

HEGEL AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY

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ABSTRACT. *It is a truism that the philosophic outlook of any age determines the political, economic and social outlook of that age. Hegelianism was once the dominant philosophy in Europe and thus, determined that period. For Hegel, the Absolute Mind which unfolded in various forms and stages was above the demands of objective morality. This paper attempts to hold Hegel on this and vehemently argues against this. Hence, no matter how the Absolute Spirit arrests any individual or nation, such is very much accountable for its actions and inactions. In this regard then, the paper condemns all the atrocities committed by both the historical individuals and historical nations of Hegel and calls for redressing of such actions by way of apologies, reparation and investments.*

KEYWORDS: Hegel, Moral responsibility, Historical individuals, Historical nations, Africa.

INTRODUCTION

The history of consciousness according to Hegel started from its rudimentary stage of mere consciousness to its absolute and final stage of philosophy. The Spirit in the course of its development, at the objective level expressed itself fully in the spirit of man and the state. The state embodying this spirit developed in history in four stages or epochs, namely, the Oriental, the Greek, the Roman and the Germanic epochs. The Germanic nations, which turned, out to be the modern day Europe and by extension the United States of America were the highest peak and the very stronghold of freedom due to the influence of Christianity.

Following Hegel's thesis, that nations whose hour had struck in history and other nations whose hour is yet to strike were without rights, the Germanic nations turned on these nations especially Africa and turned them into objects of exploitation and subjugation. According to Hegel these Germanic nations and their personalities in those exploitative activities were not within the sphere of morality because they were simply extension of the World-Mind or Absolute Spirit. In other words they were above morality.

In this paper, we looked at the activities of these historical individuals and nations with the lens of objective morality and found them guilty. That was so because according to Austin Fagothey, 'to own a slave's person would be to own not merely his body but also his intellect and will. These, however, always remain under the slave's control, and he is responsible for his voluntary acts like any other human being'. (210). So to commit

crimes under the guise of being mere instruments in the hand of the Absolute Spirit is unacceptable in any rational and sane society.

Conceptualizing Moral Responsibility.

Responsibility as a notion has one meaning in whatever field it is applied. Hence, moral responsibility is not radically different from other forms of responsibility such as legal responsibility, social responsibility and the like. In view of this, responsibility has to do with the action of the individual or a group done with a certain level of volition and knowledge. It has to do with the culpability or non-culpability of such action or actions. Responsibility, in short, deals with holding to account those and only those who properly are accountable for either favourable or unfavourable event, but most of the time with regard to unfavourable or unfortunate occurrence.

In this regard then, responsibility is more at home or is used more often in legal and moral dealings than any other. No wonder then, Joel Feinberg and Hyman Gross maintained that:

Legal theory is nowhere more generously endowed with philosophical substance than in those parts that address questions of responsibility. It is also true that the law offers more promising material than any other human endeavour to the philosopher who seeks to develop a theory of responsibility. (485).

The kind of philosophy these scholars are talking about is not, of course, metaphysics or epistemology rather moral philosophy. It is a truism that legal philosophy and moral philosophy are more closely related than any other branch of philosophy and the theory of responsibility may be said to be the ‘umbilical cord’ that links the two together.

Moral responsibility has certain conditions that must be considered before accessing actions as praiseworthy or blameworthy. The conditions necessary for the imputability of responsibility in moral sphere are of utmost importance for any moral judgment to really worth the name. Ordinarily, when one talks of responsibility, the next thing that follows is punishment. Therefore, unless these necessary conditions for responsibility are tackled, punishment may be meted out irresponsibly and the then the foundation of morality may be rocked if not totally destroyed. These conditions as a matter of fact are related to the modifiers of responsibility which include ignorance, fear and force. They are subsumed under two major headings – volition or freedom and knowledge.

