

THEORETICAL DIMENSIONS OF SOCIETAL ILL-VALUES: INSURGENCY, COUNTER INSURGENCY AND SUSTAINABLE TRANSFORMATION AGENDA

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ABSTRACT: *The task of this paper is to examine how negative social values, political and social-economic variables influence insurgency and counter-insurgency. The paper is anchored on Historical Materialism – “a class theory of terrorism” to explaining dimension of social values and stable society. It is a perspective entrenched in conflict paradigm which describes the inequalities that exist in all societies around the globe. Every society is plagued by inequality based on social differences (social, economic, political and coercive power) among the dominant group and all of the other groups in the society. This paper theoretically employs the perspective to explaining what constitutes stable society considering the multi-ethnic nature of Nigeria. This paper addresses the dynamics of upsurge of insurgency that has engulfed the country in recent time. The paper assert that understanding an insurgency’s motivations, breadth of activity and support, and core grievances is essential to successful stable society. The strongest recommendation of the paper is the need to assiduously reinvigorate our social values and functional social institutions with a view to charting new positive social values among Nigerians and transform to a stable society.*

KEYWORDS: *paradigms, social values, stable society, insurgency and counter-insurgency*

INTRODUCTION

What refers to the pattern of social relationship in a society? What regulates the interactions among members of the society, providing guidelines within the cultural norms for achieving the goals defined by cultural values? Generally, sociologists are bound to agree that it is the social structure. It maintains social stability. However, when the social structure and the societal values become incompatible, the structure must embrace social change to allow the society to survive and continue healthy development.

What forms of social change emanating in Nigeria? How healthy it is to development, vis – a - vis what development as a discourse connotes in sociological parlance. While a variety of sociological approaches have sought to describe the development and maintenance of social

structure, understanding the relationship between structure and change is necessary for the development of a stable society.

These questions take on particular pungency when the national teeming populations of youths try to make sense of the paradox of penury and hunger in a nation so richly endowed with natural and human resources. It is also brought to notice when Nigeria is compared with countries like Malaysia, South Korea, Singapore and Indonesia that are not as rich in natural resources and were in the same situation as Nigeria in the 1960s but have experienced unprecedented industrialization, with improved quality of life for the vast majority of their population since the 1990s when Nigeria cannot boldly say it is on the threshold of industrial growth – development.

Years of systemic decay by a lack of political commitment, cancerous levels of corruption and mismanagement of Nigeria's collective wealth have adversely affected all sectors of the nation even such that today, the average Nigerian seem not to have confidence in any government establishment. Better still, how we explain the followings tagged "lows of 2012 in Nigeria."

- Theft at the mint – the recent revelation that about N2.1 billion of newly printed N1, 000 notes were stolen from the Nigeria Security Printing and Minting Company (NSPMC) is indicative of systems failure at multiple levels. The larger implication of this unfortunate development is that it further exposes how vulnerable our country (Nigeria) is if there could be such an easy security breach at a place like the Mint that should otherwise be impregnable.
- **Boko Haram Insurgency:** In 2010 till date Boko Harm, a militant group heightened its attacks that saw the deaths of many Nigerians living in the Northern part of the country and some cases recorded in the capital, Abuja. More than 770 people have been killed in Boko Haram attacks in year 2012, according to an Associated Press count.
- **Incessant Building Collapse:** High figures were recorded in building collapse with loss of lives. In many instances, people were buried under the debris of collapsed buildings. This happened in major cities such as Abuja, Port-Harcourt, Enugu, Lagos and many others.
- **Increased Kidnapping:** The vices spread its tentacles to many parts of the country. It became everyday phenomenon, kidnapping and outrageous ransom of money are demanded by the captors, young and old, male and female, poor and rich, no one was left out of this menace. The 83 years old mother of the one-time Nation's finance minister, Mrs. Ngozi Okonjo – Iweala was also a victim among many high profile individuals that have been kidnapped.
- **Infernos from Oil Tankers:** Avoidable deaths were recorded with Tankers transporting fuel from one end of the country to another involved in tragic road accidents. Stories abound of tankers who while avoiding potholes tumbled and caused fires that sent many to their early graves.
- **Mubi Student's Massacre:** In Mubi, Adamawa State, Nigeria, about 40 students were reportedly killed by a gang that combed the off-campus residence of the students with a hit list. Reports had it that the victims were either butchered to death or short straight in the head.

Despite the promises made by the Inspector General of Police (IG) that investigations have been conducted into the matter, no report has been made available to the public.

- **Floods and Displacement:** This brought back reminiscences of the days of Noah (Biblically and Islamically) to many a Nigerian. The magnitude of the flood was felt across the nation with a record 363 persons reportedly dead while 18,282 people were treated for injuries. A total of 7.7 million people according to National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) in Nigeria, were affected by flooding during the period, of which 2.1 million were officially registered across the country as internally displaced persons. In total, no fewer than 22 states out of the 36 states of the federation were severely affected by the flood.

All these social – political innuendos remind one of a re-birth of Machiavelli’s conflict theory (1469 – 1527) may be sought in understanding society and explaining the social discourse. Machiavelli an Italian great philosopher in his best – known work, “the Prince and his more profound discourses the first is a handbook for dictators and the second the thoughtful statement of an Italian patriot dreaming of the unity of Italy”. He (Machiavelli) opined that human nature is basically evil.

“Men are bad and ever ready to display their vicious nature, whenever they may find occasion for it”. (The Prince and the Discourses, P. 117)

In the prince, this is interpreted to mean that the desire for conquest is most natural among men. Machiavelli posits further, initially men were few in number, living dispersed like beasts. When the human race increased, men came into contact and the need for defense against one another was felt. By necessity, men “choose the strongest and most courageous from amongst themselves and placed him at their head, promising to obey him. These postulations seemingly portray the Nigeria political experience metamorphosical, while under the dungeon and hegemony of the colonial masters, all agitation were geared towards attaining independence champion by the few – chosen Nationalist leaders. And position of authority conceded to them by the Nigerian people Nigeria gained independence, Primordialism, ethnic chauvinism and usurpation of one another states natural empowerments reign supreme in the land, minorities group were at the redemption of the powerful ones.

