THE PALESTINIAN DILEMMA "PART TWO":

HISTORICAL TUTELAGE…..OR…..POLITICAL GUARDIANSHIP!

THE PALESTINIAN ATTITUDE TOWARD NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY TILL 1967!

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ABSTRACT: *This paper examines an alternate version of the Palestinian dilemma historically rooted in their selves, and over the ages and times got to be as a main component and the hallmark of their culture and a chronic flaw alike; existence under historical tutelage and political guardianship. Shockingly, the Palestinians prepared - according to their history - to live under the control and governance of their conquerors or victors, in addition to experience the sense of oppressed colonized people under the weight of colonizers. The present examination attempts to investigate the Palestinian dilemma; people under historical tutelage and political guardianship until 1967, and to focus on the notions of the nation, nationalism and national sovereignty. Another aim is exploring Palestine, a land without any national sovereignty and the Palestinian attitude toward it until 1967, alongside nationalism and the Palestinian national movement. This led to emergence, reformation, and said implications until 1967. The analyst infers that the most exceedingly awful chronicled problem, for any individuals, that they habituated to live under tutelage and political guardianship, as this paper demonstrated concerning the Palestinians. Both Palestinian and Arab neighboring pioneers never had any accurate patterns or disposition to secure an independent state in Palestine from the fall of Ottoman Empire until UN allotment was arranged in 1947, or even during and after the 1948 war. Additionally, the Palestinian national movement was unable to lead its people to national sovereignty in their territory in 1967!*

KEYWORDS: Palestinian Dilemma, Tutelage, Guardianship, Nationalism, Sovereignty.

THE PALESTINIAN DILEMMA: PEOPLE UNDER "HISTORICAL TUTELAGE" AND "POLITICAL GUARDIANSHIP" TILL 1967!

The researcher debates in this part the Palestinian endless and chronic "dilemma", which may describe by "historical tutelage and political guardianship" of (anonymous/unrecognized) people in the sacred (southern Syria) region. By all odds, the Palestinians and Arabs have always disregarded this obvious truth - they ignore the reality, in light of the fact that they lack the capability or in experience aversion to face the actual facts on the ground. Additionally, they prefer to live in myths, illusion, mirage, false imaginations or soil mythology. Historically, they have never lived in an independent state in any particular time or verifiable stage! Briefly stated, when precisely have the Palestinians lived under the rule of their national leadership and

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sovereignty? Additionally, in which era have they established their own political entity in their own particular area?

At the same context, the Arabs-Palestinians were never concerned about legitimately reviewing their own particular history to gain understanding of their historical quandary from the fall of the Ottoman Empire work the Six-Days War in1967. With a simple overview they would uncover, effortlessly, the true state of affairs; that the Palestinians have lived from ancient times to the present under two conditions, namely "historical tutelage" and "political guardianship".

It appears that Arabs-Palestinians still live in a hallucination of the past due to human progress in Islam age, wherever it was spread the Arabian Gulf States, Iraq, Egypt, north of Africa, India, or numerous towns in Spain. It must be remembered the extent to which all Arab nations existed under recorded "tutelage" of occupation, expansionism, and "political guardianship" of Great Powers! As a case in point in the present day, the Mandate framework was basically provincial run in another pretense, and was seen as being what is indicated provincially. The principle sympathy towards European forces was to focus their abroad authoritative reaches in concurrence with United States, which did not join the League of Nations when it was established in 1919. The tutelage inferred in orders was couched in a semi-religious dialect of obligation, known as the "White Man's Burden." Under the new administration of worldwide law, the vanquished domains were established as a "Holy Trust of Civilization" under the guardianship or tutelage of western forces. Essentially, in Article 22, the League of Nations communicated that certain groups once part of the Turkish Empire have arrived at a state of improvement in which their presence as autonomous countries could be temporarily distinguished, subject to the rendering of managerial exhortation and support until such time as they would have the ability to gain independence. The wishes of these groups must be primary in the obligatory choices (Kramer, 2011).

Together with this, the Bible presents an alternate picture of occupation of Palestine that makes it clear that it was a long process. At some point, the Israelites people possessed Palestine. Then again, the Israelite position in Palestine was far more unpredictable than a review of the schematized account of Joshua may lead one to assume. It may be as viewed as evident that it was significantly more than a generally peaceful penetration of semi-nomadic tribes, as the Bible describes genuine warfare and rough enslavement (Bright, 1976).

Also, the Greeks prevailed over the territory three centuries prior to the time of the Christian Jesus, and additionally the Jews distinguished an autonomous Judea that subsisted under the Roman victors which came to fruition fifty years after the fact. In addition, Tibawi (1977) clarified the circumstances marginally in other route. He saw that the Ottoman Turks took the nation in AD 1516 and remained its suzerain overlord until the end of the First World War. Furthermore, history changed with Napoleon in 1799; he attacked Palestine and Syria and was rebuffed by the Turks. After that, Ibrahim Pasha (the son of Muhammad Ail) was involved in Palestine in 1831-1840. Later on, Turkey recovered Palestine from Egypt in 1840 (Kattan, 2009).