(a) Volition/Freedom: - The issue of volition is of paramount importance in any ethical discussion because any action that is involuntary is not a human act but an act of man, which does not attract any moral responsibility. Volition has to do with the exercise of one’s will, that is, the ability to use one’s will. The use of this will has to be from the person involved and not from outside. The effect of this use is voluntary action and an action is said to be voluntary if and only if it is not due to external compulsion. From the positive side, an action is voluntary if and only if it is done out of the agent’s own choice.

The two are saying the same thing from different angles. In all analysis then, voluntary action is one, which its origination is in the agent, he being aware of the particular details in which the action consists. (Hudson 336).

(b) Knowledge: - This is opposed to ignorance. For an action to be responsible, the doer must be knowledgeable a bit. In legality this is not the case but in morality it is. Knowledge here is the same as awareness. That is to say, any action performed in a state of awareness is a responsible action while that performed in a state of unawareness is not a responsible one. However, it is important to qualify this state of awareness. Being unaware as a result of the agent's fault does not remove blameworthiness but when it is beyond the agent's reach naturally or otherwise it nullifies all imputation of blame. Therefore, ordinary being unaware does not remove responsibility because the agent may be responsible in one way or the other. For instance, a drunken man may be unaware of what he is doing, but he might have helped getting drunk and this is the cause of his unawareness. Hence, he is to be held responsible for all his action or inactions and their effects. Another case that scholars have varied opinions is that of an insane person. Some scholars are of the view that insanity destroys self-control and awareness; hence, the victim of this is not to be accountable for his actions. Others held the view that one is not insane always or at all times. There are times and cases in which the insane is fully aware of his actions, therefore, in such cases he is responsible for his actions and otherwise, he is not. The same principle applies to kleptomaniac and all other neurotic and psychotic cases.

The Spirit and moral responsibility.

Now let us apply to concrete situations the principles or norms of objective morality discussed above with regard to the Spirit or World-Mind in its objective manifestation. According to Hegel, the Absolute Idea reached the summit of its manifestation in the objective sphere in the spirit of Man and in the State. When Hegel talks about the spirit of man, he does not mean every man but the so-called historical personalities or individuals. These included Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar and Napoleon Bonaparte as mentioned by Hegel. Hegel regarded these three figures as historical individuals because they satisfied his condition of greatness. They are those whose own particular aims involve those large issues, which are the will of the World-Spirit. They may be called heroes because they derived their purposes and their vocation, not from the calm, regular course of things sanctioned by the existing order, but from a concealed fount, one that has not attained to phenomenal.

(i) Historical Individual and moral responsibility.

Historical individuals are men who appear to draw the impulse of their life from themselves and whose deeds have produced a condition of things and a complex of historical relations which appear to be only their interest and their work. They are practical and political men yet they are thinking men who have an insight into the requirements of the time. They best understand affairs and others learn from them. Thus, Hegel regarded the trio great because they willed and accomplished something great, not a mere fancy, a mere intention, but that which met the case and fell in with the needs of

the age. However, the fate of these individuals has not been a happy one, for they attained no calm enjoyment, their own life was labour and trouble. (Hegel, Phil of History 30-31). In subjecting the activities of the historical individuals of Hegel to the crucible of moral judgment we absolutely state that no matter how Hegel tried to exonerate them from their activities, they are to be held responsible. Austin Fagothey teaches that:

To own a slave's person would be to own not merely his body but also his intellect and will. These, however, always remain under the slave's control, and he is responsible for his voluntary acts like any other human being. (210).

We accept in its entirety this declaratory statement of Austin Fagothey as it relates to the historical individuals whom Hegel said were more or less arrested by the Absolute Idea. According to Hegel, the historical personalities were not in control of their faculties and were mere instruments in the hand of the Absolute Mind. Therefore, the Absolute Idea using them as extension of itself did every one of their activities. The World-Mind as it were did not select these personalities indiscriminately; rather, the personalities themselves possessed and exhibited certain features that attracted the World-Mind to them. Prominent among these features were the ability of knowing and expressing the absolute will and the ability to rally people around oneself. Georg Lukacs puts it thus:

This is the merit of the great man: that he knows and can express the absolute will. All assemble around his banner; he is their god. It was thus when Theseus founded the state of Athens; so it was too when a terrible force took hold of the state, and indeed everything in the French Revolution. This force is no despotism, but tyranny, pure, terrifying dominance. But it is necessary and just to the extent to which it constitutes and maintains the state as a real individual entity. (310).