There is no difficulty so long as princes are wise and just, stressed Machiavelli. There would not have been any problem at the birth of Nigeria. But for the few privilege ones, individuals and sectional groups of people devouring the national collective wealth of the nation. Beginning from the epoch of Agricultural boost to the Oil epochal booming till date. However, once sovereignty becomes non-elective, there is no guarantee against inferior stock. Excessive luxury by the “prince” is an occasion for envy of others. This leads to conspiracy. Machiavelli added tantamount, Nigeria extreme display of siphoned wealth by corrupt leaders ignite a resultant effect to insurgency, values became a cost golden peal to the wilderness.

As Ogunrotifa (2013) wrote; the concept of terrorism became a major concern in philosophy and social sciences following the early writings of Auguste Comte, Emile Durkheim, Karl Marx and other philosophers who critically delved into the discursive frame of Enlightenment epoch, and the qualitative effects of French revolution of (1789) on the European society. Though, none of them single out terrorism as a study but each commented on it in course of explaining other pertinent social problems at the time. However, terrorism regained renewed academic vigour following the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 in Soviet Russia, counter-revolutionary violence in Hungary, Germany and Spain in 1919, 1925 and 1937 respectively, couple along with the attendant crises, violence and social dislocations that heralded the cold-war period. Consequently, the post-cold war era did not ushered a new lease of peace and end of terroristic history as suggested by Fukuyama (1992), rather, it was characterized by brutal killings and campaign of terror and violence especially in Somalia, Afghanistan, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo and the defunct Yugoslavia, given the changed nature of conflicts from international to local with different actors—state and non-state actors engaged in terrorism to balance out each other and defend respective interests. Please note, terrorism and insurgency are used interchangeably in this paper.

The balance of terror and the wave of global insecurity that shaped the beginning of the 21st century was the product of unsettled issues that cold-war had brushed raw. The deepening contradictions and the fallout of these unresolved issues came to fore following the bombing of New York and Washington in 2001, Madrid in 2004, London in 2005, and Oslo in 2011 on one hand, and the orgies of bombing of non-western countries such as Somalia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen and Nigeria on the other hand. In Nigeria, the savage killings and wanton destruction of property that characterized the recent terror attacks in Niger-Delta and Northern part of the country were carried out by sectarian groups and militants as a protest against the Nigerian state. Nigeria's internal security remains extremely volatile following a spate of recent shootings, kidnappings, bombings and suicide assaults. Almost every week, there are reports of attacks or threats putting the security agencies on high alert. The carnage of serial bombing of most towns and cities left over a hundreds of dead bodies in its wake, while charred remains of vehicles dotted the affected places, and many public buildings went up in smoke. Interestingly, terrorism permeates every facet of international society prior to the September 11th attacks and the subsequent "war on terrorism", with few places were unaffected by the hysteria caused by 'terrorism'. Since then, the study of terrorism has preoccupied the attention of scholars in an attempt to laying viable foundation for peaceful resolution of conflicts in the contemporary epoch. Better still, and specifically in Nigeria how does one explain a colossal alienation of the youths in Nigeria most especially could be the resultant waves and dynamics of insurgency. Bomb blasts, that is tsunamically engulfing the country recently amongst others form of societal ills. What accounts for the failures of stable society, development in Nigeria? Has it got anything to do with negative dimensions of social values that are given prominence in the way things are done in the country? If it has to do with negative values how can we ensure that this values are

transformed for the future reversal of developmental failures? These constitute the questions that the paper seeks to answer.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Social Values in a Transforming Society

To Erinoshio (2007) Values, in the ordinary sense, are defined as *accepted principles or standards of a person*. Social values are therefore the *widely shared* (viz., social) principles and standards in a society. Social values are part and parcel of *culture* which, as we all know, is *the totality of a way of life* (Edward, 1895). The other contingences of culture include national character, social stratification, moral, religion, mores, and law. All of these dimensions of culture provide the clue to the widely shared principles/standards in any society.

For instance, one of the enduring traits of the Japanese is valour which is demonstrated by their reaction toward what they consider to be dishonourable. The Japanese were inclined to commit suicide (i.e., Hara-Kiri) in order to redeem their honour. Hundreds of them committed suicide during the Second World War rather than surrender to the enemy because surrendering would shame their family and country. Japan still has the highest suicide rate among the high income countries in the world today. However, suicide is not socially approved in Nigeria. It is stigmatized and believed to be symptomatic of mental illness. Attempted suicide is a criminal offense in Nigeria punishable by imprisonment. Suicide is, therefore, not an option and is not viewed as the most honourable way out of a dishonourable situation among Nigerians.

While it is unrealistic in the context of this paper to describe the core social values of the more than 320 ethnic groups (Onigu, 1989) in the country, nevertheless one could focus on those that transcend three of the major ethnic groups. Anthropological reports suggest that the time-honoured social values among the Yoruba, Hausa/Fulani, and Igbo consist of *candour, integrity, and transparency*. Of the Yoruba, Samuel (1976) Johnson attuned, thus:

The ancient Oyo or Yoruba proper were very virtuous, loving, and kind. Theft was rare and also fornication inspite of the scantiness or often times complete absence of clothing to which they were accustomed

.....Yoruba as whole are social, polite, and proverbially hospitable. Licentiousness is abhorred. There are attested cases where a member of a family would be condemned to slavery by a unanimous vote of all the relatives when he has brought disgrace on the family.

Further support for the foregoing is found in the work of Imoagene:

Irrespective of a person's qualifications, he could not be appointed to kingly title in system one (i.e., kingship) and two (i.e., Chiefs) if he were not a member of the privileged group. Within the restricted circle of eligible candidates, intelligence, moral fitness, open-mindedness etc which candidates had to possess (Imoagene, 1976).

Virtue, honesty, and integrity were not only the preserve of the Yoruba of the olden days. They also transcended other ethnic groups like the Hausa/Fulani judging by Paden's analysis of the legacy of the Sokoto Caliphate:

A summary of early caliphate values, regarding community and authority, might include the following: (1) the community should consist of good Muslims, with provisions for fair treatment of non-Muslim minorities;(2) the purpose of community is to ensure justice, and follow Qur'an and Sunni;(3) the leadership of the community should be vested in someone who has the qualities of honesty, learning, courage, humility... and who is respected for his learning;(4) succession to leadership should be decided by councils of learned people, who would, hopefully, choose the most qualified person (regardless of dynastic linkage); (5) leaders should serve as examples to the people in terms of their action, as well as their words; (6) leaders are personally responsible to God for their actions (Paden, 1986).

