THE GENESIS, DYNAMICS AND EFFECTS OF THE CIVIL WAR IN SOUTH SUDAN

Mr. Darlington Mutanda
University of Zimbabwe, History Department- War and Strategic Studies Unit
P. O. Box MP 167 Mt Pleasant, Harare
MPhil student and Assistant Lecturer in the War and Strategic Studies Unit at the University of Zimbabwe

ABSTRACT: *South Sudan is in deep trouble despite the armistice signed on 9 May 2014. What promised to be a peaceful independent state suddenly descended into chaos and bloodshed. The key goal of this paper is to highlight how the struggle for power in Africa's newest state casts darkness on the future of the nation and the continent at large. Despite competition for power being the crux of the matter, the conflict was aggravated by the fact that it contained ethnic overtones, an aspect dominant in the whole economic spectrum of the country.*

KEYWORDS: South Sudan, Civil War, Ethnicity, Political Instability, National Interests, Humanitarian Crisis

INTRODUCTION

Africa as a whole is in chaos. Corruption is rampant and this poses a huge obstacle to economic growth. Bribes are solicited as if that is the normal thing to do. Leaders overtly castigate the practice, but take little action to curb the rot. According to Mulinge and Lesetedi, corruption in sub-Saharan Africa has reached cancerous proportions thus making it a matter of global concern. [1] The problem of corruption in the continent was aptly summarised by the two authors when they asserted that: It has permeated virtually all institutions, both public and private, and governmental and non-governmental, and become a way of life and a principal method for the accumulation of private property. The practice is not restricted to one particular group. It involves people from all levels of life including professionals for whom the vice has made it impossible for them to regulate themselves through their professional bodies. [2]

In addition to corruption, the HIV and AIDS pandemic has threatened to wipe out the remnant left on the continent. According to UNAIDS, of the 34 million people living with HIV in the world, 23, 5 live in sub-Saharan Africa. South Africa is the worst affected with 5, 6 million people infected, followed by Nigeria and Tanzania with 3 million and 1, 6 million respectively. [3] Kenya shares the same figure with Tanzania. Uganda and Mozambique have 1, 4 million apiece whereas Zimbabwe has 1, 2 million people infected with the virus. Other countries like Zambia and Ethiopia are below the million mark (UNAIDS 2013: 7). [4] What it therefore implies is that the

disease imposes serious strains on the budgets of African countries and presents a serious threat to human security because it takes away life more than war itself.

While admitting that corruption and HIV and AIDS are grave hindrances to the development of the continent, the occurrence and recurrence of civil wars is a real security (human and state) concern. Regardless of the fact that conflict scares away investors and tourists, the death and suffering of civilians at the hands of fellow armed countrymen gives no clue as to what Africa holds for future generations. Past and ongoing civil wars in countries like Angola, South Africa, Mozambique, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Libya, Cote D'Ivoire, Central Africa Republic, Mali, Somalia, Nigeria and recently South Sudan to mention but a few points to the fact that armed conflict is still a perennial problem on the continent which should be adequately dealt with for the good of its inhabitants.

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a change from global aggression to civil wars over diverse issues such as justice, political representation, security, self-determination and resources.[5] As confirmed by the South Sudan civil war, the dreadful aspect about modern wars is that they significantly impact on civilians by obliterating homes, agriculture systems, contaminating their water, land and air and killing or injuring old people, women, children and parents. Rape, torture, imprisonment, brutality, starvation, trauma and disease are major characteristics of these wars. In the aftermath of such violence, societies are left angry and disillusioned, seeking retribution and revenge to pay back perpetrators. This inevitably perpetuates the cycle of violence, thereby prolonging and continuing the violence.[6] In the case of South Sudan, ethnic dimensions of the conflict mostly contributed to reprisal attacks.[7]

