

**THE PALESTINIAN DILEMMA “PART FOUR”:
COEXISTING.....HATRED.....SEPARATING.....EXPULSION.....APARTHEID;
INCREDIBLE STORY IN THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT 1914-49**

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ABSTRACT: *This study deals with the Psycho-Political relationship between the Abrahamic cousins, namely Jews and Arabs, from the end of the Ottoman period until 1949. The absent of socio-political wisdom or rational decisions led to the “incredible story” of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict 1914-49. However this paper aims to investigate the separatism attitude in the Palestinian-Israeli mentality: “culture” or “reaction”?, the principles of peaceful coexistence and religion role in peace-building between humans, the co-existence, co-operation and trust between Palestinians and Jews from Ottoman empire till establishing of Israel, the road for hatred and war between Israelis and Palestinians, and the British, Israeli and Palestinian target till the 1948 war; “peaceful coexistence” or “apartheid”? Finally, this paper concludes that the conflict between the Palestinian and Israelis has classified and marked by unsteady cases. The start point between them was coexisted (partially peacefully with some fears), after that turned into hatred (because of various extremist and bloody actions), after that both of them preferred the separatism attitude. Then it followed by the war between them and expulsion policy from the land by the hand of one of them toward the other side, to become finally apartheid (by separation wall) between both forever.*

KEYWORDS: Palestinian dilemma, coexisting, separating, hatred, expulsion, apartheid, incredible, conflict.

INCREDIBLE STORY OR PALESTINIAN DILEMMA! THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI MENTALITY AND SEPARATISM ATTITUDE: “CULTURE” OR “REACTION”?

In fact, the historical relationship between the two ethnicities and religions, namely Palestinians/Muslims and Israelis/Jews, has been characterized by changeable cases and unsteady states in their conflict over the same piece of land for a long time in the modern era. In addition, the violence between these cousins has had perhaps around four entirely different psychological phases, which seemed to all historians to be an ethno-political “incredible story”.

Briefly, the first one started in the “Coexistence” phase, where they were living “peacefully” from the Islamic age or Caliphate era till the sunset of Ottoman Empire in the First World War 1918. The second, “Separated” phase, in which the old “Yishuv” in the Jewish Quarter inside Palestine preferred to live in Jewish “Enclave” as a “Separated Entity” - because the leaders of the Jewish Agency in this time considered this an economic, education and secure enclave, as the first step toward establishing their dream; the “Israel state” - which appeared as an attempt to a “Partial Coexistence” with their future enemy on the same land.

Chronologically, the third period may be described as the “Hatred” phase, which began by the Palestinian hand in 1920 during the annual Muslim festival, which turned into bloodshed riots in “Nabi Musa” in Jerusalem, followed by killing from both sides in different actions, such as the Jaffa riots in 1921. Finally, according to this study, the fourth phase is marked by (complete) “Apartheid” between the Israelis and Palestinians, which began after a clash after the report of the UNSCOP committee for partitioning the land between two peoples by the end of 1947. Then, the hatred derived from the 1948 war and the “expulsion policy” handled by the Israeli forces in the “Plan D” caused the expulsion of local Arabs from their villages in the “tragedy” from March 1948 to January 1949. By then the establishment of Israel to separate the two peoples by making international lines and political borders between them to end all hopes for a bi-national solution in one land forever.

British Palestine, which housed different people and with different beliefs, was separated into Arab and Jewish communities, could only be located in the commercial center and hot spots. This idea of division was nursed by the separatist national movements of both Zionists and Palestinians (Smootha & Hofman; 1976). By contrast, Morris (2009) has argued that even before the formation of Israel, the Jews and the Arabs were “two separate societies that did not interact or live 'together', except in the sense of sharing the same air”. It seems inevitable that a society composed of Arabs and Jews living together would quickly break down into violence. Proponents of this solution claim that there was “peaceful coexistence between Jews and Arabs in Palestine before the creation of Israel” and that this ideal might be revived. There is little historical evidence to support this assertion.

However, this study attempts to answer significant question; what is real motive of the separatism attitude in the Palestinian-Israeli mentality; is it “rooted culture” or “emotional reaction”? Culturally, the Arab of Palestine totally dislikes all strangers who have different language, religion, and culture. On the other hand, the Jewish people historically lived in their private closed and separated quarter, for maintenance their ethnic, religion, language, economic, and for more safety. So, it is quite clear that the Palestinian-Israeli mentality tends naturally, culturally, socially, and historically to live within the “Psychological Separatism Case” or precisely, they enjoying living behind the “Physical Separation-Wall”. As a matter of fact:

“Separation was a natural condition in the development of the two national movements. Arab and Jewish societies had evolved along separate paths ever since the early days of Zionism. This was certainly the case during the vital mandate years when the two societies were segregated along physical, institutional and developmental lines. The social services, the economic infrastructure, the educational system and the geographical boundaries of the Arab and Jewish communities were clearly defined.....Neither the Jews nor the Arabs were especially keen on having a mixed society in Palestine.....lofty dreams and platforms about Jewish-Arabs coexistence notwithstanding, and in spite of the development of some bi-national spaces of co-operation and common life the essential condition of life in Palestine was one of mutual exclusion (Ben-Ami, 2005).

The first venture toward separatism was established in 1914 by the Zionist instructive unit, which was a crucial apparatus in making this a reality. With the assistance of the mandate, the Jewish leadership effected the isolation of the education framework as early as 1923; in spite of the fact

that there was still bilingual and bi-national instruction, it was all private. The second step was when the British mandate and the Zionist authority by Ben-Gurion around 1929 were chosen, making an autonomous Jewish "Enclave" in Palestine. At that point, the Jewish settlement "Yishuv" became a "separate" economic "entity".

At any rate, culture (which incorporates history, dialect, dress, religion, food, beliefs and attitudes) is the paste that binds individuals together. Individuals who have a common history, dialect and religion impart and share a common identity. Furthermore culture and ethnicity are the fundamental building pieces of one's close to home personality. The division of individuals into gatherings by culture is pervasive as well as frequently plainly obvious. Also the troubles of accomplishing positive relations between social gatherings is perceived, and that a concentrate on bury social relations ought to be avoidance of antagonism instead of diminishing fierce clash after it has happened. Worchel (2005) determined that there are two roles of culture in intergroup clash; one is that culture divides individuals into an in-group and out-group focused around the standard of whether they impart a typical society. The second role is that culture shapes the singular's recognition of clash and how he or she will react to the clash. For more particular;

"The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations."(Yijie, 2010).