Indeed, this study does convey the same sentiment and backings of the assentation that the Ottoman Turks may be called the 'Romans' of the Muslim world. Initiating a long-cycle perspective as a top priority, the improvement states alongside the social, military and political structures hatch them the similitude around the Ottomans and additionally the Romans that

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dependent upon the relentless decline and extreme misfortune of a forcing focus. Both the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East and also the sacred Roman Empire in medieval and in addition untimely contemporary Europe mind boggling and supported. Keeping and proceeding the control over shifted populaces, multifaceted accumulations of rulers, satraps, vassals, and in addition gigantic landmasses estranged into gradually assuaging however never altered managerial sections. For the Emirs, Sheikhs, and Walis of the Arab world, the consistent misfortune of the Ottoman Empire was relating to the departure of the Holy Roman Empire for the masters, dukes, rulers, and sovereigns of Europe. In both cases, authorization of state to control over wide social alongside the geographic zones, the Muslim Middle East and Christian Europe was vacant and set back with separate yet close-by viable cases to self-sufficiency over small areas for neighborhood-favored individuals (Lustick, 1997).

The Palestinians were not on record as having a dissimilar national character for more than two centuries in backwardness and also split destitution. Rather, they were viewed by the Turks as Ottoman residents living in either the Jerusalem or Damascus locale of the Empire. On the other hand, Palestine might not have existed figured into Ottoman consideration, yet the possibility of Palestine with its own history and society did exist. The topographical name of area Palestine to some degree was undecided before 1918. Truth be told, there was no directorial territory of that name in the Ottoman Empire, despite the fact it was to end up as Palestine under the British standard (Strawson, 2010). More verifiably, after 1917, Palestine was attacked and occupied by the British under Field Marshal General Allenby. Hence, the political foundation of European and additionally Middle Eastern state framework development involves not justice but the absolute most critical elucidation for the advanced nonappearance of a Middle Eastern force (Lustick, 1997).

However, with the downfall of the Ottoman Empire, and the ensuing European tenet the area of Greater Syria was partitioned, with Britain picking up suzerainty over the region of Palestine. After World War II, the push for pilgrim freedom expanded and numerous groups battled for and obtained autonomy. This held true for Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, but not for Palestine. Palestine never picked up autonomy, which caused numerous individuals to claim that the national personality was manufactured. In reality, Palestine as a present day state has never existed. In spite of this, during the twentieth century, patriotic emotions developed in the region. The entirety of the Levant before 1917 was possessed by the Ottoman Empire. Those individuals who existed in these zones were isolated into managerial units ruled from the more urbanized territories. In spite of the fact that Palestine had reliably been a unique region inside the area of Greater Syria, it was not distinguished as financially significant enough to warrant its own particular territory (Penziner, 2004). In this respect, the researcher concurs with Hertz (2009) when he contended that:

> *"There has never been a Sovereign Arab State in Palestine: The artificiality of a Palestinian identity is reflected in the attitudes and actions of neighboring Arab nations who never established a Palestinian state. It also is expressed in the utterances and loyalties of so-called Palestinians."*

The Arab tenants viewed Palestine as their home - that much must be conceded. Yet in the British view, this did not imply that they had genuine political cases to Palestine similar to those

of the Jewish individuals with its extraordinary custom, a convention essential to western Christian society. Master Balfour expressed this plainly enough when asked to clear up for what reason the rule of determination toward oneself ought not to make a difference to Palestine and its Arab tenants. In a letter to the British leaders dated February 19, 1919, he stated:

> "The weak point of our position of course is that in the case of Palestine we deliberately and rightly decline to accept principle of self-determination. If the present inhabitants were consulted they would unquestionably give an anti-Jewish verdict. Our justification for our policy is that we regard Palestine as being absolutely exceptional; that we consider the question of the Jews outside Palestine as one of the world importance and that we conceive the Jews to have an historic claim to a home in their ancient land; provided that home can be given them without either dispossessing or oppressing the present inhabitants……The Mandate shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home, as laid down in the preamble and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion." (Kramer; 2011).

Amazingly and unexpectedly, after the war in 1948, Jordan's 'top dog' Abdullah supported the Arabs to live in the Palestinian West Bank and also took ownership of the nation to his kingdom. King Abdullah in Amman was enthusiastic to have an expansive segment of Palestine under his control, as stated by Pappe (2004). On the other hand, Egypt took the Gaza strip and for the following 18 years denied Palestinians any social liberties. It in no way, shape or form allowed the leaders of Jordan or Egypt to make a state for the homeless Palestinians (Stern, 2011). It was "the Jews", not the "Arabs" who had succeeded more than once in thwarting Arab arrangements to gain official recognition for a political figure speaking to their interests and seeing them acknowledged in London, Paris, Geneva, or New York.

According to all the above-mentioned facts, the Palestinians enjoyed living as colonizers, mercenaries, and (sometimes) slaves, in addition to playing the role of the defeated, oppressed or victims of injustice. In any case, the Palestinians from ancient to modern times never had any motivation to live in an independent state; moreover, the absence of a national attitude or goal toward establishing their national state remained the same until 1967.