The Igbo people of the good old days were also by no means different from the Yoruba and Hausa/Fulani as amply shown in the following extensive quote from the work of Olisa (2002):

Igbo values of life consist of material ends such as children, wealth, health and so on, as well as non-material ends such as harmony with the gods and with fellowmen. As has been mentioned, the Igbo accept without question the participation of the gods and ancestors in the affairs of men, in their malevolence when offended by men and in their benevolence when appeased or pleased. Because of this, most political roles or ritual roles are expected to maintain a constant good relationship between community and the supernatural powers that hold decisive influence, for good or for bad, over the vital things of life –crops, health, productivity, and fortune.

The first deduction from these basic propositions is that performers of political roles are not expected to gain materially, in an appreciable measure, from their functions (emphasis mine). Thus, the Okpara's material emoluments, such as labour service from his people, and shares of certain animals killed are well-known and established by custom. His duties do not place him in an economic and social position much different from the rest of the people... The same applies to the Ezeani, the medicine men, and even the titled persons, for the latter's wealth is not acquired by virtues of their leadership position but before they assumed the position. In other words, political office is not materially lucrative in Igbo traditional society, nor does it confer exceptional social privileges on the holder, except the influence he wields as representative of the gods and ancestors.

It is no wonder then that one of the norms expected of office holders is absolute ritual purity and political integrity; no one who has been found guilty of grave abomination can hold public office, the same applies to reprobates or other criminals (Olisa, 2002).

There is, therefore, a convergence on the social values that are dearly cherished among the three major ethnic groups in Nigeria. It is also not farfetched to suggest that honesty, probity, and candour were embraced by all the other ethnic groups in the country in from time immemorial. No anthropological work has portrayed any of Nigeria's ethnic groups as consisting of a bunch of reckless and dishonest individuals.

Dwindling Social Values

Erinosho (2007) further stated that the foregoing time-honoured core social values are now in short supply in Nigeria today. Nigeria is listed among the most corrupt countries in the world today, occupying number 157 in contrast to Ghana which is number 70 in ranking of countries worldwide. Nigeria has earned a despicable reputation for all manners of fraudulent practices and robbery. A recent report suggested that N4.6 billion naira was lost to robbery and fraud in the banking sector alone in 2006 (Olugbodi, 2007).

Demeaning one might say, yet how do we explain the seemingly epileptic nature of our National Assembly's roles in this regard. Since the inauguration of the Seventh National Assembly (Nigeria) over two years ago, it has busied itself with one form of investigation or the other.

It has been probe, probe and more probes. But, almost nothing has been achieved through these probes and even motions. A cursory look at some of the probes:

- The oil subsidy probe
- The Rivers State House of Assembly Crisis probe
- The probe of alleged illegal 37 housing estates in FCT
- The Malabu Oil field transaction probe
- The probe of alleged \$ 27 million Embassy funds
- The probe of Police pension funds
- The Apo killings probe
- The Associated Airline Crash probe
- The #255 million armoured cars purchase probe
- The probe of the collapse of some privatized companies

- The Dana Air Crash probe
- The probe of the N 273 billion pension fund
- The probe of all assets seized by EFCC
- The probe into the Aviation Ministry over a N9 billion contract
- The probe of the N6.2b SIM card registration
- The probe of the poor quality of police welfare
- The probe of the purchase of fairly used 332 CI/BI Helicopters

See many more (The Nation, October, 29, 2013) a Nigerian tabloid.

The excessive luxury by the “Prince” – government officials in Nigeria is an occasion for envy of others, Machiavelli (1469) stressed. This might be unconnected to the insurgency the country is witnessing.

Insurgency: A clog in the Wheel of Nation Transformation Agenda. The twenty – first century is typified by a volatile international environment, persistent conflict, and increasing state fragility. Long standing external and internal tensions tend to exacerbate or create care grievances with some states resulting to political strife, instability, or even insurgency. Moreover, some transitional terrorists/extremists with radial political and religious ideologies may intrude in weak or poorly governed states to form a wider, more networked threat. In this paper, insurgency is contextualized as an internal threat that uses subversion and violence to reach political ends. Conversely, counter-insurgents seek to defeat insurgents and address core grievances to prevent insurgency’s expansion or regeneration (Lloyd, 2009).

Lloyd (2009) posits further, there are three prerequisites for an insurgency to be successful in an area – a vulnerable population, leadership available for direction, and lack of government control. When all three prerequisites exist in an area, insurgency can operate with some freedom of movement, gain the support of the people, and become entrenched overtime. A population is vulnerable if the people have real or perceived grievances that insurgents can exploit. If insurgents can recruit, co-opt, or coerce local leaders or the local leaders are part of the insurgency, these leaders can direct of the frustrations of the populace. Real or perceived lack of governmental control can allow insurgents to operate with little or no interference from security forces or other agencies.

Theoretical Exposition of Insurgency (Terrorism)

The exposition of Historical Materialism to terrorism studies was first articulated by Joseph Jonathan in his 2011's paper on *Terrorism as a social relation within capitalism*. Jonathan's suggestion of Historical Materialism as a critique of the post-positivist turn in critical approach was reviewed in my previous paper (Ogunrotifa, 2013). To this end, '*a class theory of terrorism*'. The application of class perspective to terrorism discourse must first be limited to specific context and society that is crucial to the explication of the action that will be required to transform that context before venturing on terrorist acts elsewhere or making comparison.

Implicit in this theory is the awareness that terrorism cannot be understood without deepening of our knowledge about the social, economic and political conditions in the society, and the nexus between local specificity and global condition. Thus, the main ideas of the class theory of terrorism can be summarized in the following propositions:

- i. The existing capitalist social relations of production produce the irreconcilable class antagonism and tension among the classes in the society (ruling class, middle class, working class, and lumpen class).
- ii. In ensuing class antagonism, the members of the lumpen class who were frustrated with the state of affairs formed or joined sectarian groups that later resort to the use of individual terrorism against the Ruling class and the state to express their grievances.
- iii. In order to protect its interest, the ruling class in power used the state institution to counter the individual terrorism of the combatant sect(s), and suppress the dissent from below—the working or lumpen class. This is known as state terrorism.
- iv. The wave of violence continues when the combatant sect(s) and the ruling class in power engages further in individual terrorism and state terrorism respectively to balance each other out in a reciprocal fashion.
- v. Terrorism becomes globalise when the local ruling class in power receive international solidarity and support from its foreign counterpart, and together engage in aggressive military onslaught (state terrorism) against the combatant sects until retreat or compromise is found.