In this regard, for instance, Palestinian behavior, and surely Jordanians, often have a frowning face (especially in morning), and are quick anger, warm-blooded, reckless, irrational, vehement, stubborn and apathetic and prone to avoidance of all genuine opportunities on the ground. However, it is very easy to provoke their sense against others or any targeted subject. for these characteristics and other, Hamas and other extremist parties such as Dā'ish, al-Qaeda, al-Jihad al-Islamy, Muslim Brotherhood and Hezbollah, which could easily manipulate young Palestinians to leave school for digging tunnels, or bombing or killing themselves (in/under the name of Allah and the religion) in "suicide or martyrdom operations" to become a "Martyr", then going (quickly and directly) to the "Paradise".

On the other hand, the Jewish people are marked by being wise, following the self-term policy, patient, trouble-making, practicing extortion, are excellent in economic affairs, and harboring revenge for their opponent (until the appropriate time, albeit forever and ever). Specifically, or more accurately, with respect to the status of revenge, the Israeli military operations during the 1948 war, in some Palestinian villages, showed aggressive reactions toward their enemy.

For the Israeli's mentality and collective mind, they favored the "forced transfer" of Arabs from the future Jewish state, considered the best of all solutions. It was under the idea that "a distant neighbor" is superior to "a close enemy". What's more exchange was such a perfect result, to the point that it must happen sometime or another. Ben-Ami demonstrated in his contention (2005) that the thought of transferring the Arabs had a long pedigree in Zionist thought.

At the same context, many scholars have found that many conflicts occurred only because of dissimilarities in religion and culture. It is evident that issues of religion and culture are more

sensative in regard to have a war between two or more nations (Gopin, 2002). In this matter Abu-Nimer (2004) tended to deeming that the imperceptible variable and drive for scorn, hostility and separatism attitude is "religion" - the first segment of Arabs and Israelis' culture. Such mechanisms in the Palestinian-Israeli connection are reflected either in the conviction and conduct that different religions are mediocre and inadequate or in a prevalent confidence demeanor. For instance, "We, the Jews, are the chosen people," "Islam is the main complete religion," and "There is no salvation outside the Church." Whether the mechanisms include predominance of the self or second rate quality of the other, both sorts of religious disposition are propelled by the point of view that one's own particular confidence is "correct," with the notion that one's own particular religion merits the land, religious sites, and access to the Holy Land.

However, Kelman (2007) also described the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as specialized conflict between two combatants making claims of national territory and political state for a comprehensive historical conflict. With the same meaning, Fellman (2008) saw the Israeli-Palestinian clash as an ideal example of all these issues conveyed to extremes. Each one side cases it acts in light of a legitimate concern for security and survival, each one throws unlimited charges against the other. Each one has falsehoods and blames the other side for conniving. Each one side misperceives alternate's intentions. Each one sees itself as ambushed with no reference to or even recognition of the other side's equally plausible corresponding claim. In accounts of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, each one side has even been hesitant to acknowledge the truth of alternate as a country. Their reasons are army and comparable, and not persuading, for nullifying the national actuality of the other. For instance, in the strained climate of the early 1930s, a Jewish spectator wrote that (Kramer, 2011):

“Though relations between the two Semitic peoples are not exactly intimate, they remain more or less good neighbors. They grumble each other, eliminate competition as much as possible, and separate work and business. But the Arab ride in the Jewish buses and the Jews in Arab carriages, they make purchases in the market. Preferably however they try to ignore each other.”

In the same context, Inbar (2009) underpinned the separatism attitude, as shown below:

‘The rationale was that if the two ethnic communities could not live together, separation was the best option. This was the same recommendation the British government made in the case of India several years later, in the hope of limiting turmoil in the subcontinent’

To add to the above, the Palestinian dilemma appeared in two major angles; the first is the Palestinian behavior, culture and reaction which pave the way for losing all peace opportunities to retain their historical and religious rights in the land of Palestine, in addition to their irrational (political) reactions which has led to hatred between them and their eternal neighbor “Jews” in the same land. The second aspect is the Israeli culture and reaction which manifests in owning the patent and copyright of the policy of “Self-Term” and the principle of taking revenge, even after a long time.

THE PRINCIPLES OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AND RELIGION ROLE IN PEACE-BUILDING BETWEEN HUMANS

Every single religion provides their own basic principles which are unique and each may come to involve conflict. Evidently, if we look the histories, traditional religious practices underpin the foundation of war through the conditioning nature of beliefs. Again, we might say that peace represents the national, political, religious and philosophical ideal. In many cases, religious beliefs and practices play a role in causing war. Many raise a question: “Is it possible that conventional religious belief and practice could bring peace, despite splitting people into sects and denominations? With each religious group asserting that their God is the True God?” (Webster-Doyle, 1991).

However, there are many factors such as similar ethnicities, religions, culture, common histories, language, and race which are influential to avoid war. Thus, socio-cultural similarities are the very significant factors to avoid a war. There is much evidence that those nationals or groups have same socio-cultural and historical backgrounds they make the better understanding between them to compare non-similarities groups with different socio-cultural backgrounds (Ellis;2007). On the other hand, strategic actions may lead to a greater chance that the potential ‘diverter’ will itself be targeted for unfriendly behavior (Derouen & Sprecher, 2006). According to Senehi, Ryan and Sean (2010), the religious traditions and their core principles are an invaluable supplement to peacemaking, social justice, and human rights resources.

Furthermore, religion (and the religious identity as well) could be a wellspring of collaboration and a power for peace. People and religiously dynamic gatherings may figure out how to reframe the center issues of the Israeli-Palestinian clash from an existential clash over area and salvation into a conflict over assets and capability to live together with distinctive yet similar Abrahamic customs with a specific end goal of keeping control of religion in difficult circumstances. There is a need to reframe the people's recognitions of the clash, and additionally their religious relations to the others (Abu-Nimer, 2004).