THE NOTION OF THE NATION, NATIONALISM AND NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY

Numerous historians have characterized a 'nation' as a human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members. The nation is also defined as having historical land, myths and stories, as well as a similar communal culture and similar customs and laws (Smith, 1999). Guibernau (2004) stated that the nation is comprised of individuals forming a community or a society, allocating a culture that is common, visibly attached to a demarcated land, possessing the same ancient history and future project and that make them able to claim to

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rule it. However, Walker (2006) defined the nation as an imagined political community which is expected to exercise some degree of political self-determination. On the other hand, the "state" refers to 'a human community that effectivly monopolize the legitimate use of physical force within a fixed territory', although practically all states cannot acomplish this successfully; few of them have not even tried to accomplish it. In addition, the nation-state defined by the creation of the state that has monopoly kind of legitimacy, claim and used to force inside the demarcated land and wanted to unite the people and nation on the subject to govern it and by means of cultural homogenization. For a nation and people without a homeland or country, those belonging to territorial societies have their own identity and dream for self-determination and autonomy to live and rule inside the boundaries of one or more countries with which they generally do not identify (Guibernau, 2004).

It may be that nations, and more credibly nationalism, are certainly a contemporary phenomena, but this is not because of nationalism in contemporary way but in the sense that it accepts and admits the reason as a lodestone. In contrast nationalism is as much anti- enlightenment philosphy entrenched in 19th-century idealism as it is a child of cause and progressive loyalty. Why, then, must we take for granted that faith-based ideologies are any more out of date as rally of aggression that romantic ethno-nationalism? Furthermore, though we believe that an ordinary language as well as ethnicity is favorable to socioeconomic transformation, it is far from obvious that religion is more effectual as a foundation for nationhood than language, predominantly given the nature of the state limits left at the back by colonialism. Why, for instance, should we take for granted Arab nationalism, with Arabic as the marker of the limitations of the political community (Walker; 2006)?

In modern history, the nationalism can be defined as a political belief that demands that the component of governance and the nation in harmony. It restores the standard of dynastic sovereignty on which agrarian empires were supported. While the component of governance is generally unspoken to be the sovereign condition; the nation is anticipated as a community of common derivation as well as shared historical destiny. On the other hand, others have argued that the nationalism 'strong' type of ethnic feeling demands the formation and control of a state, or else requires that subjects identity to a political test. For instance, the Palestinian ethnicity is founded in tradition, and up until now nationalism has grown from early in the twentieth century, therefore producing an ethnic national identity. Despite this, nationalism has hardly ever been connected to the outbreak of political aggression in the current literature on ethnic disagreement and civil war (Cederrman, Wimmer, & Min, 2010).

Thus, the specialist has depended claim that past contradiction control the likelihood of current difference through three frameworks. To begin with, ethno-nationalist campaigners try to honor their gathering's history through stories that speak to their own particular triumph and trademark obligation regarding military misfortunes to backstabbers, feeble pioneers, or an unfeeling enemy. This means that pioneers may not expose their risk examinations and additionally may participate in fights when the chances of winning have not improved. At that point, the ensuing ethno nationalist opposes have tackled an assortment of structures, as well as uniqueness in abundance of permission to state power around the pioneers of restricting ethnic groups, withdrawal from reachable states to the foundation an inventive state lined for the sake of a

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demanding ethnic gathering, or to unite an alternate state restricted by ethnic groups. And in addition resistance around new states over shifted locale colonized by parts of their singular ethnic center aggregations. So, the probability of ethno-nationalist differences increases with the ethnic assembly's virtual demographic size (Cederrman, Wimmer, & Min, 2010).

As stated above, the researcher concurs somewhat with Stern (2011), as he noted that Palestinians were never distinguished as having any notable national character. Rather, they were viewed by the Turks as Ottoman natives living in either the Jerusalem or Damascus locale of the domain. Moreover, it is said that rather than a country, Palestine is a topographical range. Before the establishment of Israel, parts of two national unities – Palestinian Jews alongside Palestinian Arabs – were involved in the Mandate Palestine. In the 1960s, Palestine history took an unnatural shape because of the actions of the PLO. The association wanted to remove Jews from their country. This portrayed Palestinian individuals as tricksters and trespassers in worldwide history. The object was to establish the basis for building an alternate Arab state at the expense of the Jews – whom Arabs considered outsiders and an unlawful political unit in the Middle East (Hertz, 2009).

However, patriotism/nationalism has been distinguished as a contemporary ideological development. In addition, it is characterized as an ideological development for fulfilling and maintaining solidarity and self-rule of social assemblies some of whose parts accept it to include a real or potential country/nation (Smith, 1999). In this regard, Hertz (2009) acknowledged that Palestinian nationality is characterized by its resistance to Zionism; notwithstanding, it was not national goals. Palestinians have been characterized by their imperviousness to Jewish patriotism and also the yearning to trample it out, not a desire for their own particular state. Nearby dedicated sentiments are handled only when a non – Islamic unit assumes responsibility – for instance, after Israel finished the 1967 Six-Day War. It dissipates under Arab rule, regardless of how inaccessible or oppressive such rule may be.