However, these propositions avail us the appreciable ways of understanding the nature and trend of terrorism, by first deepening our knowledge of the world situation or International events, and to develop better policy to stem the tide by generating a working hypothesis like this paper seek to attuned to the study of (Ogunrotifa, 2013). This hypothesis which is derived from the empirical observation and theoretical propositions above, state that: *Individual terrorism is not just opposite of State terrorism but they are reciprocal and dialectical reactions that are expressed in terms of class interest, and will continue to shape each other in never-ending dominance of capitalist social relations*. The basis of this hypothesis is premised on the fact that the major bane of terrorism of all kinds is as a result of the internal contradictions of global capitalism that altered the balance of existing social relations among classes in the society, and as

such produces Individual and State terrorism at the local or national level. From this hypothesis, it is clear that two types of terrorism exist—individual terrorism and state terrorism. These types of terrorism came as a result of the class antagonism among classes in the society. The ruling class and its allies always use state terrorism to protect its interest and make society unchanged and unchallenged, while the use of individual terrorism is usually synonymous with the sections of the lumpen class. Although, certain members of the ruling, middle, and working class do resort to the use of individual terrorism tactics to settle scores or challenge the state of affairs that is not in their favour. The numbers of people in these classes who use this tactics is quite less compare to the lumpen class, and often collaborate with the latter to cause havoc. Moreover, middle class and the working class often use protest, strike, picketing and other forms of trade union tactics to express grievances whenever their interest is at stake. They do not subscribe to the use of individual terrorism as that of the lumpen class.

With these propositions, it is the contention of this paper in consonance with Ogunrotifa (2013) that being a ‘terrorist’ is not a fixed label as orthodox and mainstream theorists want us to believe. Being a ‘terrorist’ is only a temporary baggage that can change depending on the context, method and tactics any class used in protecting its interest or expressing grievances. This theory does not regard any group, organisation or institution (such as state) a ‘terrorist’, but they become a ‘terrorist’ whenever method and tactics of any types of terrorism (Individual and State terrorism) is used, and cease to be terrorist when the usage of such method and tactics of any of the types of terrorism is stopped or renounced. In other words, there is nothing like ‘terrorist’ or ‘terrorist groups or organisations’. What we have is individual, group and institution (like state) that use terrorism to achieve their specific objective. Both the state and non-state actors could be ‘terrorists’ depending on the context and circumstances. Therefore, terrorism is tactics of all classes in the society not only that of the suppressed lumpen class.

Conceptual clarification

These propositions represent a higher theoretical system through which analysis of terrorism in the contemporary era can be conceptualized. The ability to juxtapose these propositions with empirical reality hinge on the need to conceptually clarify certain terms and variables such as *class*, *sects*, *state terrorism*, and *individual terrorism* that will determine the set and choice of data to be collected.

- Class here connotes a group of people in society with the same relationship to the means of production and governance. The class which owns and controls the means of production rules society. In the contemporary world capitalist system, class crystallization within the society revolves around the *ruling class*, *middle class*, *working class* and the *lumpen class*.
- *Ruling class* here connotes the broad group of people who controls the economic and political powers of the state or society. They are the class of people who has most material wealth or who owns the means of production and exercise power or authority to shape the direction of a

country. In other words, the ruling class comprises the economic elites (capitalist/business sector leaders) and Political elite (the economic elites' representatives in government, political/power elites, the rich, politicians, and hired political managers

- *Middle class* is the broad group of people who constitute the administrative bulk of the societal governance structure. It is a class that stood or fell social-economically between the ruling class and the working class. Professionals like lawyers, doctors, nurses, teachers, policemen, armed forces, civil/public servants, engineers, managers, and others dominate this class. In this study, the nature and size of middle class depends on high educational status, holders of professional qualifications, and lifestyle that is tainted towards that of the ruling class.
- *Working class* is broad group of people who do not own the means of production or related to the administrative structures and governance of the state or society. They are group of people who sell their physical labour power to earn a living. They do not own mines, oil wells, and factories but they contribute directly to the production processes.
- *Lumpen class* here refers to a group of peasants, artisans, unemployed and other groups in the society that are regarded as parasites that live and feed on the sweat and work of other classes in the society. The members of the lumpen class are the majority of the population. They 'consist of the millions of teeming labourers, peasant farmers, jobless graduates, underemployed workers, criminals, beggars, prostitutes, the poor, aged and other social stratum that is outside the wage-labour system. (Ogunrotifa, 2013)

METHODOLOGY

To achieve the underlying objectives of the paper as stated above, the data for this study were collected from the secondary source that is both qualitative and quantitative documented evidences. Therefore, content analysis was used as method for the data analysis. These sources were able to reveal all the necessary information needed to conduct the study which greatly helped to draw conclusions and make recommendations.

DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

When Europeans first came to area considered to be Africa in 1440s, they came as merchants seeking to trade with Africans. This was sequel to the national limitations to its economic expansion imposed on the European (capitalist) ruling class, who later resorted to imperialism as a way of strengthened it political and economic domination at home and oversea. Between 1500 and the 1860s, European merchants and colonists introduced terrorism into Africa by forcefully shipping away millions of people from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe and America in connivance with the traditional rulers (feudal ruling class). The total number of Africans sent across the Atlantic is between 15 to 50 million (Rodney 1972:27), therefore making it the greatest forced migration of people the world has ever seen. The future impact of this forced immigration of

people against their will, have a lasting effects of under-development, poverty, debt crisis and terrorism in the contemporary Africa in general and Nigeria in particular.

The use of state terrorism was further employed when Britain through conquest forcefully integrated different ethnic communities and kingdom under Lagos colony and Niger Coast protectorate respectively into Southern protectorate in 1900, and different emirates into Northern Protectorate in 1903 without the consent of the people in these territories. Direct colonial rule was established in southern protectorates with brute force and military coercions purposely to minimise and remove pockets of resistance from different ethnic nationalities (Salami 2009).

