POLITICAL ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY IN NIGERIA: COMPATIBILITY OR INCOMPATIBILITY?

Olu Awofeso, PhD
Department of Political Science, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria

ABSTRACT: The paper highlights the principles of Islam and that of democracy and argues that both are incompatible in a multi-religious country like Nigeria. Having discussed the concepts of political Islam, Sharia and democracy, the paper proceeds by identifying the inconsistency and ambiguity in the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria which, made the Sharia issue more problematic among the Christians and their Muslim counterparts. The paper prefers Nigeria being a Secular state rather than adopting a state religion which it believes can scuttle Nigeria’s nascent democracy.

KEYWORDS: Political Islam, Shariacracy, Democracy

INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEMATIC

When some Northern states in Nigeria took the steps at adopting and implementing the Sharia legal code full scale since October, 1999, two fears were immediately expressed by the non-Muslim population in the country. Firstly, was the speculation of a hidden agenda to gradually islamize Nigeria, and secondly, was the survival of Nigeria’s nascent democracy. Equally of note is the strong belief that the major elements of democracy – rule of law, political liberty and political sovereignty (supremacy of the constitution), stand anti-thetical to certain islamic injunctions as specified in the Quran and Hadith.

The most powerful form of challenge to Nigerian nascent democracy in early 2000 and some years later, was political Islam, which in the words of Williams Zartman (1969:85) “promises the restoration of morality, authenticity and earthly success and the exclusion of corruption and error, backed by God’s word as a guide and as a guarantee” Zartman (1969:82) on the other hand queries the compartibility of liberal democracy and political Islam. According to him:

Both Western democracy and political Islam are systems of thought and actions with their own integrity, neither containing the precepts of the other. In reality, in the earth bound workings of politics and governance, the two set of ideas and practices challenge and contaminate each other whenever they meet. How to be a democrat in an Islamic state? How to be an Islamist in a democratic state? How democratic can Islamic state be? How Islamist can a democratic state be? Although, the urge to forcefully practice Sharia legal code full scale, had since mellowed down, the ongoing insurgency in some parts of the Northern Nigeria since 2009 due to the activities of a religious sect, the Boko Haram, whose demand among others was the islamization of Nigeria, poses serious concern to the international community. It is therefore imperative to analyse the compatibility of political Islam or otherwise, to democracy especially in a multi-religious state like Nigeria. Before we do this, let us quickly throw some light on the concepts of Political Islam and democracy, as well as, constitutional provisions for Sharia in Nigeria.
CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION: POLITICAL ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY

Political Islam
The concept of political Islam in our own terminology connotes an Islamic state where politics and Islamic religion are rarely separated, but rather intermingle to create the impression that both politics and Islam are inseparable. The jurisdiction of the state is not limited only to religion and politics in Islamic state, it covers all aspects of human activities. This position was aptly represented in the words of Auda as cited by Olagunju (1993:46)By principle of Islam, it meant those doctrines and theories inscribed into the Qur’an and established by the prophet... The whole of these doctrines and theories is called the Islamic jurisprudence which is the totality of principles of divine unity, faith, worships, rituals, personal status, crimes, civil transactions, administration, politics and all other objectives and trade

Inextricably linked with the concept of Islam is the concept of Sharia which is regarded as the legal pre-scriptions of the religion of Islam as laid down in the Quran, the Sunna and other sources. Muslims regard Sharia as integral part of their religion, which covers every aspects of their lives, including the civil and the criminal aspects. Thus, in the context of Islam, Sharia denotes the path or the road ordained by Allah for all Muslims to follow. In this regard, the dictionary of Islam defines Sharia as: “The way or road in the religion of Muhammed, which God has established for the guidance of his people both for the worship of God and for the duties of life”.

Also derived from the concept of Sharia is the concepts of “Shariacracy” which according to professor Ali Monzri (2000) means “governance according to the norms, principles and rules laid down by Islamic law” Within the context of Nigeria and this paper, Shariacracy (hence political Islam) is used to mean the adoption of Sharia as the foundation of governance and its expansion into the domain of criminal justice system.