One may rightly observe that these personalities from the onset were hard men. The World-Mind did not make the hard, but their hardness and meanness attracted the Idea. Equally observable is the fact that these men were responsible for the founding of many nations or brought about revolutions that strengthened the nations in question. For Hegel then, these men in the process of carrying out this task of founding nations or organizing revolutions for re-establishing of nations were never morally responsible for any means they used to fulfill this noble mission. And secondly, they could not be praised or honored for this job because the job was not done by them as such but carried out by the World-Mind itself:

All actions, including world historical actions culminate with individuals as subjects giving actuality to the substantial. They are the living instruments of what is in substance the deed of the world mind and they are therefore directly at one with that deed though it is concealed from them and is not their aim and object. For the deeds of the world mind, therefore, they receive no honour or thanks either from their contemporaries or from public opinion

in later ages. All that is vouchsafed to them by such opinion is undying fame in respect of the subjective form of their acts. (Hegel, Phil. of Right 218).

Now, because of the non-culpability of these historical personalities, for the fact that they were the living instruments of the World-Mind, Hegel so much admired Niccolo Machiavelli whom he saw as a despairing protagonist of the Italian national unity that had been lost but which he wished to restore. He viewed him as a national revolutionary who was eager to attain this great goal with whatever means that were available.

The conclusion to be drawn from these views is that these historical individuals are above or rather outside the confines of objective morality. This goes to say that all their activities are not to be viewed with the lens of objective morality with the view of ascribing role, liability or capacity responsibilities and with the consequent punishment. Before verifying the veracity of the non-culpability of the world historical individuals as purported by Hegel, it is of relevance to note that Hegel despite this his stand never viewed these personalities as eternally one with the World-Mind. According to him time will come when they will outlive their usefulness and Spirit will abandon them, then they will be overthrown:

The memory of the tyrant is execrated; but in this respect too he is only spirit certain of itself. As such he has acted as a god only in and for himself and expects the ingratitude of his people.... This was the case with Robespierre. His power abandoned him, because necessity has abandoned him and so he was violently overthrown. (Lukacs 310).

This simply entails that the tyrant only enjoys moral immunity when he is necessarily relevant. At the moment of his superfluity, he is bound by all moral legality and sanctions. However, in our assessment of the moral implication of the activities of the tyrant, we are not only going to investigate his activities when he is out of the pinnacle of power but when he is really one with the world mind, really at the peak of his career.

Calling to mind the powerful statement of Austin Fagothey, that the slave is responsible for his voluntary actions despite the fact of his enslavement, we start assessing the historical personalities by subjecting them to the requirements of the three basic conditions for moral responsibility, namely, knowledge, volition or freedom. Following the thesis of Fagothey, we affirm that the world mind not only enslaved these historical figures in their bodies alone but their intellect and will as well. However, despite this wholesale arrest or enslavement of these figures, they were in perfect control of their inner faculties, that is, intellect and will. This means that they had full knowledge of what they were doing and willed them in themselves and freely carried them out. The power of reason in them never interfered with the functions of these faculties. They acted in full consciousness. Hence, Hegel extolled them thus:

The great man of the age is the one who can put into words the will of his age, tell his age what its will is, and accomplish it. What he does is the heart and the essence of his age, he actualizes his age. (Phil. of Right 295).