In fact, there are few principles of peaceful coexistence in human history for attaining reunion and reconciliation besides conflict, racism, hostilities, xenophobia language and hatred, in spite of, religious, political, cultural, and racial aspect. According to Slavik (2004), the principles are as follows:

- There should be mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and independence;
- There should be mutual non-aggression;
- There should be mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs;
- Experiencing equality and mutual benefit;
- Finally, peaceful co-existence

In this matter, the researcher also agrees with Kelman (2010) where he suggests the following ideas:

- The conflict resolution is interactional, and is not obviously forced by outside powers. Therefore, both parties practice the greater degree of commitment.
- The conflict-resolution deals with both parties’ primary needs and uncertainties. So, it helps them to maintain themselves for long time.

- The conflict resolution provides a trust in two parties which matter-of-fact that trust sees in the other's interest for achieving long-term peace.
- The conflict-resolution helps to establish a good relationship between two parties, in which they are caring each other like the partnership. Further, they also share and care other's needs and limitation and agree to cooperate.
- The conflict resolution provides communal support for agreement into two groups and agreements between two parties and promotes the development of each other.

Furthermore, the greatest obstacle to Middle East peace from both Palestinian and Israeli extremists has been identified by several writers. Both sides have misgivings as to the existence of any roadmap to peace due to mistrust as such they may even regard that as conspiracy plans to sabotage the peace process (Ho, 2004).

THE CO-EXISTENCE, CO-OPERATION AND TRUST BETWEEN PALESTINIANS AND JEWS FROM OTTOMAN EMPIRE TILL ESTABLISHING OF ISRAEL

Actually, Palestine throughout the early period had a convention of coordinated economic movement on ethnic and religious lines. As long as Palestine was controlled as a solitary budgetary unit, buyers did not need to keep national affiliations. In this matter, Harms and Ferry (2008) found that the Ottoman Empire consisted not just of Turks, but also Arabs, Armenians, Greeks, and Slavs. By this time, the Istanbul was a multinational melting pot of 700,000 citizens representing all three monotheistic faiths. The religious statistics were interesting, though, as 58 percent were Muslim, 32 percent were Christian, and 10 percent were Jewish. It means that in Jerusalem, the adherents of the three monotheistic religions lived in harmony.

At the same time, the British Mandate powers used Jews and Arabs, Muslims and Christians in the same business locales. Bedouin workers and planters worked on Jewish farms settlements and mechanical enterprises. Jewish kibbutzim had Arab neighbors. They may visit the same specialists, enlist the same experts, or live in the same neighborhoods, on the same avenues, or even in the same structures. These, and numerous different, circumstances helped individuals to "coexist" and "cooperate" on non-national levels of class solidarity, common occupation or issues, such as managers and unemployment. For example, that Haifa in 1920 became the site of the most energizing background of class solidarity and bi-national, or even a-national, collaboration is not surprising. It is a city whose Jewish, Christian and Muslim groups were comparable in size. It was additionally the most prosperous town in Palestine, holding the significant government factories. In spite of the fact that there was much to go after in Haifa, there was likewise much to be picked up by the individuals themselves from word related participation and cooperation. In 1920, Palestinians and Jews secured the first trade union in Palestine in the yards and workshops of railway, telegraphic, and postal administrations. In this respect, the British government in Palestine reported that, all through the administration, 1,400 commercial partnerships between Jews and Arabs were fashioned on what the administration characterized as an "Inter Racial Basis" (Pappe, 2004). For more details, see the following:

"In 1935, around 12,000 Arabs (5 percent of Arab wage earners) were employed in the Jewish sector, more than half of them in agriculture, especially in citrus groves; the remainder worked in construction, industry, and services (by comparison, 32,000 Arabs were employed by the mandate

authorities, while 211,000 were either self-employed for working Arab employers).” (Kramer, 2011).

Moreover, the local Palestinian workers could have taken care of the developing requests of the Jewish immigrants, who required channels of venture and use for the capital that they brought with them. One of the clearest manifestations of peaceful coexistence between Palestinians and Israelis was education, despite the fact that the division of society showed itself in the instructive framework, which under the mandate formed into separate Jewish and Arab branches. The Jewish instructive division worked freely of the state schools, which were went to basically by Arab learners. In political terms, in the municipal elections of 1927 and 1934, Arabs took part alongside Jews. For reasons of day to day life, communication between the two groups was so strictly fragmented in numerous spaces that metropolitan decisions were of exceptional priority. They sorted out as indicated by voting booth extents, which in Jerusalem relegated spots to four Muslims, two Christians, and six Jews. However, they were designed in such a way that Jews should likewise vote for Muslim applicants, and the other way around. Regardless of their demonstrations of noncooperation at the national level, the neighborhood elites basically took a sober-minded approach (Kramer, 2011).

Even at the level of lawmaker, Palestinian pioneers were occupied with such intercommoned associations; Haj Amin al-Husseini was a case in point, regarding a pan-Islamic gathering in Jerusalem in 1931 to enroll Muslims and Arabs to help against what he saw as Zionist infringement on Haram al-Sharif. At that point in 1929 he started by building a royal residence for dignitaries. The undertaking was tendered to two Jewish builders, one of them Haim Weizmann's brother-in-law. The mufti was so satisfied with the work that he utilized the same developers to complete some work done on his new house by Palestinian architects.

By contrast, Kelman (2005) saw that both sides feared to trust each other in order not to put their own existence into danger as efforts to conflict resolution is in dilemma thus there cannot be a peace process without trust and vice versa. It is naïve to take an enemy's good will or interest in making peace as a given, as this violates the norms of intense conflict relationships. Further, Benny Morris (2009) stated that the history of bloodshed between Israelis and Palestinians has eliminated the possibility that the two groups may live together in peace.

From all above, the researcher infers that there was wide gap between the Palestinian political discourse and the reality on the ground, as well as the social needs for coexistence peacefully and the untrue factors which drive people toward the hatred and chronic conflict. Furthermore the researcher considers the Palestinians from the lower to upper level class had a status of “cognitive dissonance/cacophony” between what they believe and they practice, or in any event, they have “Religious-Political Schizophrenia” case.