PALESTINE; THE LAND WITHOUT ANY NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY TILL 1967

Actually, sovereignty is challenged by vacant states which view the endurance of defensive sovereignty as vital to worldwide regulation along with many ethnic groups that see states as an obstruction to their individual assert to sovereignty (Richmond, 2002). Geo-politically, as it rehashed by all authors that Palestine was not even acknowledged a dissimilar region of the Ottoman Empire. It was a piece of the regions of Syria - more specifically, the south of Syria - and to be sure the Palestinians viewed themselves as a major part of southern Syria. The secular concept of the nation, and its expression in a modern state, was basically alien to Arab people groups. The overall idea was more that of the "Arab Nation" than that of say, the Palestinian, Iraqi, or Syrian nation and state. So, in this respect Ben-Ami (2005), a present-day history specialist, contended that:

> *"A clearly defined national consciousness did not exist among the Palestinian Arabs at the time of the arrival of the first Zionist settlers in Palestine. The local Arab population had of course an urban component, but it mostly consists of fellahin, peasants who*

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toiled on the land of absence landlords. Tribal and local loyalties more than a defined national identity with a clear notion of its territorial horizons characterized the Palestinian population that the first Zionist pioneers encountered."

In the same context, Hertz (2007) argued that:

"... But Palestine was different from the other ex-Turkish provinces. It was, indeed, unique both as the Holy Land of three world-religions and as the old historic homeland of the Jews. The Arabs had lived in it for centuries, but they had long ceased to rule it, and in view of its peculiar character they could not now claim to possess it in the same way as they could claim possession of Syria or Iraq."

According to Hertz (2009), through 2,000 years, Palestine has never established a state. Actually, it has never had a state that is in some way or another disengaged from other Arabs. This circumstance has essentially been the same for 1,300 years of Muslim mastery in Palestine beneath Arab and additionally Ottoman principles. Essentially, Palestine was a singular geographic name. In this perspective, it is not surprising that in ebb and flow times the name "Palestine" or "Palestinian" was viable as a modifier to all people of the area, including the Mediterranean Sea and in addition the Jordan River, in which the Palestine Jews and Arabs were recognized partners. In this respect, Kramer (2011) argued that:

"Palestine can never be regarded as a country on the name on the same footing as the other Arab countries. You cannot ignore all history and tradition in the matter. You cannot ignore the fact that this is the cradle of two of the great religions of the world. It is a sacred land to the Jews and the Christians; and the future of Palestine cannot possibly be left to be determined by the temporary impressions and feelings of the Arab majority in the country of the present day".

After World War II, the push for lofty freedom was enhanced and various zones wrestled sovereignty. This was valid for Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, not for Palestine. Palestine had not in the slightest bit attained autonomy, which caused numerous individuals to state that the national character development was false. For these reasons, the Palestinian uniqueness and character were continuously moved from outside their primary area (Penziner, 2004). In this regard Hertz (2009) expressed that:

"There has never been a Sovereign Arab State in Palestine: The artificiality of a Palestinian identity is reflected in the attitudes and actions of neighboring Arab nations who never established a Palestinian state. It also is expressed in the utterances and loyalties of so-called Palestinians."

In one word, the Palestinian dilemma was well known likewise to the British, as showed by the Peel Report in July 1937:

"A national self-government could not be established in Palestine as long as it would be used to frustrate the purpose of the Balfour Declaration. Even so, the crux was plain enough to Arab eyes. It was the Balfour Declaration and its embodiment in the draft Mandate and nothing else which seemingly prevented their attaining a similar measure

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of independence to that which other Arab communities already enjoyed. And their reaction to this crux was logical." (Kramer; 2011).

By differentiation, Arabs in nearby states, who had 99.9 percent of Middle East land, have never recorded a Palestinian state. They often considered Palestine and also its populated areas part of the great "Arab Nation" Certainly, Palestine was a vital a piece of Greater Syria - Suriyya al-Kubra – a chronicled record of both side of the Jordan River. Regarding this matter, Hertz (2009) stated that:

"The Arabs never established a Palestinian state when the UN offered a partition plan in 1947 to establish "an Arab and a Jewish state". Nor did the Arabs recognize or establish a Palestinian state during the two decades prior to the Six-Day War when the West Bank was under Jordanian control and the Gaza Strip was under Egyptian control; nor did the Palestinians clamor for autonomy or independence during those years under Jordanian and Egyptian rule."

NATIONALISM AND THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT: EMERGENCE, REFORMING, AND ITS IMPLICATION UNTIL 1967

Various history specialists have stated that Arabs existing in Palestine "hated" outsiders, particularly Jewish pioneers, as a result of the opportunities they reveled in under the capitulations and the way that most Jews failed to offer any information in the local Arabic dialect. Besides, it was throughout that year of the first Aliyah (1882) that the Ottoman courts began rebuilding the Levantine territories. By rebuilding, the differentiate regions of Jerusalem, Galilee, Hebron and Haifa all were distinguished as Palestine. In aggregate, both Palestine and Lebanon were recognized as smaller parts of a Greater Syria. Emulating the Ottoman rebuilding, however, Palestine had a more notable character and personality (Ross, 2009).