The forceful amalgamation of Northern and Southern protectorates in to what today's known as Nigeria, in 1914 amounted to the furtherance of state terrorism tactics by the British colonial power. The colonist did not seek the view or consent of Nigerians as to whether or not they favoured such an amalgamation (Salami 2009:4). In this regard, Nigerian state was founded on the basis of terrorism. In a bid to consolidate its economic grip on the amalgamated state, the colonial power introduced the policy of divide and rule. The colonists deliberately gave certain privileges to some tribes at the expense of others. Divide and Rule (tribal divisions) were encouraged and intensified by the most Christian European rulers. The British were especially skillful at this game. In Nigeria, the politics of divide and rule was first noticed when Lord Lugard and other colonial officials attempted to remove Nigeria's capital from Lagos to Zungeru or Kaduna because he felt the northerners are traditionally submissive (to their local leaders) and in total cooperation with the colonial rulership. When the decision failed, 'colonial state pursued its cardinal agenda of divide-and-rule policies that entrenched systems of ethnic segmentation and polarization. These included the 'Warrior tribe' policy of recruitment into the army and the police, the exclusion of Christians and southerners from the core north and their restriction to strangers' quarters, and the privileges accorded leaders of the major groups in the regions, all of which bequeathed a fatal legacy' (Osaghea 2011:17).

The amalgamation that was imposed purely for economic interest, gave Foreign trading corporations and firms such as United Trading Company in West Africa, United African company (the subsidiary of Unilever and Lever Brothers) and others monopoly trading power to exercise complete control over the purchase of agricultural products and the sales of imported goods. The colonial capitalist economy became periphery and microcosm of the world capitalist economy. This marked the beginning of the imperialist phase of the exploitation of Nigeria such that the export of International finance capital to and of goods from Nigeria became the predominant feature. The advancement of primitive colonial capitalist accumulation came with the introduction of pound sterling as the universal medium of exchange, thus encouraged export trade in tin, cotton, cocoa, groundnuts, and palm oil and ensured that Britain maintained its firm economic hegemony over the colonial Nigeria. This however led to commodification and

objectification of all aspects of economic and social relations, and the proliferation of wage labour and sustained through forced labour and taxation (Chizea, 1984 cited in Olutayo, 2009:3).

Trailing behind the domination of foreign corporations is the rise of national bourgeoisie and growth of indigenous capitalist enterprise. The local capitalist class comprises local merchants, middlemen agents and the new black elites. Nigerian local bourgeoisie made their fortunes from the sweat of the peasant farmers such that they 'bought cash crops at low price from the peasant farmers and sold to the foreign firms at high price. The product were then exported for processing and finished goods, and brought back to Nigeria, by these agents/allies, at exorbitant prices' (Olutayo, 2009:4).

However, the response of the people to the capitalist crisis was expressed in terms of nationalist movement that had gained momentum. The brand of nationalism that emerged was that of bourgeois nationalism that was strictly controlled by the emerging national bourgeoisie. A national identity was created amongst the colonized people of Nigeria through common struggle against the oppressors. The colony of Nigeria, with land territory of 923,768 square km, more than 320 distinct ethnicities, and over 400 languages and dialects was united by a common history of British colonization. The first layer that articulated Nigerian nationalism was that of the young intellectuals who studied abroad and brought home with them the spirit of Pan Africanism led by Herbert Macaulay, Nnamdi Azikwe and others through the establishment of newspapers such as Lagos Daily News, West Africa pilot, and others were used to arouse political awareness among the people. The outbreak of the Second World War added an appalling burden on the shoulder of the beleaguered people who are still battling with the catastrophic crisis of 1930s global economic crisis. The skyrocketing cost of living, austerity programme and colonial continuation of anti-people economic recovery policies in the post war years stretched the already impoverished people especially the working class to the breaking point, that later crystallized into class struggle and general strike of 1945.

Given the social disillusionment, the ruling class was increasingly divided and disoriented by the depth of a crisis they never expected and have no idea how to solve them. Suddenly, they find themselves unable to maintain control of society by the old colonial methods. Rather than showing leadership, the political elites of the ruling class resorted to the use of divide and rule, and ethnic/regional politics that thrived on strong patronage networks and rampant corruption. For instance, the regional government in Western Nigeria implemented a lot of progressive programmes such as free education, free health, industrial and infrastructural development and rural integration schemes. In the eastern region, industrial and infrastructural development was the major programme of the administration as this was calculated to strengthen its grips on commerce, trade and control of petroleum resources. Apart from industrial and infrastructural development programmes, the region did little in addressing diseases, illiteracy, malnutrition and other problems that were more rampant in the region compare to the rest of the country. In terms of education, the same colonial policy of forbidden western education was still in place in

Northern Nigeria. This was deliberately maintained by the Northern ruling class to ensure complete feudalization of the region so as to consolidate its aristocratic grip on her people. Rather than establishing western schools, more Islamic schools were established for poor and commoners while children of the rich have access to few western/missionary schools that ex-colonial power established. Paden (1986) reported that in 1964, the late Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto and the Premier of Northern Nigeria, wanted to establish over two million Koranic schools scattered in all parts of Northern Nigeria. This was sequel to the British conspiracy with the local ruling class at the outset of the colonisation process (indirect rule) to shield the Muslim north from being exposed to Western education and culture (Coleman, 1986; Dudley, 1968; Ohadike, 1992, Sanusi, 2007: 181). This development led to the institutionalization of Almajeri system, deep contempt for western education among the people of the Muslim North and the influx and multiplicities of different religious sects³⁶ claiming to hold superior dominance of Islamic knowledge and how best to practice Islam (Danjibo, 2009).

Gaffar Ijaiya (1998) observed that ‘austerity measure put in place by the government between 1982 and 1986 has caused a lot of hardships to the people that subsequently resulted in a high scale of poverty’ (Falana, 2012). This was further corroborated by the World Bank report (1990) that the austerity policies of the Nigerian government had severe effects on the country’s poor as consumption further plummeted in the 1980s than in 1950s (World Bank, 1990). The consequences of this increase in poverty include among others; increase in the number of destitutes, beggars, prostitutes, and paupers, and increase in the rate of crime in the society. World Bank figures for Nigeria’s gross national product per showed that from a peak of US \$780 in 1981, GDP fell to an all-time low of US \$220 in 1994³⁹. Similarly, surveys conducted by Nigeria’s Federal Office of Statistics show that:

In a 16 year period that began in 1980 (the year the oil boom years of the 1970s began to go burst), the percentage of Nigerians living in poverty rose from 28 percent to 66 percent. Numerically, while 17.7 million people lived in poverty in 1980, the population living on less than US \$1.40 a day rose to 67.1 million by 1996. Within the same period the percentage of the rural poor increased from 29 percent to 70 percent, while the share of the poor in the urban areas rose from 18 to 55 percent. Those classified as the core poor (the poorest of the poor - living on about US \$0.70 a day), increased from six percent to 29 percent of the population. The geographical distribution of poverty showed that the percentage of the poor ranged between 55-60 percent in the south, in the north they ranged between 70-78 percent of the population (FOS, 1980).