Using the Collier and Hoeffler model, the paper examines the genesis, dynamics and impact of the civil war in South Sudan. The model helps to probe deeply into the problem of civil wars and propose what could be done to create a continent ripe for peace and prosperity. All hope is not lost though if continental fathers and mothers knit their efforts together for the common good of Africa. Problems in South Sudan generally reflect the chaotic nature of the international system where nations are driven by national interests.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Several theories and explanations have been put forward to account for the occurrence and recurrence of civil wars in Africa, but one thing for sure is that the dilemma is too complicated to be explained in a straightforward manner. The research by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in 2000 revealed that "Africa is the most conflict ridden region of the World and the only region in which the number of armed conflicts is on the increase".[8] The Collier-Hoeffler econometric model of civil war is particularly essential in analysing the civil war in South Sudan. The argument by Collier and Hoeffler is that greediness not grievances leads to civil wars because civil wars normally occur when rebel groups are able to build large organisations, and

such organisations require substantial financial resources both to meet their payrolls and to purchase armaments.[9] Collier and Hoeffler refute political science literature which attributes the occurrence of civil wars to motives, that is, rebellion occurs when grievances are sufficiently acute that people want to engage in violent protest.[10] Mutanda citing Collier and Hoeffler (2004) asserted that the financial viability of the rebels can be a result of backing from the diaspora living in developed countries or from hostile governments or Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).[11] South Sudan is rich in oil and this offers the rebels an incentive to carry on with the fighting regardless of the consequences. The division of Sudan in 2011 placed three quarters of the country's oil in an independent South Sudan, although the infrastructure required to export the oil remains in the north.[12]

While the Collier and Hoeffler model is helpful in comprehending the prevalence of civil wars in Africa, especially South Sudan, it is simply not adequate to account for the occurrence of civil conflicts on the continent. It therefore becomes imperative to contextualise the place in which these conflicts (specifically civil wars) precipitate. If we take, for example, the civil wars which were fought in Africa during the decolonisation process, the model would not apply under the just war theory. Despite, the civil war in Mali (2012-2013)[13] and the ongoing conflict between the Nigerian government and Northern extremists called Boko Haram could be attributed to religious extremism although other factors can come into play. On the other hand, ethnic fractionalisation significantly and negatively results in the outbreak of with civil war in Africa (Anyanwu 2002: 9).[14] More so, democracy reduces the onset of civil war in Africa.[15] The causes of civil wars in Africa are multifaceted and it therefore follows that no single explanation can account for the outbreak of civil wars on the continent. The Collier and Hoeffler model is, however, more appealing in the case of South Sudan considering the motives of the rebels as shall be explicated in the paper.

Background to the conflict
When analysing the causes of conflict, it is helpful to differentiate between the deep underlying causes that created the grounds for potential conflict and the immediate causes.[16] The South Sudan civil war is traceable back to 1955 when Sudan was trapped in a bloody civil conflict. She later gained her independence in 1956 after a long rule by Anglo-Egyptian regimes. Colonialism laid roots of the conflict in Sudan. Sudan had been officially divided into two areas: the North and the South.[17] Sudan's first civil war was fought from 1955-1972 when southern insurgents, called the Anya Nya, fought against the government of Sudan (GOS) for greater autonomy.[18] In 1971, the rebel group combined into the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM), the precursor to the modern Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). The war was concluded by the Addis Ababa Agreement signed in 1972 between SSLM and GOS, which granted significant regional autonomy to southern Sudan.[19]

From 1983 to 2005 Sudan became entangled in another brutal civil war. Under the leadership of John Garang, the Southerners sought independence from the North under the direction of the party's political and military wings called Sudan People Liberation Movement/Army. Garang

succeeded in recruiting fighters in Sudan's most marginalised and peripheral regions, especially South Kordofan, popularly known as "Nuba" by outsiders.[20] South Kordofan, the centre of conflict between the central government and the rebels is home to some 100 distinct non-Arab tribes, each with its own language and homelands, some limited to as small an area as one rocky mountain.[21] The grievances of the Southerners are well documented. One of the most pressing problems was that the development of the North was proportional to the underdevelopment of the South. Since 1956, the Southerners suffered harsh policies such as land-grabbing by investors in commercial farming, and attempts to supplant local cultures with the Arab-African culture of the northern Nile Valley.[22] Despite producing a huge chunk of the country's oil, the South found its situation becoming more deplorable. The central government created paramilitary groups such as Popular Defence Forces (PDF) after 1989 to fight SPLM/A.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 resulted in the independence of South Sudan in 2011 after seceding from Sudan. Nevertheless, the oil-rich nation has been hit by internal conflict since its formation (Mokone, 2014: 5).[23] Sudan was partitioned into two states following a January 2011 referendum in which 98.8% of southern Sudanese voted for independence. The referendum constituted part of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement that officially ended a twenty-year war between the Khartoum government and the South-based SPLM.[24]