Despite the fact that Palestine was the special case here - dissimilar to Syria (counting Lebanon) and Iraq - it was indeed not treated as a mandate; subsequent to British understanding, it was liable to unique regulations. Accordingly, Palestine from the beginning was given a unique status that inferred from the Jewish question, all the more extraordinarily from Zionist cases to national acknowledgment toward oneself. On a social basis, the Palestinian group had four classes, namely the aristocratic wealthy, effendis "educated", peasant "Fellahins", and Bedouins. Regardless, the Arab "effendi" represented no social challenge for the British. This was more correct for the Arab worker and Bedouin (Kramer; 2011).

Outcome of the First World War, the new order took shape in a region where three influences had been dominant: the Islamic civilization, the Arabic language and Ottoman political allegiance. As British and French administrators set about remapping the Middle East, they had to contend with the rising Arab nationalist movement. The British and French, in refashioning the region, were aware nonetheless that Palestine was richly endowed by nationalist sentiment of both Jews and Arabs. Britain in particular played a pivotal role in forming the contemporary Middle East. However, it had become a sponsor of the Arab nationalism and Zionism by the early 1920s, with both strategic and financial support for the Arab Revolt. All of this actually

began in 1916. Just a year later, in 1917, public expression of sympathy for Zionists was expressed in the Balfour Declaration.

In this respect, social scientists recognize that there is no fixed definition of the nation or of nationalism, yet acknowledge that this sensation exists. Penziner (2004) stated that a nation exists when a critical number of individuals in a group see themselves as to structure a country, or act as though they structured one. Besides, the Arab-Palestinian nationalism is characterized as an up-to-date development to establish the Arabic dialect for support of nationality and to make an Arab nation with a genuine government.

One stage at the emerge and reforming of national movement, the General Islamic Congress in Jerusalem provided a sample of the communication of the two countenances of nationalism, and of social character as well. Gathered from 7 through 17 December, 1931, the Congress was formed by around 150 agents from everywhere throughout the Islamic world. The Congress accentuate its imperativeness for marshaling Pan-Islamic assumption to test supreme control and Zionism, and they detail the discussion the Congress incited over the issue of the re-station of the caliphate. Assuming that there is any focus at which political Islam all things considered appears to be unequivocally to dominate nationalism, it would unquestionably be the time of the Islamic Congress. What has been overlooked is the reaction of Arab nationalist activists, who saw the Congress as a lacking a method to resist settler powers and the Zionist movement, and who even criticized the Congress, depicting it as a method of encouraging imperial domination. The weight of the patriots was felt during and after the Congress, affecting its processes and undercutting its capability to persist as an establishment. It may securely be contended that during the congress, the rising Arab nationalist acquaintanceships in Palestine gave a much stronger test to British approaches and Zionist state building than did the Congress and the organizations that it created (Matthews, 2003).

Whether Arab patriotism, especially Palestinian patriotism, is a phony twentieth-century construct or not, the reality remains that numerous Arabs see themselves as constituting national assemblies. As an assembly, Palestinians characterize themselves by this national alliance and see themselves as different from Lebanese, Syrians, or Egyptians, as might be seen in the rationalistic contrasts in their spoken dialect. In any case, inside the Levant, likenesses between these national personalities were better maintained because of a common history, dialect and society. Then, supporters of Palestinian assimilation into the more outstanding Levantine Arab populace used these similarities as a justification for doing so. Notwithstanding, the analyst is set to open deliberation this area through two primary focuses as follows below.

THE EMERGENCE AND REFORMING OF PALESTINIAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT UNTIL 1967

The researcher has a tendency to characterize nationalism as a particularly solid type of ethnic feeling that demands the creation or control of a state or overall subject's personality to a political test. Palestinian ethnicity is situated in convention, yet nationalism has expanded quickly during the twentieth century, in this manner establishing an ethnic-national personality.

However, the Israeli-Palestinian clash is currently more than a century old. Its sources call back to the birth of political Zionism at the finish of the nineteenth century. The twentieth century carried waves of Jewish immigrants who bought land, constructed settlements and social establishments, and plainly indicated their aim to build a Jewish country and eventually a Jewish state in Palestine. The developing Jewish region was soon recognized as a danger by the Arab populace of the area, which was itself impacted by the improvement of Arab patriotism and the development of a particularly Palestinian character/identity (Kelman, 2005).

The Palestinian national movement started in the 1920's by characterizing the land of Palestine. The land asserted by Palestinian patriots was flanked by the Jordan River to the East, the Mediterranean Sea to the West, and the Negev desert to the South. These borders followed the borders established by the British Mandate as no clearly defined state of Palestine had previously existed. Before British rule, the Ottoman Empire had split Palestine into sub-districts, each ruled separately from afar. During the Ottoman Empire, the people of the region may have referred to themselves as Palestinian, but the state itself was not a unified political entity. In response to the Balfour declaration and the Zionist movement, educated Palestinian elites demanded that Palestine become an independent sovereign Arab state. This movement rejected the idea of sharing Palestine with Jews, either demographically or geographically. It is not that the Palestinian movement was necessarily anti-Semitic, but that Zionism was seen as a dangerous and manipulative force. Therefore, in a position ironically similar to that of the Jewish immigrants, the Palestinians felt that their fight against Zionism was a fight for survival. The next decade saw a series of bloody clashes between Jews and Palestinians as the two nationalist movements began to collide (Taylor-Weiner; 2009).

