

**THE PALESTINIAN DILEMMA “PART THREE”:
THE LEADERLESS 1918-48; WHENEVER THE ENEMY SELECTS HIS
ENEMY’S LEADER!**

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ABSTRACT: *There has been constrained consideration paid to the issue of the Palestinian historical dilemma, which is politically known as "leaderless," the period ranging from the fall of the Ottoman Empire until Nakbah (catastrophe) war in 1948. The researcher endeavors to shed light on this socio-political issue that created the squandering of several chronicled opportunities, rights and political gains for the Palestinian people. This study means to audit several sorts and meanings of leadership, the fundamentals of selecting the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem in the period from the Ottoman Empire until the British Mandate. Who precisely selects the Palestinian leaders? Or used with a different meaning: when the enemy selects his enemy's leader. Moreover, this paper assumes that the Palestinian grand mufti Haj Amin al- Husseini could not fill in the vacuum, and thus Palestine came about to be "leaderless." It struggles to gain only one goal: "autonomous statehood" to be alongside an "Israeli state". However, al- Husseini had no any sense or character of leadership; he did not have qualifications, skills, or even charisma that other well-known national leaders such as Herzl, Gandhi, Mandela, or Ben-Gurion had. In addition, the researcher thinks it intelligently happened in light of the fact that he was chosen deliberately and exceptionally well by his great enemy: "the Jewish and Zionist leader ".*

KEYWORDS: Palestinian dilemma, leaderless, hostility, mufti, religious-economic-political vacuum

TYPES AND DEFINITIONS OF LEADERSHIP

The researcher depicts leadership as the power that demanding persons (leaders) set forth for the objective accomplishment of others (secondary) in an authoritative situation. In addition, leadership captures variety, improvement, concentration on individuals, arousing trust, having an eye on the prospects, and 'completing the right things'. There are further worries that must be distinguished; there are two sorts of pioneers: developing leaders—the individuals who procure an authority plan through their information, capacity, and ability to control others, or singular decency by the assembly; and relegated pioneers—those who offered force to practice power through choice. Charismatic leaders have a notable identity that gives them the perspective to have unforeseen power over others. They are slanted to power, have well-manufactured reliability, and duty; thusly, they persuade energized dedication and guarantee to the pioneer that his or her operational commitment is enthused. From a passionate commitment, adherents come to conviction and this characteristic is distinct from the pioneer (Christy; 2009).

In addition, genuine leadership is defined as “a process that draws from both positive psychological capacities and a highly developed organizational context, which results in both greater self-awareness and self-regulated positive behaviors on the part of leaders and associates, fostering positive self-development.” While others defined genuine leadership as: a prototype of see-through as well as ethical leader behavior that gives confidence [and] honesty in allotment of facts required to make assessment[s] while accommodating followers’ contribution[s]. Another type of leadership is transformational leadership, as the leader behaves in a way that renovates as well as motivates supporters to carry out beyond the outlook while exceeding self-awareness for the good of the organization. In ethical leadership the expression is suitable to demeanor; that is, individual actions and interpersonal relationships are taken into consideration, in addition to the endorsement of such demeanor to followers. In the same context of spirituality and leadership, many writers have referred to that being annulled as well as to having an effort to look at how a better sense of religion in the workplace might be promoted.

The research on workplace religion now has a focus on religious leadership that is defined as “comprising the values, attitudes, and behaviors that are necessary to intrinsically motivate own self and others so that they have a sense of spiritual survival through calling and membership”. Some researchers also mentioned that “the ultimate effect of spiritual leadership is to bring together or create a sense of fusion among the four fundamental forces of human existence (body, mind, heart, and spirit) so that people are motivated for high performance, have increased organizational commitment, and personally experience joy, peace and serenity”. In the comparative leadership field, such research evaluates leadership in two or more cultures, investigating the amount to which a practice that was urbanized in one culture relates to others. An ordinary approach looks at the undeviating impact a cultural measurement has on leadership (Avolio, Walumbwa & Weber; 2009).

Additionally, servant-leadership might be viewed as "another type of leadership. This leadership practice is special in light of the fact that it puts serving others as the top necessity. Servant-leadership advocates increasing service to others. Its perspectives work with an all-encompassing approach by pushing group sense. Decision making is shared and evenly distributed in this style of leadership. As stated by servant-leadership theory, the inner standards and lifestyle of unique pioneers, and additionally those distinct standards like reasonableness and trustworthiness seem to be "the free variables that activate servant pioneer conduct." Therefore, values are at the core of any administration perspective—they structure the uniqueness of pioneers, which in turn affect their practices alongside their managerial execution (Smith; 2005). Thus, the field of leadership has a percentage of the proceeding mystery interfaced with authority. These contain whether pioneers are conceived or made, how supporters have an impact on how triumphant pioneers can be, and the way some urging pioneers upsurge social orders while others wipe them out (Avolio, Walumbwa & Weber; 2009) Motivational practices counsel those practices that advertise allies and set forth maintained endeavor, especially in times of many-sided qualities (Burke, Stagl, Klein, Goodwin, Salas & Halpin; 2006).