Benefitting from the Collier and Hoeffler model, the motive for greediness is private gain. The availability of "lootable" resource base provides a motivation for rebellion and a facilitating factor.[25] In mid-December 2013, South Sudan was on the brink of a gruesome civil war instead of being on the brink of international stardom. Simply explained, it was a matter of political power, the need to rule the newly formed state.[26] According to Oudenaren, what happened on the night of 15th December 2013 is just a reflection of the simmering tension already present in the political party.[27] On the fateful day, 14 members out of 124 of the SPLM National Liberation Council boycotted the meeting. For strategic reasons, intra-party fissures were set aside after independence, in order to deal with the vast internal and external threats of the period of 2011-2012, particularly the oil shutdown and cross-border military crisis caused mainly by the uprising of the party's own northern adherents, SPLM-North, in the Kordofan and Blue Nile territories.[28]

In April 2013, when the situation was relatively calm in South Sudan, evidenced by the flow of oil, internal fissures resumed. President Salva Kiir stripped his deputy, Riek Machar, of powers and initiated a cabinet reshuffle which deposed him altogether. The 'restructuring' led to key personalities such as Riek Machar being dropped from the Cabinet and subsequently trimmed the number of ministers.[29] The reshuffle was applauded by numerous analysts as a positive step and many citizens valued it as a superb step to save resources to be used for basic service delivery and improved infrastructure. Nevertheless, the reshuffle had the effect of heightening political rivalries and tensions within the party. To make matters worse, before the reshuffle, key members of the SPLM had begun campaigns within the ruling party aimed at assuming the leadership of the party

and subsequently the leadership of the country.[30] In this case, Machar had made clear his intentions to run for the chairmanship of the SPLM.

The political quarrelling and fury within the ruling party translated into armed conflict between the forces loyal to the two camps. The government's position is that Riek Machar staged an attempted coup d'état against a lawfully elected government, an allegation Riek Machar and his allies vehemently refute.[31] The spread of the crisis gave Riek Machar an opportunity to announce his intent to remove the government of Salva Kiir through the use of military force.

The complexities of South Sudan's security situation
The security situation in South Sudan is very complex as a result of the proxy wars between the government of South Sudan (GOSS) and Sudan. External threats emanated from the split of the countries in 2011. Paradoxically, the tension exacerbated instead of declining. There are claims that Khartoum supports Museveni's long-time rebel force enemy called the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which regularly attacks South Sudan and abducts youth.[32] This again explains Uganda's involvement in South Sudan conflict.[33] As a counterstrategy, male youths from the villages and peri-urban communities under threat from the LRA organised themselves into militias, known as the Arrow Boys. The militias man the front lines against armed LRA soldiers, using predominantly traditional weapons such as bows and arrows, spears and knives.[34] The GOSS is also battling with rebel militia forces led by defiant South Sudanese former military leaders.[35] Sudan does not want to see a strong and prosperous South Sudan and thus she is keen to destabilise the region by sponsoring rebel groups in proxy wars against South Sudan. The Juba administration is also accused of supporting the Darfur rebels against the Khartoum government.[36] An example is that of a brutal militia based in Sudan's Darfur region called Justice and Equality Movement, which participated in raping and plundering everything anti-Kiir during the civil war in South Sudan.[37] By and large, the territorial disputes and oil disagreements between the two countries remain a thorn in the flesh.

The failed coup that happened in mid-December was followed by considerable defections of army brigades stationed in strategic places like Bentiu, Malakal and Bor. This added to a number of army units that also defected in Western Equatoria and Yei along with those who staged the rebellion in Juba.[38] It was through the intervention of Ugandan troops that Juba was spared from the carnage and destruction.[39] Uganda, despite being a member of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), intervened to safeguard her national interests because Machar's victory would give LRA a spring board to launch attacks on Kampala. Nevertheless, it was morally right for her to save a genocide that looked so imminent. Ethnic Nuers or the so-called White Army were mobilised to wreak havoc in Bor, Bentiu and Malakal and Uganda's intervention saved the day.[40] By and large, South Sudan is in danger of both internal and external threats.

