

EXAMINING THE BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY IN NORTHERN NIGERIA AND THE QUEST FOR A PERMANENT RESOLUTION OF THE CRISIS

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ABSTRACT: *The state of insecurity engendered by Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, especially in the North-Eastern part of the country is quiet worrisome, disheartening and alarming. Terrorist attacks of the Boko Haram sect have resulted in the killing of countless number of innocent people and wanton destruction of properties that worth billions of naira through bombings. More worrisome however, is the fact that all the efforts of the Nigerian government to curtail the activities of the sect have not yielded any meaningful positive result. Thus, the Boko Haram scourge remains intractable to the government who appears helpless in curtailing/curbing their activities. The dynamics and sophistication of the Boko Haram operations have raised fundamental questions about national security, governance issue and Nigeria's corporate existence. The major thrust of this paper is to investigate the Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria and to underscore the urgent need for a permanent resolution of the crisis. The paper argues that most of the circumstances that led to this insurgency are not unconnected with frustration caused by high rate of poverty, unemployment, weak governance, religious fanaticism among others. It also addresses the effects of the insurgency which among others include serious threat to national interest, peace and security, internal population displacement, violation of fundamental human rights, debilitating effects on the entrenchment of democratic principles in Nigeria among others. The paper recommends among others, the necessity to address poverty reduction, religious secularism and political re-orientation. The need for adequate collaboration and partnership between the government, non governmental organizations, civil society organization as well as the individuals is also advocated. Finally, the need for the re-evaluation of the country's domestic and foreign policies as a means of combating the menace of this domestic terrorism is also stressed.*

KEY WORDS: Boko Haram, Insurgency, Permanent Resolution, Crisis, Domestic Terrorism, National Security

INTRODUCTION

The trend of domestic terrorism in Nigeria as exemplified by the nefarious activities of the dreaded Islamic sect popularly known as Boko Haram has become a major concern to the Nigerian government in particular and the international communities in general. The activities of the sect especially since 2009 has constituted a major security threat to the nation and make Northern Nigeria particularly the North-East (where their activities are rife), the most dangerous region to live in the country. The dynamics and sophistication of its operations and apparent invincibility of the sect have raised fundamental questions not only about national security, but also on governance issues as well as on Nigeria's corporate existence. The militant incidents of the sect have been targeted mainly at the government and her institutions and officials, churches, motor parks and sometimes mosques; and countless number of innocent Nigerians have borne the brunt of the Boko haram acts of devastation. The dangerous nature

of insurgency launched by the group has pitched Christians and Muslims against each other owing to the incessant bombings of churches in the north particularly the most affected states of Bornu, Yobe and Adamawa. The violent activities of the sect have also assumed international dimension with the kidnappings and brutal killings of some Europeans.

The nature of their dastardly acts include bombings (including suicide), kidnapping of innocent people especially women and students (like the 276 Chibok girls kidnapped in 2014), shooting victims at close ranges, throat-slitting and day light and nocturnal attacks. The current increasing attacks of the sect even with the emergence of President Muhammadu Buhari (a Muslim and a Northerner) as the Head of the current civilian dispensation has debunked the myth or belief in some quarters that Boko Haram emergence was particularly targeted to pulling down the defunct President Goodluck Jonathan's administration and resist southern domination of the helms of affairs in the country.

It is against this background that the paper tends to investigate the Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria and underscore the urgent need for a permanent resolution of the crisis. Thus the paper is divided into six parts. Part one deals with the introduction while the second part focuses on interrogating the emergence of Boko Haram in Nigeria. The effects of Boko Haram insurgency constitute the third part; the fourth part examines Government response to the insurgency. Recommendations on how to curb the insurgency are examined under the fifth part, titled: towards the quest for a permanent resolution of the crisis, while the sixth part is the conclusion.

LITERATURE REVIEW

This section reviews some of the works that have been done in the field of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. Rasheed (2013) in "Boko Haram Insurgency and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria", while relying on literature centred model, analyses the debilitating effects of the religious sect on the entrenchment of democratic principles in Nigeria. However, the present study is not limited to the effects of Boko Haram insurgency alone, but also covers the whole gamut of the Boko Haram problem.

