

## THE ROLE OF POLITICAL LEADERS IN THE RESOLUTION OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN YOBE STATE, NORTH- EAST REGION - NIGERIA

**ADOLE, Raphael Audu**

Department of Public Administration

Faculty of Management Sciences

University of Maiduguri

Borno State

Nigeria

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**ABSTRACT:** *This study investigates the role of political leaders and the management of political violence in Yobe State, North –east region of Nigeria. Nigeria transitioned to democratic governance on May 29<sup>th</sup>, 1999 with much fanfare and great expectations. Despite the euphoria and sentiments especially from the political class, that would greet the celebrations, it is rather debatable whether there is any specific social, political and economic development in Yobe state and Nigeria generally due to the persistent spate of political violence. It is against this background that this study examines the role political leaders have played in promoting and curbing political violence in Yobe state with particular reference to the activities of the Jammatul Ahlis Sunnah Lidda’awati wal jihad (Boko Haram). This study is also timely due to the fact that the country is presently confronted with serious security challenges. The study is therefore guided by the following research proposition: Political violence is not an expression of systemic leadership failure. To achieve this objective therefore, the study employed the qualitative methods as the main research methodology, which was supplemented by basic quantitative methods. These two methods complemented each other through triangulation. Chart for data analysis was drawn using the 2003 Microsoft Excel XP Version 10 package. The study also utilized secondary data through an extensive review of literature in order to provide a foundation on which the empirical data was built. In fact; a sample of 510 respondents was randomly selected and administered with the questionnaire from 6 local government areas in Yobe state. The study used the conjectural political conflict model as the main theoretical framework. From the empirical data analyzed, the study revealed that political leaders have not done much in the management of political violence in Yobe State. The study therefore recommends amongst others that political leaders should be bold and have an articulate leadership style that would effectively manage and prevent conflict in Yobe state*

**KEYWORDS:** *Political leaders, Political violence, conflict management, Boko Haram, Yobe State, Nigeria.*

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### INTRODUCTION

The role of Political leaders in the management of political violence in societies cannot be over emphasized due to the fact that Violence, the political type of violence has become a problem of great national and international concern because of its socio-economic and political consequences.

Through much of history violence has been the norm rather than an exception in relation among individuals and groups in social formations. That is why the way it should be managed is fundamental in every society.

Nigeria, like any other plural federal states has been characterized by incessant contestations among individuals, groups and the different ethnic groups that make up the federal union. Since the return to democratic rule on 29<sup>th</sup> May, 1999, these contestations have increased in alarming and violent proportion across the country. According to Mohammed (2012: 1) “some ethnic groups in Nigeria feel that the return to civilian rule has offered them the opportunity to agitate for what they believed is their right to possess, partake in or achieve their development”. Thus, while some geo-political nationalities agitate for some form of greater dividend from the oil revenue, as in the case of the Niger Delta Region of the country, some States within the Northern Region are agitating for access to political power and the implementation of the *sharia legal* system. Others within the South Eastern part of the country are agitating for self-independence or the creation of sovereign States as in the case of the Movement for the Sovereign State of Biafra (MOSSOB). Thus, these competing groups achieve their political, economic and social objectives with dire consequences on the Nigerian polity.

That is why various forms of aggressions are displayed on a daily basis in different parts of the country. For example, the activities of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunnah Lidda'awati wal jihad* (Boko Haram) and the activities of other geo-political nationalities in the country could be traced to the inability of some individuals or group of individuals to access the economic and political resources of the country. In fact since the country returned to democratic rule on 29th May 1999 the phenomenon of violence has assumed a serious dimension: Bombings, militancy, religious riots, vandalism, arsons, political assassinations and the like have become the main features of Nigeria's nascent democracy. The scenario encapsulated above is not different from that of Yobe State. It is against this backdrop that the researcher is embarking on this study aimed at examining the consequences of the situation for the socio- economic development of Nigeria generally and Yobe State in particular.

### **Statement of the Problem**

Political unrest has continued to pose chronic threats to human security in the Yobe state. For instance, the Norwegian Refugee Council and Internal Displacement Centre (2011) stated that following the announcement of the 2011 presidential Election results, there were massive protests in some parts of Yobe State alleging that the Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP) had connived with the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and other Security Agencies to rig, manipulate and influenced the outcome of the results at the detriment of the Congress for Progressive Change and other political parties in the State.

The protest led to the destruction of government facilities, public buildings, Churches and Shops particularly in Damaturu and Potiskum local government areas of the State. More so, in 2009 the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) reported to have registered over 4000 displaced men, women and children in three locations in Bade, Potiskum and Damaturu Local government areas and others sought refuge at military barracks as a result of the political violence

that ensued after the imposition of local government chairmen in the 17 local government Councils by the State government.

Obviously, the spate of bomb blasts, kidnappings, vandalism and series of killings from 2009-2014 especially in Damaturu, Potiskum, Fika and Bade Local Government Areas of the State is worrisome. Despite the assurances and measures taken for the protection of lives and property by the State Government, the security situation in the State has continued to deteriorate with huge impact on the socio-economic and political development in the State.

### **Research Questions**

In order to achieve the purpose of this study, the following research questions were raised:

- i. What roles have political leaders played in curbing political violence?
- ii. Is there any linkage between systemic leadership failure and violence in Yobe State?

### **Research Objectives**

This aspect of the thesis is to highlight the objectives of embarking on this study as such the following could be put forward as the main objectives of the study are to:

- i. Examine the roles political leaders have played in curbing the violence in the State; and
- ii. Identify the linkage between systemic leadership failure and political violence in Yobe State;

### **Research Proposition**

This study is guided by the research proposition below:

- i. Political violence is not an expression of systemic leadership failure.

## **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

### **The Study Area**

Yerima, Bunu and Shettima (2008) stated that Yobe State is a rural State without a single cosmopolitan city with five medium sized towns with significant commercial activities. It was created on 27<sup>th</sup> August 1991 out of old Borno State by the military regime of President Ibrahim Babangida. The State covers an estimated area of 47,153 square kilometers and shares border with Republic of Niger to the North and within the country, it shares border with Jigawa and Bauchi State to the west, Borno State to the east as well as Gombe to the South. The 2006 population census put the total population of the State as 2,432,321.

It is important to state here that Yobe State has a pluralistic population with rich and diverse historical and cultural heritage. The major ethnic groups in the state include: Kanuri/Manga, Fulani, Kere-Kere, Bolewa, Ngizim, Bade, Hausa Ngamo, Buber/Maga and several other ethnic groups from different parts of the country. Umar (2011) also added that the head quarter of the State is located in Damaturu because of its geographical centrality and strategic location. The headquarters in fact connects the major towns of the State namely: Potiskum, Gashua, Nguru and Geidam. Damaturu has become a melting pot of geo-political activities.

**Research Design**

The study is a survey research. The research is a survey research because it examines the social, economic and political impact of political violence on the selected Local Government Areas chosen for detailed analysis because it aimed at eliciting accurate and reliable data from the respondents particularly on the phenomenon under investigation. It is important to state here that the survey research method also provides an effective way of collecting information from a large number of sources through sample taking provision from where inferences can be drawn about the target population. This will help in overcoming the difficulties that would have been encountered in an attempt to study the whole population of Yobe State.