The ethnic factor in the incidences of atrocities, rape and other crimes against humanity
As highlighted above, Sudan constituted of many ethnic groups and South Sudan alone has more than 60 ethnic sets. After the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the SPLA absorbed former ethnic groups into the national army. As is common with many African armies, soldiers are usually tribally based but the problem with South Sudan was that the army ended up being dominated by the Nuer tribal group which was mostly loyal to a fellow Neur, Riek Machar.[41] On the other side, the SPLA also consists of soldiers mainly from the Dinka tribe and other tribes, including the Nuer who are loyal to Salva Kiir as the legitimate Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the country's defence forces.[42] What it therefore suggests is that the civil war pits two opposing groups, the Dinka and the Neur, who do not hesitate to slit each other's throats. According to Hilde Johnson, head of the UN mission in South Sudan, ethnicity immensely contributed to large-scale violence in the form of mass killings, disappearances, rape and sexual violence of different sorts, abductions and extrajudicial killings to mention but a few.[43] However, in towns like Bentiu, foreigners were also targeted. The fear was that the violence was going to result in a famine and genocide because the killings were driven by ethnic bias.

Due to the ethnic problems in South Sudan, the country's oil hub of Bentiu (one of the most affected by the conflict) among other civilian centres of population saw rape being used as a political instrument to humiliate and punish opponents. When rebel troops from the rival Nuer community re-took Bentiu in April 2014, they raped wives of Dinka men, both civilians and soldiers.[44] A woman raped by Nuer rebel soldiers narrated her ordeal as follows:
The reason they gave was '[President] Salva Kiir is in charge and is killing our people'. They said they wanted to rape me because when Dinka soldiers came here they did the same.[45]
The men told her they wanted to get rid of her Dinka baby, but the attack did not cause a miscarriage. In the capital of Juba, Nuer women, who left the UN compound to buy supplies suffered the same fate as they were seized by troops loyal to Salva Kiir and taken to a hut in view of the base to be raped.[46] The ethnic tone of the civil war meant that the government equally participated in the killings than protecting the people. This was evident when a mother of four called Naynatong Mamjok confessed what befell her in the hands of government soldiers, "The soldiers entered my house and asked, 'Are you Dinka?' "When I said 'yes,' a soldier said 'leave'" (Kushkush and Sengupta 2014).[47] Ethnic based conflicts are as dangerous as religious motivated clashes because they are fundamentally hinged on what people define as either right or wrong.

International dimension of the conflict
The conflict analysis models help to especially understand the causes, actors and dynamics of the conflict. Nonetheless, it is impossible to resolve a conflict without a clear understanding of its international dimension, that is, the interest of foreign countries. Although there are no great powers directly fuelling the civil war in South Sudan, it becomes a matter of interest to investigate the source of weapons and then see what could be done to curb the crisis. China has for long been linked with the events happening in Sudan even before the independence of South Sudan. A plausible explanation about the Chinese presence in Sudan can be found back in 1997 when Sudan

23

started exporting oil. In the same year, the United States imposed economic sanctions against Sudan over claims that it was sponsoring international terrorism. This inevitably led Sudan to turn to China.[48] The small arms used by rebels loyal to Machar were made in China, Iran and Sudan but they found their way through Sudan.[49] China, just like any other country, seeks to pursue her national interests and would not therefore deter from providing weapons to any country if that makes her more than a billion people to stay afloat. Although China and Iran do not directly support the civil war in South Sudan, they know very well about the massacres that are happening.

The extent of the humanitarian crisis
The civil war in South Sudan displaced more than a million people and many people took refuge at United Nations camps and other isolated shelters such as mosques, churches and hospitals. However, places outside UN camps are not safe as evidenced by the death of hundreds of people who had taken shelter in a mosque in the town of Bentiu. It took many days before people were finally buried. Dogs and pigs in the town fed on carcasses before mass graves were finally dug.[50] According to Amnesty International, the conflict in South Sudan left tens of thousands of people dead.[51] The deepening of the crisis resulted in "dozens of mass graves", including five in the war-ravaged town of Bor containing over 500 bodies.[52] Of the more than one million internally displaced people (IDPs), over 250 000 sought refuge in neighbouring countries whilst there are over three million people in need of humanitarian assistance.[53] About 68 000 are protected in UN compounds (UNMISS) in the country.[54] In a weekly humanitarian bulletin dated 26 May 2014 released by the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Ethiopia office, since mid-December 2014 more than 133,000 South Sudanese refugees arrived in Ethiopia's Gambella region, with an average of 1,000 per day during the month of May.[55] The spread of diseases and shortage of food and water cannot be overemphasised under such conditions. This can be confirmed by the outbreak of cholera in South Sudan which by 24 May had killed 14 plus 395 suspected cases reported although 308 had been taken care of.[56] Looting is an evil that is commonplace as fighters demand valuables like money and cell phones.[57]