Abimbola and Adesote (2012), in "Domestic Terrorism and Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria Issues and Trends: A Historical Discourse", sees Boko Haram insurgency as the latest manifestation of domestic terrorism in Nigeria; while Adesoji (2010) examines the Boko Haram uprising and Islamic revivalism in Nigeria. The present study is an extension of the former works since the first stopped at 2012 and the second stopped at 2010, while the present study extends to July 2015.

Awoyemi (2012) examines the nexus that existed between poverty and the emergence of Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria, while Danjibo (2009) attempts a comparative evaluation of the Maitatsine and Boko Haram crises in Northern Nigeria as manifestations of Islamic fundamentalism and sectarian violence in Nigeria. This study therefore builds on earlier works already done in the field of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria.

METHODOLOGY

The study employed the historical method of research and analysis. This is due to the nature of the research which sought to illuminate those forces that shaped the phenomenon of the Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria in the past, especially from 2009, to the contemporary time (2015), and the likely implications on the future as regards the search for a permanent resolution of the crisis.

The study is also descriptive in nature or style as it built on the findings of earlier works done in the field of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria; while Newspapers were also relied upon for the contemporary development in the field of the insurgency

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This section covers findings on, and analyses of, the Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria. Specifically these shall be examined under the following sub-headings: Interrogating the emergence of Boko Haram in Nigeria, chronology of major incidents of Boko Haram insurgency since 2009 to date, the effects of the Boko Haram insurgency and Government's response to the insurgency.

INTERROGATING THE EMERGENCE OF BOKO HARAM IN NIGERIA

This section gives a brief history of the emergence of Boko Haram sect in Nigeria, examines the reasons that led to the emergence of the sect and gives a chronology of major Boko Haram attacks in the country.

History of the Emergence of Boko Haram

There is no consensus among scholars on the actual time that the Islamic militant group called Boko Haram emerged in the country.. However, it was revealed that the *Jama''atul Ahlus Sunnah Lidda' Awati wal Jihad* (Brethren united in the pursuit of Holy war), also known as Boko Haram, started off its activism in 2001 under the leadership of the Slain Mallam Mohammed Yusuf, who successfully radicalized the group and opened it to foreign collaboration, especially with the *Al-Qaeda* in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (formerly known as the Algerian *Salafist* group). Late Muhammed Yusuf won the respect of some clerics and youths in Northern Nigeria who become his followers; while the bulk of his followers however come from the *Almajiri*. The leader of the sect according to Danjibo, (2009) and Nigerian Tribune (30/01/2012), were after 2004 given training on combat and use of improvised explosive devices (IEDS) by AQIM, and through the training acquired, they were able to show dexterity in handling of weapons and manufacture of what is called "dirty bombs" through IEDS.

Factors that Led to the Emergence of Boko Haram Sect

Several factors could be adduced as being responsible for the emergence and spread of the Boko Haram sect in Northern Nigeria. These shall be examined below.

Rejection of Western Education and Values

The Ideology and philosophy of the movement can best be understood through giving an explanation of the two key words *Boko* and *Haram*. According to Danjibo (2009:7) and Adesoji (2010:100), the word *Boko*. is an equivocal term which means either book, western or foreign, while the word *Haram* is an Arabic derivative meaning forbidden, sinful or ungodly. Literally put together, book *haram* means book is sinful. But in its deeper meanings, it connotes “forbid everything Western” and western Education is sinful, sacrilegious or ungodly and should therefore be forbidden (Danjibo,2009, Adesoji, 2010). The inference from the foreign explanations is that the movement characteristically opposes and outrightly rejects western education, western values and culture as well as modern science.