Democracy
Like Shariacracy, democracy is also a system of governance according to some agreed upon principles and ethos which has been identified by scholars over ages. For instance, Michael Sudaro (2001:167) identifies three basic principles of democracy as: (1) the rule of law, (ii) inclusion and (iii) equality. Mark Kasselman (2000:16) on the other hand, have observed that for a political system to qualify as democratic, a country must have the following political characteristics – (a) political accountability, (b) political competition, (c) political freedom and (d) political equality. To Austin Ranney and Williams Kendall (1969:46), the principles of democracy can be broken down into four major features, namely: (a) popular sovereignty, (b) political equality, (c) popular consultation and (d) majority rule. Many other authors and scholars have equally identified several elements termed “democratic principles” from various perspective, the interpretation of which are in consonance with those already mentioned above.

At this juncture, it is imperative we state categorically that, our objective in this paper is to unveil the extent the governing principles of democracy agree with that of Shariacracy in Nigeria. In this regard our emphasis shall be two fold, namely: the rule of law and popular sovereignty. We begin with the rule of law.
The Rule of Law
The rule of law is the supremacy of the constitution as against any form of arbitrariness in government. Professor A. V Dicey (the greatest advocate of the concept) in his analysis of the rule of law based his explanation on the following:

i. That the law of the land is supreme,
ii. That everybody is equal before the law to the extent that there should be impartiality in the administration of justice,
iii. That the constitution recognizes the fundamental human rights of individuals.

The rule of law according to Sodaro (2001) “is the principle that the power of the state must be limited by law and that no one is above the law”. It also means that the law of the land (i.e. the constitution) is supreme to any other law, either spiritual or temporal. Hence, the rule of law, according to him “is the fundamental bedrock upon which democratic government rests… (and) unless it is routinely observed by governing officials, democracy may not survive”. The rule of law by extension, upholds that individual rights such as: freedom of association and religion, freedom of thought, expression and belief, and others must be entrenched in the constitution and strictly observed by the governing officials. Besides, the rule of law also upholds the doctrine of equality and inclusion. Equality according to Sodaro means that fearness to all, while inclusion means “democratic rights and freedom must be for everyone. They must not be denied to specifically targeted elements of population such as woman or minority groups” He further elaborates that the principles of inclusion means that all the main social groups that comprise the population in a country – ethnic groups, religious groups, social classes and so on, should have reason to feel that they are free and not discriminated.

Popular Sovereignty
Michael Sodaro (2001:171) explains popular sovereignty in the following words:

Popular sovereignty is the idea that the people have the right to determine how they are governed. The people themselves, in other words are the source of the states legitimacy; they are sovereign over their governing institutions and officials. They have the right to determine the type of governmental institutions they want, along with other aspects of their political system. They have the right to determine the actions and policies the government adopts as well as the right to hold their governing officials responsible for their actions. The notion of popular sovereignty is conveyed in such phrases as “government by consent of the governed” and Abraham Lincoln’s famous characterization of democracy as “government of the people, by the people, and for the people”

Also inextricably linked with the concept of popular sovereignty are two key concepts: participation and accountability. The linkage between these two concepts and popular sovereignty is better appreciated in the words of Sodaro (2001:171)

If the people are sovereign, they have the right to participate in politics themselves. They also posess the right to hold those who govern them accountable for their actions.

Legality or Illegality of Sharia under the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria
When Zamfara state kick-started the adoption of the Sharia legal system in 1999 and subsequently implemented it full scale the following year, many other states in the North –
 Niger, Sokoto, Kano, Bauchi, Kaduna, etc, followed suit. Despite the fact that this action was regarded as ‘Political Sharia’ by most observers, many political analysts and constitutional lawyers were quick to point out the lapses in the 1999 constitution that gave room for such occurrence. This development also generated a fierce argument between the supporters and critics of the implementation of the Sharia legal system. A major outcome of these opposing views was a protracted debate over the constitutionality or otherwise, of the implementation of the Sharia legal code in any of the Nigerian state. Seminars, workshops and symposia were organized in several parts of the country, for or against the adoption of Sharia in Nigeria. Interestingly, both the protagonists and antagonists of the Sharia legal code hinge their claims on certain sections of the 1999 constitution to justify the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of Sharia. Let us examine critically those sections of the constitution often quoted to substantiate the legality or illegality of the implementation of Sharia legal code. We begin with section 10 of the 1999 constitution, which states that: “The government of the Federation or of a State shall not adopt any religion as State Religion”.