**Population and sample**

The population from which samples was picked for this study is that of the six selected local government areas of Yobe State. The Revised National Census figures for the State in 2006 put the total population of the selected local government areas in Yobe State at 788,485. The Local government areas are varied in ethnic, tribal, and religious composition. They also have partisan loyalty and some degree of urbanization, so they can thus serve as a reasonably good microcosm of the State as a whole. More so, since violence particularly political form of violence affects almost all individuals and groups in a society, in this study, the sample from which data would be obtained will include the following groups: The political class, civil servants, traders, community leaders, students and security agents. From the analysis above, it can be seen that the total population of the local government areas selected for detailed analysis is 788,876. It is out of this number that the sample for this study was drawn.

**Sample Size and Sampling Technique**

A total of 510 respondents were drawn from the selected local government areas of the State. (n = 788,485; Confidence level: 95%; confidence interval: 4.0%). Consequently, the researcher administered 510 questionnaires to the respondents in the selected local government areas. The simple random sampling technique was employed when picking the respondents in the six (6) Local Government Areas that were purposively selected out of the 17 Local Government Areas of the State. This technique was employed when administering questionnaires and also identifying interviewees for this study. Giving the number of respondents (510) that were surveyed and the number of Local Government Areas involved, the researcher sought the help of a Community Guide, and two Research Assistants that helped in the distribution and collection of some of the questionnaires that were administered in the selected Local Government Areas of the State. For the purpose of this study, six Local Government Areas which include: Damaturu, Potiskum, Gujba, Fika, Bade and Nguru local government areas were purposively selected out of the 17 Local Government Areas of the State due to the fact that they are the flashpoints of the crises in the State. Apart from this reason, available records from the National Emergency Management Agency (2012) showed that these Local governments host about 4000 refugees displaced as a result of political violence in the State.

**Method of Data Collection**

Since the research is a survey research, the researcher used the primary, secondary and participant observation methods of data collection for the study. The primary and secondary data were gathered through the use of survey instruments particularly the administration of structured

questionnaires and an extensive review of literature which provided a foundation on which the empirical data was built. The secondary data for this study was thus collected from various sources. Since existing literature is an important source of information, heavy reliance was placed on literature that dealt with the issue of the role of political leaders in the management of political violence in societies

### **Data Analysis Technique**

The researcher analyzed all the initial qualitative data manually. This process consisted of the researcher reviewing the data, identifying key ideas of the research questions, and relating them to the objectives of the study. The researcher further explored themes, organized the findings in a manner that helped to examine the linkage between role of political leaders and the management of political violence in Yobe state.

### **Conceptual clarifications**

Some of the key terms used in the study are clarified as follows:

#### **Political violence**

Nieburg (1969) advanced that political violence is a product of factors and actors and peoples' reactions that combine to produce violence in a society. He went further to add that political violence can also be seen as a process that takes place between various groups or categories of actors within a political system. Gurr (1970:3) refers to political violence as "collective attacks within a political community against a political regime, its actors including competing political groups as well as incumbents or its policies". Arendt (1972), Rapoport (1989) and Kean (1989) all viewed political violence as an extreme behavior that is very dramatic, strongly emotive and highly visible that intends to distort general perceptions by "flooding" the senses and sensibilities of observers. The decision to use violence directly involves only a subset of the mobilized population; even in the most extreme situations, only a minority of any population is actively engaged in violent action.

The broadest definition of political violence focus on the subset of purposive acts of violence by groups that intended to increase group welfare by affecting the political relationship between groups (Communal violence) or among groups operating in the political system in general (State violence and anti-State Violence). Base on the forgoing, Zimmermann (1993) offered a criterion as an effort to distinguish violence from political violence. First he took into consideration the number of people involved in a violent act. All things being equal, the probability that the acts of violence will be thought as political in nature is greater when more persons are involved in those acts. This fact should not in any way mislead people as this should not mean that if a group of people commit violent acts this becomes political violence. The motive of the act and how the community reacts to the violent act has to be seriously considered too.

The second criterion according to Zimmermann (1993) is examining the intentions of the actors and the reaction of that particular community, or the public in general. His criteria states that violent acts, whether it is simple or collective in nature would become acts of political violence.

Moser and Clark (2001) see political violence as a collective sphere manifested in guerilla conflict, paramilitary conflict, political assassinations, and armed conflicts between political parties, rape

and sexual abuse while Eric (2004) stated that political violence means the exercise of physical force with the intention to harm the welfare or physical integrity of the victim. According to him, the exercise of such force that is politically motivated and that can be exercised by governmental or anti-governmental groups can be described as political violence. Mifflin (2009) on his part, stated that political violence is the calculated use of unlawful violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. Dzurgba (2010) also advanced that political violence arises from party formation, party membership, campaign hosting, voting behaviour, pressure groups, use of thugs and assassins, recruitment and training of militias, control and use of economic resources such as petroleum oil and solid minerals, sharing of revenue, leadership, control and distribution of power, unjust electoral process, perverted judicial institution and police, indiscipline political behaviour, corruption and foreign influence. Civil war and international war are the greatest aspects of political violence.

Political violence is a perennial feature of plural societies; in fact it has become a problem of great national and international concern because of its socio-economic and political implications. It is therefore any form of disaffection with or opposition to the procedural consensus established by a society which is calling for the total destruction of its political system. It is a purposive form of behaviour intended to disorient the behaviour of others thereby bringing about the demise of a hated social system. The term political violence in fact covers myriads of activities, it is perhaps important to clarify the usage of this term as far as this study is concern. Political violence within the context of this study is therefore the calculated use of unlawful violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political or ideological.

### **Conflict Resolution**

Conflict resolution is conceptualized as the methods and processes involved in facilitating the peaceful ending of conflict and retribution. Most at times, conflict resolution as a concept is taken to mean dispute resolution where arbitration and litigation processes are critically involved. Conflict resolution involves the reduction, elimination or termination of all forms and types of conflict. Conflict resolution is in fact different from conflict management in the sense that conflict management according to Borisoff and Victor (1989) has to do with the minimization of negative outcomes of conflict and promotes the positive outcomes of the conflict with the goal of improving individual and group relations in organization.

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

Conflict and political violence is an intrinsic and inevitable part of human existence. In Nigeria, it has given political leaders much concern. Political leaders have converged in different forum in an attempt to find lasting peace in the country. Domestic conflict within Nigeria has made peace a prime value; the most valuable public good in this present democratic dispensation. The researcher observed that the current insecurity and insurgent activities that is going on in the Northern part of the country is worrisome. This conflict is fought in one of the poorest regions in the country and has wrecked devastating consequences on the region in terms of considerable loss of human lives, resource depletion, and population displacement.

This has made the North-east region one of the most dangerous regions to live in Nigeria. The Nigerian government and the international community through military, technical and intelligence collaborations have been trying to maintain peace and resolve most specifically the problem of the Boko Haram insurgency. There are so many speculations on the rationale behind the persistent spate of violence in the North – east region. Most academics and scholars have come up with theoretical explanations on the causes of conflict and political violence in societies. It is in the light of the above facts that this Chapter is an attempt to review some of the theoretical assumptions of the determinants of political violence in societies. Many scholars have viewed the causes of conflicts in societies from different perspectives. It based on this premise that the sections below are designed by the researcher to examine some of the theoretical insights on the motivations of political violence across the globe.