Religious Bigotry and Imposition of its Ideals

Closely related to the first factor is the issue of religious bigotry. Boko Haram is informed by the nature of religious belief, practice and the high capacity to impose and assert its perspective on the country’s political agenda (Rasheed, 2008:23). The evolution of the sect could be traced to what Muhammed (2009) views as phenomenal rise of the *salafi* movement:

*the movement grew from a coterie of disgruntled
Ulama (Islamic scholar) into a broad based social
movement in which various grievances found
expression. Yamatu Izalati (Bid ‘a Wa Igamatus
Sunnah (movement against negative innovation
and orthodoxy), or Izala for short is the
representative example of Salafi movement in Nigeria.*

The Nigerian *Izala* movement was rooted in Sheik Mahmud Gumi’s teaching and preaching activities which emphasized a just and ethical order (Muhammed, 2009, Alanamu, 2005). Thus, Boko Haram embraces and advocates the propagation and strict adherence to Islam by all and sundry, irrespective of people’s personal wishes (Abimbola and Adesote 2012). According to Burmah (2009), the movement seeks to impose Sharia across all Nigerian states. The sect full name *Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna. Lidda’awati wal-Jihad* (“People committed to the propagation of the Prophet’s teachings and Jihad”) – seeks to create an Islamic state governed by Sharia law in Nigeria by any means is at its disposal and at whatever human cost (Burmah, 2009). The sect believes the moral decadence and problems in the society are engendered by the embrace of western culture and values and so as to checkmate such decadence, there must be the entrenchment of an Islamic society on the nation through destroying modern political institutions and infrastructures (Danjibo, 2009).

This belief was also heightened by ideological fanaticism of the movement, that any member who fights and dies – either by suicide bombing in the process of establishing a sharia state by destroying modern state formation and government institutions or by other means would automatically go to *Aljana* – Paradise or heaven (Danjibo, 2009). The ideology and philosophy of the Boko Haram sect as exposed by Tell (10 August, 2009:34) was to entrench an Islamic state where;

Orthodox Islam is practiced. Orthodox Islam according to him (Yusuf Muhammed, Leader of the sect) frowns at western education and working in the civil service because it is sinful. Hence, for their aim to be achieved, all institutions represented by government including security agencies like Police, Military and other uniformed personnel should be crushed.

Poverty, Unemployment and Ignorance

Poverty, Unemployment and Ignorance contribute significantly to the spread of the sect's activities in Northern Nigeria. Most Nigerians agreed that the current insurgency in the North is worsened by the high level of poverty, unemployment and illiteracy prevalent in Northern Nigeria. This reality is corroborated by marxist proposition on religious influence on man.

Accordingly, when a young man is poor, illiterate and unemployed he becomes a clean slate for any kind of brainwashing which is more potent when it comes from religion aided by culture. This is so because this category of people lacks the intellectual power to question logically or critique what they are told. Also, the activity component of the brainwashing given to them provides a quasi-equivalent of employment, and thus they fell engaged in acting out what they have been brainwashed on (Awoyemi 2012:24). To buttress the above standpoint, according to Danjibo (2009), majority of the followers of late Malam Muhammed Yusuf were largely illiterate youths who engaged in petty trading or had dropped out of school. This standpoint also accounts for why the movement has large and committed followers among the *Almajiris* – Quran trainees who depend on their Malam – teacher for knowledge, inspiration and their daily survival. The low intelligent quotient of the recruits also manifested in why they believed in suicide bombings and automatic access to *Aljana* (heaven where 72 virgins will be ready to welcome them).

Table 1: Chronology of Major Incidents of Boko Haram Insurgency Since 2009 To Date

Date	Incidents	Effects
July 26-29, 2009	2009 Boko Haram Uprising marking the Beginning of the insurgency in northern Nigeria.	Nearly 1,000 people were killed in clashes between Boko Haram Militant and Nigerian Soldier
July 30,2009	Execution Of Muhammed Yusuf, Spiritual Leader Of Boko Haram by Nigerian soldiers following the recent uprising.	Abubakar Shekau takes control of the group
September7,2010	Bauchi prison break	5 people were killed and 721 inmates freed from Bauchi prison.
October 11,2010	Bomb Attack on Maiduguri Police Station	The police station was destroyed and three person injured