This section literally appears to be very clear and unambiguous, but has been subjected to various interpretations. To many, mostly the Christians, the provision of section 10 is simple: - it means that: Nigeria is a secular state and that neither the federal nor the state government can impose any religion on the people. Although, the constitution never used the word ‘secular’, both Muslims and Christians have differently interpreted the term to suit their interests and demands. To most Christians and critics of Sharia in Nigeria, secularity means “the detachment of a state or other body from religious foundation” (Mclean, 1996: 445). This calls for total neutrality of the state in all religious matters, and confines it only to temporal, rather than spiritual matters. Therefore, the action of Zamfara and other Northern states that implemented Sharia legal system is tantamount to an imposition of a state religion, which is contrary to section 10 of the 1999 constitution.

On the other hand, the Muslims conceive secularity to mean a concession to multi – religion practice, which implies that both Muslims and non- Muslims can fully practice their religions as desired. It is argued that, Christianity, for historical reasons have accepted the separation of state and religion, Islam rejects that dichotomy. The religion of Islam encompasses all aspects of life and therefore rejects secularism (Adegbite, 2000:73). Stressing the view that there is nothing like secularity in Nigerian multi-religious society, Lateef Adegbite (2000:72) characterizes the Nigerian state in the following words:

The correct characterization of Nigeria is a liberal multi-religious state wherein freedom of religion is safeguarded, rather than attributing to the country a nebulous nature called secularism

As if the ambiguity of section 10 of the 1999 constitution and the controversy over the meaning of secularity were not enough, section 38 (1) strengthens further the viewpoint of both camps by declaring that: Every person shall be entitled to freedom of thought, conscience and religion including freedom to change his religion or belief, freedom to manifest and propagate his religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance.

Many non – Muslims would agree that the constitution recognizes the Sharia, but not beyond the limit provided by some sections in the constitution. The Muslims, on the other hand, argue that the constitution provides enough support for Muslims to practice Islam to its fullest.
Like the customary law, the Sharia law is recognized by the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Section 244 (1) states that:

An appeal shall lie from decisions of a Sharia Court of Appeal to the Court as of right in any civil proceedings before the Sharia Court of Appeal with respect to any question of Islamic personal law, which the Sharia Court of Appeal is competent to decide.

Section 245 (1) of the constitution counter balances the provision of section 244 (1) by extending similar legal status to customary law.

An appeal shall lie from the decisions of a Customary Court of Appeal to the court of Appeal as of right in any civil proceedings before to any question of customary law and such other matters as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly.

The imports of sections 244 (1) and 245 (1) are twofold. First, both Sharia and Customary laws are recognized by the constitution, but to the extent to which they are allowed. In the case of Sharia for instance, section 277 (1) & (2) of the constitution limit its application to civil proceedings, while sections 315 adopts the penal code as the criminal aspect of the Sharia legal system. And secondly, it has been argued that the recognition of these laws do not in any way “confer legitimacy or constitutionality on any institution or person(s) to practice or adopt a Custom or Sharia law as a state law or legal philosophy” (Adaramoye, 2000), as clearly stated in section 10 of the constitution.

The provision of section 10 notwithstanding, the advocate of the Sharia legal system were quick to exploit the ambiguity in the constitution by referring to section 4(7), 6(4) & (5), 38, 262 among others, to sustain the argument that the constitution guarantees freedom of religion; the Assembly has legislative competence to establish other courts in addition to existing ones; Muslims in the state have expressed their overwhelming desire to submit to Sharia beyond the ‘personal law’ confines. (Yadudu, 2000:37). Unfortunately, while section 277 of the constitution spells out the jurisdiction of the Sharia Court of Appeal as extending only to Islamic personal law, same constitution did not establish subordinate Sharia Court from which appeals would lie to the Sharia Court of Appeal of the state. It is therefore assumed, either wrongly or rightly, that individual state may create subordinate Sharia Court and prescribe their jurisdiction. Therefore, the action of Zamfara and other states that have implemented Sharia have been justified on the ground that, they have simply created Sharia Court first instance and extended their jurisdiction to include the Sharia criminal offences and their punishment. This argument finds support in section 4(7) and 6(5) (k) which empower the state House of Assembly to make law for the peace, order and good government of their state, as well as create court at first instance or on appeal to exercise competent jurisdiction (Adegbite, 2000:67). Reacting to the position that Sharia can only apply in the realm of personal law, Abdul-Lateef Adegbite has this to say:

Zamfara State by seeking to expand Sharia into the criminal sphere through the incorporation of certain Sharia offences, as well as by establishing Sharia court of first instances, (have not) violated the constitution … for, only the Sharia court of Appeal of the state created by the constitution are restricted to Islamic penal law in the exercise of their jurisdiction (Adegbite, 2000:61)

Section 4 of the 1999 constitution divides the legislative powers between the federal and state government. It also specifies in its second schedule the exclusive legislative list on which only
the federation makes laws, and also the concurrence legislative list, on which both the federation and the state may make laws. In addition, it empowers the state to make laws on any other matters not included in the two lists. It is argued that “Sharia fall within the residue and, consequently, a state has the constitutional power to make law relating to Sharia” (Bello, 2000:11). Both section 6 and 275 have also been quoted to justify the legality of the Sharia law in Nigeria. In this regard, Justice Mohammed Bello (rtd) contends that:

Section 6 of the constitution empowers a state to establish courts to exercise jurisdiction on matters will respect to which the House of Assembly of a state may make laws. It is axiomatic, therefore, that a state may establish a Sharia court of first instance. Section 275 specifically, empowers any state that requires it to establish its Sharia court of Appeal to hear appeals from the lower courts (Bello, 2000:11).

The constitutional recognition of Sharia not withstanding, the 1999 constitution equally makes provisions, which could serve as constraints to the full implementation of Sharia as recorded in Quran and other Islamic books. For instance, section 1 of the constitution prescribes as follows:

The constitution is supreme and its provisions shall have binding force on all authorizes and persons throughout the Federal Republic of Nigeria; if any other law is in consista

The supremacy of the 1999 constitution over any other laws that are inconsistent with its provisions is clearly stated in this section without mincing words. But, Islamic scholars have defended the wholesale application of Sharia law in civil and criminal matters on grounds that the Islamic legal system, Sharia Law, is superior to the 1999 constitution of Nigeria. (Akinsanya, 2000:60) Yet, section 36 (12) outlaws the conviction of any person(s) on the basis of any laws not written or un-codified. For the avoidance of doubt section 36 (12) states:

Subject as otherwise provided by this constitution, a person shall not be convicted of a criminal offences unless that offense is defined and the penalty therein prescribed in a written law; and in this subsection, a written law refers to an act of the National Assembly or a law of a state, any subsidiary legislation or instrument under the provision of a law.

The Sharia law as stated in the Quran, Hadith and other sources is not a ‘written law’ within the meaning of section 36 (12) of the 1999 constitution. Therefore no person can be convicted for any Sharia offense unless the National Assembly or a State House of Assembly enacts the offence and its punishment. That explains why at the wake of Sharia controversy, those Northern states that have implemented Sharia had to quickly codified criminal offences known to Sharia or simply extended the Penal Code to include new criminal offences.

From the foregoing discussion, it is conspicuous that what obviously looks like a politically generated crisis in the implementation of Sharia was further complicated by ambiguity and inconsistency in the 1999 constitution. It is strongly believed that the advocates of Sharia may have capitalized on this to push the practice of Sharia in Nigeria beyond its constitutional limits. The same lapses in the constitution may have irked the conviction held by the critics of Sharia that its implementation is unconstitutional. There is no doubt therefore, that those sections of the
1999 constitution that deal with Sharia question deserve a second look. In this regard Adaramoye’s (2000) note of warning and prescription are very instructive: Unless the 1999 constitution is replaced with a people-oriented constitution that derive its legitimacy from the people via a constitutional conference the polity shall continue to witness tragic implosion and cataclysmic explosion arising from the inherent time-bomb contradictions in the 1999 constitution.