But before examining some of the studies conducted in respect of the determinants of political violence in societies, it is imperative that the concepts: political violence and conflicts are clarified.

### **Conflict, political violence and the phenomenon of violence in societies**

According to Dougherty and Platfgraff (1970:139) the term conflict usually refers to “a condition in which one identifiable group of human beings whether tribal, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious, socio-economic, political or others engaged in conscious opposition to one or more other identifiable human groups because these groups are pursuing what appears to be incompatible goals”. Conflict among individuals and groups can lead to violence in a state. Violence could come in the form of domestic, religious and political. Gurr (1970: 3) refers to political violence as “collective attacks within a political community against a political regime, its actors including competing political groups as well as incumbents or its policies”. He used his Relative Deprivation theory to explain the parameters of political violence in a society. Gurr (1970) opined that every culture establishes norms under which its members can act out or internalize their anger, under the right conditions a culture may regard violence as a justified means of expressing aggression. The power of the State, and its willingness to use violence itself, will determine the magnitude and success of political violence. Finally the justification for violence will stem from the states perceived legitimacy in the eyes of its people. In Nigeria, politics and violence are like Siamese twins. Political activity has always come out with a notable degree of violence both in the colonial and post—colonial phases of Africa particularly the cheaquered history of Nigeria. Anifowose, (1982) advanced that the interface between political activity and violence has not in any way changed since Nigeria got independence. A survey of the First Republic (1960-1966) for instance showed how political violence unraveled until the military eventually intervened on 15th January 1966. Buttressing the view of Anifowose (1982), Arthur (1987) opined that the colonial strategy in Nigeria was despotic inevitably the country was administered with the most unspeakable cruelties and with unfounded forces of annihilations which rendered mass murder through the administrative techniques of the colonial regime. The obvious outcome was that pre-colonial societies were smashed into pieces through raw violence defined in colonial literature as punitive expeditions, patrols or pacification. Ademolekun (1988) also contributing to the above discourse added that the threat of a possible collapse of the whole social system of Nigeria into complete anarchy triggered the putsch of 31<sup>st</sup> December, 1983 which eventually and effectively interred the

Second Republic. According to Hargopal and Chandrasekhar (1989) conflict situation creates an environment where different section of the society would resort to aggressive protests and rebellious behaviour. The rebellious movements can destroy the existing structures but would not be able to offer an alternative to what the deemed best or what they would presume an ideal State.

In Less Developed Countries (LDCs) particularly African countries embarking on the path of a painful transition from authoritarianism to a semblance of civil governance are most often susceptible to domestic and international forces which have greatly facilitated violence in the continent. Fukuyama (1992) opined that the international forces include the rumination of the cold war, the collapse of the Soviet behemoth, the attendant unpopularity of the communist world view, and the consolidation of the democratic ethos by the apparently victorious liberal societies of the western bloc promoted conflicts and violence in countries within the African continent. Rene (1992) also argued that Africa transitional process tend to unleash rising social demands thereby sharpening political competitiveness among ethno-regional entities that promotes political violence in African societies.

Amuno (1992) Ake (1996) and Ndongko (1997) in similar manner looked at the importance of the domestic challenges to decades of political violence and dictatorship in many African States. These include the collapse of social infrastructures, economic stasis the continued marginalization of unfavoured minority groups in most heterogeneous societies and the virtual reduction of governance itself to unbridled accumulation and crass opportunism on the part of largely shorted sighted political elite.

The process of transition from totalitarianism to democracy in Africa is characterized by a legacy of bloodletting. Different political scholars have studied the African situation and they in fact differ profoundly in their rationalizations. for instance Omitoogun and Onigu (1996) attributes the high level of political violence in Africa which followed democratic transitions in Africa to the absence of necessary structures, given that political changes had occurred mainly through military coups d'état'. The occurrence of political violence seemed to be a prevalent feature in Less Developed Countries (LDCS). Politicians in Africa always want to acquire power by all means as such they employ all forms of strategy to achieve their aim. It is in line with this form of behaviour that Moser and Clark (2001) see political violence as the acquisition of power through violent acts. It is driven by desires for power that can lead people to transgress other people's private domains. This phenomenon can be seen among fighters such as guerrillas, paramilitary groups, tyrannical regimes, extremists, religious and ethnic groups and others aiming to undermine the other in order to achieve hegemony over a region, state or group. Johari (2006) has identified some reasons which make the study of political violence in these social formations more compelling than anywhere else. In this regard, he enumerated the following points:

First, in all the countries, politics and government are shaped by the basic facts of scarce economic resources, extensive poverty and inequality, and a relatively weak position in the international system. The political leaders have fewer options available in resolving problems or in responding to demands from various groups for a bigger piece of the national economic pie. Thus, economic conflicts are more likely to arise as the agitations of the farmers and workers and the rulers are often found involved in the cases of corruption and mal-administration. Second, in these countries,

the political legitimacy is very weak. It is true that the people obey the laws and cast their votes in elections, but they do not see the government as being very relevant to their lives or as being able to do anything about their most serious concerns. They may even regard the government as having a negative impact on their lives, and their citizenship in the state may be negligible as a source of their political identity.

Johari (2006) also added that the effective power of leadership in such countries is also very limited. The State may have little real ability to exert its authority much beyond the capital city and a few large urban centres. The rural and backward areas and the patron-client relationship may be visualized. That is, the wealthy and the powerful people exploit the poor and weak people and also help them in some respect that is in some cases neither legal nor moral thus the formal aspects of government such as laws, parties and elections are less important than the informal politics of patron-client relationship. More so the general experience of the third world societies indicates the increasing dependency on the coercive organs like police, Para military and military forces. The increasing role of the coercive apparatus and marginalization of the developmental wing suggests that the State is getting back to its primitive role for it is gradually abandoning the functions that it acquired during the course of civilization and development. The use of force without a development ideology in poverty-ridden societies is bound to create legitimacy crisis.

Otite (2006) advanced that most often than not conflicts are also designed to resolve divergent dualism and to achieve some kind of unity even if it were through the annihilation of one of the conflicting parties and should not therefore be regarded only in negative light or dysfunctional or disjunctive process and a breakdown of communication as seen in the 1967-1970 civil war in Nigeria. The war was fought in other to make the country remain as one indivisible entity. Miall (2006) also stated that conflicts generally arise from the pursuit of divergent goals and aspirations by individuals and or groups in defined social and physical environment.

From the above discourse, it can be seen that conflicts are inherent in all kinds of social, economic or political settings and it is characterized by ethnic, religious and other forms of pluralism. Conflicts have long been recognized as one of the more fundamental threats to institutional stability, political order and state cohesion in multiethnic societies particularly in third world countries where Nigeria is located. According to Norwitz (2009) no country is free from some level of armed brutality and bloodshed that is why Dzurghba (2010) opined that Group violence is inflicted on people, property, principles and other values by political pressures groups, Students' Unions, Labor Unions such as: Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC), Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU), Nigerian Medical Association (NMA), Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) Non Academic Staff Union of Educational and Associated Institutions (NASU) and the like. These groups inflict violence on establishments or institutions and societies through violent demonstrations, protests and strikes.

