FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA 1960-2012: THE MISSING LINK

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ABSTRACT: The study examined Nigeria Foreign Policy from 1960-2012. The objective was to find out whether there is any change in foreign policy orientation among the various regimes or administrations within the period of study. The method of study employed was historical and descriptive research study methods. To this end, the analysis was done thematically and the results or findings show that the logic and the instrumentality of domestic development linkage theory in foreign policy is virtually lacking in Nigerian foreign policy behaviour. This is because Afrocentric foreign policy commitment overwhelmingly overshadows domestic reality. Although the Obasanjo’s and Jonathan’s economic diplomacy try to aligned the nation’s economic reality (The NEEDS policy and Transformation agenda) with her international interaction, however, much of the foreign policy resources were not deployed to bear on the welfare of the citizenry hence, the current economic crisis in the country. Based on this, the study recommends a paradigm shift of using foreign policy as an instrument for the revitalizations and the diversification of the nation’s economy to engineer national development.

KEYWORDS: Foreign Policy, Discourse.

INTRODUCTION

The history of Nigeria’s diplomatic practice has been in the making shortly before the country’s independence. To a large extent, this was more of a manifestation of British system of handing over power to her former colonies through a systematic process (Gabriel, 1988). This entailed training of personal in all facets of activities and developing the Civil Service was paramount in this approach. As a nucleus of diplomatic practice, a Foreign Service division was created in the Nigerian Prime minister’s office in 1957, to deal with matters concerning commonwealth and foreign relations. Officers selected to serve in this division, because the first crop of Nigerian Foreign Service Officers. They were at first attached to British
Emphasis and consular posts to function as Third Secretaries Vice Consuls and so on.

On 1st October, 1960, Nigerian won Independence and subsequently established a separate Ministry known as Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations (Jibril, 2004) to deal with external affairs of the government. Nigeria became a Republic on 1st October, 1963, but still remains an active member of the Commonwealth.

The Nigeria diplomatic practice has witnessed a rapid growth over the years. This chapter therefore, takes an overview of Nigeria’s past administrations foreign policy beginning from October 1960 to 2012. This academic sports worth undertaken because the period enclosed between 1960 2012 had witnessed significant changes in world affairs with profound effects on Nigeria’s international relations, major one being the demise of colonization that hitherto defined the focus of Nigeria foreign relations in her earlier life.

Another paramount change in the globalizing world order in which virtually every facets of human life have been affected; above, the period 1999 to date stands for the end of military era and the beginning of civilian democratic regime with attendant symbolism attached. Nevertheless, as postulated by Karl Deutch that indeed, the main justification for analyzing the nature of foreign policy is that is affects people’s life.

Bukar (2000) mentioned two dimensions which could guide evaluation of Nigeria’s diplomatic practice.

1. The reality that certain diplomatic approaches have lasted long enough to genuinely tackle contemporary development and
2. The identifying fact that the conduct of all successive administration was governed by the justification of pursuing their policy.

The above thoughts provided the background for the study.

**An Overview of Nigeria Foreign Policy**

Nigeria’s foreign policy from 1960 – 2012 is going to be examined thematically in relation to regime.
Balewa Administration Diplomatic Practice
As stated earlier, the foundation of Nigeria’s diplomatic practice was laid in the late fifties, not in 1960 as presumed by some scholars. However, in 1960, following Nigeria’s independence, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa became the Prime Minister. In this six years period within which he served as prime minister, Balewa opening address adopted a policy of non-alignment. The nation’s diplomatic practice was guided by certain principles.

(i) Safeguarding the newly won independence
(ii) Membership of the Commonwealth and United Nations
(iii) African oriented Interest/Continental Unity)

Balewa was conscious enough not to offend Nigeria’s friends, particularly Britain and the United States, in order to meet the domestic and economic needs of his country without compromising her sovereignty. This was clearly revealed in his speech at the last constitutional conference toward independence statehood. Despite his non-alignment posture, Nigeria’s political economy was aligned with the west. This is evidence in the signing of trade and agreements with the Eastern bloc, even though these agreements were not taken seriously. He signed the Anglo Nigerian Defence Pact in 1961 and later abrogated following strong protest by university students.