The role of the African Union in the conflict
The perennial challenges of the African Union (AU) such as financial, logistical and personnel constraints are in black and white. Funding for the African Union traditionally came from the 'big five', that is, Nigeria, South Africa, Algeria, Libya and Egypt, but it is simply not enough.[58] This therefore entails that Africa's security problems are dealt with by foreigners who normally intervene in defence of their interests. A case in point was that of France's intervention in Mali and Libya. France and US Africa Command (AFRICOM) are expanding its intervention policies throughout Africa because of the need to extract resources.[59] In the same vein, one can argue that had it not been for France's intervention, Mali could have descended into serious trouble, but honestly, that was not for charity. The looting of minerals in Africa is done in many ways. In countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo, armed militias such as M23 based in the eastern part of the country siphon the country's resources and sell them at sub-market prices to Western

24

companies. Most of these militias are run by neighbouring Western sponsored countries like Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi.[60] Britain is Rwanda's largest bilateral sponsor.[61]

The African Union backed African Standby Force's (ASF) operationalisation was planned for 2008, pushed to 2010, then 2013 and now to 2015.[62] It is not even guaranteed that by then the ASF would be ready for action in light of the challenges and divisions in the continental body. The envisaged role of the ASF would be that of an African rapid reaction force capable of deploying anywhere on the continent.[63] Serious divisions in the AU were evident during the Libyan crisis (2011) when three African states voted in favour of UNSCR 1973 (South Africa, Gabon and Nigeria) which sanctioned a no-fly zone on Libya, despite the AU High Panel taking a different position (Observatoire De L'Afrique 2011: 2).[64] The National Transitional Council (NTC) backed by North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) exploited the resolution to kill Gaddafi. The impediments in the AU were summarised by an organisation called Observatoire De L'Afrique as follows:

There is poor leadership, a lack of consensus in the AU and weak early warning capabilities in the intelligence field. These weaknesses are also compounded by a lack of financial and institutional capacity for intervention. As a result the AU is often taken by surprise and found to be reacting too late to crisis situations.[65]

Being aware of the fact that a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush, the AU remains Africa's only panacea to the challenges affecting the continent. Despite its shortcomings, just like the United Nations, everyone needs it. South Africa's former president, Thabo Mbeki, is one among the few trusted on the continent to deal with political conflicts arising across Africa. Mbeki succeeded in negotiating for a Government of National Unity (GNU) (2009-2013) between President Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) and Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) parties led by Morgan Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara (later ousted by the party to pave way for Professor Welshman Ncube). Despite incessant antagonisms, the GNU stabilised the economy and decreased political violence, although the situation got out of hand after the controversial July 2013 harmonised elections. Mbeki was also involved in Côte d'Ivoire in December 2010 to resolve the conflict between Gbagbo and Ouattara. Mbeki, however, failed because he did not combine efforts with ECOWAS and both parties felt that they were dealt with unfairly because Pretoria was seen as favouring Gbagbo. At the same time, former Kenyan Prime Minister, Ralia Odinga, compromised his neutrality as a mediator when he supported military action prior to confirmation by ECOWAS, which had not reached an internal consensus on the matter at the time.[66]

South Africa played a central role in negotiating for a truce between the belligerents in South Sudan. Meditation is not an easy process as there are lots of hitches and embarrassments. Teodora Nguema of Equatorial Guinea could not be considered as a mediator in Côte d'Ivoire because of his questionable human rights credentials.[67] Good reputation explains why former UN secretary general, Koffi Annan, was successful in forging a GNU in Kenya. Mbeki is a special envoy for the

African Union in South Sudan and this cements how he has gained the trust of the continent in general. However, South Africa's President Jacob Zuma in early February 2014 appointed African National Congress Deputy, Cyril Ramaphosa, to act as the country's special envoy to compliment the efforts of Mbeki.[68] Mediation enables parties to the dispute to reach 'satisfactory' terms for its termination by themselves.[69] The African Union needs to be vigorous in its efforts to end recurring conflicts. Mediation can end armed and non-armed conflicts, but after exacting a heavy toll on civilians. This therefore demands the continental body to register its military presence in conflict burdened countries. The political and military sides should complement each other.