Peaceful demonstrations and protests become violent when activist clash with policemen who use their batons, teargas and guns on protesters or demonstrators who may be students, workers, human rights activist, members of opposition parties or members of any other group. Protesters resort to violence by destroying vehicles, buildings, goods and lives.

### **Role of political leaders in the management of ethno – religious conflict and political violence in Nigeria**

Central to the duo concepts of ethnicity and regionalism are the concepts; ethnic groups and regional groups. An ethnic group is a group of people sharing distinctive cultural traits as a group in society. It also refers to a small or a large group of people who share a national, racial, linguistic or religious heritage, whether or not they reside in their countries of origin.

A region on the other hand refers to a large land area that has geographical, political or cultural characteristics that distinguish it from others, whether existing within one country or extending over several areas (Microsoft Encarta 2009), a regional group therefore consists of a people who share common geographical boundary and thus share certain real or perceived oneness. The thin line of difference between the two concepts is that while ethnic groups do not have to share a common geography, regional groups need to. According to Max Weber: Ethnic groups are those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization or migration, this belief must be important for the propagation of formation conversely it does not matter whether or not an objective blood exists (in Hutchman and Smith 1996:11).

It means therefore that the concepts ethnic groups and regional groups are connected which of course could have a subjective or objective connotation. The feeling of oneness that a particular group share could either is real or perceived. Suberu (1996:15) buttressed this claim that: An ethnic group is regarded generally as a social collectivity whose members not only share objective characteristics as language, core-territory, ancestral myths, culture, religion and/or political organization but also has some subjective consciousness or perception of common descent or identity .

In addition to the conception that an ethnic group link up with regional group, Jimada (2002) added that “an ethnic group is a social formation distinguished by communal characteristics of language, culture and territoriality. From the foregoing, it indicates that the concepts of ethnic group can hardly be demarcated from a regional group. However, an ethnic group is a group larger than a family for which membership is reckoned primarily by descent, is conceptually autonomous and has a conventionally recognized “natural history” as a group unlike a regional group (Fearon and Lactin 2000).

Since a particular ethnic group sees itself as being distinct from other ethnic groups, they sometimes perceive others as been inferior to them. This feeling of the superiority of one’s culture is what is referred to as ethnicity. Ethnicity is “the cultural characteristic that connects a particular group of people to each other”(Metumara 2010: 97) The characteristics, Metumara(2010) refer to here could take on different variables such as language, religion, colour, ancestry and culture to which social meanings are attributed and around which identity and group formation occur (Nagel, 1995).

It is important to stress at this point that ethnicity is not a permanent trait but changing group characteristics (Berth, 1969 and Jimada 2002). Ethnic groups and not just ethnicity, Jimada (2002) added are constantly being redrawn and redefined. This is because ethnicity is consequence of

mobilization and politicization of ethnic group identity (Egwu, 2007). The argument then goes on to mean that no ethnic or regional grouping is monolithic rather they flow into one another. Usman (2000) citing the case of Nigeria observed that, the current groups as we have them now are not separate but intermeshing and intermingling, for example, he argued that there is very thin line between Nupe, Bassa and Gbagyi. He maintained that what came to be known as *kasar Kano* (Kano land) was a migratory settlement of people from different parts of Nigeria, West and East Africa and Asia. They moved in to the present area due to trade and fertile land that Kano provided. Jimada (2002) arguing in line with Usman, affirmed that there were series of migration of the different ethnic groups as we find it today in Nigeria, so argument for a monolithic ethnic nationality is only an illusion Because of the perceived feeling of distinction ethnic or regional group nurture as opposed to other groups equally organized within a given state, nationality and loyalty shifts from the state to the particular group in which one belong. This kind of loyalty and nationality is what is referred to as ethno-nationalism. Ethno-nationalism is: The mobilization of ethnic groups by using language, ethnic diversity, religion, traditions and customs. It is therefore a people's loyalty to and identification with a particular ethnic nationality within a state (Olayode 2007:3)

This ethno-nationalistic tendency in Nigeria confirms Awolowo's popularly quoted statement that "Nigeria is a mere geographical expression and not a nation." Before the advent of colonialism, nations and groups in Nigeria existed as distinct nations but colonialism brought these disparate groups together for colonial reasons (Metumara 2010, Ojie and Ewruojakpor 2009). This point was however debunked by Usman (2000), as he tenaciously maintained that the names of ethnic groups like Yoruba, Hausa, Igbo, Nupe etc were not original, rather they were but political nomenclature that emerged in the 1900s.

In an attempt to unravel the nature of the present Nigerian ethnic composition, many scholars have argued deeply that there is a need to interrogate the role of colonialism in that respect. Nnoli (1978) and Jimada (2002) have passionately argued in this direction. Colonialism, they posited shaped and to a large extent still shapes the developmental pattern and governmental system in most African and colonized states in general. Colonialism has been the most important variable in the evolution of most African states. Ekeh (1972) observed that "*colonialism is to Africa what feudalism is to Europe*" These factor forms the historical background from which Africa and Europe advance to modernity. As such, they have determined the peculiar characteristics of modernity in each of these areas. Colonialism through a series of polities is the most important factor in the exclusionary and antagonistic nature of contemporary identity politics in Nigeria (Nnoli 1978, Jimada 2002). A good example of these policies include the SabonGari policy of the 1920s in which migrants from other parts of Nigeria were prevented from mingling with native populations in ancient cities such as Kano, Katsina, Zaria etc.

However, ethno-regionalism became real and significant in Nigeria in the 1950s (Arnim, Mustapha and Stewart 2007; Ashafa 2002, Jimada 2002). It is noteworthy that this was the period when political parties in Nigeria began to take shape and it was in that period that the recourse to ethnic and regional grouping took center stage. This was evident in the formation of the Northern People's Congress (NPC) in 1951; Action Group (AG) in 1951 Northern Element Progressive Union

(NEPU) in 1950; United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) which emerged later as a regional party to counter the Northern hegemony of the NPC.

Ethnicity has a strong and binding force as an element of mobilizing group for scarce societal resources such as revenue and industries; political and appointive positions as well as social gain like education and recognition. This claim is supported by Wolpe and Melson (1971) that “under conditions of scarcity inequalities and uneven access to economic and political resources, ethnicity has provided a convenient platform for political mobilization” (in Mustapha 2005:19). The competition between and among ethnic nationalities could become so obvious that it serves as the platform on which power is sought. Otite (2001) argued that: “The control of the state power is the greatest prize in ethnically plural societies. It is regarded not only as the source but also the distributor of resources commonly valued in the society. As the chief “allocator” of services, facilities and factors of development, the state becomes a target over which control, ethnic territorial group engage in endless struggle“(Otite 2001:33).