Contradictions and inconsistencies characterized Balewa’s diplomatic practice making it to be described as conservative, (Okoro, 2002). The pursuit of a conservative approach was informed by factors that placed limits on possible radical posturing of Nigeria’s alignment one such factor was total dependent on the west for development capital (Okoro, 2002, Jibrel, 2004).
Balewa’s Conservatism notwithstanding, the nation played key role in its support for global peace and security, in this way, Nigeria contributed troops to the United Nations peace keeping forces in the Congo. Nigeria within the period, played leading role in the formation of Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 and Chad Basin Commission in 1964. The administration also signed economic agreement with the socialist bloc countries and opened regional foreign office.
Aguiyi Ironsi Regime January (1866 – July 1966)

Aguiyi Ironsi regime was short-lived. It was barely seven months and therefore, did not have any diplomatic direction. However, the regime assures the global community about Nigeria’s commitment to all previous agreements and obligations. The regime could not formulate a well defined diplomatic approach because the nation was engulfed with political instability. This crisis equally led to the closure of regional offices overseas as well as disengagement of regional government from sending economic missions overseas.

General Yakubu Gowon (1966 – 1975)

The conduct and general diplomatic practice of this regime typically reflected the well established national mind-set about its presumed leadership role based on its size and potentials. The drastic turn in diplomatic practice was partly informed by the Nigeria Civil War, in which the government solicited for military aid from Britain and United States, both declined, making the government turned to the Soviet Union for military assistance.

The diplomatic direction of this regime marked the beginning of Nigeria’s central role in African affairs. This was made clear when Gowon declared in 1972 that “Africa is the Cornerstone of Nigeria’s foreign policy” while the question of African United had become an “article of finth (Jibril, 2004). In his comment, Dr. Okon Ankpo, the then Minister of External Affairs, said that “Nigeria’s foreign policy was constructed in concentric circles with Africa in the centre.”

Africa-centeredness of the regime was translated into reality, when:

(i) Nigeria committed herself to regional integration efforts, envisaged under ECOWAS. Thus, Nigeria accepted the task of large financial commitments to ECOWAS, regularly, contributing up to one-third of its annual budget (Bukar, 2002). This position is supplemented by the occasional donations to meet exigent situations;
(ii) Nigeria gave financial and moral assistance to the Liberation Movements in Southern Africa;
(iii) Paid dues to the Liberation Committee of the OAU campaign against the Anglo African states for the creation of ECOWAS;
(iv) The regime negotiated with the European Economic Community (EEC) as Nigeria’s new trading partner;
(v) Solidified friendship with the former Soviet Union and recognized the People’s Republic of China;
(vi) Nigeria also spearheaded the African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries (ACP) in their struggle to negotiate as one body with the EEC for improved trade relations. Nigeria’s economic boom of the post-civil war years contributed significantly to the country’s ability to develop a dynamic diplomatic practice under Gowon.

Murtala/Obasanjo Regime (1975 – 1979)
Like General Gowon, Obasanjo, who was left with governance after the assassination of Murtala Mohammed, pursued Afro-centric diplomatic practice. Under his leadership, the country demonstrated more commitment to, and took more radical and military initiatives in the eradication of colonialism and racism from Africa. The Nation’s diplomatic practice was guided by the following principles:

(i) The defence of our sovereignty and territorial integrity
(ii) Self-reliance and rapid economic development
(iii) Promotion of equality and self-reliance in Africa and the rest of the developing world
(iv) The promotion and defence of justice and respect for human dignity of the Blackman; and

Guided by the above principles, the regime increased Nigeria’s financial and material contribution to the Liberation Movements and recognized the MPLA as the legitimate government of Angola and Trevino government in Maputo (Okoro, 2002):

- Support Anglo-American peace proposals in Zimbabwe
- Settlement of the Chadian and the withdrawal of the French troops in Chad
- Commitment to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states
- It took the determination and foresight of this regime to ensure that the headquarters of ECOWAS was cited in Nigeria and not Lome in Togo as conceded earlier by Gowon regime.
The regime also nationalized the British Petroleum (BP), to stop Nigeria crude oil being made available to the apartheid regime in South Africa and to stop Britain from recognizing the puppet regime in Rhodesia.