THE “ROAD” FOR “HATRED” AND “WAR” BETWEEN “ABRAHAMIC COUSINS”

In fact, Arabs-Muslims not able to differentiate between Jews and Zionists, or anti- Zionism, anti-Judaism, and anti-Semitism, regarding the Zionists talked for the sake of the Jewish people on the

loose, not of political gathering or the Jewish Yishuv in Palestine. The Zionist commission and the Jewish agency were universal Jewish associations through which even non-Zionist Jews got included with the Zionist cause. In any case, the researcher concurs with Inbar (2009) where he contended that the Arab-Israeli clash transformed through two principles arranged; the first in 1917-48 was described by a collective battle, setting two unique ethnic groups against one another over a solitary parcel of land. The second stage was started with Israel's foundation and the resulting ambushes by the armed forces of the encompassing Arab nations on the new substance.

Since and after 1948, the relation between the two ethnics turned from living and co-existed peacefully into hatred and clash between them. So the researcher considers the 1948 war completely changed the path and the history of the Palestinian-Israel conflict, besides increasing of hostility sense between each other. However, Aref Pasha Dajani, for example, a Palestinian leader from Jerusalem notified that “it is impossible to live with the Jews. In all the countries where they are at present, not wanted, because they always arrive to suck the blood of everybody. If the League of Nations will not listen to the appeal of the Arabs, this country will become a river of blood.” Moreover, Jamal Husseini announced that if the U.N. tried to implement partition, “the blood will flow like rivers in the middle east” (Palestinians were very fond of the “river of blood” metaphor). In a related context, Stern (2011) stated that it didn't matter that European Jews came with capital and expertise, began enterprises, reclaimed agriculture lands that had lain barren for centuries - all of which brought significant material benefits to the Arabs of Palestine and raised their standard to the highest in the region. None of this mattered because Palestinian leaders remained obsessed with one issue and one issue only: the Jewish interlopers must never allow sharing the land or achieving political sovereignty.

Therefore the researcher believes that there were four bloody historical events caused and led to the hatred, separation “apartheid”, and ended – logically - any attempt for peaceful co-existence between the two sides; three of them were originally from the Palestinian hand but the fourth from the Israeli one; Nabi Musa riots 1920, the Wailing Wall riots 1929, the Arab revolt 1936-39 and the ethnic cleansing of Palestine from March 1948 to January 1949. All were as indicated briefly below:

THE NABI MUSA RIOTS OF APRIL 1920 IN JERUSALEM, AND JAFFA RIOTS OF MAY 1921

There are two significant facts about Islam; firstly, Islam reveres Moses and Jesus and provides for co-existence with Jews as well as Christians as “the People of the Book”. Secondly, each monotheistic religion (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) is comprised of several sects and certainly many differences between each of them. All share just in the title of its religion. For instance, Islam had 73 sects. Exclusively and certainly too, the correct, moderate and conservative one is the Sunni sect - its followers just follow the holy Quran, Sunnah (Hadith) and Unanimity of Muslim scholars (Ejmaa Ulamaa), all through the understanding of the prophet's friends (Sahabah). However, the extremist, radical and bloody sects are Kharijist (they consider all Muslims disbelievers/atheists) and Shia (they believe that all Sunnis hypocrites and Shii must kill them to gain paradise) - both Kharijist and Shies use religious discourse to achieve their political purposes under the name of Islam and “Allah” (completely same Hamas, Muslim Brotherhood and Hezbollah). On the other

hand, the Sufi sect are interesting in various forms of “wrong way” of worship; festivals and pilgrimage to shrines “maqam” of their saints (not to the Kaaba in Mecca, to ask those dead the assistance rather than God “Allah”).

By 1920, the clash that had been developing between the Arabs and Zionists reached a crucial stage and Arab riots grew up around Jerusalem throughout the Nabi Musa pilgrimage challenging the project of the Jewish national home. On the weekend of 2-4 April 1920, the yearly Sufi celebration around the shrine of Nabi Musa which is at the same time as Good Friday and the Jewish Sabbath. On that Sunday, battling broke out between Jews and Arabs pilgrims from Hebron who were parading through Jaffa Gate, which is one of the fundamental passageways into old city of Jerusalem. Various Arabs and Jews were captured and consequently discharged whereupon further battling occurred. Throughout the battling, nine individuals were slaughtered, 22 were severely injured and 220 individuals were daintily injured (Kattan, 2009).

For more elucidation, in 1920 the celebration fell in that week as both Orthodox Easter and Passover, and Jerusalem was packed with pilgrims. Prayer to God at al-Aqsa Mosque was some piece of Sufi journey and on their path to the mosque, numerous explorers would cross the Jewish Quarter in Jerusalem. On April 4, 1920, viciousness against its Jewish occupants (the vast majority of them were parts of the old Yishuv, who generally had no sensitivity to Zionism, on the grounds that the Arabs saw no difference amongst Jews and Zionists) after various Muslim dignitaries, from leader Musa Kazim al-Husaini to the adolescent Amin al-Husaini, had given political talks calling for rejecting the Balfour Declaration. Amin al-Husaini is said to have indicated the swarm a picture of Feisal and to have shouted out: "this is your king" (Kramer, 2011).

Unexpectedly, the uproars of May 1921, which cost around one hundred human lives, had Jews and Arabs in just about equivalent numbers, according to Kramer (2011), and were of an altogether different character. They broke out while throughout the May Day parade supporters of the communist party “Mopsi”, which then only Jewish, walked from Jaffa toward Tel Aviv. On their route they conflicted with demonstrators of the Zionist Ahdut Haavoda. At the point when the police shot everywhere to scatter the mob, Arab spectators thought Jews were shooting at them. The communists at last crashed into the blended Jewish-Arab Manshiyya Quarter of Jaffa, where they entered into a battle with neighborhood Arabs who moved to destroy Jewish stores and foundations in Jaffa. This incorporated a migrants' inn run by the Zionist commission that housed both men and ladies and were accordingly viewed by numerous neighborhood Arabs as a hotbed of bad habits.

On the other side, during and after those two mobs in 1920 and 1921, the British response to both of them was completely different. To analyze the reason for Nabi Musa riot, the British military in Egypt created a court of inquiry by Major General Plain, while Samuel Herbert secured the Haycraft Commission of inquiry to inspect the reasons for the aggravations in Jaffa riots in 1921.