Sharia and Democracy in Nigeria: Compatibility or Incompatibility

After many years of military interregnum, Nigeria, once again, became a democratic society in May, 1999 when political leadership changed hands from the military dictatorship to popularly elected leaders. The new leadership has since continued to strive towards adherence to democratic values – majority rule, popular sovereignty, constitutionalism, political participation, political representation, political equality and liberty among others. Consequent upon this, the international community perceived Nigeria as a democratic state, not an islamic state. But the decision by some Northern states to implement Sharia legal system is however perceived with some anxiety and fear by non-Muslims who roundly interpreted this action to mean an attempt to gradually islamize Nigeria. Even though, mere implementation of Sharia legal code does not single handedly on its own connote an islamic state as we were made to understand (Adegbite, 2000, El-zak-zaky 2000), it is observed that certain principles of democracy run contrary to some practices of Sharia. In this regard, professor Akinsanya (2000:60) observes that: Several issues come to fore with the introduction of Sharia law by some Northern states: federalism, secularity, supremacy of the constitution, sanctify of human right and the rule of law.

The rule of law is an integral aspect of democracy, the absence of which negates democracy and democratic practice in any society. So central is the concept of rule of law to democracy that it embraces three cardinal aspects of democratic practices namely: the supremacy of the constitution, equality of all before the law and respect for the human rights and liberty of individuals. Let us examine the extent to which Sharia can be said to be compatible with these principles. We begin with the principles of supremacy of the constitution.

There is no contention among Muslims on the issue of the superiority of Sharia over any ‘man-made’ constitution. Muslims, the world over, share this belief, and Muslims in Nigeria are not exception. Whereas, section 1 of the 1999 constitution makes the constitution supreme over laws of the land, the proponents of Sharia in Nigeria have said times over again and again, that Sharia is supreme to the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria. Abd al-Masih and Ibn Salam (2000:4) provide us with the religious and philosophical underpinnings to such adherence.

*The Sharia government is regarded as Allah’s government. The first of the “five Pillars of Islam” is called Khalims Shahada, confession of faith: “There is no God but Allah and Mohammed is the messenger of Allah”. According to one of the greatest islamic commentators, Sayed Quotb, this confession means ascribing divinity to Allah alone and not allowing any human being to share this attribute of divinity. According to Quota, sovereignty is the first characteristics of this divinity; since Allah is the only sovereign one, only he must be law-giver of the Muslims. Submitting oneself under a human government is therefore regarded as a denial of the very foundation and pillar of Islam*
The implication of this on a polity like Nigeria is that a Muslim must not subject himself to any law that is not Islamic, including the 1999 constitution. It also implies that a non-Muslim is not qualified to rule the Muslim population, especially, in states where Muslims are in majority. If we may ask: what becomes of a state like Kaduna (in Nigeria) if a Christian suddenly wins election, and considering the fact that the population is almost 50% Muslims and 50% non-Muslims? Would the Muslims, especially, those in Northern Kaduna who are presently observing Sharia submit to the rule of a Christian? If not would this not amount to classifying the non-Muslims into a second class category?

The proponents of Sharia in Nigeria have argued that Sharia is compatible with democracy and that the actions of Zamfara and other states that have implemented Sharia were in line with the spirit of democracy which allows any group within the federation to identify with its way of life. Accordingly therefore, there is the: Need to give full weight to the right of Nigerians to democratically choose the kind of society they wish to have, at the level of the state, and within Nigeria as a whole(Adegbite 2000:70)

It is equally argued that the Nigerian constitution recognizes three co-existing legal cultures; English law, customary law and Islamic law. But the English law (otherwise considered to be Christian law) is predominantly practiced in disregard to others. This according to them amounts to undue imposition, discrimination and unfair disregard to the Muslims who are not allowed to practice their religion “freely and fully as set in the Fundamental Rights chapter of the constitution”. (Section 38:1).

On the other hand, the Sharia legal system has been criticized on ground that its practice violates some aspects of human rights including the right “ to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, as well as, the right to change one’s religion or belief as enshrined in section 38 (1). Honourable Justice Bello, former Chief Justice to the Supreme Court and a devoted Muslims, acknowledges the fact of non-compatibility of the Sharia legal system and the section 38 (1) of the 1999 constitution because of the offence of ridda (change of religion) which attracts capital punishment. The view that the practice of the Sharia legal system contravenes some aspects of individual human right is further corroborated by Abd al – Masih and Ibn Salam (2000:45)

One major thing that makes the Sharia irrelevant for the modern man and woman is that the Sharia does not allow freedom of religion. It does not allow freedom of conscience. You cannot believe what you want to believe. A Muslim under the Sharia constitution has no right to leave Islam if he finds it reasonable or justifiable to do so. The legal punishment (hada) for leaving Islam is death.