One glaring achievement of the regime was greater consistency and coherence in diplomatic practice that reflected in greater independence in policy making and execution than previous regimes. The dynamic diplomatic practice of the regime enhanced the emergence of Nigeria as a continental power that earned her a seat in the Security Council of the United Nations.

Shehu Shagari Regime (1979 – 1983)
The Shehu Shagari regime marked the end of thirteen years of military rule and the beginning of the second republic. The Shagari regime like previous regimes, focused on Nigeria’s African oriented foreign policy as entrenched in the 1979 Constitution. This position was made clear when President Shehu Shagari, in his speech declared that: “Nigeria would continued to make Africa the centerpiece of her foreign policy.”

Professor Ibrahim Gambari, did not mixed words as he defined the focus of Shagari’s diplomatic policy in the following terms:

“President Shehu Shagari’s administration inherited a high degree of national consensus which emerged behind the main features of Nigerian foreign policy goals and objectives. These include support for the liberation movements in Southern Africa, opposition to racism and racial discrimination throughout the world, reasoned support for regional economic cooperation such as ECOWAS, the pursuit for New International Order, Africa as the central focus of the country’s foreign policy and the operationalisation of a trule non-aligned foreign policy (cited in Jibril, 2004).”

This foreign policy feat, made Ogbodeze (1990) to described Shagari major foreign policy trust as “Frousier extension.” This however, did not ignore the Extra-African affairs aspect of Shagari’s regime, as the regimes recognized and observed international principles in the conduct of the Nation’s diplomatic practice. The administration was guided by world body’s principles such as United Nations Principles and Objectives, Commitment to the aims and objectives of the non-aligned movement, support for the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries and active participation in the prevailing International Economic Order for the enhancement of the social wellbeing of mankind and evaluation of a fair, just and peaceful world (the Herald, April 24, 1980).

In pursuance of African centeredness of his foreign policy, Shagari regime gave $5 million to Mugabe’s government. Shagari also demonstrated Nigeria’s commitment to the peaceful settlement of inter-state disputes and conflicts. These conflicts include Chadian Conflict between Goukonni Weddeye and Hissen Habre; Ethiopia and between Morocco and Polisario Movement over the Western Sahara.


Buhari’s regime inherited a very weak economy and therefore embarked on a foreign policy commitment that were over-ambitious in scope. To save the nation from total collapse, the regime had to re-order Nigeria’s priorities to cope with the available resources. To this extent, the regime reduce the nation’s diplomatic missions abroad, ordered the closure of Nigerian borders and expelled illegal aliens, who were citizens from Nigeria’s neighbours.

According to Ogbodeze (1990), Buhari’s Foreign Policy was characterized by what he terms “hostility to Nigeria’s neighbours, undefined objectives, confrontational diplomacy, a demoralized foreign service and contracted instruments of diplomacy.”

Under the short-lived regime, relations between Nigeria and Britain became strained following the rejection of Umaro Dikko extradition request made by the regime.

In spite of this constraint, the regime supported Liberian struggles:

- Recognized the right of Namibian people for independence
- Encourage inter-state economic cooperation in West Africa, through the provision of land in Abuja for the building of ECOWAS permanent headquarters.
- The regime refusal to accept the proposal by the Arab Moslem Group of the Organization of Islamic and Financial Conference which promised Nigeria economic and financial assistance.
General Babangida took over government from Buhari on August 27, 1985; as Head of State, a change in foreign policy was anticipated. The immediate domestic context of the decision by the regime to reorder the nation’s foreign policy was the deep-seated and seemingly intractable crisis of accumulation, which has bedeviled the Nigerian economy. The crisis in the nation’s economy provided the basis for the embrace by the regime of Structural Adjustment which, in turn, strengthens the hands of the international financial institutions and the leading advanced capitalist economy.

Both the contexts of domestic economic crisis and structural adjustment and a rapidly changing international politico-economic environment have acted to shape the decision to adopt economic diplomacy as an object of foreign policy action. The main tenet of economic diplomacy inform necessity for a more direct linkage to be established between Nigeria’s domestic economic requirements and its foreign policy with a view to ensuring that the latter served the needs of the former more systematically, (Gabriel, 1988). This foreign policy feat is not new as element of economic diplomacy is observed in all the regime, but what is new is that, this regime signal the spirited attempt to realign the conduct of the country’s foreign relations in line with domestic economic realities. This situation is blame on disposition of the nation’s leaders.