Way forward after 9 May 2014
Mediation should be vigorously pursued to end the crisis in South Sudan but with full support of the military in order to save the civilians and key government infrastructure. Mediators from the regional bloc, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), presented a truce agreement on 23 January 2014 which can be useful in bringing the conflict to a successful end.[70] After 9 May 2014 there were hopes that a truce signed by Kiir and Machar in Addis Ababa would end the war, but on the following day the rebels accused the government for breaching the agreement: "The latest violations of the agreement to resolve the crisis in South Sudan shows that [President Salva] Kiir is either insincere or not in control of his forces".[71] There are political games in South Sudan which can only be ended by a political solution, that is, the hasty formation of a transitional government before an election roadmap if chatted. However, there is a need for effective independent monitoring and evaluation system of the two rival forces on the ground in order to respect the ceasefire or determine violators.[72]

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Bearing in mind that there are so many ethnic groups in South Sudan, it is imperative to make sure that all of them are equally represented in the security forces and other sectors of the economy in order to neutralise allegiances. This is important in light of the ethnic dimension of the killings.
- Rape should be treated as an emergency. Everyone wishes a situation whereby rape ceases to be used as a military strategy but this is just utopian. It would help if the victims are given timely medication and rehabilitation. Perpetrators should also be given deterring sentences, although this has proven to be mere fantasy as political leaders try to protect their subordinates by passing the blame to others.
- It is also important to rebuild ethnic trust in South Sudan. The UN compound in Bentiu housed around 30,000 refugees (as of May 2014) and so what UN staff did to unite these tribes was to bring children from separate Dinka and Nuer sections of the camp to dance together a couple of times a week.[73] The rebuilding of ethnic trust cannot solely be done by the government, so compromised to do it, but it demands the efforts of the church, civil society organisations, community leaders and the South Sudanese themselves.

- The African Union cannot do it alone. Bush's proclamation that "African solutions for African problems" after failing in the Somalia debacle has proved futile in yielding encouraging results. The international community should play an active part in African conflicts just like what the UN did by setting compounds in South Sudan for people to get refuge. China should play an active role in preventing and ending conflicts in the continent. The construction of the majestic AU headquarters is a welcome development, but that is not enough.

- Conflict transformation should not prejudice the warring parties for durable peace to be attained. According to Johan Galtung, conflict transformation is "co-operating to plug the holes in the boat we share than searching for the one who drilled the first hole".[74] It is in fact an alternative to conflict resolution. A creative conflict resolution approach enables all parties to be respected, to be able to speak, to be heard and contribute to decision making.[75] When the civil war in South Sudan was being resolved, Kiir and Machar were able to meet in Addis Ababa as they deliberated on the political crisis affecting the country. In this respect, it is important to ensure that conflict transformation mechanisms leave arch rivals internally smiling, although the security situation in South Sudan is quite grim.

CONCLUSION

In 2011 the world naively celebrated when South Sudan became independent. Many decades of civil strife with the Khartoum government led to massacres which some commentators referred to as genocide. This therefore called for jubilation when the Southerners resoundingly voted for secession. But a few days after independence, signs of political tension began to surface until 15 December 2013 when all hell broke loose. Despite the efforts by international actors to calm the storm in the world's youngest state, the civil war in South Sudan is far from over because the root causes of the conflict are still intact- struggle for political power, slow pace of development and problems associated with ethnicity. A sincere political situation is only what is in store to rekindle the dim rays of hope. Kiir made a political blunder by trying to use the Stalin style to silence his enemies in the government. The reshuffles he instigated were meant to give Machar and allies their political waterloo but in fact it enabled them to achieve their aims the Machiavellian style. Nonetheless, Machar remains guilty for using armed force to justify his cause as this has led to unnecessary death of people. The government remains equally guilty for using retributive justice on ethnic Neurs instead of dealing with the rebels. In view of this disorder, the African Union should step to the fore.

Endnotes

[1] Munyae M. Mulinge and Gwen N. Lesetedi, 'Corruption in sub-Saharan Africa: Towards a More Holistic Approach', *African Journal of Political Science*, 7: 1 (2002), 51-52.

[2] Ibid., 52.