For the great man to actualize his mission has to be himself, that is, must be in control of his inner faculties. As we noted earlier on, these great men were founders of states and this is a noble and worthy objective but it has to be carried out in a morally accepted relationship between the end and the means. Hegel, as a matter of fact created a gulf between the motives of these figures and the effects of realizing them. According to Avineri; 'Hegel puts a distance between a historical person's motives and the consequences of his deeds.' (232). We cannot as a matter of fact praise a Hannibal for what he achieved without subjecting the means he used in achievement to moral scrutiny no matter the arrest of the Spirit. The essential thing is not the fact that the motives of these personalities which were subjective initially were turned around to be altruistic by the hand of Reason later on; but that they are fully accountable for the means they employed in realizing their objectives whether at the subjective level or the objective level through the interference of the world mind. The Machiavellian principle of the 'end justifying the means', which is morally abhorrent and despised, cannot be employed to justify the activities of the world historical individuals. For Hegel to hold that these figures, since they are one with the world mind, do not receive thanks or honours for whatever they did from their contemporaries and later generations because they were simply mere instruments in the hand of the world mind entails that they cannot be criticized or blamed because they were not themselves.

In the light of this assertion, the relevance and the need for the application of the powerful statement of Austin Fagothey to those figures cannot be over emphasized. Once again he wrote:

To own a slave's person would be to own not merely his body but also his intellect and will. These, however, always remain under the slave's control, and he is responsible for his voluntary acts like any other human being. (210).

Man naturally is a rational and free being and no amount of captivity both physical and otherwise will remove or reduce these faculties from or in him. Man has the freedom to will and to know and freedom to negate these. In other words, man has freedom or volition and knowledge as intrinsic part of his being. However, there certain factors that may interfere with these but do not obliterate them entirely. These factors are the modifiers of responsibility treated earlier on.

In the words of Fagothey, the slave, the tyrant or the 'instrument' is responsible for his voluntary actions like any other human being. And an action is said to be voluntary when the agent has full knowledge and full consent. There is no amount of enslavement or 'instrumentalization' that will erase from man his inner faculties of intellect and will, the seats of knowledge and volition. Hence, the historical individuals were responsible for their actions either positively or negatively, that is, either praiseworthy or blameworthy.

Hegel interestingly used the term 'Machiavellianism' to describe the arduous task of nation building, a term that suggests using deception, absolute power devoid of moral principles and the like in carrying out one's set objective. Now considering the duties of the great leader in state building such as educating and teaching the practice of discipline and obedience and the like, we categorically state that the leader in his activities was not bereft of his inner faculties. There was no indication of either physical or non-physical coercion in carrying out his task and his noble admirable roles indicated all amount of knowledge. Therefore, his actions qualifies to be termed voluntary, hence, his accountability.

In view of these, the historical figures of Hegel such as Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar and Napoleon Bonaparte were culpable for all their activities in their respective states and times. These figures were dictators and tyrants both in their states and conquered ones and committed so many atrocities in their wars of annexation of states and in settling scores with enemy states. Hence, in all these brutalities they were culpable and cannot hide under the umbrella of mere instruments in the hand of World-Mind. In the Nazi Germany, the holocaust committed by Adolf Hitler can never be justified and Hitler exonerated in the guise of being instrument of the World-Mind. Hegel's outrageous teaching that what should count is the objective of their work is morally unacceptable because the end can never and will never justify the means. Might can never be right.

(ii) Historical Nations and moral responsibility.

The morality of the activities of the so called historical nations will be treated with the same moral principles as those of the historical individuals. Basically, in the thought of Hegel, not every nation in the present dispensation qualifies to be a nation. Hegel did not make a distinction as such between a state and a nation; rather he only said that the state is the mind of the nation. By this he meant that the state is the actuality or the form of the nation and it embodies all rationality. The state for him is:

Absolutely rational inasmuch as it is the actuality of the substantial will which it possesses in the particular self-consciousness has been raised to consciousness of universality. (Phil. of Right 155-156).

Therefore, the state comes about when all the particular self consciousness in the society come together or unite to form a universal consciousness whereby the particular self consciousness that make up the state disappears.