The logic is that, as far as Islam is concern, there is no distinction between the state and religion. Therefore, if a Muslim discards his religion, it is regarded as having committed treason against Allah and the state, hence the capital punishment (death), must be melted on him. In his interpretation of section 277 (c) (1) of the 1999 constitution which states that: “where all the parties to the proceedings, being Muslims, have requested the court to hear the case in the first instance to determine that case in accordance with Islamic personal law …” Adaramoye (2000) contends that Sharia is a voluntary legal system which Muslims parties may surrender themselves to its jurisdiction. Anything other than voluntary submission to Sharia law is regarded by him as undue imposition and violation of human rights of those concerns.
Apart from the criticism, that the practice of Sharia does not allow freedom of religion and conscience, there is also the argument that when Sharia becomes fully operational in any state, its practice will unavoidably discriminate against women and non – Muslims. Women under Sharia are not considered equal to their menfold. For instance, two women witnesses equal a man’s witness in a law court (Masih and Salam, 2000: 35). Non – Muslims are equally regarded as dhimmis under a Sharia government, and all dhimmis are second – class citizens (Masih and Salam, 2000:10). Besides, all dhimmis are compelled to pay tax Jizya. This state of affairs is succinctly described below: The tax Jizya’ (is) imposed on them (i.e. all dhimmis) to make them acknowledge the lordship of Islam over them. It is a tax of humiliation. The word Jizya has its root from jaza which means ‘punishment’. So, the Jizya tax is a punishment for not embracing Islam. (Masih and Salam 2000:10)

The above discriminative punishment is similar to the compulsion of beards wearing in Islam. For instance, the prescription of beards wearing by the former Zamfara state governor Alhaji Ahmend Sani Yerima as prerequisite for the award of contracts by the state, and for receiving support from the state government, can best be described as discriminatory and impositional. According to the former Zamfara state governor on this matter: I enjoin Zamfara youth to grow beards from today, I myself will start growing it. Whoever wants contracts must grow beards. Those without beards will not be considered. Even if you want to marry and are looking for government assistance, it will be given to you only if you have a beard. (Tell, Nov. 15, 1999:18)

From the foregoing discussion, it is obvious that the implementation of Sharia full-scale in a multi-religious society like Nigeria is inherently incompatible with democracy. Muslims may decide to ignore these facts in a fully blown islamic environment where the Sharia legal system reigns supreme. But, certainly not in a multi-religious society, which acclaim to democratic practice. Democracy is far more than free and fair election, majority rule, accountability and constitutionalism. Its real essence lies in how to ensure that the individual actualizes the greatest level of happiness and satisfaction in conformity with the principles of justice, fair-play and equity. And bearing in mind that democracy does not strive in a chaotic environment where “lawlessness, abridgement of individual’s right and liberty, denial of the preservation of rights to life and property” are the order of the day, it is only proper to avoid the implementation of any law that can generate chaos. This may have prompted Adaramoye’s (2000) submission that: The adoption of Sharia law in some states is violent invasion of all the individual citizens of these states and crude assault on the rule of law, democracy and human rights.

CONCLUSIONS

So far, the paper has discussed both theoretical and peculiar issues, especially against the background of the adoption and implementation of the Sharia legal code full scale, by some Northern States in Nigeria. Most importantly, is the crisis generated by these actions and the argument that Sharia is anti-thetical to democratic principles by non-Muslims. Also highlighted are the constitutional provisions which appear to support and the same time restrain the adoption of state religion in Nigeria. Against this background, and bearing in mind that Sharia question in Nigeria is an aged long problem which has generated misunderstanding between the Muslim and Christian population, and has the potentiability of resurfacing again as it did in 1977/78, 1988/89, 1994 and 1999/2000. the paper submits that a national conference should be held to address the issue with the aim of resolving all ambiguity sections in the 1999 Constitution that
makes the Sharia question controversial and problematic. This is particularly necessary especially when one conceives the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria since 2009 in light of systematic attempt to Islamize Nigeria in order to fulfill Shariacracy.

REFERENCES