It is in a bid to gain access to state power that ethnic and sometimes regional sentiments are evoked by elites. That is to say that ethnic competition becomes sharper due to its fueling by the elites. Obi (2002:79) affirmed that “elites bereft of cross-cutting ideology resort to ethnicity as a force to ascend the ladder of power and superintend over disbursement of these resources”. Ethnic groups compete because of the need to survive ideologically and materially especially in plural societies where the control of the government translates into the control of all of the institutions and resources of the society.(Hamman, 2002) argued that the factors that serve as a catalyst to the tendency to politicize ethnicity is the resource control syndrome. That goes to explain the claim that in the contest for economic and political power, ‘ethnicity is politicized and politics is ethnicized’. Osaghae (1994) maintained that ethnicity becomes a bargaining tool in the struggle for political and economic resources.

Taking a closer look at Nigeria in the 1950s, Olayode (2007) observed that the struggle for power sharing was reduced to a struggle for hegemony among the three major ethnic groups namely the Hausa/Fulani Yoruba and the Igbo. In the process of distributing the societal scarce resources among the ‘disparate’ groups in the society, there arises an inequality either in economic, political or social provisioning. This inequality therefore serve as a foundation for conflict over the composition of governmental institutions in Nigeria(Arnim, Mustapha and Stewart 2007) To ensure their continual existence as a group within the state, ethno-regional groups usually rally round parties and candidate that are purported to represent their particular ethnic interests and contestation (Mustapha 2005). This goes to explain why prime political positions as the presidency either of the state or of the senate, speakership, and governorship of the state, the chairmanship of public establishments are hotly contested by the various ethnic groups (Ojie and Ewhrujakpor 2009). They further argued that fear; suspicion and uncertainty informed the formation of political parties by the minority ethnic groups in the various regional groups in Nigeria in the wake of independent. It is this kind of feeling that led Joseph Tarka to lead other minority groups in the Middle Belt to form the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) away from the ‘One North’ led by Northern People’s Congress (Ashafa, 2002).

Mair (1962) view an ethnic group as a people sharing the same historical experience, having the same culture, speaking the same language and sharing the belief about the future together. Weber (1968) also described an ethnic group as those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent. Other liberal theorists such as Zolberg (1965), Oyobaire (1974), Mitchell (1974), Young (1976) and Stavenhager (1997) all see ethnicity as an inevitable consequence of modernization, economic and political development, especially in Africa.

The liberal theorists however believed that an ethnic group has as its member, people who share a conviction that they have common interests and fate, and they tend to propound a cultural symbolism expressing their cohesiveness. They believed that ethnic groups differ from other groups particularly in their composition. Kasfir (1976) suggests four ways in which ethnic group could be recognized. These include: culture, language, traditional political organization; and territoriality.

From the above definitions, it must be clearly stated that an ethnic group must share a common culture, language and custom and occupy the same territory. In order to buttress this view, Mair (1993) again identified three main characteristics of ethnicity first, it is a culturally specific practice and unique set of symbols and beliefs, especially the way in which an ascribed identity is given contemporary construction through socialization and mobilization in cultural and political movements.

Second, it is a belief in common origin involving sometimes, the existence or imagination of a common past. Third, it involves a sense of belonging to a group defined in opposition to others these have manifested in different forms like intra and inter party intolerance and fracas, conflicts between States and Federal Government or conflicts between States and Local Governments over fair representations. More often than not such conflicts are informed by the hunger of some politicians for power, influence, and patronage, primitive accumulation of wealth and zero-sum party politics or politics of winner-take-all.

The foregoing analyses in fact needs to be also viewed within the context of the nagging national question in Nigeria and the crises which has generated among the constituent units of the Nigerian State most especially the three dominant tribes: Igbo, Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba. To briefly summarize the national question in Nigeria, it in fact revolves around the equitable sharing of political power, bureaucratic- opportunities and economic resources among several mutually suspicious ethnic groups.

Over the years, two critical developments have facilitated perceived monopoly of political power by Northern based interests, a monopoly strongly resented by power elites from other sections of the country, and the increasing importance of oil in the nation's political and economic sector. As Nigeria became more and more reliant on oil revenues, oil itself became an explosive element in majority — minority nationality relations in Nigeria (Obi, 1993 and Soremekun, 1997). This situation spawned calls for a democratization of politics and a restructuring of the country's apparently dysfunctional federalism. The call for socio-political re-ordering were largely ignored by the ruling elite who used an array of stratagems to cow opposition, ranging from financial inducement to cajolery and in a few cases to plain murder. Nnoli (2007:5) stated that: "ethnicity is

a social phenomenon associated with contact among ethnic groups that exist within the same political system. It is characterized by cultural prejudice and social discrimination". Nigeria is confronted with problems which have resulted in the dramatic upsurge in ethnic conflicts which is a by-product of ethnic nationalism and political demands based on ethnicity from the colonial period to the return to civil politics. Since 1999 Nigeria has witnessed the resurgence of political demands along ethnic and religious lines. The liberalization of the polity and the expansion of the political space appear to have provided additional impetus for ethnic and religious demands in Nigeria. Coming after decades of colonization by the British, military rule and military dictatorship including the centralization of power and resources that accompanied it, groups and communities that hitherto felt excluded and marginalized are seeking to be accommodated. Ethnic politics has always been the major source of growing political tension in Nigeria which has resulted in periodic outbreaks of violence between different ethnic groups in the country.

Nigeria has witnessed a variety of disturbances as earlier discussed in this section some of which have threatened the existence of the country as a nation. Some of these disturbances could also be described as intra-religious while the others are inter-religious. There are others that are more of politico-tribal in nature than religious even though some people may see them as religious simply because each group involved come from a different religion. Ethnic politics is bitter rivalry between the various ethnic groups and could be traced to the formation of the entity in 1914 called Niger area now Nigeria.

Nnoli (1978) on the other hand, view ethnicity as a social phenomenon associated with interactions among members of different ethnic groups. Ethnic groups are social formations distinguished by communal character of their boundaries. The relevant communal factor may be language culture or both. Ethnicity is behavioural in form. First it exists only within a political society consisting of diverse ethnic groups and the relationship between them that produce ethnicity. Ethnicity is also characterized by a common consciousness of being one in relation to the other relevant ethnic groups and can result from inter-ethnic competition for scarce valuable resources.

Nnoli (1978) went further to add that ethnic exclusiveness as an attribute of ethnicity shows that "in-groups out-group" boundaries emerged with it and in time became marked, more distinct than before and jealously guarded by the various ethnic groups. He went further to add that acceptance and re-election on linguistic cultural grounds characterizes social relations. They are expressed inevitably through inter-ethnic discrimination in Jobs, housing, and admission into educational institutions, marriages, business transaction or the distribution of social welfare services. For Toland (1993) ethnicity is the sense of people hood held by members of group, sharing a common culture and history within the society. Corroborating the above view, Kruger (1993) described ethnicity as a political factor linked with nationalism. He viewed elite's competition as the factor causing ethnic conflicts and argues that ethnicity and nationalism are not given but could be seen as social and political constructions. That they are a creation of elites, who draw upon, distort and sometimes fabricate materials from culture of the group they wish to represent in order to protect their wellbeing or existence or to gain political and economic advantage for their groups as well as for themselves. The process invariably involves competition and conflict for political power, economic benefit and social status between the political elites, class and leadership groups within and among different ethnic categories.