THE WAILING WALL RIOTS 1929

Due to the immigrant religious Jews in 1928, they raised a screen to separate male from female worshipers celebrating Yom Kippur at the Wall. This activity elevated pressures in Palestine over

Jewish migration as bits of gossip, engendered by Hajj Amin, circled about Jews wanting to assume control over the Temple Mount. About the birthplaces of the 1929 Riots, the Mandate government expressed that:

“The conflict of claims, Jewish and Arab, as to the right at the Wailing Wall continued to afford opportunity for disorder. On the Arab side there is suspicion of any Jewish act in the vicinity of the wall, coupled with resentment of the provincial regulations issued by the high commissioner, which are interpreted by certain Moslems as giving authority for Jewish devotions of congregational character which, in the Moslem view, have no sanction. On the Jewish side resentment is caused by acts of Moslems which are not within the ambit of the provisional regulations of the high commissioner and which tend to make devotions, either private or public, impossible to fulfill.” (Mitchell, 2007).

In short, in 1929, al-Husseini framed his paramilitary development, which impelled savagery, especially in thickly populated urban regions where Jews and Arabs existed in perilous vicinity, such as in the old quarters of Jerusalem, Safad and Hebron. This implied at the same time calling for the barrier of Jerusalem and debilitating immediate movement on the ground. However, the Palestinian masses found this sort of co-picked patriotism inconceivable. They existed close to the blessed places and saw Jews begging there in exceptional numbers, which they saw as a major aspect of a bigger plan to Islamize Palestine. A minor occurrence concerning request to God plans close to the Wailing Wall, started brutality that soon flared throughout Palestine in general in 1929. Altogether, 300 Jews and a comparative number of Palestinians were executed (Pappe, 2004). After that:

“A Palestinian protest at the Wall spread to neighboring cities and resulted in the death of 133 Jews and 116 Palestinians. This violence had important implications in the context of the histories of the two peoples. To the Jews these killings were reminiscent of the European pogroms and convinced many that a Jewish minority would never be safe in Palestine. For the Palestinians, the killings reaffirmed the notion that the aim of the Zionists was to steal land and destroy the Palestinian people” (Taylor-Weiner, 2009).

In this regard, the British response was by sending the Shaw Commission in 1929, which was sent to Palestine to uncover the reasons for the reaction against the British government and its pro-Zionist arrangement, which reached a peak in the slaughter of the Jewish population of Hebron. The Shaw Commission's discoveries were that the Arabs now saw in the Jewish movement a threat to their means of living, as well as a conceivable overlord later on (Penziner, 2004).

THE ARAB REVOLT 1936-39

In October 1936, the Arab higher committee pronounced a general strike and composed across the country demonstrations, the vital one held in Jerusalem, where something like two thousand demonstrators accumulated inside the walls of the Old City. The showings got more brutal three weeks after the fact, when British police opened fire on demonstrators in Jaffa (Pappe, 2004).

Meanwhile the disobedience was headed by Haj Amin al-Hesseini, The resistance constrained the British to understand that they couldn't disregard the diversions of Palestinians without confronting fierce backlash. These additions took a swing at a generous expense to the Palestinian individuals. Throughout the three years of defiance, ten for every penny of the grown-up Palestinian male populace had been executed, injured, detained or banished. A high extent of the Arab losses had been parts of the Palestinian administration and accomplished military officers. Furthermore, throughout the resistance, the British enlisted and prepared Jews to help stifle the Arab revolt. The misfortune of Palestinian military officers, coupled with the preparation of new Jewish strengths made an influence differential between the two gatherings, which has kept on growing until today (Taylor-Weiner, 2009).

However Ben-Ami clarified in his work (2005) that the Arab revolt in 1936-39 was what it was a battle until the very end, a war for individual and national survival between two opposing national groups vying for the same land. All the well-intentioned or sober minded thoughts of the past about coexistence, a federal or a bi-national state were put to rest. It would have to be "them or us". In short:

“During the revolt of 1936-39 that the intractable nature of the conflict as a profound clash between two national movements driven by diametrically opposed objectives and by irreconcilable beliefs became patently clear even to the moderates and idealistic dreamers among the Zionist leaders. The revolt was the prelude to what increasingly became an inevitable all-out war between Jews and Arabs for the exclusive ownership of Palestine. partition and separation were also fed and enhanced by the cultivation of the image of a brutal Arab enemy that was not susceptible to dialogue and compromise.....To the Israelis the message of the Arab Revolt 1936-39 was that coexistence was out of the question and it was either the Arabs or the Jews, but not both.”

At the same context, many researchers consider that the Arab Revolt was the “point of no return,” In the wake of the Arab revolt of 1936, and the expect that the two groups would never live together in a bi-ethnic state, the British chose to investigate dividing Palestine. At that point the Royal (Peel) Commission was sent to Palestine to analyze the reason for the rebellion and make proposals for future British arrangement in Palestine (Penziner, 2004).

THE ETHNIC CLEANSING OF PALESTINE: THE WAR FROM EXPULSION POLICY, BRUTAL MASSACRES TO JUDAIZING LANDMARKS; MARCH 1948-JANUARY 1949

As a human being and a historian, I feel much bitterness and shame when I review “ethnic cleansing” events elsewhere in our world. In any war, ethnic or religious violence should first be through the political and diplomatic channels, then, after the failing of all peace negotiations and attempts, perhaps it becomes to blows fighters and armies, but not with civilians, regardless of who is indigenous or newcomer. Moreover, humanity will not accept any excuses or justifications from the murders under any current titles, reasons, or even historical enmity or retaliation.

Actually the researcher proved and affirmed in his two previous works, titled “the Israeli Experience” part one and two, that the Jews/Israelis had historical and religious rights to their promised land “Eretz-Israel”. In addition the researcher (and most writers) condemned the “Nazi”

aggression against the Jewish people in the “Holocaust” in Europe during the Second World War (and certainly all of us sympathize with the Jews in that historical disaster) because of our relation as a “human being”. By contrast, nobody will support or agree with the Israeli soldiers in any aggression and massacres against the civilians and Palestinian population during and after the 1948 war.