With this as the definition of the state, it is observed that many states existed in history before Hegel. However, Hegel only recognized in history four states or nations and these four nations divided history into four epochs. These historical nations of Hegel are the Oriental realm, the Greek realm, the Roman realm and the Germanic realm. These individual realms did not refer to what we have today as a single nation but what we may describe as a group of nations in a certain geographical location. For instance, the

Oriental realm comprised of nations as China, India and Persia. So for Hegel, world history started in the East. In the East, the Absolute Idea manifested itself in a very rudimentary form. Here, there was more or less no distinction between substantiality and individuality:

In the Oriental world, the individual is totally immersed in substantiality; the sacred has not been separated from the profane and the Oriental absolute despot appears by necessity as the incarnation, in some way or the other, of the deity. (Avineri, 223-224).

For Hegel, this is the start of history. However, this picture of the world-mind in the Oriental history is not common with all the Oriental nations. Some were much more crude than others. As a matter of fact the crudest form of the manifestation of the world mind in history was in the Chinese nation that ‘completely lacked any differentiation between objective existence and subjective consciousness’. It is more or less a static world. India on the other hand, which is a step above China in terms of the manifestation of the Absolute Idea:

Represents a deep socio-cultural differentiation but the principle of differentiation as it appears in the caste system is arbitrary and naturalistic, completely devoid of spiritual dimension. The caste system, based as it is on the accident of birth... leaves no room for consciousness, man is rarely reduced to his function and distinction between what is human and what is animal-like disappears. (Avineri 225).

Hegel, as it were criticized the Indian practice of caste system, linking it to Plato’s order of society. But, actually, if the world-mind is unfolding itself in history and in the India’s form of history, then the caste system is to be rightly interpreted as part of the necessary manifestation of spirit which cannot be criticized or condemned.

The Persian state is an advancement of the Indian form in world history. According to Hegel, the Persians in their religion, the Zoroastrian religion, discovered reason as well as its opposite, but they were unable to go beyond this position. Here freedom is still embedded in the abstract action of the monarch who, as it were, stands for what is good. The Persian experience gave base to the dictum that in the East only one is free and this only one is the king.

The next historical nation after the Oriental world is the Greek world. The existence of the city-states in the make-up of the Greek world is what distinguishes it from the Oriental world and each state is autonomous with a mind of its own. The city-states were always at war with each other for domination and supremacy but what generally held them together which advanced them more than the Persian world is the existence of freedom which discerns the ethical and the beautiful in the multiplicity of forms and nuances. Actually in the Greek world, the individual was free but it is a kind of freedom that is embedded in the substantial unity of the polis. This is to say that those who were

really free were those so much close to or associated with the polis, that is, the ruling few. Thus, the justification of the maxim that in the Greek world, only few are free. It is to be noted and very seriously too, that in the Greek world the Absolute Idea manifested its warring aspect for the first time. This is the world that gave birth to Alexander the Great, one of the greatest fighters ever in history.

Another distinguishing feature of the Greek world is its culture. The Greek culture was so rich that it once became the culture of the enlightened world. The Greek language became the language of the learned. However, in spite of the richness of the Greek culture, what it lacked was individual subjectivity. Since few individuals were free, it all meant that majority was not free. It is a society that approved the existence of free men and slaves. Naturally the slaves were not free and according to Hegel, the due satisfaction of particular needs was relegated exclusively to the class of slaves.

The third state of history is the Roman world, which stands for sheer arbitrary external power. According to Shlomo Avineri:

To the Roman, the state is the ultimate end, not the totality of social life as it was to the Greek. The individual is a mere instrument in the hands of the state and the polis is turned into a universal empire, which thus ceases to be the realm of beautiful, though unmediated freedom, and becomes the sphere of hard work and servitude. ... With the growth of empire the struggle for power within Rome itself became worse, since nothing could satiate the infinite drive for more and more power. (227).