In addition, the magnitude of socio-economic consequences of SAP hit the Nigerians so hard across broad spectrum. Ehiedu Iweriebor (1997) observed that:

Two years of the relentless enforcement of SAP, involving the massive devaluation of the naira, trade liberalization, and the removal of all petroleum, agricultural and other subsidies generated

industrial underproduction, massive unemployment, increased cost of living, drastically reduced school enrollment, and reduced investment in health. The program has contributed to the revival of previously controlled diseases and has generally impoverished the people. In short, a rapid and steep decline in the already poor living standards of the people has been the fruit of SAP (Iweriebor, 1997)

The implementation of World Bank/IMF-imposed austerity measures by the Nigerian government met stiff and broad ideological, intellectual and political resistance of Nigerians as manifested in the popular protests of 1986, 1987, 1988 and 1989 against rising inflation, savage cuts and brutal attacks on the socio-economic livelihoods. The government's response was to use police and army to brutalise the people, and quell the social unrest generate by the policy of SAP. The general purpose of the repression is to create a silenced, disarticulated and prostrate citizenry especially civil society, religious and ethnic sects that may want to challenge the authority of the military dictatorship. Through the culture of intimidation, the military was able to sustain the tempo and maintain forced tranquility until its eventually relinquish power to democratic regime in 1999.

Similarly, the religious illusions orchestrated by the ruling class to divide the people will only last as much as the socio-economic well-being of the people improves. Otherwise, such illusions will become a time bomb that will tear the society apart in the future. Acute poverty, unemployment, untold hardship and misery that were imposed by the military on Nigerians vis-avis Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) and unaddressed by the latter civilian regime are beginning to impinge upon the consciousness of ever-broader layers of the population. The layers of the society that was affected by the socioeconomic crisis are the working class and the lumpen class, and these economic hardships find its expression more in the Northern Nigeria than the Southern part. The response to widespread disenchantment with the Nigerian State and its ruling class was exploited by the Boko Haram. Mohammed Yusuf—the founder of Boko Haram was an Islamic scholar and cleric who criticised Nigerian leadership (especially those from the North) for its failure to develop Nigeria and improve the social-economic livelihood of the people. He specifically blames western education for training the Nigerian ruling class in the act of looting treasury. Boko Haram demonization of western education can be seen as a social-political response to corruption and poverty brought by successive Nigerian leaders. Drawing its ideology from Quran, the Boko Haram leader believed that the enthronement of Islamic state on the basis of Sharia law remains the only solution to the attendant crises of corruption, unemployment, poverty, moral decadence and socio-economic problems in Nigeria. To enthrone Islamic state, Mohammed Yusuf posited that modern state institutions such as civil service, government departments, security formations—police, military and other uniformed personnel should be destroyed (Danjibo 2009:7). He then began his radical and provocative preaching against other Islamic sects, scholars and against established political institutions'

In Criminology, it is often said that when gangs emerge, they replace and fill vacuums society left uncovered. In a society like Nigeria where: police are corrupt and repressive, judiciary are corrupt and not independent, infrastructures are crumbling, politicians have made corruption official and the ruling class created over four decades of grotesquely unequal society vis-a-vis its backward neo-liberal capitalist policies, the alienated members of the lumpen class found solace in sectarian groups like Odua Peoples' Congress, Niger-Delta Militant group, and Boko Haram. These frustrated members of the lumpen class are alienated victims of the society rather than the exceedingly violent, opportunistic criminals they are called. In fact, the quest to maintain hold on society by the Northern ruling class, and the vacuum they created by not seeing education as a priority, was exploited by the Boko Haram. Mohammed Yusuf capitalised on existing resistance among the Muslims in the area to western education and well entrenched Islamic educational system, by establishing mosques and Islamic schools in which many poor Muslim families from across Nigeria and neighbouring countries enrolled their children (Ekanem, Dada and Ejue, 2012:233). This ploy was described by critics as recruiting centre for Jihad and Jihadists to fight the state or training school for fanatics, die-hard members, and future suicide bombers. By capitalizing on dwindling social-economic situations in the northern part of Nigeria to swell its rank of foot soldiers, Boko Haram group grew in leaps and bound within the short space of seven years.

In the study of Boko Haram activities in Nigeria, Abimbola Adesoji noted that 'the sect was able to attract more than 280,000 members across Northern Nigeria as well as in Chad and Niger Republic. The sect's membership cut across the broad spectrum of society, but a preponderant number of members came from its poorest groups. Although the common denominator among all members was their desire to overthrow the secular government and to propagate Islamic law, the oratory prowess of Yusuf arguably contributed to their mobilization and participation (Adesoji 2010:100). Having built the group as a popular abode for jobless and frustrated youths who found hope and engagement, Boko Haram leader's populist support grew. As his followership grew, his confidence grew, and his intolerance of criticism from other Muslim sects grew as well. The Boko Haram intolerance was first exhibited when it engaged in the use of individual terrorism against other Islamic sects and villagers residing in Kanamma which was located about a mile from its original/traditional camp in December 2003. During the raid, the group attacked local government installations, and killed about 30 people, and kidnapped a number of villagers who refused to join the sect. The police in response carried out a raid on Boko Haram camp and arrested some of its members. In reaction, the sect conducted offensive raid and retreated to the city of Maiduguri. David Cook (2011) observed that after the initial defeat, Boko Haram widened its activities, attacked police and prison formations between January and June 2004 in order to rescue the arrested members. These operations fail as many members of the sect and that of police and prison died. Despite these defeats, the sect forged ahead in the use of individual terrorism by attacking the convoy of 60 policemen at Kala-Balge on Lake Chad in October 10, 2004. 12 policemen were kidnapped while the rest were killed (Cook, 2011). It is clear that this

early attacks on police formations were designed to obtain weapon for future armed insurrections.

