External Non-Adjudicatory Mechanisms and Trade Disputes Settlement in Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry (2005-2018) (Published)
This study investigated the efficiency of external non-adjudicatory mechanisms (mediation, conciliation and arbitration) setting trade disputes in oil and gas industry in Nigeria from 2005 to 2018. The study was guided by three research objectives. In order to achieve these objectives, the study adopted the survey research design that involved a combination of in-depth interview and interpretation of existing data from the records of The Ministry of Labour and Employment. The population universe were NUPENG and PENGASSAN officials, but the sample was drawn from the officials of five selected oil and gas companies in Nigeria using purposive sampling technique. Fourteen (14) officials were drawn from NUPENG and sixteen (16) officials were drawn from PENGASSAN for the purpose of the interview. Content analysis was adopted in analyzing the responses to the interview questions, while tables, frequencies and percentages were used to analyze data from the records of The Ministry of Labour and Employment. It was found that Mediation was efficient in settling trade dispute in the oil and gas industry but it experienced low usage (10.94%); conciliation enjoyed the highest usage (57.81%), but was not very efficient; and industrial arbitration panel has not been efficient in settling disputes referred to it. Thus, the study concluded that the overall performance of these non-adjudicatory mechanisms in settling trade dispute in the oil and gas industry has not met the expectation of the stake-holders in terms of efficiency. Therefore, it was recommended that mediation should be adopted more frequently in settling trade dispute; the statutory period for conciliation and arbitration should be extended.
Nigerian economy has witnessed occasional hike in the pump price of fuel in the last three decades. This occasional increase has generated reaction from civil society especially trade unions and pressure groups in the form of outright rejection and criticism of government’s policy of increase in fuel pump price. Such posture has also led to occasional trade dispute and strike action aimed at forcing government to reduce pump price of fuels with its attendant consequences on the economy of Nigeria. Thus this paper examines the case of increase in fuel-pump-price related trade disputes with special focus on the January 2012 fuel subsidy removal experience. It therefore assesses the performance of these associations (trade unions and pressure groups); reviews the issue of deregulation; and considers the possibilities of breaches being redressed or avoided entirely