With additional exactness, the land as a huge drive for the feeling of nationalism, the land possession was relevant not only economically, as well as socially and politically too. While respect, eminence, and power could be determined from differing criteria and individual qualities, they were fundamentally established on landed property. Nationalist myths raising the area and those working it to the precise embodiment of Palestinian personality expanded its typical quality. For Jews and Arabs, an advanced, comparative sort of blood-and-soil mythology, communicated in song and dance and poetry. This is particularly pertinent to the historical backdrop of Palestine, as well as the Palestinian imperviousness to Zionism and British occupation transformed into an Arab-Palestinian national movement (Kramer; 2011).

One can thus ask, under what circumstances did Palestinian activists decide to express their political personality regarding nationalism? This study concurs with numerous researchers accept that Palestinian identity started in the 1930s with the disillusionment of the Palestinians with the Arab administration's unwillingness to help them battle off outside standard. By the 1930s, the Palestinians stopped calling themselves "Southern Syrians" and started to see themselves as a separate state. This inclination was demonstrated in the Arab Riots of 1936-39; the cementing of their characterization came when other Arab pioneers interceded when outside forces interfered to end the uprising. This is not to say that the creation of Palestinian identity was selfless. On the other hand, Ross (2009) stated that:

"The modern Palestinian identity predated the British mandate. Beginning in 1882, Palestine became the future cite for two conflicting movements. It was during this year that the first Jewish Aliyah began. Based on the arrival of European Jews, more and more Arabs became weary of the growing Jewish presence in Palestine. According to Morris, the Arabs living in Palestine viewed the Jewish settlers as "strange and alien—people whose manner and actions bespoke subversion."

Actually, the beginning stage of improving the Palestinian national movement was that the British effect on the urban training framework was a first nearly as per the longs for the youthful patriots. The British made Arabic the official dialect, along these lines helping a further definition of a national identity. They permitted secularism to supersede religious instruction, and were viewed by the national first class as serving to provoke national partisan affiliations (Pappe, 2004).

In a saying, Palestinian nationality is characterized by its resistance to Zionism, and not its national goals. What unites Palestinians has been their resistance to Jewish nationalism and the craving to stamp it out, not a desire for their own state. Energetic sentiments are generated only when a non-Islamic element assumes responsibility, such as when Israel finished the 1967 Six-Day War. It dissipates under Arab rule, regardless of how removed or authoritarian. In addition, the Palestinian character/identity did not exist until a contradicting power made it so - essentially Zionism. Restriction to a non-Muslim nationalism on what neighborhood Arabs, and the whole Arab world, view as their own particular turf was the main articulation of "Palestinian peoplehood". So, the analyst agrees Ben-Ami (2005), as he stated that:

'The Palestinian nationalism would emerge and crystallize in the first two decades of the century as a defensive response to the Zionist arrival. It Just as Jewish modern nationalism was the response of the Jews to the threat posed by the Europeans to their distinct identity, so Palestinian nationalism can be largely seen as the collective reaction of the local Arabs to a Zionist enterprise that threatened their natural rights in Palestine. In one word, - according to "Zionism and Palestinian nationalism developed as twin movements, each feeding and nurturing the other".

At any case, the nationalism defined as a strong ligament between individuals sharing the common history, an interpretation of the present, and a vision for the future. People in different walks of life imagined or invented themselves and the reality around them in a similar way. As such they were able to become a political identity. In this regard, Ilan Pappe (2004) considers that:

"In Palestine 1918-20, a new force was emerging: nationalism. It was disseminated by the religious notables, who quickly became nationalist notables. In this regard, the Palestinians involved in previous lifestyle as Ottoman nobility, and had a blurred notion of what nationalism demanded in terms of solidarity and commitment. In addition to, the new interpretation of life as a national experience was formulated within the familiar clannish circles of Palestine's principal towns. However there were three different national groups in Palestine: the Christian-Muslim Association

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expanding its branches, while other two national clubs with opposing views enlivened the political scene; al-Nadi al-Arabi and al-Muntada al-Arabi, an Arab club and a literary club respectively."

Even though despite what might be expected, Hertz (2009) acknowledges that until the 1967 Six-Day War made it practical for Arabs to make a Palestinian peoplehood, local Arabs simply considered themselves part of the 'Southern Syrians.' Furthermore he contends that;

"Palestine is a Geographical Area, Not a Nationality: the Arabs invented a special national entity in the 1960s called the Palestinians, specifically for political gain. In fact, until the 1960s, most Arabs in Palestine preferred to identify themselves merely as "part" of the "Great Arab Nation" or "citizens" of "Southern Syria."

At the same pattern, the analyst orchestrates with recognizing that, by the 1967 War, the Palestinians found themselves and their identity as Palestinians, both individually and collectively. They then turned to methods by which they both safeguarded and developed this character. However Penziner (2004) emphasized that despite of the fact that the Palestinians saw themselves as a gathering of individuals, they did not see themselves as a country. At that point, he also stated that:

"After 1967 Palestinians no longer depended solely on Cairo, Beirut or Damascus for a definition of what was Arab and, in particular, what was Palestinian. Instead they rediscovered their own folktales, began writing in earnest their own poetry and short stories, began dancing the national "dabkeh" and sewing the traditional multi-coloured embroidery. They began to write the history of the nation from their experience, essentially contradicting the Zionist and pro-Zionist versions of events in the Middle East".