Practically in the Palestinian case, the previous sorts and definitions make plain that there was not any type of national leadership throughout the historical backdrop of the Palestinian people up to now, at any time from the Ottoman Empire to the rise of the (politically) flighty, headless and

insecure pioneer Arafat (he dismisses totally the Camp David peace accord in 1979, while with no importance he acknowledged the Madrid and Oslo accord!).

THE PALESTINIAN LEADERLESS DILEMMA FROM THE FALL OF OTTOMAN EMPIRE UNTIL 1948

Everybody can basically run across the reality that there was a Palestinian "time everlasting" dilemma that the lack of the national leadership or the status of "leaderless" created from the fall of the Ottomans in the First World War until the re-creation of the Israeli state in 1948. This was demonstrated well in my past work: in the Palestinian dilemma "part two," the researcher accentuated that the Palestinian people were portrayed by historical tutelage and political guardianship in their territory "without any resentment" until the British Mandate of 1917! Then again, maybe, as Ibn Khaldoun—the popular Arab scholar of sociology, clarified the nature of the Arab mentality and personality in his argument "the Introduction" that it is so difficult to control the Arabs under civilian governor or leadership; it recently happened after much patience by the prophet "Mohammad", then some Arabian tribes (after the demise of prophet) attempted to escape the control of the focal government headed by the first caliph Abu Bakr.

Somehow the majority of Arabs and Palestinians specifically had a warm craving to revel in under the state of the tutelage and guardianship, headed by military, bloody and grisly dictators like Jamal Abdel Nasser, al-Assad, Gadhafi, Saddam, Mubarak, Omar al-Bashir, . . . or in the best case scenario, living in the socio-political leaderless case! In accordance with this situation, the Palestinians were prepared to be headed by any type of leadership: religious, foreigners, mercenary and traitors, or even notables (who completely had no sense or primary knowledge about what precisely were the social requests of their kin: peasants "fellahin," educated "effinidi," and Bedouins).

However, the relationship between Islam and nationalism exists in aggregate political personality, which shows itself obviously in the particular instance of the Palestinian national movement throughout the early Mandatory period, when the Islamic political sensibilities that truly had been fundamental to the Ottoman Empire were altogether interlaced with Palestinian territorial nationalism and Pan-Arabism. It is not troublesome to recognize singular Palestinian activists who communicated their political characters at different times through any of these classifications. Plainly, religious and patriot bases of social and political identities are not totally unrelated or constant (Matthews: 2003).

Actually, the "leaderless dilemma" discharged the political and religious scattered status, which paved the way for shredding the Palestinians (as the catastrophe of the 1948 war was a rational result of this predicament) into the earth (around Arab and non-Arab countries). Shockingly, the verifiable status of diaspora switched from the Jewish people to the Palestinians. Their enemy, in the right time, created the main structure for the their future state: the Zionist organization and Jewish Agency, which were headed by qualified, skillfully and high diplomatic leaders such as Herzl, Ahad Ha'am, Weizmann, Ben-Gurion . . . and so forth. Then the Israelis succeeded in their agreeable objective; one national home for all Jews from all over the world, the "Israel state", because the Israeli leaders had in a broad sense a clear vision for what is the presence precisely on

the ground today and what it should be tomorrow. Along the same lines, Taylor-Weiner (2009) examined that:

“For nearly a decade after the end of the Israeli war for independence; the Palestinian people were dispersed and leaderless. The wealthiest and the most highly educated Palestinians had either lost their property or had moved away. The Palestinian people lacked real recognition, both in the international community and in the land of Palestine. This only began to change in the late 1950’s when a young Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat, began the Palestinian National Liberation Movement, known as Fatah. Arafat galvanized the Palestinian people with visions of direct armed action against Israel and independence from other Arab governments.”

Under the weather of the leaderless dilemma, the absence of recognizable proof of the Palestinians already made the nationalist notables leaders—despite the fact that they were not representatives of their community, cause, or even their people’s political demands. Moreover, the notables were unable to exhort their kin on how best to go up against the Jewish community and its aggressive expansionist arrangements. They neglected to diminish Zionist extension, yet swayed their rural groups to ill-equipped and muddledly go against the Jewish settlers. From this matter, Pappe (2004) infers that:

“The nationalist notables and the Zionist leaders had one thing in common: they made and wrote their own history. They constructed a narrative of the people of Palestine that fitted the agendas of their respective elites. The power of these two contradictory views became increasingly evident between 1882 and the 1948 war, and they still dominate historiographical narratives in Israel and the Palestinian communities. On the political level, each day brought political drama, which mostly affected a small number of people but were written into history as collective calamities or victories.”

The analyst's presumption agrees completely with Penziner (2004) at whatever point he contended that the principal reason compactly put for the Palestinian incorporation in the Mandate framework is the absence of dynamic and qualified “leadership.” In practice the insurance of common and religious rights were not maintained. Further, infighting happened inside the Palestinian leadership as a result of the opposition between different families, specifically the Husseinis and the Nashashibis, for control of the individuals. The agitation brought about by this infighting incited the British throughout this period to cinch a cover on social change, taking an extraordinarily traditionalist stance with respect to the question of Palestinian leadership to stop the potential for social distress. So in this respect, Ben-Ami (2005) points out that:

“The road to the Jewish state was paved not only with the advantages drawn by the Yishuv from mandate years, but also by the shattering and dissolution of the Arab community in Palestine. The Arabs of Palestine paid dearly for their challenge to British rule. They were left practically without leaders and representative institutions. The Arab higher committee was dissolved and all its leaders were sent into exile. The mufti, the chief instigator of the insurgence and the embodiment of Palestinian nationalism, fled the country and left the Supreme Muslim Council, the focal point of Palestinian nationalism, leaderless and irrelevant.”