[3] UNAIDS, Special Report Update, 2013 (Geneva: Switzerland), 6-7.

[4] Ibid., 7. The figures could even be bigger than this considering that some people are not ready to undergo the tests.

[5] H. Ware, (ed.), *The No-Nonsense Guide to Conflict and Peace* (Oxford, The New Internationalist, 2006), 12.

[6] Ibid.

[7] The East African, 'South Sudan war escalating into 'cycles of revenge': Amnesty', 8 May 2014, http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/South-Sudan-war-escalating-into-cycles-of-revenge-Amnesty/-/2558/2307890/-/o3bose/-/index.html.

[8] Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, 'On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 46:13 (2002), 13.

[9] Ibid., 14.

[10] Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, 'Greed and grievance in civil war', *Oxford Economic Papers*, 56 (2004), 564.

[11] Darlington Mutanda, 'The art of mediation in resolving African conflicts: lessons for Zimbabwe and Africa', *Journal of Aggression, Conflict and Peace Research*, 5: 3 (2013), 131.

[12] Revenue Watch Institute, 'South Sudan', http://www.revenuewatch.org/countries/africa/south-sudan/overview.

[13] In early 2012 there was a Tuareg rebellion in Mali led by the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) for the independence of Northern Mali. The government of Mali requested foreign assistance to repossess the north and France answered the call by restoring Mali's government back to power. See Guzman, T. A. 2014. As War Lingers in Mali, Western Powers Target its Natural Resources, *Global Research*, January 7.

[14] John C. Anyanwu, 'Economic and Political Causes of Civil Wars in Africa: Some Econometric Results', *Economic Research Papers*, 73 (Abidjan, The African Development Bank, 2002), 9.

[15] Ibid.

[16] ICCO and Kerk in Actie, *Conflict Analysis Practical tool to analyse conflict in order to prioritise and strategise Conflict Transformation Programmes* (2008), 12.

[17] Marina Ottaway and Mai El-Sadany, M. *Sudan: From Conflict to Conflict* (Washington, D.C, The Carnegie Papers, 2012), 4.

[18] M. Zapata, 'Sudan: Independence through Civil Wars, 1956-2005', http://www.enoughproject.org/blogs/sudan-brief-history-1956.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Claudio Gramizzi and Jérôme Tubiana, *New war, old enemies: Conflict dynamics in South Kordofan* (Geneva, Small Arms Survey, 2013), 11.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid.

[23] T. Mokone, 'Ramaphosa to 'compliment' Mbeki's role in South Sudan', *Sunday Times*, 16 February 2014.

[24] I. Seri-Hersch, 'From One Sudan to Two Sudans: Dynamics of Partition and Unification in Historical Perspective', *Tel Aviv Notes: An Update on Middle Eastern Developments*, 7:13 (2013).

[25] C. J. Anyanwu, 'Economic and Political Causes of Civil Wars in Africa: Some Econometric Results', *Economic Research Papers*, 73 (Abidjan, The African Development Bank, 2002), 6.

[26] D. V. Oudenaren, 'Analysis: Political dimensions of the South Sudan crisis', https://radiotamazuj.org/en/article/analysis-political-dimensions-south-sudan-crisis.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid.

[29] South Sudan Human Rights Commission, *Interim Report on South Sudan Internal Conflict*, December 15, 2013 - March 15, 2014, 2.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Ibid., 3.

[32] M. Sommers and S. Schwartz, *Dowry and Division: Youth and State Building in South Sudan* (Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Special Report 295, 2011), 2-3.

[33] A. A. Awolich, 'The Question of Ugandan Troops in South Sudan' 4 March, *Weekly Review* (Juba, The Sudd Institute, 2014), 1.

[34] M. Sommers and S. Schwartz, *Dowry and Division: Youth and State Building in South Sudan* (Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Special Report 295, 2011), 2-3.

[35] Ibid., 2.

[36] S. Mbogo, 'South Sudan rebels use Chinese, Iranian arms', *The East African*, 16 November 2013.

[37] 'Investigating rape and murder in South Sudan's Bentiu', BBC, 8 May 2014.

[38] Ibid., 1.

[39] Ibid., 2.

[40] Ibid., 5.

[41] South Sudan Human Rights Commission, *Interim Report on South Sudan Internal Conflict*, December 15, 2013 - March 15, 2014, 4.

[42] Ibid.