Many scholars such as Hertz (2009) have stated that the Arab intrusion of Palestine was not a means for attaining a free Palestine, but instead the consequence of an absence of agreement from the Arab states with respect to such autonomy, summed up singular antiquarian. Followers of a disconnected Palestinian uniqueness were a voiceless part of the West Bank and Gaza for 19 years of Jordanian and Egyptian rule. Israel took control from the Jordanians and in addition the Egyptians in 1967. Startlingly, Palestinian nationhood came to be warranted – and 21 other Arab states agreed with it. Arab development on the West Bank, alongside Gaza experiences, formed significant public divisions due to distinctive geographic, historical, sociological and family differences. Palestinians mutually is a warily cultivate hatred of Israel alongside the refusal of Jewish country hood. Well before the 1967 choice to fabricate imaginative Arab individuals called "Palestinians" when the statement "Palestinian" was associated with Jewish exercises.

On the other hand, in 1937, Awni Abdul-Hadi, a local Arab leader, claimed before the Peel Commission, a British exploratory body that "There is no such country as Palestine! Palestine is a term the Zionists invented! There is no Palestine in the Bible. Our country was for centuries, part of Syria." In the same regard, the Arab higher committee reconstituted itself as the political body speaking for Palestinian Arabs. Consequently, the analyst acknowledges that as demonstrated by Palestinian history, the status of subordination and political guardianship of the Palestinians under the different rulers, realms, and victors (counting Egyptian and Jordanian rule)

meant that the Palestinians had no sense of any type of national sovereignty or political independence.

At all events, the analyst alert red spot here, by the more critical inquiry; why was an Arab delegate government not created in Palestine, either in 1948 or the following 19 years of Arab tenancy? Perhaps different Arab groups used the Palestinian cause as a rallying or revitalizing point that might progress the concept that the territory was up for grabs. Alternately, this may be due to the fact that Arab intrusion of Palestine was not a method for accomplishing an autonomous Palestine, but instead the aftereffect of an absence of agreement from the Arab states with respect to such autonomy. From a different perspective, Kattan's argued that (2009):

> *"The fact that the Palestinians have still not been given an opportunity of creating a state of their own – despite the numerous pledges, promises and unilateral declaration made over so many years – makes their case stand out from other contemporary self-determination claims and justifies the number of UN resolution and heightened interest in resolving this dispute by that organization".*

In short, the Palestinian individuals needed genuine distinguished, both in the universal group and in the place where there is Palestine. This started to change in the late 1950's, the point at which a youthful Palestinian pioneer, Yasser Arafat, started the Palestinian National Liberation Movement, reputed to be Fatah. Arafat roused the Palestinians with dreams of immediate action Israel and autonomy from other Arab governments. The Six-Day War in 1967 had essential contributions to the developing Palestinian Liberation Movement. Israel was then the immediate occupier of a large number of Palestinians who lived in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This allowed Arafat a number of selected contenders and financers. Therefore, after the Six-Day War Yasser, Arafat and the Fatah political gathering formally became the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which was the Palestinian pseudo-government working from Jordan (Taylor-Weiner, 2009).

THE IMPLICATION OF NATIONAL MOVEMENT IN THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE TILL 1967

In fact, unlike similar movements in Lebanon and Syria; the national movement in Palestine was slower to develop, primarily because of the political squabbling of local notables. Nonetheless, Palestine witnessed a growing national push for unity against the Jewish settlers and Ottoman administration. In turn, visions of a "Greater Syria' were the driving force behind Arab nationalism during the early half of the twentieth century.

While the Jewish settlers sought predominance in Palestine, the Palestinian Arabs sought to maintain the Muslim character of the region. What emerged from this conflict was dueling nationalisms. While many scholars assert that Palestinian nationalism was a reaction to Zionist encroachment and was highly disorganized. While there was a reactionary element in Palestinian nationalism, the fight against Zionism became the focus of Arab nationalism only in the wake of the wider Arab failure to create an independent state centered in Damascus. For one reason or another, Mitchell's vision (2007) that the Nationalism inside Arab societies was affected by three

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elements. The principal element was Arab pride in their history. Patriot authors commended Arab commitments to the Ottoman Empire and Europe. The second component was the idea of the "homeland" presented by the Sultanate throughout the Tanzimat between 1839 and 1876. While through pan-Arabism, the thought of a solitary Arab state did exist, thoughts of a homeland were predominant. The third variable that formed Arab nationalists was the authority of the West. Middle Eastern patriots stated that the Ottoman Empire was lingering behind the Western European countries in institutional and military terms. Institutionally, Arab nationalists needed to raise an educational framework that taught western dialects and sciences.