At all events, one of the perpetual issues was the leadership vacuum in rural areas specifically, which gave the opportunity to anybody to be popular national leader. For example, Izz al-Din al-Qassam, a Syrian preacher who settled in Haifa in the mid-1920s, succeeded in discovering supporters in the poor urban communities and shocking tenants. In 1933, al-Qassam started a guerrilla war in the north, selecting warriors from around Haifa and heading them to the encompassing slopes, assaulting any Jews or British fighters they encountered on the way. In 1935, al-Qassam was murdered by the British armed force, but this was sufficient to make him a saint and give an illustration of another sort of safety. The second issue prompted the coming up short of a brand of patriotism to inspire provincial Palestine as an entire entity, which exclusively decided everyday ethical qualities, behaviors and schedules. In short, the chain of importance in the village was clear: first the clan, then the village, then everything else, or to be more specific, any legislative issues in the town was "neighborhood" and not "national" work in the 1948 war. As it were, the Palestinian culture isolated into two tomahawks partitioning the political scene: close affiliations and the ideological grinding between Qawmi (pan-Arabism) and Watani (patriot) introductions, as illustrated by the conflict between the al-Husayni family and the Nashashibis (Pappe; 2004):

“The Palestinian revolt was an affair of lower classes. The upper classes and the institutional leaders either betrayed their cause by leaving on their own or were exiled by the British. But the imagination of masses was fired and inspired by the popular heroes of the resistance, such as the Islamic charismatic fighter Sheikh Izzedin al-Qassam, whose death in a shoot-out made him a nationalistic icon for future generation, sheikh Farhan who confronted the British forces around Nablus until he was arrested and executed, Abu-Jildeh who managed to terrorize the northern parts of the country, and Abd’ el Khader el Husseini who was destined to become one of the more charismatic military leaders in the war for Palestine in 1948.” (Ben-Ami; 2005)

However, for example, in 1936, the Palestinian laborers were all living on their territories in pressing circumstances and were unable to turn business horticulture into benefits. Those leaving the area were packed into the aloof towns and urban areas. They held up for direction (same circumstances occurred throughout the 1948 war), knowing even without being educated in high governmental issues that conditions were sure to break down further. Also they realized that they had no administration to depend on.

At the same connection, the Palestinian notables were distinguished as pioneers—even though they did not succeed in stretching their energy base past their root towns. One of their endeavors was to connect with the long-overlooked rural chieftains so as to make a joint, recognized, group of notables by means of suitably patriotic talk. The rural chieftains were presently searching for another part in patriotic legislative issues in the mandate of Palestine. Also, the Palestinian leaders, semi-feudal in the field and dictatorial in the urban areas, were unable to transcend the tight universe of the legislative issues of notables. In a circumstance where political elites battled one another eagerly, this intolerance was commensurate to stagnation and a loss of motion. However, this circumstance verifiably rehashed—as shown by Pappe (2004) after the rebellion in 1936-39 at whatever point al-Huanyni got away in 1937 before captured. Additionally, after the Second World War all guerrilla administrators in the resistance were subordinated to Arab legislators in the neighboring states, each of who utilized the circumstances within Palestine, as stated by his

national or particular agenda. In the interim the Palestinians stayed essentially “leaderless.” On the other hand, the British had viably obliterated the patriot notables; the same for the foolhardy and nonsensical state of mind of the religious notables

The vacuum in the national initiative condition was filled by several politicians from neighboring Arab states, as a part of the circle of the dilemma of “historical tutelage and political guardianship”:

“The years between the Arab Revolt and the Nakbah of 1948 witnessed the dismemberment of the Palestinian community and the loss of their political autonomy to the extent that when they had to face the challenge of partition and war in 1947-48, they were no longer the masters of their own destiny. By then their cause would be usurped by the neighboring Arab states. It was not until the emergence of Fatah movement and Yasser Arafat’s PLO in the mid 1960 that the Palestinians recovered the control of their own cause.” (Ben-Ami; 2005).

From time to time, the Palestinian notable families assumed a key part in leadership throughout the Ottoman Empire and all around the British order. Such authority basically depended on a redistributive power, as the notables could intervene between their peasants and the mandate powers. These supporter customer relations generally persevered after the British withdrawal and after the Israeli occupation of 1967. The power foundation of the Palestinian notables was specifically their responsibility for and their procurement of work for peasants and their ability to intervene for them with government powers to get to assets. For example, visas were dynamically dissolved under the Israeli occupation (Trottier; 2007).

At any rate, in 1948 the Palestinians turned into excluded individuals. They lost their property and saw the guarantee of a state of their own being frustrated by scanty leadership, by the ineptitude of the Arab armed forces, by the childishness and absence of motivation behind their authorities, and by overpowering military élan of a Jewish Yishuv that for a considerable length of time had been precisely ready itself for this trial. At the same time Ben-Ami (2005) expressed that:

“The Zionists always better than leaderless Palestinian Arabs assumed imminence of the forthcoming all-out war for Palestine, readied them to face the challenge and eventually prevailed. The Arab revolt in 1936-39 and consequent dismemberment of the Arab community laid the ground for Zionist victory of 1948.”