While the drums of the 1948 war started by scattered, arbitrary and uncontrolled clashes between the two cousins, Arabs and Israelis, the day following the UN partition plan was acknowledged by the General Assembly. The Yishuv's pioneers and the military commanders of Hagana arranged a plan (which known by plan D) as an endeavor to arrange the Jewish deliberations.

Moreover, this arrangement was meant to cleanse (or rinse) the future Jewish state of whatever number Palestinian as could be allowed. The principle Jewish military energy was the Hagana, which had a few detachments. Each unit received a list of villages it was to conquer. The majorities of towns were bound to be devastated, and in extremely extraordinary cases troopers were requested to abandon them in place. Likewise, a portion of the brigades were to take part in the assumption of control of the blended Arab-Jewish towns of Palestine and their environs. This implied - according to Pappé (2004) - occupation and expulsion of Palestinian populace. In April 1948, the Jewish powers had executed the Dir Yassin massacre, a generally-exposed bloodbath. The local people were threatened, and further scared by removal set off by Jewish drives in Arab neighborhoods and pestered by expert marksman all around. Not many Palestinians stayed in the city, and their leaders considered the Jewish offer to stay misleading and tricky.

In this matter, a few slaughters were submitted close to the blended towns, some of the time in striking back for Palestinian strike on Jewish caravans; however, frequently there were unmitigated demonstrations of severity. They may have been intended to, as they inevitably did, energy Palestinians living in ranges falling into Jewish hands to escape under the danger of death or expulsion. These atrocities were not arbitrarily dedicated; they were some piece of an expert plan to free the future Jewish state of whatever number Palestinians as would be prudent. As indicated by plan "D", no less imperative than the arrangement was the environment formed which prepared for an ethnic cleansing operation in Palestine. When the British left in May, one-third of the Palestinian populace was officially expelled. Furthermore Pappé (2004) considered that:

“during the early phases of the removal of the indigenous population, a depopulation that was assisted by a first wave of about 70,000 Palestinians belonging to the social and economic elite of the country, who had fled Palestine by January 1948. In May 1948 the number of troops (including those from neighboring Arab countries) was equal in each side 100,000, but for instance in the Jewish side, the Hagana and Palmach, were well trained soldiers, have more war experience and better equipped, facing the Palestinians with poor arms and hardly any military discipline or experience and divided into factional units owing their allegiance to clans, or at best to ideological parties. On the way of establishing Israel state, more than 64 Palestinian villages out of 370 villages in the heart of rural Palestine wiped out or almost complete disappearance by the Israeli forces. Where the armed Israeli soldiers surrounded each village on three sides, and put the villagers to flight through the fourth side. In many cases if the people refused to leave, they were forced onto lorries, and driven away to the West Bank.”

The Israeli operations in Galilee and Negev were focused around methodical arrangement of ejection, while other Israeli detachments utilized comparable methodologies for Judaizing the new state. The precise perspective was in the strategies utilized, first threatening the populace, executing a couple to actuate others to leave, and afterward welcoming an authority trustee to survey the estimation of area and property in the abandoned towns or neighborhoods. As an aftereffect of the 1948 war, out of something like 850,000 Palestinians living in the domains assigned by the UN as a Jewish state, just 160,000 stayed on or close-by their property and homes. The individuals who remained turned into the Palestinian minority in Israel. The rest (700,000) were casted out or fled under the risk of expulsion, and a couple of thousands kicked the bucket in massacres. In short, 75% of a million Palestinians became displaced people (refugees). So regarding to this tragedy, the modern Israeli historian Ben-Ami (2005) expressed that:

“In the Israeli side, it would describe that cultured officers had turned into base murderers and this not in the heat battle....but out of a system of expulsion and destruction; the less Arabs remained, the better; this principle is the political motor for the expulsions and the atrocities”.

Toward the “Palestinian dilemma”, when independence of Israel state was announced on 15 May 1948, the outskirts of the new state were well past those of parcel UN partition plan 1947. Four out of the five blended Jewish-Arab urban communities, namely Tiberias, Haifa, Safed, and Jaffa, were by this time exhausted of their Arab tenants, and more than a hundred Arab towns had been assumed control. Despite the fact that the Jews acknowledged Resolution 181, which was prepared and decently conveyed to face a war ought that this be the result, and the Arabs, who rejected the Resolution and made no secret of their expectation to subvert it, were not in any way ready for war. Then again, as opposed to securing the stronghold of a Palestinian state along the lines of Resolution 181, there was to a lesser degree a thought process in the Arab pioneers who sent their armed forces to Palestine for making their regional claims or frustrating their adversaries in the Arab coalition. By contrast, to the Israeli leaders – such as Ben-Gurion the war was not pretty much the physical survival of a little Jewish state, it was about the success, the ownership and the settlement of the land (Pappe;2004).

Toward the politically-sanctioned racial segregation, the Israelis had won the 1948 war for survival and required new lands. At that point, Ben-Gurion pronounced that the Jews did not need to purchase any more, just conquer land. He likewise stated that relinquished Arab towns were required to be settled by Jews even before the end of hostilities. Settling the area in a manner that made Jewish contiguity and demographic prevalence never-ending was an undertaking to be executed after triumph (Ben-Ami 2005).

In brief, the 1948 war between the Israelis and Palestinians went through several steps; a clash between the two communities, terrorizing and expelling indigenous people, massacres and destroying villages by Israeli bulldozers, and finally Judaizing the state by re-cultivating the Palestinian land, building a new Jewish settlement, and Hebridization all the original Arab place names.

THE BRITISH, ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN TARGET TILL THE 1948 WAR; “PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE” OR “APARTHEID”?

In this section, it will be useful to review the target of the three sides in the land of Palestine, namely British, Jews, and Palestinians who were in conflict during the mandate time till founding of the state of Israel in 1948:

The British target during the mandate of Palestine till the UN partition plan 1947

Historically, British rule in Palestine started when General Sir Edmund Allenby marched into Jerusalem on 11 December 1917, and the British mandate was instrumental in defining Palestine and in placing it on the world map (El-Eini, 2006). In total, Britain ruled Palestine for over 30 years between 1917 and 1948. Thus the researcher considers that the British Mandate period over Palestine is divided into four stages; first the military rule from December 1917 to June 1920; second, the civilian rule from July 1920 to September 1923; third, the administrative rule from 29 September 1923 to 28 November 1947. While the fourth includes the success in achieving its final and main goals from the occupying the land after the first world war, which specified by; re-mapping the Middle East (especially the Levant “Greater Syria”, Iraq and “Arab” Gulf States), protecting the (Christian) holy sites in Jerusalem, supporting the Jewish dream by re-establishing their “homeland” in Palestine, and finally partitioning the land of South Syria “Palestine” into: Jordan, Israel and small Palestinian scattered and ungoverned cantons.