The struggle for power naturally led to clashes between the individuals and the state, that is, between the agents of the state who thought themselves to be hardworking and the servitude majority who saw themselves as being dehumanized by the ruling class. Hence, they wanted to assert their humanity and freedom. The members of the ruling class, because of the thirst for power continued to suppress and victimize the masses. So the advancement of the Roman realm over the Greek world in terms of the differentiation of the subjective individual from the substantiality logically brought ethical life; ‘ into the extremes of the private self consciousness of person’s on the one hand, and abstract universality on the other.’ (Hegel, Phil. of Right 221). Therefore, the Roman world was one of warfare both internally (as a republic) and externally (as an empire). This is the nation that gave birth to Julius Caesar, one of the historical individuals of Hegel. Rome under Caesar embarked on several devastating wars, internally to silence opposition and externally for expansion as a mark of prowess.

The last stage of the Absolute Idea’s manifestation in history is the Germanic world. The Germanic world here does not only comprise of the present day German nation and the Nordic nations but comprises of all the descendants of the Germanic peoples on the ruins of the Western European Empire, namely, France, Italy, Spain and England.

In the Germanic nations, the existence of Christian religion enabled the absolute to express itself more than any other time in history. In the earlier worlds and epochs, there

was no subjective freedom as such. In the Oriental world, it never existed and in the Greco-Roman world, only very few enjoyed it. In the Roman world particularly, the state is everything, the individual disappears in the state. With the emergence of Christianity the notion that all individuals can be free and indeed are free became dominant. Christianity emerged as an instrument and vanguard of freedom; as an agent that liberates the subject from the political power or state by introducing subjective consciousness in the political history. In the view of Avineri; ‘ history since the emergence of Christianity is a continuous unfolding of subjective freedom in the world.’ (228). In other words, freedom of all in the Christian epoch distinguishes this period from other epochs. And as it were, the Germanic peoples who were originally alien to Christianity were the historical agent that carried it to its complete expression – freedom of all.

The Germanic world, despite the fact that it recognized the freedom of all, involved itself in so many fierce wars just as the Roman world before it. It recognized subjective freedom and yet was involved in oppression, domination and subjugation of persons and nations. We have to recall here that this world that recognized individual freedom gave birth to Napoleon Bonaparte who in the course of his wars and revolutions disregarded this subjective freedom that Christianity preaches. It is the world that birth to Niccolo Machiavelli who propagated the theses of ‘the end justifies the means’ and ‘might is right’. Christianity came to liberate the individual from any captivity including that of the state but for Hegel, the state as seen in the Germanic world is the march of God on earth and therefore, its existence is more important than that of the individual and the individual consciousness is to be meaningful only in the universality.

This is the nature of the Germanic realm, which Hegel said is the highest expression of the world-mind in history. What actually distinguishes this world from others before it is simply that it existed as Christianity came to be established as a world religion. Christianity as it were, became a world religion shortly before the decline of the Roman Empire, through the edict of Milan of Emperor Constantine on February 13, 313. Hence, it can be said that the Germanic realm was a Christian one in terms of spatio-temporal consideration rather than effective application of Christian principles.

In these four epochs or nations in the world history, the world mind manifested itself successively and progressively. So at certain times in world history, each of the nations was the dominant nation. After playing its role in history, the Absolute Spirit abandoned that nation for another one. So each of them had only one period in history to shine. The shining here entails self-developing of the world mind:

The nation which is ascribed a moment of the Idea in the form of a natural principle is entrusted with giving complete effect to it in advance of the self-developing self-consciousness of the world mind. The nation is dominant in world history during this one epoch, and it is only once that it can make its hour strike. (Hegel, Phil. of Right 217-218).