For more clarification, the Zionist political leadership engineered a new society through its control of the stream of the new Jews, for which it had developed a proficient and unified organization. The primary critical venture in that course was confiscating any say in Palestine's Jewish affairs from the Zionist associations outside Palestine. By 1929, Zionist arrangements were controlled by the legislature of the nearby group, the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem. The Agency's officials comprised both Zionists and non-Zionists, like Chaim Weizmann, who became the first president of Israel, and the administrator of the officials was David Ben-Gurion, who became Israeli's first prime minister. The head of the political office, the remote office of the organization was Haim Arlosaroff, who turned into Israeli's first foreign minister:

“Many members of the executive were ministers in the first government, ensuring a swift transition from community into a state in 1948; briefly it was a state within a state that gained official status in 1948. Moreover, the Zionism ideological relied on four most powerful movements; the Labour movement, the socialist Hashomer Hazair, the religious national Mizrahi movement, and finally the right-wing revisionists” (Pappe; 2004).

THE FUNDAMENTALS OF SELECTING THE GRAND MUFTI OF JERUSALEM DURING PERIOD OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE UNTIL THE BRITISH MANDATE

Historically, the muftis in Palestine since and throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries appear to not have been coordinated into the "ilmiyye" (knowledge qualified), and to have been less nearly fixed to the state courts than was the situation in Istanbul, Bursa, or Edrine. To make an impact, they subsequently required local recognition, which was most effortlessly picked up by someone belonging to a respected family, and who added learning, achievement, and possibly charisma to his inherited rank and status. In the nineteenth century, the pattern of more excellent bureaucratization arrived at Palestine, so that here excessively the capacity of the mufti was progressively formalized and characterized all the more strictly regarding the supreme chain of importance (Kramer; 2011).

During the mandate of Palestine, the British were going to assume a bizarre part in finishing the procedure of transforming the notables into nationalist pioneers. The primary issue for the British rulers was that the community they called the Muslims of Palestine had a tip top but no leadership. The British attempted to force the Ottoman idea of millet, a group spoken to by a main religious head, on the larger Muslim part in Palestine. Their masters on Islam reinvented the mufti, who held the most noteworthy position in the Muslim social progression. A mufti was a Muslim cleric who conveyed judgments with the support of his scriptural and religious information. His judgments connected to both mandate and discriminating parts of life, and influenced public and singular conduct.

Palestine had numerous muftis. There was one for each town and each school of Islam. The Hanafi School, which was supported by the Ottomans, was commanded in Palestine. The British hence designated the Hanafi mufti of Jerusalem to be the mufti of Palestine and the leader of its Muslim greater part. This was Kamil al-Huanyni, a descendent of the city's heading family, whose progenitors had held that position with few intrusions since 1700. Al-Huanyni was an anglophile, and at any rate until the spring of 1920 appeared to be uninterested in legislative and political issues, which served the British well. By contrast, different parts of his family, especially his more youthful sibling Haj Amin, had the sanction of the making of Greater Syria and adored Faisal as the to-be ruler of Palestine (Pappe; 2004).

Following the Ottomans' vanquishment, the High Commissioner had inherited the power of the Mutasarrif (senator) of Jerusalem. One of the obligations of the Mutasarrif was to select the new Grand Mufti of Jerusalem after Kamil al-Husseini died in 1921. Throughout the Ottoman period, the workplace of the Grand Mufti was subordinate to the Ottoman "Sheik ul-Islam." However, in the post-World War One period, the Mufti held transcendence in Palestine. The Husseini family, which had generally controlled the office of the Mufti, was anxious to stretch its energy along

these lines and named Hajj Amin to be the Grand Mufti. The Husseini family also confronted a solid adversary: the Nashashibis. In 1920, Ragib Nashashbi reinstated Musa Kazim Husseini as the leader of Jerusalem. One year later, the Nashashibi family jumped at the opportunity to claim an alternate Husseini-held office for themselves. Hassock exclusively managed that the Mustasarrif needed to select the new Mufti from a schedule given by the "ulama" (scholars). At the point when the ulama chose its applicants, Hajj Amin was not on the list. His family propelled a battle to engage High Commissioner Samuel to delegate Hajj Amin in any case. Excited to arbitrate the parity of forces between the Husseini and the Nashashibi families, Samuel assented to the Husseini's requests and in 1921, Hajj Amin was introduced as the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem. Then the Nashashibi started a monstrous fight with Samuel, who declined to evacuate Hajj Amin (Mitchell; 2007).

As one of the religious positions concerned with the Islamic values and conventions in the Muslim world, the grand mufti ought to be great scholar in his prestige and knowledge. However, in Palestine, the position turned into a rival status between a few men (notables who hired fighters or even mercenaries) to land a paramount position in the Muslim community, to carry out the mandate politics, and to carry out political and personal interests or any private-international agenda. Moreover, the Ottoman Sultans were not religious rulers and the footstools never honed the Sunni sect during their period. They just disseminated doctrines of the Sufi denominations and governed the Muslim world under the name of an Islamic caliphate by the name of Allah "God". In the Palestinian case, the clashing occurred between two notable and striking families, the al-Husseini and Nashashibi, overpicking up "religious prestige", which was an unequivocal consequence for the debasement throughout the evanescent empire.