In this respect, Britain adopted dual obligations toward the two peoples; for the Palestinians, Britain promised the Arabs of self-determination thus the rights to rule themselves, and at the same time promised the Israelis “Jewish national home’ in Palestine.

Over and above, to achieve its targets, Britain established several commissions for various missions from 1917 to 1947; some of them for re-fashioning and re-creation new Middle East after the First World War such as; Sykes-Picot agreement 1916, and King Crane Commission 1919, the British Mandate 1919-1922, and the Treaty of Lausanne 1923. While some commissions for separating the Arab world from the Ottoman Empire (an attempt for Arab independence) like; Hussein-McMahon correspondence 1915, and Peace Conference in Paris 1919. In same context, the Balfour Declaration 1917, the Haycraft Commission of Inquiry 1921, (in general) the Churchill White Paper 1922 and the Macdonald Letter 1931 (in general), have all reflected clearly the British support to create the “Jewish National Home” in Palestine.

On the other hand, some of them like; the Shaw “Report” Commission 1929, the Hope-Simpson Commission 1930, and the Passfield White Paper 1930, all to organize the purchase and sale of the land between the Palestinians and Jews, and also to discover the reasons for conflict between the two sides. Finally, another one’s for partitioning the land: the Churchill White Paper 1922, an ad hoc commission to Palestine 1930, the Palestine Royal Commission (or Peel Commission) 1937, Woodhead Commission 1938, the White Paper 1939, the United Nations Conference at San Francisco 1945 (totally and gradually led to the partition of Palestine), and UN partition plan (UNSCOP) 1947.

Diplomatically, Britain mediated between the Palestinians and Israelis, because the mediation is one of the most widespread techniques for preventing conflict and promoting cooperation; moreover, the mediators can facilitate cooperation by building trust between two parties (Kydd, 2006). In addition, the British authorities were isolated in their disposition to Zionism; those with sensitivity to it helped it to further its cause, although hostile authorities attempted to tip the equalization and aid the Palestinians, unwittingly along these lines fortifying Zionism as a national movement (Pappe, 2004). However, a few eyewitnesses perceived that:

“The English want to be just, and try to be just, in Palestine. But they feel at home with the Arabs as they do not and probably never can, feel at home with the Jews. These Arab are natives in the real sense of the word. They behave as the English have found natives behaving in other parts of the earth. They are indigenious to their own strange soil. Therefore the English know what to do with them and how to treat them. They can play their pipes as they have played them in a hundred lands....the English, as the governing authorities of Palestine, do not like the Jews as a subject population. In fact, they do not know what to make of them, as in all their imperial experience they have never had to deal with people of just this kind before. As comprising a part, and a large part of the inhabitants of the country, the Jews must of course be classified as natives. But they do not seem like natives. They are acquainted with western culture; they are themselves cultured, in the true English sense of the word; many of them speak the English language, and are familiar with English ways. They are not submissive, and obedient, and grateful for benefits received...the Jews trouble-makers....and thus are regarded by the English” (Kramer, 2011).

Unexpectedly, Britain rose up out of World War II extremely poor and not able to back the administration required to regulate the Palestine Mandate. Further, after World War II, the choice to put Palestine under United Nations control was because of unlawful Jewish migration, increasing anxiety in Arab nations, and the general powerlessness of the British government to settle the circumstances. The United Nations acknowledged the thought of partitioning Palestine. On the other hand, on May 14, 1948, the British government finished its Mandate, Israel announced its autonomy, and the Arab nations were ambushed.

THE ISRAELI TARGET FROM THE FIRST ALIYAH 1982 TO 1949

Absolutely, for all Jews, Israel is just not a place or historical homeland but to them is a place of heaven where they feel secure and avoid discrimination and where the culture of Jews could be flourishing. Thus they had desire without any limit for their chronicled "Jewish" state; the endorsement of partition along the lines of resolution 181 by Ben-Gurion was basically a strategic move. As he said, does anyone truly feel that the first significance of the Balfour Declaration and the command, and in reality, that of the millenarian longing of the Jewish individuals, was not that of securing a Jewish state in the entirety of Eretz-Israel? In addition, the Israeli mentality became something like the following:

“To Ben-Gurion; “there are no final settlements in history; there are no external borders, and no political demands are final. We shall still see great changes in the world”. Whilst, to Yigal Allon, - who was the most influential general in the 1948 war- “the borders of partition cannot be for us the final borders.....the partition plan is a compromise plan that is unjust to the Jews....we are

entitled to decide our borders according to our defense needs". Moreover, for Israel Galili –the chief of staff of the Haganah-; "we are fighting and we shall fight for all the lands that were possessed by the Jewish settlement so far.....the borders of our state will be defined by the limits of our force.....the political borders will be those of the territories that we shall be able to liberate from the enemy; the borders will be the fruit of our conquests." (Ben-Ami, 2005).

In fact, all Zionists and Jews had one dream and goal; "Homeland in the whole of Palestine". Further, both two ideological wings of Zionism imagined Palestine as the land of the Jewish people. For instance, the socialist larger part strove to understand the Zionist dream by true politic, while the revisionist minority possessed themselves with utopian dreams of past greatness, used radical talk about the need to make a future kingdom of Israel extending as far as the eastern border of Transjordan. However, the central inspiration for the Zionist drive for autonomy 1929-48 was a craving to have however much control as could be expected over the area and markets. The steady stress over having 'enough land", which developed into a national insanity in the state of Israel, had existed since the early 1920s. For example, before the end of the 1930s, 40% of expenditures of the general use funds in the Jewish agency were used to buy of land and for agriculture colonization, and something like 75% of general financing was appropriated for that reason. Moreover, for Israeli leaders, the land was all; it was the asset on which adolescent Jews would settle and prepare as fighters, laborers, and ranchers (Pappe, 2004). For these reasons and others Ben-Gurion's declared was that;

"We did not come here to expel the Arabs...but to build, but building implicitly meant evicting and expelling.....Arabs did not deserve to possess the land for they were "incapable" of reviving the land and restoring it from ruin.....we both want Palestine, and this is the fundamental conflict" (Ben-Ami, 2005).