According to Ate (2002), since independence, Nigeria’s foreign policy has been marked by two prominent features. First, the political leadership has generally tended to conduct foreign policy as if this exercise were merely an external manifestation of the sovereign status of Nigeria. Second, Nigeria’s foreign policy has largely tended to react to external forces rather than serving as a conscious set of policy measures to address crucial national problems.

Consequently, the Nigerian political leadership of the period had little disposition to contemplate the positive use of foreign policy as a strategic instrument for engineering national economic transformation and political integration. Essentially, one could argue that this pattern of foreign policy did not change significantly until end of the 20th century. Though the Babangida regime attempted a paradigm shift in foreign policy when it officially introduced economic diplomacy, the feat was not fully achieved as intended because most of the reforms like Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), and creation of the
National Directorate for Employment, etc. were grounded due to corruption and lack of political commitment with regards to implementation.

Again, Nigeria’s foreign policy suffered a devastating blow under the Abacha administration. Under this period, the domestic environment witnessed a great deal of instability, conflicts, demonstrations, politically motivated killings and bombings as well as the aggressive attempt to consolidate power. This culminated in the killing of nine Ogoni Citizens in the Niger Delta alongside an international environmentalist, Ken Saro Wiwa and subsequent expulsion of Nigeria from the Commonwealth of Nations. Nigeria’s foreign policy lost focus and attracted series of face-offs, strains and blunders which qualified her “a pariah state.”

In the thirty-nine years of Nigeria’s foreign policy from prime minister, Tafawa Balewa to General Abdusallami Abubakar, the thrust of her foreign policy had tended to revolve around some basic principles.

Retrospectively, Nigeria’s foreign policy had been influenced and guided by a strong commitment to African’s centeredness. The foregone analysis in not missing as Nigeria’s diplomatic practice has over the years demonstrated continuity than change.

The evaluation, show a seeming inversion of the objective in which leadership posture in Africa takes procedure in her diplomatic practice over other more pertinent economic targets or goals that would reverberate in greater economic opportunity and prosperity for the people and the state. Successive regime in Nigeria places more emphasis on African interest than on vital national interest; though some scholars are of the view that by protecting African interest, Nigeria is automatically protecting its ‘core values’ in terms of security and protection of her sovereignty and territorial integrity (Akenyemi, 1986). What is paramount here is that, these scholars do not consider the enormity of Nigeria’s commitments to these principles and the great resources expended on them as against the limited resources for the welfare and wellbeing of the Nigeria’s citizens.

**Obasanjo Regime (1999 – 2007)**

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The 1999 Obasanjo regime marked the end of military era, and the inception of democracy in place, with new expectations in Nigeria’s foreign policy.

On the eve of the 21st Century, Nigeria’s foreign policy is faced with new and complex challenges arising, at least in parts from the nation’s internal social and geo-political composition. The inept political leadership mostly under the military accentuated rather than reduced the differences among the various groups. Corruption, lack of transparency, and human rights abuse became the distinguishing traits of government. This domestic crisis and the desire to rectify the sad experiences essentially, made the Obasanjo’s democratic dispensation to commit itself to maintaining and nurturing the mechanisms essential for consolidating democracy and human rights. President Obasanjo in his speech said:

“We must return to the true spirit of federalism in which equity, fairness and justice must become sacred principles. In particular, we need to uncover human rights abuses of the past in order to learn the right lessons, to comfort the injured, and to promote national reconciliation (Obasanjo, 1999).”

The disposition above, acknowledged the nexus between foreign policy and domestic policy of a state. Both do not exist in separate compartments. They are related products of the same leadership and have their origin in the same basic national purposes and must be actually supporting in order to be successful. Political stability of a nation is very important in the pursuit of any political system include political culture of the nation, the nature of the leadership of the country, discipline and patriotism of its citizens. All these factors were lacking in Nigeria during the military era. This, perhaps, explains why Obasanjo (1999) advised that:

“Democracy would not be complete if it does not directly address, in a concrete manner, the human condition of the Nigerian people, the majority of whom are impoverished. It is paradoxical Nigeria is fading one of the poorest countries in the world despite her immense natural and human resources.”