WHO EXACTLY SELECTED THE PALESTINIAN LEADERS?

Logically, each one group and nation has the right to select its leadership, notwithstanding the statutes or precepts of this process, but it is unbelievable that we find that the enemy—at the same round of clash over the same piece of land—selects his enemy's leader without any equivocation or latency or even timidity! Staggeringly, this occurred in Palestinian modern history when the Jewish Zionist British high commissioner in Palestine chose the foolhardy, thoughtless, careless, and neglected young mufti "Haj Amin al-Husseini" in 1921 to be the leader of his people to accomplish their national demands and goal: "an autonomous state"!

In this matter, the researcher perspective's corresponds with Pappé (2004), who clarified that:

"The generous term Palestinian leadership should be treated cautiously when discussing the first years of British rule, it was some time before, aided by the British, and a more cohesive leadership emerged. The making of national elite was focused on one person, Amin al-Husseini (1895–1974). His rise to power was facilitated by, among other things, changes in Palestine, when in 1920 the British gave Palestine a civilian government and a new political chapter in the country's history began."

So this study will shed light particularly upon two recorded characters who were impacted in the Palestinian-Israeli clash: the Grand Mufti in Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husseini (1921-48) and Sir Herbert Samuel, the first High Commissioner in Palestine (1920).

WHENEVER THE ENEMY SELECTS HIS ENEMY'S LEADER!

For all intents and purposes, the Grand Mufti was conceived into the Husseini family of Jerusalem in 1895. Since the sixteenth century, parts of the Husseini family controlled the workplace of the Mufti. By the mid nineteenth century, the Husseini family achieved more excellent force taking after an arrangement of legitimate changes in Istanbul. In light of the need for more terrific duty income, Istanbul turned to well-off notables over the domain to gather taxes from the nearby populace. However, due to a lack of knowledge of local customs and traditions and much of the time, the tongue of the ranges being referred to, numerous Ottoman governors came to depend on the great remaining nearby notables to authorize the sultan's will.

Amin al-Husseini developed as an unequivocal figure and pioneer in the First World War. In 1918, Hajj Amin joined Faisal's armed force, which brought him to Damascus as a partner to the executive of Syrian security, Gabriel Hadda'ad. Afterward, Hajj Amin got included in patriot aggregations fixated on Faisal, and took a dynamic part in the association of the Pan-Syrian Congress held in Damascus in 1919. He was particularly animated in arranging the support of Palestinian delegates. In 1919, Hajj Amin came back to Jerusalem where he turned into an accomplice in the Rawdat al-Mar'arif school, one of the instructive places for Arab nationalism. In 1920, Hajj Amin was captured for affecting viciousness at anti-Zionist exhibits in Jerusalem (Mitchell; 2007).

In March 1921, a couple of months after al-Husseini returned home (he was fled to Transjordan after the Nabi Musa riots in 1920), his sibling, the mufti Kamil al-Husseini, died, leaving Amin as the Husseini competitor to swap in for him. His status as a member of a persuasive family and his sharp fight of petitions, interests and thoughtful mediation by nearby British authorities, cleared his approach to power. He was delegated mufti in spite of advancing fourth in the races directed around all of the religious Muslim dignitaries of the nation (Pappe; 2004).

Meanwhile, London disbanded the military administration of Palestine and installed a civilian administration in its place in 1920. Lloyd George designated Herbert Samuel to be its head as the new high magistrate. Samuel, a Jew, liberal, and a Zionist, had been the first member of the British government in 1914, when the war against Turkey started, to have proposed the making of a British-supported Jewish homeland in Palestine. His errand indicated that the Prime Minister was resolute in his Palestine strategy; yet the roughness which the military administration had supported engendered others in London to have doubts with respect to the backing for a Jewish homeland.

More specifically, in the squall of the 1921 uproars, High Commissioner Herbert Samuel forced constraint on Jewish migration, proposed a level of rule on the Arabs, created the post of mufti to which he designated the same youthful nationalist, Haj Amin al-Husseini, who had impelled the Nabi Mousa riots in 1920, and permitted the formation of the Supreme Muslim Council, which the mufti would soon transform into the primary political stage for the Arab national battle for Palestine (Ben-Ami; 2005).

In summary, Samuel secured al-Husseini at the middle of Palestinian legislative issues, yet the actions of the high commissioner were a long way from attractive to the nearby first class. By contrast, Samuel, a professional Zionist ruler in many ways, empowered the Zionist movement to complete an orderly land study that was the support for its extension all around the mandate. Additionally, he encouraged the vocation of a higher number of Jews than Muslims in the new common government. By and by, Samuel appeared to have an affinity with al-Husseini, and helped the mufti to turn into the leader of the new body Muslim religious dignitary, the Supreme Muslim Council, which was instituted in 1922. The Supreme Muslim Council managed and controlled religious courts, blessings and charities. The council was an effective political and financial base which granted al-Husseini religious power and authority over the national bodies emerging out of anti-Zionist intensity (Pappe; 2004). In the same context, it was argued by Matthews (2003) that:

“Sir Herbert Samuel appointed al-Husseini to the post of mufti of Jerusalem. It was in the government’s interest to place Hajj Amin’s influence in its service and to keep him on a short tether for two reasons. First, he was a scion of one of the most powerful families in Palestine, and second, he had engaged in anti-British agitation the previous year. Pardoned and given a salary, he effectively became a civil servant, his name even appearing in the Blue Books and Civil Service Lists of government employees. His political power derived from his ability to act as an intermediary between the state and the Muslim populace. Hajj Amin thus became a notable of the traditional style. The creation of the SMC provided such effective machinery for the generation of political patronage that the issue of its control divided politically active Palestinians into two main factions. The first of these, known as the Majlisi faction, was composed of those who supported Hajj Amin for the offices of president of the SMC and mufti. The other faction defined itself against the partisans of Hajj Amin and was known simply as the oppositions (al-Mu_aridin).

In fact, the objective of British arrangement was, according to Matthews (2003), not to plan Palestine for freedom or statehood, but to look after British impact on the right flank of the Suez Canal and guard royal interchanges with India. Somehow, the British were anxious to cool the circumstances, and subsequently respected certain Arab requests; however, they did so without making any essential concessions concerning the Mandate Treaty and Arab representation.

In any case, the first high commissioner to take his post at the helm of a civilian government in July 1920, who made apparent the problem of excessive British strategy unmistakably, was Sir Herbert Samuel, a cousin of Sir Edwin Montagu, who originated from an acclimatized British-Jewish banking family and was known as a confessed Zionist. Of course, he was welcomed with eagerness by neighborhood Zionists. Yet the Arab group additionally treated him with deference. With the help of Samuel, Zionists were allowed to raise their banner and in a strict sense "show their colors" and they were additionally permitted to openly sing their songs of praise. In the meantime, exculpates were granted to various Arabs captured by the mobs of April 1920. Some of the most critical measures taken by the high commissioner were—as concluded by Kramer (2011)—his authorization to make a Supreme Muslim Council and his appointment of Hajj Amin al-Husaini as mufti of Jerusalem in 1922.

In return for his establishment, Hajj Amin guaranteed to co-operate with the Samuel-headed Mandate government. Hajj Amin, be that as it may, was not a British manikin—according to

Matthews (2003) He realized that the British were not putting into Palestine the creation of cantonments. At that point, Amin's general view was that the Palestinians ought not to rebel against the British principles, which were excessively solid and, regardless, transient; rather, they ought to focus on contradicting the Zionists, who were the fundamental danger to the Palestinian patriots. However, Hajj Amin's energy and the impact inferred most from his work placement as mufti of Jerusalem and president of the Supreme Muslim Council (SMC). The British rulers made the Supreme Muslim Council in 1921 to regulate the Sharia (Islamic law) courts and Awqaf of Palestine. Their aim was to permit Palestinian Muslims to deal with their religious undertakings. Hajj Amin, as head of the Supreme Muslim Council, sat at the leader of a regulatory mechanical assembly that could convey favors to supporters and punish his political adversaries.

As discussed above, despite there being a political vacuum in the Palestinian leadership, whenever the British mandate chose to fill in that crevice in this historical-political unique case, they doled out this errand to one of the British Jew-Zionists. Sir Samuel Herbert attributed the responsibility to al-Husseini to lead his society religiously, nationally and politically. This implies that the Palestinian leaders (religious or secular) selected by the Jewish and Zionist leaders were supposed to be the same enemy in the same round of “conflict” over the same targeted “land.”

AL-HUSSEINI; MACHIAVELLIAN AND PROMOTER FOR HOSTILITY BETWEEN ARABS AND JEWS FROM 1920-37

The researcher has more certainty that al-Husseini was the common factor in all bloody clashes and grisly events that occurred between the Palestinians and Jews from 1920-37 because he was the main motive behind the three historical tragic actions between the two sides during that time. These included the Nabi Musa riots in 1920, the Wailing Wall unrest in 1929, and the revolts from 1936-39.

In short, the Palestinian politics were determined by destitution as well as by religion, especially in Jerusalem. The religious nature of al-Husseini's authority as the most astounding religious dignitary in the area, whose power originated from a Jerusalemite parentage (in the Shia and Sufi sect alike), turned the consideration of numerous Palestinians to Zionist action in that city. For example, the Show Commission in 1929 reported that:

“Al-Husseini never fully recovered his position as a leader. His greatest failing was the massive selling of Palestinian lands for Jewish settlements. The sales continued to the end of the mandate, but had declined somewhat by the mid-1930s. This decline temporarily patched over the rifts within Palestinian society, but the pace of political mobilization and organization was slow, especially compared to the dynamic development of the Zionists” (Pappe; 2004).

However, the Grand Mufti al-Husseini's goals were progressively removed from pan-Arabism, the longing to bring together all Arab nations into one and where Palestine's Arabs might join with their siblings of Syria, to prevent Palestine from being divided into parts. More precisely, his goals moved to guarantee the exact survival of the Palestine. Furthermore, due to non-Muslim vicinity in Palestine, al-Husseini needed to manage riots in 1929 and Arab revolts between 1936 and 1939.

In view of the suspicion that Jews had come to Palestine to deny and take control of Arabs, he assembled a great number of adherents to dissent (Hertz; 2009).

