14 Prison staff, 2 soldiers, 4 civilians while 21 *Boko Haram* members died in the clash. Similarly, on April 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> 2013 the *Boko Haram* members engaged in another clash with the multinational joint task force (MJTF) in Baga Local Government Area of Borno State in which 185 people died and thousand of houses were burned. In responses to these colossal collateral damages and massacre on the structure of the society, the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, on Tuesday, May 14<sup>th</sup>, 2013 declared a state of emergency in the three most highly affected states of the North-East; Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States (The Nation, 2012).

The attacks were not limited to Borno State alone but spread to other states in the north-east such as Yobe, Bauchi, Adamawa, Kano and Kaduna in the north-west.

The Federal Capital, Abuja, was not left out in the wanton destruction of lives and property with Salkida (2011) pointing out that *Boko Haram* bombed Louis Edet House, headquarters of the Nigeria Police, on Thursday June 16<sup>th</sup>, 2011, followed on Friday, August 26<sup>th</sup>, 2011 with the bombing of the United Nations (UN) House by suicide bombers.

Between 26<sup>th</sup> and 29<sup>th</sup> July, 2009, Mala (2012) disclosed, the *Yusuffiya Boko Haram* insurgents had free reign in the capital city of Maiduguri, Borno State, killing or maiming innocent citizens in their battle with law enforcement agents, even claiming most parts of the city as theirs, until the federal government sent the military to the city on July 29<sup>th</sup>, 2009 to recapture areas that were hitherto under their control.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

This research recommends that the Federal Government, amnesty committees and counter insurgency efforts of all security outfits investigate the root cause and dynamics of *Boko Haram* including trend and pattern of existence from 1992-2012, to have a better understanding of the phenomenon and their strategic attacks and periodic bombings. It is crucial that the government make concerted efforts to identify and understand the kind of ideology of *Boko Haram* vis-à-vis the objectives of their activities. Worth knowing is *Boko Haram's* financial support and the socioeconomic implications of its activities on the society.

Also recommended are areas of focus and further research; Who really are the *Boko Haram*? What is their objective? How can they be identified? Why do people join *Boko Haram* in spite of it being viewed as a violent socio-cultural/religious group? Other questions raised are: how did *Boko Haram* become so strong with the acquisition and use of sophisticated weaponry? Who co-ordinates their operations? Why are these security challenges concentrated mostly in Borno? What are the factors responsible for their activities? Does *Boko Haram* have links to foreign sources for support and funding? To this end, it is also worth asking, are the Boko Haram insurgents a group operating under the garb of Islam? What is their ideology? From the spate of their violent and well co-ordinated attacks, does *Boko Haram* have any structure? What is the mode of their recruitment and, how do they operate?

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