[43] 'Investigating rape and murder in South Sudan's Bentiu', BBC, 8 May 2014.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Ibid.

[46] Ibid.

[47] I. Kushkush, and S. Sengupta, 'U.N. Report Documents Atrocities by Both Sides in South Sudan War', *New York Times*, 8 May 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/09/world/africa/south-sudan-war.html?hp&_r=0.

[48] S. Mbogo, 'South Sudan rebels use Chinese, Iranian arms', *The East African*, 16 November 2013.

[49] Ibid.

[50] 'Investigating rape and murder in South Sudan's Bentiu', BBC, 8 May 2014.

[51] The East African, 'South Sudan war escalating into 'cycles of revenge': Amnesty', 8 May 2014, http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/South-Sudan-war-escalating-into-cycles-of-revenge-Amnesty/-/2558/2307890/-/o3bose/-/index.html.

[52] Ibid.

[53] ECHO Factsheet, Republic of South Sudan, 2014 (Brussels: European Union, 2014), 1.

[54] Ibid., 2.

[55] Radio Tamazuj, 2014. Ethiopia camps nearing capacity as S. Sudan refugee number tops 133,000. 27 May, https://radiotamazuj.org/en/article/ethiopia-camps-nearing-capacity-s-sudan-refugee-number-tops-133000.

[56] Daijiworld 2014. Cholera outbreak in Sudan kills 14. 24 May, http://www.daijiworld.com/news/news_disp.asp?n_id=237174.

[57] I. Kushkush, and S. Sengupta, 'U.N. Report Documents Atrocities by Both Sides in South Sudan War', *New York Times*, 8 May 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/09/world/africa/south-sudan-war.html?hp&_r=0.

[58] A. Vines, 'A decade of African Peace and Security Architecture', *International Affairs*, 89:1 (2013), 108.

[59] T. A. Guzman, 'As War Lingers in Mali, Western Powers Target its Natural Resources', *Global Research* (2014), http://www.globalresearch.ca/as-war-lingers-in-mali-western-powers-target-its-natural-resources/5364079.

[60] Dan Glazebrook, 'The West's War Against African Development Continues', *Counterpunch Weekend Edition,* 15-17 February 2013, http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/02/15/the-wests-war-against-african-development-continues/.

[61] Mike Pflanz, 'Britain accused of failing to speak out against Congo violence', *The Telegraph*, 13 Jul 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/democraticrepublicofcongo/9398748/Britain-accused-of-failing-to-speak-out-against-Congo-violence.html.

[62] C. Adedze, 'Africa 50 years on: from unity to union', *Third World Resurgence*, 278 (Penang, Third World Network, 2013), 9.

[63] A. Vines, 'A decade of African Peace and Security Architecture', *International Affairs*, 89:1 (2013), 97.

[64] Observatoire De L'Afrique, 'The African Union's role in the Libya and Côte d'Ivoire conflicts', *Africa Briefing Report* (2011), 2.

[65] Ibid., 1. The Observatoire de l'Afrique (OA) is a network of independent institutes and experts based in Europe and in Africa. See http://www.obsafrique.eu/ for more detail. Of course its description of the AU is too general and unrealistic.

[66] Ibid., 3.

[67] Ibid., 3.

[68] T. Mokone, 'Ramaphosa to 'compliment' Mbeki's role in South Sudan', *Sunday Times*, 16 February 2014, 5.

[69] J. Tacsan. *The Dynamics of International Law in Conflict Resolution* (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1992), 500.

70   Press   TV,   'Political   solution   will   settle   South   Sudan   crisis: UN',
       http://www.presstv.com/detail/2014/02/06/349450/diplomacy-will-solve-s-sudan-crisis-
       un/.
71   Press   TV,   'S   Sudan   rebels   accuses   govt.   forces   of   violating   truce,
       http://www.presstv.com/detail/2014/05/11/362232/south-sudan-ceasefire-seems-shaky/.
72   Sudan Tribune, 'South Sudan rebels deny rival leaders held face to face talks',
       http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article50949.
73 'Investigating rape and murder in South Sudan's Bentiu', BBC, 8 May 2014.
74 R. Baksh et al. (eds.), *Gender Mainstreaming in Conflict Transformation: Building Sustainable
       Peace* (Marlborough, Commonwealth Secretariat, 2005), 27.
75 Ibid., 28.