Actually, it seems to the researcher that al-Husseini was not Sunni, but he followed Kharijites or perhaps Shiites religious sects. Despite this fact, he never cooperated with al-Qassam and al-Qawaqji, or even created any type of associations with them. For instance, al-Husseini overlooked al-Qassam's widow from the start, yet on becoming aware of the mass investment in the man's burial service, he paid his regards at the end of the forty days of grieving (Pappe; 2004). Moreover, in August 1936, Fawzi al-Qawaqji (1890-1976)—a previous officer in the footrest armed force of the Lebanese, saint of the 1925 Syrian uprising against the French, and an ex-officer of the Iraqi armed force—entered Palestine with around 190 volunteers to battle as an afterthought of the revolutionaries. The operation rapidly ran into challenges when the nearby guerilla and state army pioneers declined to submit to Qawaqji, who was an expert officer and prestigious contender for the Arab cause, and regularly longed to expect command over all outfitted units (Kramer).

By complexity, emulating his escape from Palestine in 1937, the mufti would partner himself with Nazi Germany and support its Anti-Semitic arrangements, but the Arab populace of Palestine and its political elite did not take after him in this course (Kramer; 2011). In this matter, throughout the 1930s, al-Husseini prearranged a Palestinian-Arab youth movement in representation similar to the Hitler youth. He also sent a delegation team from Palestine to attend to Nazi Nuremberg rallies (Stern; 2011). In 1933, Al-Husseini reached the German delegate general in Jerusalem and offered his congratulations and support to the new National Socialist government in Berlin. At that point, at a private gathering in Berlin in November 1941, the Fuhrer informed al-Husseini about the impending killing of European Jewry. Al-Husseini guaranteed to help the Nazi by getting the Arabs to battle the British. Moreover, al-Husseini started the Islamic institute in Berlin in December 1942 with a sanctioned decree of the cooperation with Nazism. In addition, he used Islam and the justification of the Quranic prescription that “the most antagonistic people are the Jews.”

A charismatic speaker and ruthless politician, Al-Husseini used his new offices to fuel the bonfires of hatred in Palestine. He became the most powerful Palestinian leader during the mandate period and beyond. He led his people down the path of Islamist extremism and murderous anti-Semitism and into a disastrous military confrontation; first with the British and then with the nascent state of Israel. If the Palestinian people really suffered a Nakba, it was largely of their own making—and that of their grand mufti. Moreover, personally, Al-Husseini, never challenged politically that he created his own death squads to eliminate potential Palestinian rivals (Hamas, on the same footsteps, did same with its religious-political rivals). After the 1929 riots, Al-Husseini learned the lesson that British commitment to the Balfour Declaration was not ironclad and could be influenced by the threat of more violence (Stern; 2011). In one word, the researcher is wondering about the selection of Amin al-Husseini by the High Commissioner Herbert Samuel, although Amin lacked formal qualifications for the office, as Kramer (2011) emphasized:

“What, when, recommended Amin al-Husseini for the office of mufti of Jerusalem, in spite of his obvious lack of proper qualification? Above all, the British hoped to cultivate him as a promising young man from an elite family who in the tense atmosphere of the early mandate years could

credibly defend a policy of "reason and moderation" against all forms of "extremism," a policy that would ultimately serve British interests."

Briefly, at whatever point the British Jew-Zionist Herbert Samuel designated al-Husseini in the position of grand mufti in Palestine, to become the official head and authorized leader of both religious and national movements, they had known well that he effectively was described by nonsensical and rash attitudes. Hence, he started contempt, hostility and war between the two communities, Arabs and Jews.

AL-HUSSEINI; THE REAL ACTOR BEHIND THE POLITICAL VACUUM IN THE PALESTINIAN COMMUNITY 1937-48

The matter throughout and after the Second World War was that the Palestinian leaders experienced altogether different encounters. Amin al-Husseini was meandering as an outcast from one Arab state to the next; he went to Berlin, where he served the Nazi war machine as an estranged cause of his national movement in the eyes of the victors. Then the feeling that the Palestinian leadership, especially al-Husseini, was pro-Nazi, a designation that made his return to Palestine unimaginable. While a few leaders got superfluous like al-Husseini, who went around the Axis forces, wanting to select those he wrongly thought might be the following experts of the Middle East, or at any rate associates in the war against the British. On the other hand, some leaders stayed in Palestine, or came back from exile in the wake of being acquitted by the British. They were defenseless even with the boards the British had set up to discover an answer for a spot they were resolved to leave, or were fundamentally run just by implication or as a substitute. In this regard Pappe (2004) argued that:

"Finally, those types of leaders alienated the British policy makers from supporting the idea of an independent Palestinian state, which they now contemptuously called a "mufti state". The episode of al-Husseini's connections with the Nazi did a great service to Zionist propaganda after the war.....In one word, the 1948 War, –the Nakbah "Disaster" for Palestinians and Arabs- totally would describe by ill prepared and poorly coordinated, the Arab armies were dragged into the war by popular pressure in their home states, and because their leaders each had his own agenda of territorial expansion".