Hegel went ahead to say that as far as this nation is at the pinnacle of power, all other nations and those whose hour had struck are without rights and do not count in history. The implication of this is that because the minds of other nations are without rights and historically irrelevant, they automatically become mere instruments in the hand of the current dominant nation. Therefore, their oppression, subjugation, exploitation and destruction have no moral implication adversely. Again, the idea that the dominant nation is the only one that counts puts to serious questions Hegel's teaching about international relations. Nations actually relate among themselves based on the fact of mutual recognition and respect; 'it follows that every state is sovereign and autonomous against its neighbours... and is to be recognized by them as sovereign.' (Hegel, *Phil. of Right* 212). Hegel despite this stand went ahead to postulate that in spite of this mutual recognition autonomy by the states, that the dominant nation would still recognize the fact that it is not at par with other nations in everything, that is, it is superior to all the others and will be relating with them as such; 'the civilized nation is conscious that the rights of barbarians are unequal to its own and treats their autonomy as only a formality. (219).

The barbarians here are the other nations and those whose hour had struck already which no longer count in history. It is really this treating of other nations by the dominant nation as historical nonentity devoid of rights, to be treated as objects and instruments of greatness that bring to focus the issue of moral responsibility on the part of the world historical nations of Hegel.

So judging the activities of the so called historical nations and especially the Germanic realm with the tenets of objective morality, we note that these nations ventured into other nations out of greed and self-aggrandizement. Therefore, no matter how the world mind manifested itself in them, they were very conscious of what they were doing in this regard.

Now just like the world historical individuals, these historical nations were very conscious of their activities. And because they were conscious of what they were doing, they acted voluntarily, freely and knowingly and therefore, were fully responsible for their actions. Thus, in crime like slavery (slave trade), they committed crimes against the moral duties of preservation of and respect for life, which enjoins that life should not be taken both in one's self and the other. Again, the exploitation of other nations' natural resources especially African nations by Europe is a crime against the moral duty of respect for property, which enjoins us to refrain from the abuse and destruction or illegal appropriation of another's instrument of well being. As far as African continent is concerned, the Germanic nation committed the worst crime in this area. All the enslavement, killings, exiling of native Africans were carried out by these nations simply to pave way for illegal appropriation of Africa's natural resources, her instrument of well being.

Having stated that the Germanic nation, nay, European nations were guilty of crimes against the moral duties mentioned above, especially that of respect for private property,

they are to face the consequences of their voluntary activities which will come naturally in the form of punishment.

CONCLUSION

Now that the historical personalities of Hegel and their off springs as well as the historical nations have been judged with the norms of objective morality and found guilty, what follows next? In this regard James Sterba says:

Where a person has been found culpable, then he becomes liable to one or more of the three unwanted treatments, punishment, condemnation, payment of compensation (254).

With regard to the historical individuals of Hegel like Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar and Napoleon Bonaparte together with their nations are to be treated as prescribed above. In the present dispensation, the Germanic nation that produced this trio is Europe and by extension the United States of America. Therefore, Europe to a greater extent and USA to a lesser extent are hereby condemned for their oppressive and exploitative activities in other nations and more especially in the continent of Africa.

What Africa and the rest of the oppressed by these nations need from the West is an admission of guilt and a sincere apology for the crimes of slavery and colonization. Apology as a matter of fact has a wonderful healing effect on the offended and the offender as well because of its moral weight. As apology is being rendered for the crimes of slavery and colonization, the current tactics of imperialism must stop forthwith.

With regard to payment of compensation, Europe and America should not hesitate in doing this because this is the only reasonable avenue left for them to annul the crimes of slavery and colonization. Actually compensation, restitution and re-structuring of international economic relations are needed for the cancellation of the Western crimes against Africa and others. When these are done Africa will really be integrated into the mainstream of current globalization process. Africa cannot afford to lag behind.

Of remarkable importance is the fact that there were some agents of change in history that were extolled and exalted for the success of their mission without committing crimes against humanity. Hegel himself noted Socrates and Martin Luther as world historical individuals, and they changed the course of history beneficently and through crime-free processes. Therefore, it tantamount to inner contradiction and inconsistency for the World-Mind to be a tyrant in one individual and a peaceful innovator or restorer in another. Hegel did not offer any explicit explanation for this apparent inconsistency in the World Reason.

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