Diamond and Platter (1994) in their attempt at the meaning of ethnicity, viewed the concept to be a highly inclusive group identity based on some notion of common origin recruited commonly and primarily from kinship and typically manifesting some measures of cultural distinctions. So conclusively, ethnicity easily embraces groups differentiated by color, language and religion. It covers also tribes, races, nationalities and castes. Thomson (2000) on his part, defined an ethnic group as a community of people who are convinced that they have a common identity and based on issues or origin, kinship ties, traditions, cultural uniqueness, a shared history and possibly a shared language

Thomson (2000) again added that ethnicity becomes more pronounced when it is used to distinguish one ethnic or social group from another within specific territory. They stated that all individuals have ethnic allegiances irrespective of whether they are from the minority of neither a State's population nor the majority; with the result that ethnicity becomes a sentiment expressed by both the majority and minority population. According to him most often than not, this social pluralism usually leads to differences of interest and this is where the possibility of ethnic conflict starts to emerge. Apam (2006) defined an ethnic group as a segment of a larger society whose members are thought by themselves or others to have a common origin and to share important segments of a common culture and who in addition participate in shared activities in which the common origin and culture are significant ingredients. There is a close-natural affinity between religion and ethnicity. This affinity is strongest where the sense of a primordial attachment to an ancestral group and its traditions is most deeply felt.

From the foregoing analysis, one can easily view the relationship between ethnicity and religion. It is in fact impossible to discuss ethnicity without reference to religion. That is why it is generally believed that ethnicity and religion work in tandem. Religion is defined as a system of beliefs and practices by means of which a group of people struggle with the ultimate problems of human life suffering, injustice and meaninglessness. It expresses their refusal to capitulate to death, to give up in the face of frustration; not to allow hostility to tear apart their human associations and desires of human groups (Yinger 2001 and Apam 2006).

Over the years, there have been series of ethno-religious clashes or conflicts in Nigeria for instance the Biliri-Kaltungo and Shongom in Gombe State, the Tivs and several ethnic groups in Nasarawa State. Kaduna, Kano and Plateau State have acquired the unenviable reputation for bestial inter religious and ethnic violence in the country. In the down South of the Country vicious ethnic struggles are also observable. These could be seen in the frequent clashes between the Ijaws/Urhobos and Itsekiris in Warri over indigenship rights. The Ogoni, Andoms and Eleme and Okirika in River State over land and Ijaws and Ilajes in Ondo State also over land. In addition to these conflicts are recurrent intra-communal territorial disputes between Ife and Modakeke in Ogun State and Aguleri and Umuleri in Anambra State. Equally notable are the festering crisis and unrest in the States of the oil bearing Niger Delta especially Rivers, Bayelsa, Delta and Akwa Ibom.

Nigeria is divided along religions, tribal and ethnic fault lines and cleavages. The ethno-religious and communal clashes in Plateau State dating back in recent times to September 2007 had escalated with reverberating effect in the neighboring States of Bauchi, Gombe, Kaduna, Borno

and Yobe State and even the Federal Capital Abuja and including reprisal attacks in the Hausa dominated Kano and in the Igbo communities of Imo and Abia State in the South-East. The clashes in Ryom, Yelwa, Wase, Shendam and Lantang areas of Plateau State had resulted in killings and breakdown of law and order in the State and threatening the breakdown of peace and order in other parts of the country (Umar, 2009). Inevitably, these divisions have generated distrust, suspicion, bitterness, antagonism, tension and identity driven conflicts among the various social groups in the country. The rise of micro – nationalities has thwarted Nigerian political development efforts. Geo-political militia like Oodua Peoples' Congress (OPC), Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafara (MASSOB), the Nigerian Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF), the Arewa Peoples' Congress (APC), the Yusufiyya brotherhood (Boko Haram) and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) all anchors their separatist campaign through cries of political frustration, marginalization, deprivation and opposition.

These political bickering that resulted from these geo-political groups have seriously affected development of democracy and good governance. It is important to state here that in these strife-torn States, restive and militant youths who are enraged, have also engaged State authorities and Multinational Oil Corporations in open conflicts over abject infrastructural underdevelopment, political subjugation and environmental pollution in their localities. Currently the activities of the dreaded Boko Haram sect in the Northern part of the Country has led to the proliferation and flow of illicit arms and weapons and hiring of rebels from neighboring countries like Chad and Niger which are threatening the national security of the country.

The bitter struggles for superiority and space between Christians and Muslim, Hausa- Fulani in polyglot entities like Plateau, Kaduna, Bauchi, Yobe, Borno and Adamawa State has also contributed to the ethno-religious sentiments in the country. In the face of the multiple crises and conflicts that have arisen from these divisions in Nigeria today, the violence that followed has massively threatened to run the country aground, the ultimate nagging question is there any hope for a momentous breakthrough in the inter-group reconciliation in a divided society like Nigeria?

Socio-political conflicts as earlier stated arose as a result of the diverse ethnic groups and communities in most African States. The differences have led to religious and ethnic disagreement and incompatibility by these diverse ethnic groups. These situations were often exploited by African leaders for their selfish reasons, with unimaginable consequences on their population. The most notorious of such cases can also be seen in other parts of Africa particularly the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Kenya among others. In Rwanda there was full scale genocide in April 1994 during which up to a million Tutsis were massacred by the Hutus. In order to resolve the crisis, the Truth and Reconciliation Committee was set up to help restore peace in the Region. The activities of the International Court of Justice (ICC), the African Union (AU) and other Regional organizations like that Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Cooperation (SADC) have all contributed in one way or the other in managing and resolving socio-political conflicts in Africa.

In Nigeria, the major challenges confronting successive governments since independence are how to effectively manage ethno- religious and political conflicts in the country. This issue has in fact

constituted a policy dilemma at the Federal level even though some conflict management and peace building mechanism have been employed at the local levels where incidents of ethno-religious violence have occurred.

Egwu (2001) in considering the conflict management mechanism that have been applied to the Nigerian situation, the point again has to be raised that diversity and expression of identity do not constitute a problem. That both history and experience have shown that these diversities are well cultivated. They provided favour, strength and vitality to the non state project based on the establishment of multiple linkages and platforms for cross-cultural civic engagement. Corroborating the above view, Apam (2006) posited that the Nigerian ruling elites and policy makers have often accorded recognition to a pluralist framework. For instance, in recognition of the conundrum of ethnic and religious violence, successive regimes in the post independence period both military and civilian have responded through a series of measures in addition to the adoption of a Federal Constitutional Framework as well as a liberal attitude to religious growth and diversity. He went further to ask these important questions: how efficacious have these measures been? Have such measures either in isolation or in combination not exacerbated or ameliorated the problem? What has been the place of governance in these schemes? And what lessons can Nigeria learn from the experience of other nations?

Federalism and the federal character principle were some of the measures taken in response to the persistent ethno-religious and political conflicts during and after colonial rule in Nigeria. Since Nigeria achieved independence from the colonial masters in 1960, she has continued to struggle in her attempt to achieve political, social and economic development. One of the problems confronting the political, social and economic development of Nigeria is the structure of its political system that is why some writers have argued that federalism is a problem rather than a solution to the Nigerian question.