Over and above, many historians take into consideration that the parcel of the land of Palestine would not provide for the Zionists on a silver platter; it must be wrested by energy from the British. It was the most distinguished accomplishment a standout amongst the most splendidly effective national endeavors of the twentieth century. In aggregate:

"The Zionists finally achieved the charter of international legitimacy that Herzl had established as the central objective of the movement from the moment he conceived it as a political enterprise. The Arabs were defeated by the Zionists' remarkable persistence and by their extraordinary capacity to combine military means with diplomatic savoir faire. The Zionists' bold creation of facts on the ground and construction of the institutions of the future state were now complemented by a skillful manipulation of the Jewish catastrophe..... A sense of realism and the unique capacity of the Zionist mainstream leadership to respond to changing historical conditions made the Jewish state possible." (Ben-Ami, 2005).

The Palestinian target from the end of First World War till 1949

Undoubtedly, the Palestinian dilemma since the emergence of the national movement until the expelling of the Palestinians in 1948-49 was due to a lack of a clear vision or specific goal for its people. Aside from, the Palestinians already ruled by Egypt and Jordan from 1948 until 1967, with no any national attempt to establish an independent state.

The most wonderful thing that the Palestinian nationalist notables endeavored to spare Greater Syria venture, rather than "Palestinian state", utilizing mass theater creations and daily papers trying to show broad backing for Faisal in Palestine. Per their targets and mentality, the two distributed daily papers in Southern Syria; the name Palestine was to take in Faisal's future kingdom, while the other one called Filastin was established by conventional Christians in Jaffa in 1909. They called for an autonomous Palestine (Pappe, 2004).

Throughout the Arabs' clumsy period of authority, their absence of target and national attachment ended up being a significant partner of the Zionist endeavor. Where Arab landowners primed to sell land to the Jews and to double-cross their own particular national cause were never in short supply (landowners, among them key patriot figures, some of them even parts of Supreme Muslim Council, helped encourage the Zionist enterprise). However the lands were sold to the Jews by the noblest families among the Palestinians, like the Husseinis, Nashashibis, and Abdel Hadi family, El-Alamis, Al-Shawas and the Shukeiris, among numerous others.

At the same meaning, vital Palestinian families like the Nashashibis, the Slimans and the Tukans had confidence in a Transjordan choice, and would in reality achieve high positions in the Jordanian administration after the war. The wonder was widespread to the point that one is directed to the conclusion that Palestinian patriotism was either not yet an undeniable desire for all Arabs living in Palestine, or that it essentially implied an alternate thing to the individuals who did not take after the initiative of the activist Husseinis. Much of the time family relations, tribal loyalties and the connection to the town as opposed to a vague national domain turned out to be stronger than the steadfastness to a nebulous Palestinian regional group. Numerous among the collaborators essentially accepted that they were protecting the Palestinian national enthusiasm by declining to second the mufti's self-destructive diplomacy of "all or nothing":

"The question of Palestinian collaborators with Zionism and later the state of Israel is no anecdotal matter in the history of the struggle for Palestine. Arguably, without the assistance given by Palestinian collaborators to Zionist movement, the entire map of Jewish settlements, and consequently that the state of Israel, would have been substantially different. Palestinian Arabs helped the Zionist cause not only by selling land to Jews, but also by actively assisting the British and Zionists in repressing the Arab Revolt, and later by collaborating with the Yishuv In the 1948 war. Entire sections of Palestinian front during that conflict collapsed and capitulated, thanks largely to the work of collaborators." (Ben-Ami, 2005).

CONTRIBUTIONS

It has usually been said that the Arab-Israeli conflict is continuous because it involves two competing nations vowing to control the same territory. The conflict between the ideologies of the two Abrahamic religions is ancient and subject to further examination in order to determine a better position for analyzing reasons for the conflict. One question is inevitable: how can all people live together?

For many years, scholars have debated the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from the beginning until the present day. At first glance, it may seem that there are many different point of views dealing with this issue. In addition, people have failed to notice the significance of studying the Palestinian Dilemma and the Palestinian-Israeli mentality and separatism attitude, taking into account the Psycho-Political reasons behind the incredible story of unsteady relations until 1949.

Therefore, this research proposes to examine and answer number of questions that are addressed in this paper including: first, what were the factors behind changing relations between the Israelis and Palestinians from coexistence to hatred, separation, and expulsion of one group from the land in a form of Apartheid, in one of the most unsolved and incredible conflicts from 1914-49. Second, what were the historical events which caused the hatred between the two sides to last until 1949?

However, the researcher has considered the expression the "Palestinian Dilemma" in the political research, as debated in four works;

Palestinian Dilemma "Part one": "Which Piece of Land do you mean?" The Arab Mentality from Islamization, Palestinianization, to Cantonization; Palestinian Dilemma;

Palestinian Dilemma "Part two": Historical Tutelage.....or.....Political Guardianship! The Palestinian attitude toward national sovereignty till 1967;

Palestinian Dilemma "Part Three": The Leaderless 1918-48; Whenever the Enemy selects his Enemy's Leader! Besides the present study; and

Palestinian Dilemma "Part four": Coexisting.....Hatred.....Separating.....Expulsion.....Apartheid; Incredible story in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict 1914-49.

In the short term, there have several studies, books, and findings related to this conflict, but this study addresses the Palestinian dilemma with four psychological phases between the Abrahamic cousins from the end of the Ottoman period until 1949. Further, this paper attempts to fill the academic gaps of all previous works regarding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The researcher hopes that this study can drive to establish a preliminary view to ameliorate hostility and hatred between the two groups.

CONCLUSION

This study concludes that the conflict between the Palestinian and Israelis is classified and marked by unsteady case. The starting point between them was coexistence, after that turning into hatred, and finally both turning to separatism. This was followed by war between them and expulsion policy from the land by the hand of one of them toward the other side, to finally become apartheid between both forever.

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