Furthermore, Hertz (2009) expressed that al-Husseini, an intense religious leader with solid anti-Zionist convictions, has savagely contradicted Jewish migration in the 1920s and 1930s. This two-sided methodology could be termed as a "diplomacy of rejection". Alongside merciless measures, the Grand Mufti looked for political assistance from Lebanon, Syria, Transjordan and Iraq. These nations were framed to re-organize themselves after the Ottoman period. Also, these nations were granted recognition by the United Nations, the British and the French.

In the battle for an election boycott, the mosques, local muftis, and preachers assumed a significant part, proclaiming it a religious obligation of Muslims not to vote under such conditions. Indeed, the high commissioner's idea of making an Arab agency parallel to the Jewish agency, to exhort the British concerning Arab undertakings amounted to a puff of smoke. On the off chance that beforehand the Arab leadership had been answerable for deficient political representation, the last

endeavors to discover a distinguished voice for all Arab Palestinians were thwarted by the Zionists; not without cause, the Zionists dreaded composed imperviousness to Jewish migration, Jewish land purchases, and the advancement of the Jewish homeland (Kramer; 2011).

At the same time, the British power exhibited and offered the self-governing state to Jews 20 percent of the continuing mandated region, while the Palestinian Arabs might get 80 percent for their own particular state. Miserable for any intention to have the capacity to accumulate enormous amounts of rare European Jews, the Zionists unwillingly established the commission's partition plan. Headed by a mufti, the AHC abandoned separation out of hand and pressed on with the armed rebellion besides the mandate.

In the same vein, the mufti of Jerusalem and the head coordinator of the General Islamic Congress, in his record of the birthplaces of the Congress of Arab Youth, gave it a role as the result of an activity taken by the Arab Executive to complete amazing decisions and pushed by Hajj Amin's partisans. It will become clear that this was a long way from the case. Instead, the patriot activists pushed a capable compulsion over the open deliberation on autonomy and hence on the character of social personality. The station of the Congress of Arab Youth was the conclusion of a rambling communication between the nationalist activists and the notables in the period, paving the way to the Islamic Congress, and that talk might be seen as regarding the two appearances of society. These activists saw themselves as from another era, distinguished by their childhood and their European-style instructions. They were enlivened by the case of Mahatma Gandhi in his initiative of the development of Indian freedom. It will further become clear that the Islamic Congress occurred in an emergency setting that elevated the qualifications in regularly smudged outskirts between Arab nationalists and Islamic political characters. The explanations behind the clearer articulation of patriot personality at this point can be found in the partisan character of British pilgrim control and the mufti's role in it. (Matthews: 2003).

In this respect, Ross (2009) is definite that the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem was behind the breakdown of the nationalist movement. Regardless of the fact that al-Husseini had been one of the instigators of the Nebi Mussa riots, Samuel was persuaded that the Muslim torch could be co-picked and that his arrangement might relieve the Arab notables. Samuel's mistake compounded when he also accepted al-Husseini's election as president of the Supreme Muslim Council. However, notables like the Husseini family profited under Turkish rule and kept thriving under the British. It is for this reason that the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem cannot be considered a patriot pioneer. His magnetic appeal was no substitute for the Mufti's powerlessness to submit himself to a political vision required to maintain a nationalist movement. If anything, the Arab Rebellion of 1936 uncovered the Mufti's reservations about such a driven arrangement. The way that he kept away from authority throughout the initial ten days of the general strike indicates that the Mufti did not completely sympathize with the national goals of Palestinian Arabs. The Mufti needed firm duty to the patriots, which shows that he was more concerned with the protection of his own office and power. What Palestinian nationalism needed was political leadership focused on the improvement and development of a Palestinian movement that could meet the Zionist movement as an equal contender. It is troublesome to envision the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem as a nationalist leader when much of his political acting was an endeavor to defend the his family's impact and fortune.

After 1948, the Palestinians were left feeling vulnerable in their circumstance, as first the force to be reckoned with was Britain and afterward the more diminutive forces of Israel and the Arab nations directed their future. At that point, the pioneers of the encompassing Arab states, who were hesitant to be drawn into the war, had no specific enthusiasm toward Palestinian mass migration. For it was unequivocally true that exodus subjected them to an overpowering prevalent weight for a war they were not prepared to join. The mass departure was accidentally energized by the pioneers of the Palestinian group when, in their avidness to trigger the attack of Palestine by the Arab armed forces, they exploded out of discontent towards the abominations conferred against Arab citizens (Ben-Ami; 2005).

As demonstrated above, al-Husseini, by his escape (and all other Palestinian leaders did the same between the years 1936-48) from Palestine in 1937, left all obligations and responsibilities toward his land, state, cause and people with laxity, carelessness, and uselessness. The peasants, nationalists and religious found themselves without any type of leadership, aide, guide or national leaders, unlike their enemy, the Israelis.

CONCLUSION

This study presumes that the Palestinian grand mufti Haj Amin al-Husseini could not in any way fill in the vacuum that came about from the authentic quandary or the historical dilemma, the "leaderless", or even to struggle for his people toward one goal, to be an "independent state" or to be an efficient neighbor to the "Israeli state". In fact, he had no sense or character of leadership, nor the capabilities, allure, or charisma that the other famous national leaders, such as Herzl, Gandhi, Mandela, or Ben-Gurion had. So the researcher thinks it was a legitimately occurrence that he was chosen precisely and extremely well by his adversary, "the Jewish and Zionist leader".

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