Since 1914, the British frantically looked to establish their eminence in the Near East, and to counter the spectra of hostile to British pan-Islamic propaganda as cultivated by the Germans and the Turks. Because of the racial patriot observations of the Arab social order that were held by policymakers, it was accepted that the guarantee of Arab national flexibility might generate energy for the British cause, and guarantee passive consent to British control in the locale during and after the war. Additionally, the beneficent nature of nationalism in the personalities of approach creators implied that it was seen as the cure to the malicious danger of pan-Islam. Winning in the Middle East and beating the hindrances to British desires in the area were not by any means the only concerns about the future of the Ottoman Empire. By April 1917, the impact of racial and patriot thoughts formed around strategy prompted a general presumption that nationalism was the way to win over this ethnic opinion (Renton: 2007).

However, starting with the British occupation of Palestine, Palestinian nationalism assumed an included size. From various perspectives, Zionism characterized Palestinian nationalism. Despite the fact that the Palestinian Arabs of the late Ottoman period started review themselves as differentiate from other Arabs, Zionism offered earnestness to the Palestinian cause for solidarity and nationalism. Nationalists such as Darwazah spoke of Zionism as an outside danger that, if left unchecked, might demolish the Palestinian character. Notwithstanding various contrasts around the Arabs, including tribal and religious order; in any case, the unanticipated advocates of Arab patriotism vocalized a general call for solidarity that might unite all Muslims living in what is today Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine. In this way, Ross (2009) argued that:

> *"After the war, literary critics like Muhammed Izzat Darwazah emerged as vocal opponents of the British administration and Jewish Agency. A civil servant in the Ottoman Department of Communications during World War I, Darwazah became an early proponent of Arab nationalism in Palestine. Following the war, Darwazah returned to Nablus where he served on the board of trustees for the local college. There, he became involved in local politics, joining the National Bloc party and serving as director of the Moslem Waqf in 1928. At the time, many nationalists like Darwazah defined Arab nationalism in the broadest of terms."*

The clearest effect of the Palestinian national movement was the emergence of the Palestinian daily papers and the structuring of political gatherings. Thusly, gaining access to newspapers made the Palestinian cause more open all around the Arab world. It was the expansion of daily papers and a flourishing print society that characterized Palestinian patriotism and nationalism in

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the 1930s. Daily papers such as Filastin, al-Difa, and the Islamic League, were widely printed, with each one upholding Arab autonomy and the dismissal of Zionism. Likewise, every newspaper represented the interests of local political parties. As a case in point, Filastin communicated the diversions of the National Defense party throughout the 1930s, inasmuch as al-Difa upheld the Independence party. These daily papers turned into the official organs and mouthpieces of contending political developments in Palestine at the tallness of the British mandate (Ross; 2009).

The new activists utilized newspapers, first in Jaffa and Haifa, then in Jerusalem, to assemble a regular reaction to the first commemoration of the Balfour Declaration. This was directed in such a way that most of the anonymous writers were Christians, who advertised nationalism as a bi-religious movement. The talks in the press transformed into genuine political movement when, in 1948, young Palestinian enthusiasts from the prominent families created the Christian-Muslim association, Palestine's first-ever political gathering. The social order expanded everywhere throughout the nation, expecting to arrange a national show of force against Zionism and for Faisalism (Pappe, 2004).

Furthermore, the 1920s and 1930s saw a fast development of Arab private schools and of government schools, in which Arab educators were remarkably nationalistic and rather unlimited in their classroom exercises. With the use of a modern, European-style curricula, Palestinian students, following the example of learners of other colonialized zones, had exposure both inside and outside the classroom, to models of nation, nation-ness, and nationalism refined from the turbulent, clamorous encounters of more than a century of American and European history. Modern education, in which history has a tendency to be based on national history, has been crucial to the conviction of educated junior Palestinians that the nation was true and that enrollment in it involved a set of qualities. Such convictions are constitutive of the first face of culture portrayed prior (Matthews, 2003).

Why then did Palestinian nationalism fail to attain its objectives for national independence and solidarity in the 1930s? Despite the fact that most Palestinian Arabs concur on a general objective for national unity, they cannot agree on execution. All the more critically, it was the hindrance of the affluent VIPs that prevented the Palestinian Arabs from attaining their goals. While there has been unending civil argument over the improvement of Palestinian nationalism, particularly when it developed, there is no doubt that the Palestinian Arabs saw an arrangement of political conversions throughout the span of the 1930s. In view of the manifestation of a literate society and contending political parties, Palestinian nationalism was in its incipient stage at the beginning of the Arab Rebellion. What Palestinian nationalism needed was political leadership focused on the improvement and development of a Palestinian movement able to face the Zionist movement. Rather, interior hostilities between the notables limited the start of national development due to political factionalism and disunity (Ross, 2009). It has become progressively clear that there is a noteworthy tradeoff between two national movements battling for the same land. Also, the Palestinian national movement has neglected to create an independent state (Inbar, 2009).

CONCLUSION

The researcher acknowledges the most exceedingly terrible recorded situation or "historical dilemma", for any people habituated to living under tutelage and political guardianship, as this study demonstrated regarding the Palestinians. Both Palestinian and Arab neighboring pioneers never had any verifiable patterns or ability to create a "Free State" in Palestine from the fall of Ottoman Empire until the UN partition plan in 1947, or even during and after the 1948 war. Additionally, the Palestinian national movement was unable to lead its people to national sovereignty in their territory until 1967!

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