The reality of the above problems informed the regime’s attempts to strengthen foreign policy apparatus to make it more result oriented, the overall aim being to shift from a virtually reactive approach to a more proactive orientation. In his worlds, Obasanjo (1999) declared:
“The overriding and permanent of our foreign policy is to project and safeguard the national interest. Historically, the main thrust our foreign policy has been the struggle for peace, unity, security, economic development and cooperation. Africa will continue to be the primary theatre of our foreign policy. Nevertheless, his administration endorses the universal values of the contemporary globalization process, which are development, human security, equity ethnics, inclusion and sustainability.

The assertion implies a combination of Afro-centricism and multi-nationalism pattern of foreign policy. On African perspective, the regime supported to bring an end to war in Liberia and facilitated the enthronement of democracy in that country.

In August 2003, the President of Sao Tome and principle was ousted in a military coup while attending the Sullivan Summit in Abuja, Nigeria but was later restored to power by Obasanjo administration.

At the multinational level, President Obasanjo made the presence of Nigeria well felt with several trips abroad to attend sessions of United Nations (UN), G77, G15, G8, OPEC, World Bank, IMF, UNESCO, Non-Aligned Movement, Commonwealth Organization, African Union (AU), ECOWAS and many other organizations.

On the bilateral angles, Obasanjo diplomatic practice resulted in the followings:

- Nigeria – South Africa Bi-National Commission
- Nigeria – Cameroon Joint Commission
- Nigeria – Ethiopia on Technical Aid Corp
- Nigeria – Morocco Joint Commission
- Nigeria – Niger Joint Commission (Consolidate)
- Nigeria – Egypt Cooperation
- Nigeria – Nigeria Bilateral Economic Relations

In 2005, Nigeria was accorded the right to host the Common Wealth Heads of State and Government Meeting (CHOGM) which subsequently make President Obasanjo its Chairman after being suspended indefinitely in 1995. Nigeria entered
into more the six bilateral agreements with China, one of which resulted in the reconstruction of the Nigerian railway system.

On the whole, the following achievements were made:

- The regime reintegrates Nigeria into the County of Nations and repairs the sore spots in Nigeria’s relations with the international community.
- The administration equally achieved debt relief.
- The administration made frantic efforts to recover stolen monies lodged in foreign banks by corrupt leaders.
- The African Renaissance is another important contribution of the require foreign policy.
- Enthronement of democracy in Liberia.
- Attraction of foreign instruments, but not remarkably into the non-oil sector as compare to Ghana and India.

Jonathan Regime: Beyond 2011

When President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan assumed office on May 29, last year, there was no doubt that Nigeria’s Foreign Policy bequeathed to the nation at independence in 1960, required a new policy direction. At independence, Nigeria’s foreign policy thrust centered on the quest for African Unity, decolonization and the removal of the obnoxious policy of apartheid in South Africa as these were the priority challenges in Africa at that time.

Convinced that a lot of changes had taken place during the 50 years of existence of the policy document, with the Cold War era over, apartheid dismantled in South Africa and decolonization of Africa completed, President Jonathan ordered a review of the Foreign Policy document in line with the Transformation Agenda of his administration. These changes had brought about new emerging markets in Africa, Asia and Latin America as well as new key global challenges of terrorism, climate change, human and drug trafficking, migration and the quest for democracy and good governance to mention just a few.

Nigeria’s policy experts and diplomats could not agree more with the Nigerian leader that Nigeria’s Foreign policy should not only seek to respond effectively to these new realities but also focus on activities to promote the country’s economic growth and development, secure its national interests and define how Nigeria can
enhance the mutuality of interests from its foreign policy initiatives in Africa and the rest of the world, while strengthening its role in international organizations.

It is worthy to note that Nine months after the review, Nigeria has recorded appreciable successes as a new vista in economic and citizens diplomacy continues to open. In line with the Citizen diplomacy, Nigeria and South Africa resolved their diplomatic row over the deportation of some Nigerians travelling to South Africa, reviving their Bi-National Commission which had been moribund.