The structure of the political system evolved by the colonial master did not reflect the realities on the ground. This is because before the advent of colonialism the different ethnic groups that today constitute Nigeria were well organized groups with their own different political systems, culture, or custom and Regions. It is against this background that Ojo ( Akintola 2001:37) stated that: “you cannot continue to tie people together by force one day the people are bound to successfully resist it, be it 50 years or in a hundred year time and when that time come Nigeria will destabilize”.

The above view came as a result of the fact that colonialism merged erstwhile autonomous, semi-autonomous and independent societies together. This was clearly done in 1914 when the protectorates of Southern and Northern Nigeria were amalgamated. Okpaga (2011) also stated that between 1914 and 1954, several constitutional and structural arrangements were made. It could be recalled that within this period the country was essentially under a unitary form of government. Three constitutions: the Clifford, Richard and Mcpherson’s constitution were drawn up. Okpaga (2011) still went further to opine that the lopsidedness in the way the country was structured created on unequal relationship, an imbalance between the Region’s leading to demands for a federal arrangement in the country.

It is in view of the above fact that the Littleton constitution recommended a federal arrangement in 1954 which automatically made Nigeria a federal system. Since 1954 the Nigerian Federal

structure has undergone a lot of modification and restructuring under successive regimes particularly under the military where several States and local governments were created. One of the prominent features of the Nigerian federalism is the federal character principle. The term was first used by General Murtala Ramat Mohammed in his address to the opening session of the Constitution Drafting Committee on 18<sup>th</sup> October, 1975.

The main objectives of the federal character principle according to him was primarily to monitor recruitment of personnel both administrative and political in the public service of Nigeria so as to reflect the aspiration, culture, religion and tribal affiliations of the people that make up Nigeria so as to foster and promote unity in diversity. Recently, the issue of the federal character principles started receiving attention from both the executive, legislative and other stake holders in the Nigerian project. Leon (2012) posited that the main reason why the South west leaders met President Jonathan on 15<sup>th</sup> February 2012 at the presidential villa Abuja was on the issue of a national conference. According to the south west leaders, there has been a fundamental distortion to the Nigerian federalism. The deviation from the character principle has given rise to a lot of afflictions.

The South West raised the issue of marginalization of the Region in the Good Ebele Jonathan's administration. They argued against the paltry presence of the Yorubas in key position in the presidency and the upper cadres of career and political appointments including leadership of major federal parastatals most especially they felt let down by their neglect in appointments into key parastatals and ministries. In the words of Idriss (2012) the continual abuse of the principle had led to an uneven distribution of infrastructural development, marginalization, lopsidedness and imbalance in the composition of government at top levels in Ministries and the respective Agencies.


### **Conjectural political conflict model**

In his analysis of the causes of political conflict in societies, Shock (1996) captures the intricate social dynamics that combined and invariably breed political conflict in societies. Using the conjectural model of political conflict he advances how a combination of factors promotes conflict in societies. The model is relevant to the phenomenon under investigate (political violence) in Yobe state. The model illuminates a situation where conflict is inevitable because of the large array of factors that are deeply embedded in a plural society and the direct or indirect role of the state in fueling it. As such, it would help to examine the role political leaders have played in promoting as well as curbing political conflict in Yobe state.

It is important to add here that the conjectural model is different from the economic discontent theory and the political opportunity theory because of its stress on a synergy of factors that lead to political violence in societies. The conjectural model of political conflict states that social groups are agents that aggregate and articulate group interests mainly arising from competition for economic values, which invariably see into political and social interests. Again the model is distinct from the dominating theories of political conflict in the sense that "it stresses the combination of economic inequality and existing political structures, and maintains that political context moderates the relationship between economic inequality and political violence." (Shock 1996: 100).

From the above analysis, we can see that Shock argues that for a proper understanding of political conflict, there should be need to understand the multiplicity of factors rather than relying on a single factor, what role does the state play in contributing to political conflict? Shock answered this question when he argued that the state either mediates conflict among inter-group successfully or fuels it due to its weakness in providing public goods to a society. (Shock 1996:107).

Although, the central idea of the conjectural model focuses on group violence against the state, not essentially violence among inter-group, his model is quite useful to the understanding if the myriad of factors that lead to political violence in Yobe state, at least the following reasons: first, due to its weakness of the state as the chief social services provider and second, as a result of its covert or overt involvement in the politicization of inter-group violence, the state has become incapable of gaining the confidence of its subjects in providing security or management of conflict. And when it becomes intermingle with other equally intervening variables such as religion, ethnicity or social inequality and discrimination, it fans the embers of political violence. This is shown in the figure 2.1 below



**Source: Habu Mohammed, 2012, P.111**

**Fig 2.1: Conjectural Model of Political Conflict.**

Figure 2.1 shows the intricate chain of multifarious factors that promotes political violence in a society such as Nigeria. Conflict is rooted in the perceived threat, real or imaginary of the danger of domination by each antagonistic group. They also try to dominate other groups as well as struggle for some form of independence or compete for either equal participation in the distribution of power or contest for material gains.

**Data Presentation/Discussion**

The study was conducted among 510 respondents in the six selected local government areas of Yobe state. It is imperative to state here that a total of 510 questionnaires were distributed to the respondents in the selected local government areas and out of this, 357 respondents correctly filled and returned the questionnaire. It is therefore based on the 357 respondents that correctly filled and returned the questionnaire that the analysis was made. Below is the presentation and analysis of the data obtained from the survey area.

**Demographic presentation of data****Table 3.1 Sex distribution of respondents**

<b>Sex</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage (%)</b>
Male	249	69.7
Female	108	30.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>357</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source:** Sample survey, 2015.

Table 3.1 shows that 249 (69.7%) of the respondents were males while 108(30.3%) of the respondents were females. It is thus clear that the male respondents were more than the female respondents in the area surveyed. The reason for the differential is due to the fact that patriarchal norms largely account for women's restricted role in decision making, at household and community level in Yobe state. Thus, beyond being restricted by cultural expectations and ideologies regarding their activities, women are also disadvantaged by laws which constrain their movement at home and work place. This of course account for the reason why the male respondents were higher than the female respondents in the area surveyed.

Apart from the above reasons, data collected on the literacy status of the respondents was further disaggregated by sex and the researcher observed that women were less educated because their parents found no value in educating girls and rather, sent the boys to school. This in fact justifies why the percentage of the male respondents were higher than the female respondents in the surveyed area as shown in Table 3.2 below.


**Table 3.2: Demonstrates the literacy status of respondents**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage (%)</b>
Primary Education	74	20.7
Secondary Education	95	26.6
Tertiary Education	188	52.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>357</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source:** Sample survey, 2015.

Table 3.2 shows that 74 (20.7%) of the respondents surveyed had primary education, 95 (26.6%) of the respondents had secondary education and 188 (52.7%) had tertiary education. It is important to state here that education is important for progressive development, in that it helps individuals to make informal decisions that impact their general well-being. Thus determining the educational

status of the respondents is an important development because it influenced their level of awareness particularly on issues affecting their socio-economic development. From the table above, it can be seen that the level of education amongst the respondents surveyed in Yobe state was high. Looking at the overall percentage of respondents that had secondary and tertiary



education (79.3%) in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, one can therefore put forward that the male respondents are more educated than the female respondents because the female respondents have limited access to western education in the State.