In the analysis of the origin of Boko Haram insurgency, Tilde (2012) observed that ‘the sect leader (Muhammed Yusuf) wrote series of letter to the Borno state government and the Borno commissioner of police. He called for the compensation of the family of those who were killed by the police during the funeral procession. He followed his letter with practical visits to the police but all appeal fell on deaf ears. He then called severally to the IG of police and the Yar’adua administration to intervene but to date; nothing was done to the culprits. He began to send threat to the government and the police. He castigated the Yar’adua government and called Yar’adua an oppressor and declared the government as unjust. For those Muslim leaders and scholar who opposed his threat against the government, he declared them as hypocrite and even declared some as unbelievers. He and his member began to arm themselves while receiving support from many who sympathized with them and had grievance against the jungle justice of the Nigerian police. He was said to have received sympathy even by some non-Muslims who were alleged to have bailed him out on some occasions that he was detained by the police on the ground of perceived breach of peace due to his threats to the Yar’adua government’.

The reciprocal conjecture of Boko Haram to engage in the use of individual terrorism as a response to the state terrorism of police and the Nigerian ruling class is a dialectical process that is shared through social-class relations. While the material condition for Boko Haram to strike and embark on revenge mission is ripe, the catalyst for such mission must be linked to perceive threat to its leaders and members, and until that happen, the sect will remain in the background re-arming itself. As the sect is preparing for insurrection, the Nigerian government was aware and prepared to counter any aggression. The security information available to the government suggests that the sect might strike anytime and in order to prevent that, pre-emptive strike was launched at the ‘sect’s hideout at the Dutsen Tanshi area of Bauchi on 26 July 2009 by a joint security team, during which nine of its members were arrested and materials for making bombs and other weapons confiscated’ (Adesoji 2010: 98). This led to reprisal attack on police and prison formations on the same day. The insurgency which started in Bauchi quickly spread to six northern state of Borno, Bauchi, Yobe, Gombe, Kano and Katsina, and left hundreds of people dead and several houses, churches and government properties burnt and destroyed. Danjibo (2009) noted that ‘more than 500 members of the sect were killed by government security forces in Borno. In Bauchi state, 41 persons including a soldier and a police officer lost their lives while in Yobe state 43 persons lost their lives with greater casualty on the sect. By the time the violence was contained, between 1,000 and 1, 400 people have lost their lives with inestimable damages to properties. The sect was said to have used propelled grenades, locally produced bombs and AK 47 riffles in carrying out the attacks’

However, below are the chronicles of Boko Haram Bombing since September 2010

The Chronicles of Boko Haram insurgency since September 2010	
7th of September 2010	Gunmen attack a prison in Bauchi, killing around five guards and freeing numerous prisoners, including former sect members.
6th of October, 2010	Gunmen assassinate two security guards outside a politician's home and, several hours later, assassinate ANPP leader Awana Ngala in Maiduguri.
9th of October, 2010	Gunmen assassinate Muslim cleric Bashir Kashara and one of his students in Maiduguri. Separately, gunmen assassinate a police officer in Maiduguri.
11th of October, 2010	Bombing/gun attack on a police station in Maiduguri destroys the station and injures three
28th of December, 2010	Boko Haram claims responsibility for the Christmas Eve bombing in Jos that killed 38, and assassination of a senior police officer and two others at a hospital in Maiduguri.
3rd of January, 2011	Assassination of a policeman in Maiduguri.
20th of February, 2011	Assassination of a policeman in Maiduguri.
23rd of February, 2011	Assassination of a policeman in Maiduguri.
28th February, 2011	Attack of a police commander's home and kill two policemen.
2rd of March, 2011	Assassination of two policemen in Maiduguri.
13th of March, 2011	Assassination of a Muslim cleric Imam Ibrahim Ahmed Abdullahi in Maiduguri.
27th of March, 2011	Assassination of an ANPP leader Alhaji Modu Gana Mekanike in Maiduguri.
9th of April, 2011	Bombings at polling places injure several and killing at least one person in Maiduguri.
22nd of April, 2011	Boko Haram frees 14 prisoners during a jailbreak in Yola, Adamawa State
17th of May, 2011	Assassination of a policeman in Maiduguri.
29th of May, 2011	Bombings at an army barracks in Bauchi and maiduguri; Zuba International Market at Abuja, and Zaria
6th of June, 2011	Assassination of a Muslim cleric Ibrahim Birkuti in Maiduguri.

7th of June, 2011	Bombing of church and police stations in Maiduguri, killing five.
16th of June, 2011	Bombing of National police Headquarter in Abuja
26th of June, 2011	Shooting and bombing of a bar in Maiduguri kills some 25 people.
10th of July, 2011	Bombing of All Christian Fellowship Church in Suleja, Niger State
12th of August, 2011	Prominent Muslim Cleric Liman Bana is shot dead by Boko Haram militants
4th of November, 2011	Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the attacks on State police headquarter, government buildings, banks and churches in Damaturu, Yobe state
25th of December, 2011	Christmas day bombing of churches in Madalla, Jos, Gadaka and Damaturu, killing more than 40 people.
20th January, 2012	Bombing of prison and Police station in Kano, killing policemen and freeing all inmates.
8th of February, 2012	Boko Haram claims responsibility for a suicide bombing at the army headquarters in Kaduna
16th of February, 2012	Bombing of a prison in Central Nigeria, killing of a warder and freeing 119 prisoners
8th of March, 2012	Killing of kidnapped Italian and British hostage (Franco Lamolinara and Christopher McManus) by Boko Haram splinter group.
26th of April, 2012	Bombing of Thisday Newspaper office in Abuja
29th of April, 2012	Bombing of Police chief convoy in Taraba.
30th of April, 2012	Bombing of churches in Kano and Maiduguri, killing at least 15 people
31st of May, 2012	Killing of a German hostage in gun shoot out with the Military
3rd of June, 2012	Bombing of a church in Bauchi , killing 16 people
5th of June, 2012	Assassination of Retired Police Chief in Kano
17th of June, 2012	Bombing of three churches that killed at least 50 people in Zaria and Kaduna town.
25th of July, 2012	Boko Haram gunmen killed two Indians in Maiduguri, and attacked police stations, a local government office and a factory owned by Indians
27th of July, 2012	Boko Haram attacked JTF's patrol vehicles in the Maiduguri metropolis