Nigeria’s posture of peace played out strongly during the twelve months of the Jonathan administration so far, when it threw its weight behind Libya’s National Transitional Council, supported the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Ivory Coast and championed the ECOWAS Framework Agreement on the situation in Mali.

To demonstrate its commitment to the promotion of democracy and democratic values, Nigeria still insisted that it would not accord recognition to the military junta in Mali during the recent coup and that full constitutional order must be restored to the country.

Nigeria’s firm belief in good neighbourliness had motivated it to support democratic efforts in Equatorial Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Ghana, Sierra-Leone and Liberia to mention just a few. On a wider international scene, Nigerian troops are taking part in several UN Peace-Keeping missions in Africa notably in Sudan, South Sudan, Liberia and Sierra-Leone.

No wonder therefore, that Nigeria was invited recently to New York to become a member of the Governing Council of the Community of Democracies, an international organization with its Headquarters in Poland. This may not be unconnected to its exemplary leadership, as the Chair of the UN Security Council between 2010 and 2011 during which it addressed stringently threats to international peace and security not only in Africa but also in Europe, the Middle East, Asia and the Americas.

It is on record that during Nigeria’s Chair of the Council, a triangular cooperation between the Security Council, the Secretariat and the Troop –Contributing Countries, TCCs, was institutionalized, offering the TCCs for the first time, the opportunity to speak out concerning the renewal of the mandate and the Welfare of peace-keepers.
Nigeria’s new foreign policy thrust on Economic Diplomacy which features prominently in President Goodluck Jonathan’s Transformation Agenda, has also led to the maximization of benefits as several bilateral agreements have been reviewed and re-negotiated while new ones have been brokered. Nigeria has continued the programme of engagement with Asian countries, leading to the signing and activation of bilateral Joint Commission with Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and India.

In recognition of Nigeria’s leadership role in the West African region and Africa in general, the country holds the presidency of the D8, a group of eight developing countries. Within this period, Nigeria witnessed a number of high level visits between it and friendly nations where President Jonathan used the platforms to push his administration’s Transformation Agenda which aims at attracting foreign investments into the Country. Prominent amongst them were the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, David Cameron and the French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe.

Nigeria’s leadership role in both regional and global arena has won her recognition by the international community with the country elected to key positions in world bodies. Suffice it to mention her election to the Executive Board of UNESCO in November 2011 for a four-year term, the Governing Board of the UN Environment Programme UNEP and the Economic and Social Council ECOSOC. A number of Nigerians have also been elected into key positions in international organisations, a pointer to the doggedness of Nigeria and its citizens to make impact in global affairs.

However, in spite of these successes, Nigeria faces Security challenges arising from the threats from Boko Haram sect which has carried out several attacks on churches, public buildings including the UN headquarters in Abuja. The Jonathan administration should not, however, allow these challenges to distract it from its contributions to ensuring a world order where peace, equity and justice reign supreme, while expanding and exploring new frontiers in her relations with nations of the world.

**Common Trends**

Relating the above analysis with domestic reality, one would quickly understand that the logic and the instrumentality of domestic development linkage theory in
foreign policy is virtually lacking in Nigerian foreign policy behaviour. This is because Afrocentric foreign policy commitment overwhelmingly overshadows domestic reality. The little gain from Nigeria external relations cum African diplomacy fall squarely within the domain of regional prestige that bears no relationship to the nation’s human and economic security.

Okpokpo (2002) in his article “the challenges are facing Nigeria’s foreign policy in the next millennium” has rightly argued that Africa alone should no longer be the one and only reason for the existence of a foreign policy in Nigeria. This position is apt, because Nigeria has sacrificed a lot for African countries without anything in return. Foreign policy that bothers on external costly political mission with little or no bearing on core national interest, run the risk of being underdeveloped; this kind of posture made Reuben Abate to accused Nigeria being extra-ordinary naive by restricting its foreign policy to Africa as its cornerstone. Nigeria’s foreign policy from Abubakar Tafawa Balewa to Obasanjo second coming has sacrificed the true national interest of Nigeria on the alter of African centeredness foreign policy. This position de-linked foreign policy from internal developer conception or approach. How do we explain twenty million dollars that went to Angola without what Nigeria might gain?