**Table 3.3: Occupational distribution of respondents**

Variable	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Political elites	23	6.4
Civil servants	187	52.4
Traders	73	20.5
Students	51	14.2
Security agents	14	4.0
Community leaders	09	2.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>357</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source:** Sample survey, 2015.

Table 3.3 above depicts the occupational distribution of the respondents in the sampled area. As shown in the table above, 23 (6.4%) of the respondents were political elites, 187 (52.4%) were civil servants, 73(20.5%) of the sampled respondents were traders; 51(14.2%) were students; 14(4%) security agents while 09(2.5%) of the respondents were community leaders. It is clear from the empirical data in the table that civil servants had the highest response rate with a mean score of 187 respondents followed by traders, students, security agents and community leaders with the mean score of 73, 51, 14 and 09 respectively. Figure 4.1 below shows the occupational distribution of respondents in the study area.

**Figure 3.1:** Occupational distribution of respondents

Figure 3.1 above was drawn from the data in Table 3.3. The analysis of the data shows that civil servants, traders and students had the mean score of 187, 73 and 51 respectively as shown in the figure above.

**Table 3.4: Roles of political leaders in the promotion of conflicts**

Variable	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Marginalization of other groups in the allocation and distribution of resources	98	27.5
Creation of emirate councils to create social disharmony	84	23.5
Funding political thugs	86	24.1
Manipulation of election results	89	24.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>357</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source:** Sample survey, 2015.

Table 3.4 shows that 98(27.5%) of the respondents believed that political leaders promote conflicts in Yobe state through the marginalization of other groups in the allocation and distribution of resources of state. 84(23.5%) of the respondents were of the view that political leaders promote conflicts in the state through the creation of emirate councils to create social disharmony among the various ethnic groups in the state. 86(24.1%) of the respondents felt that political leaders promotes political violence through the funding of political thugs in the state while 89(24.9%) believed that political leaders promotes conflicts by manipulating election results. Table 4.6 shows the opinions of respondents on the roles political leaders played in the promotion of conflicts in Yobe state. In fact the pattern of respondents in the table above shows that 27.5% of the respondents believed that the main role political leaders play in the promotion of conflicts is the marginalization of other groups in the allocation and distribution of resources of the state.

**Table 3.5: Roles of political leaders in curbing conflicts**

Variable	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Dialoguing with aggrieved parties	66	18.5
Creating awareness on the danger of violence		
Providing funds to manage the crises	96	26.9
Have not shown commitment	88	26.6
	107	30.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>357</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source:** Sample survey, 2015.

From the table above, 107(30.0%) of the respondents were of the view that the government has not shown any commitment in curbing conflicts in the state. 96(26.9%) of the respondents believed that political leaders have created awareness on the danger of political violence in societies while 88(24.6%) respondents were of the view that government provided funds to manage the crises. Furthermore, 66(18.5%) of the respondents believed that political leaders play the role of dialogue with aggrieved parties in curbing conflicts in the state.

From the pattern of responses above, it can be seen that political leaders have not shown any commitment in curbing conflicts in Yobe state. The indication from the analysis on Table 3.5 concludes that political leaders have not played any role in curbing political violence in Yobe state.

**Confirmation of Research Proposition 1:** The study is guided by the research proposition which states that: Political violence is not an expression of systemic leadership failure. The analysis of this assumption is analyzed in Table 3.6 below.

**Table 3.6: Political violence and leadership failure**

Statement	Responses	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Political violence is not an expression of systemic leadership failure	Strongly agreed	113	31.7
	Agreed	97	27.2
	Undecided	40	11.2
	Disagreed	62	17.4
	Strongly disagreed	45	12.6
<b>Total</b>		<b>357</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source:** Sample survey, 2015.

The research assumption in Table 3.6 clearly states that political violence is not an expression of systemic leadership failure. In testing the assumption, 113(31.7%) of the respondents strongly agreed that political violence is not an expression of systemic leadership failure. 97(27.2%) of the respondents agreed with the assumption. However, 62(17.4%) and 45(12.6%) of the respondents disagreed and strongly disagreed respectively. It is also important to add that 40 (11.2%) of the respondents were undecided with the assumption that political violence is not an expression of systemic leadership failure.

With reference to the above Table, therefore, the opinions of the respondents that strongly agreed and agreed to the assumption is 58.9% indicating that the spate of political violence in Yobe state cannot be attributed to systemic leadership failure.

The pattern of responses above thus shows that the assumption can be accepted as valid that political violence in societies is not as a result of systemic leadership failure. Other factors such as poverty, unemployment and ethno-religious conflicts had been implicated in this study as the root cause or causes of political violence in Yobe state. Though, the issue of poor leadership has been a serious challenge confronting Yobe state and Nigeria generally, one cannot out rightly isolate systemic leadership failure as a major factor that promotes political violence in societies.

## CONCLUSION

It is evident from the study that political violence has impacted on the socio-economic development of Yobe state. As found in the study, political violence has dragged affected victims into a situation of poverty. It has created an increase in the level of inequality and suffering of the marginalized areas of the state. Political violence has plunged the Yobe population, including

children and youth into an environment of uncertainty, fear and insecurity as seen in the number of children and youth that have been killed in the state.

Political violence has also combined with the prevailing insecurity in the state to increase population displacement, create acute food insecurity and disrupted livelihoods in the state. Political violence has also produced groups that focus on violence particularly the Jama'atu Atilis sunnah Liddawati wal Jihad (Boko Haram) whose activities have threatened the peace and security of the state and Nigeria generally. Yobe state is in fact polarized along ethnic fault lines as seen in the analysis from the empirical data obtained in the selected local government areas of Yobe state. This has provoked in the populace a sense of hopelessness and Cognitive disconnect that is highly damaging to their mental health.

It is therefore clear that the above situation is worrisome, somber and negative as it has serious implication on the socio-economic development of Yobe State in particular and Nigeria generally.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

In view of the findings of this study the following recommendations are made:

1. In Yobe state, political violence arose as a result of the role political leaders' play in promoting conflict in the state. Political elites are split along lines of religion and ethnicity. This has resulted in ethnic rivalry, suspicion and hostility among the leaders. Political leaders should therefore be bold and have an articulate leadership style that would effectively manage and prevent conflict in the state.
2. The government should undertake skills training for the youth in order to equip them with alternate livelihoods strategies. Generate adequate jobs in the rural areas to provide employment for the youth and adults so as to provide income and curb youth involvement in militant activities in the state.
3. To promote ethno-religious harmony in Yobe state, there should be a ban on all forms of incitements as well as inflammatory and provocative speeches from religious as well as political leaders which can cause ethno-religious disharmony in the state. Intensive Peace Education should be vigorously pursued in the area at both formal in informal level. The teaching of peace education at formal level especially in schools and colleges and other higher institutions through subjects like, social studies, religious studies, civic education, peace and conflict studies etc. is highly commended and should be intensified upon by allocating more time to the subjects as well as enriching their curricula with peace education related concepts. Incorporating peace education in the curricula of *Almajiri* schools or *Tsangaya* across the states in the zone should be encouraged and promoted by the government through the relevant Ministries, Agencies and Departments.

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