30th of July, 2012	Boko Haram suicide bomber attacked two police stations, and killed two policemen in Sokoto
4th of August, 2012	Boko Haram suicide bombers killed 6 soldiers in Damaturu, Gombe and Maiduguri.
6th of August, 2012	Boko Haram attacked and bombed police station in Sokoto.
4th of September, 2012	Boko Haram razed down a primary school in Maiduguri
5th of September, 2012	Boko Haram claimed responsibility for telephone mast bombing in Borno.
8th of May, 2013	Boko Haram attack on Bama, Borno State. 55 killed, 22 policemen, 2 soldiers, 14 prison officers among victims

Sources: BBC news coverage on who are the Boko Haram Islamists and Wikipedia article on Boko Haram

As Ogunrotifa (2013) noted that the class perspective that has been offered in this paper demonstrates that analysis of terrorism cannot be isolated from the International event on one hand, and the social-economic, political and cultural factors that conditioned it on the other hand. Therefore, investigating terrorism must be limited to specific context and society that is crucial to the explication of the action that will be required to transform that context. The findings however miserably weakened the logic and claim of psychological perspective that attribute individual terrorism to the personality trait and characteristics of the individual motivation rather than the social-economic, political and cultural factors that conditioned the sectarian group to use that terrorist tactics and act the way they do. However, certain individuals may have grievances with the state of affair like Norwegian bomber—Anders Behring Breivik about rising number of Muslims in Norway, his appearance and personality does not portray that of a ‘terrorist’ as psychological theorists would want us to believe. Apart from Anders Behring Breivik, individual members of the groups such as Boko Haram, *Al Qaeda*, Hezbollah, Al- Shabaab, Irish Republican Army (IRA), Hamas, and Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) are not born ‘terrorist’ neither is the organisations they belong are ‘terrorist organisations’. They are regarded as ‘terrorist’ or ‘terrorist organisations’ because they employ the use of individual terrorism to express their grievances about social-economic, and political situation in their respective societies.

Secondly, terrorism is always divided into individual and state terrorism, and both are shape by class basis that gave rise to them. From this study, it has been revealed that interest of ruling class and that of the lumpen class are diametrically opposed to each other, and none of the classes will freely surrender its interest without a fight. In as much as capitalist system continues to exist, the class interests that culminate into terrorist act between the two classes will continue.

This however confirms the working hypothesis of this study that Individual terrorism is not just opposite of state terrorism but they are reciprocal and dialectical reactions that are expressed in terms of class interest, and will continue to shape each other in never-ending dominance of capitalist social relations. Therefore, terrorism is a reflection of social relations among social classes within modern capitalism (Jonathan, 2011).

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

By developing class theory of terrorism on the basis of the study of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria vis-a-vis historical method, this study has shown that the discursive frame of terrorism cannot be analysed and understood in isolation of its class nature and the social-economic conditions that gave rise to it. In this sense, it was observed that terrorism is an inevitable consequence that will feature more prominently in the capitalist mode of production because the social contradiction (social-economic crisis) that arises out of the conflicts between the social relations and productive forces will usher a continuous struggle within classes as Karl Marx's Historical Materialism affirmed. Consequently, this perspective locates the present root cause of all forms of terrorism (individual and state terrorism) at the behest of the antagonistic class struggle inherent in global capitalist system. Therefore, state terrorism emerged as a result of the triumphant of capitalism over feudalism, and was sustained through the unending dynamics of capitalist social formation. Like in Nigerian case, the emergence of state terrorism stems from the forceful incorporation of world capitalist system through colonialism, and sustained through capitalist accumulation and capitalist class formation. This study has revealed that state terrorism is in large part, the historical product of class antagonism between the ruling class and other classes in the society. While individual terrorism was and still generated by the very same historical process that sustained state terrorism: the development of capitalism (Ogunrotifa, 2013).

It is likely that if Boko Haram insurgency is resolved either through military actions or dialogue, the use of individual terrorism by sectarian groups is likely to re-emerge in the future as long as the endemic social-economic problems caused by global capitalism remained and unaddressed. In as much as the social-economic crisis remain, aggrieved members of the lumpen class who could no longer tolerate the series of frustration they suffer will find solution in joining or forming sectarian groups and resort to the use of individual terrorism as a response to the state of affairs.

Contrary to the policy directions of realist and liberal approaches that suggest aggressive and combative counter-terrorist strategies, and strengthening of criminal and anti-terrorism law respectively, policy recommendation from class perspective seems to differ from the aforementioned approaches, as it seeks to address what causes antagonism and tension among

classes, why do members of the lumpen class form or join sectarian groups and engage in individual terrorism, and how can lumpen class be discouraged from engaging in individual terrorism or forming/joining sectarian groups that believe in the use of individual terrorism? The answers to these underlie the policy direction the class perspective might take in addressing problems posed by individual terrorism.

The real barrier to growth and crisis in capitalism is the private ownership of production that breeds greed, exploitation, insatiable wealth, corruption, poverty, misery and widening gap between the rich and the poor. This is the basis of tension and antagonism among classes in the society especially in the developing countries. In the developed countries, there are social welfare programmes put in place to reduce the tension among the classes but in the developing countries such programmes are absent and make class antagonism fiercer. With this development, the members of the lumpen class who have frustrated with the socio-economic problems will have no option than to respond one way or the other. The result has been the increasing trend of individual terrorism in the contemporary world.

However, the transformation of the members of the lumpen class into working class remains an appropriate social and public policy formulation that is needed to salvage the cyclical social dislocations orchestrated the global capitalist crisis, and to discourage the youth who are mostly member of the lumpen class from joining organised groups/organisations tainted with individual terrorism. This can be achieved through equitable distribution of wealth, and by taken all grievances seriously rather than resorting to police and military measures to address this problem. For Western capitalist states it is much easier to fight individual terrorism with military force, than introducing complex economic measures, such as an equitable redistributive mechanism in the global market. Without political will to implement these policy recommendations, individual terrorist tactics like that of Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda and others will continue to remain a recurring event especially in the regions that has suffered from the haemorrhage of poverty, unemployment, corruption and under-development.

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