Oscar in Olusanjo and Akindele (1986) pointed out that:

“It was indeed, ironical for Nigeria to have spent 859.8 million on the multilateral peace keeping activities in Chad without indicating the interest for which such huge amount was spent.”

While Nigeria has played a vital role in Africa and indeed global peace keeping, Nigeria itself has been immersed in perpetual underdevelopment with attendance threat to both human and state security. Following from the above a paradigm shift in migrated.

Codsact (2001), put the matter significantly, foreign policy of economic diplomacy is increasingly important both on the bilateral as well as the multinational levels. The present emphasis on economic diplomacy against the lone Africa centric objective is a call for general trend shift in the nation’s diplomatic practice to accommodate increased national development policy. Nigeria’s welfare and security should be the centre of Nigeria’s foreign policy.
This implies that Afro decolonization posture, an old fashioned that dealt so much with geo political aspect of required prestige, makes economic diplomacy an inferior task. Contemporary world order gives with the demise of cold war, movement to economic dimension in inter-state relations. This is because increasing globalization of world economy now sharpens the quest by countries to secure and consolidate their national development.

Today economic matters of foreign policy are of great concern to nation that desire to address development challenges. Present day diplomatic practice demands “a stepped-up effort that clearly pursues issues and actions that have direct linkage, and which would impact positively on their national development quest. To achieve national development, the nation’s diplomatic practice should encourage the promotion of export trade, the alteration of foreign investment and fresh financial inflows.

Nigeria must wear diplomatic orientation that is internal development induce. This does not just entail re-ordering of the nation’s priorities in the Nigeria’s Afro centric relations but a careful cultivation of friendship, and goodwill with countries that could help in the development quest of the nation. In this case, the nation foreign relations need to be redefined in the contemporary global politics in order to fill the gap between the country’s diplomatic practice and expectations. The ultimate objective should be constructed around what Nigeria intends to gain from any given foreign relations or behaviour. Foreign policy discussions makers and implementers should be guided by the country’s national interest. This is the only way by which the nation development challenges can be tackled squarely.

There is a considerable accord between the practioners and theoretician of foreign policy that “the health of a nation’s economy is one index of the vigor and purposefulness it displays in its relations with others (Rodee, 1983). This is clearly depicted in Olusenya (1988) position that “A strong economic foundation and a happy and contented people provide a second basis for effective pursuit of foreign policy” and Nwachuchukwu (1988) assertion “that the ultimate end of foreign policy must be the welfare of the people”.

The analysis clearly shows that Nigeria, continue to perceived itself as a rigorous subsistence collaborator” role in West Africa, where it created and still is funding ECOWAS, River Basin Scheme, Industrial and Joint economic ventures with its less privileged neighbours. Second, Nigerians still acted as “a mediator integrator” in several intra-African disputes. Nigeria continue aspiring to
international position at all costs with little regard to the fact that foreign policy is used as an instrument for solving those domestic economic problems, rather, Nigerians uses foreign policy as a tool for mounting expensive idealistic missions abroad, (Ogwu). With respect to later Olusanya has warned that:

*A country in which millions are in the unemployment market, a country crying for foreign investment and weighed down by the burden of external debts, is not good candidate for highly competitive position in the field.*

From Abubakar Tafawa Balewa in 1960 to President Goodluck Jonathan beyond 2011, there has been total commitment to the most financially demanding aspect of Nigeria’s Afro-centric foreign policy. This posture is still carried out without clarification as to what gains Nigerians want to achieve. This orientation of Nigerian Foreign Policy is completely devoiced of internal developer role conception that emphasizes aligning our domestic problems with our global interactions. This is completely at variance with Japanese Foreign Policy Orientations.

**Conclusion**

In essence, what is being emphasized in this essay is that from Abubakar Tafawa Balewa to Jonathan there has been no clear difference in the nation’s foreign policy as the nation foreign policy makers still cling to the traditional approach of Afri-centric posture with little contemplation of using such orientation to address issues that bothers on the welfare of Nigerians. Nigeria needs to reorder her diplomatic objective with greater emphasis on “What she stands to gain from foreign relations.

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