December31,2010	Attack at Mammy Market at Army Mogadishu Barracks, Abuja	11 people died
May 29,2011	Bomb explosion in Abuja and Bauchi (during Goodluck Jonathan's swearing in as new President)	15 people killed
June 16,2011	Failed Abuja police Headquarters Bombing (Nigeria's first instance of suicide Bombing)	2 people died (the suicide Bomber and a traffic policemen)
August 4,2011	Damaturu Attacks	Between 100 to 150 people were killed
December22-23,2011	Boko Haram and Nigerian Army clashes in Maiduguri and Damaturu	68 people, of whom are 50 militants, at least 7 soldiers and 4 civilians were killed
December25,2011	Bombing of St. Theresa's Catholic church, Madalla	46 people killed
January 21,2012	Kano multiple bombs blast	185 people feared dead
April 29,2012	Attack Bayero University, Kano	13 Christian worshipers, 1 non-teaching staff and 2 Professors were killed
June 17,2012	Kaduna church Bombings	19 people were killed
August 7,2012	Deeper Life church shooting	19 church members killed.
December25,2012	Maiduguri and Potiskum church shootings	27 Christians were killed
January1,2013	Nigerian Army Raid on Boko Haram	13 militants were killed
March 18,2013	Kano Bus Bombing	Between 22 and 65 people were killed.
April 16,2013	Baga Massacre (Borno state)	187 people were killed
July 6,2013	Yobe state school shooting	Over 42 persons were killed
August 12,2013	Attacks on Maiduguri Mosque	56 people killed
September12,2013	Ambush by Boko Haram	40 soldiers died.
September12-18,2013	Nigeria Army offensive against Boko Haram sect	150 militants and 16 soldiers died
September19,2013	Benisheik Attacks by Boko Haram	16 people were killed
September29,2013	Guiba College Massacre(Yobe state)	Over 50 students were killed
October 2013	Government force Raid on rebel	101 Boko Haram fighters were killed
October 29, 2013	Raids on Damaturu	At least 128 people were killed (95 militants, 23 soldiers, 8 policemen and 2 civilians.
January 26,2014	Northern Nigeria Attacks by Boko Haram	138 killed in total

February14,2014	Borno massacre in konduga	121 Christian villagers were killed
February15,2014	Izghe attack by Boko Haram	106 persons killed
February 25,2014	Federal Government College Attack by Boko Haram in Yobe state	59 students were killed some through throat sliting by militants
March 14,2014	Attack on Giwa Military Barracks in Maiduguri	Boko Haram Detainees were freed from a detention facility and recaptured detainees were executed by the military
April 14,2014	Abuja twin Bombing Attack	Over 88 people were killed
April 15,2014	Chibok School Girls kidnapping (Borno state)	276 female students were kidnapped by Boko Haram
May 1,2014	Abuja Car bombing	19 people killed
May 5,2014	Gamboru Ngala Attack (Borno State)	At least 300 people were killed
May 20,2014	Jos Car Bombings	At least 118 Villagers were killed
May 27,2014	Buni Yadi Attack (Yobe State)	49 security personnel and 9 civilians were killed
June 1,2014	Mubi Bombing (Adamawa State)	40 people were killed
June 2,2014	Gwoza Massacre	At least 200, mostly Christians were killed in several villages in Borno State.
June 20-23,2014	Borno State Attacks	70 people were killed and 91 women and children kidnapped by militants
June 23-25,2014	Central Nigeria (Middle Belt) Attack	About 171 people were killed in series of attacks in the middle Belt of Nigeria
July 26,2014	Nigerian Military Raid on Boko Haram camps	Over 100 Militant were killed
November28,2014	Kano Bombing and Gun Attacks	At Least 120 Muslim followers of the Emir of Kano, Muhammed Sanusi II were killed during a Suicide bombing and gun attack by Boko Haram. The Four gunmen were subsequently killed By an angry mob.
December13,2014	Gumsuri Kidnappings (Borno State)	About 35persons were killed, while about 185 persons were kidnapped.
December 28-29, 2014	Failed Boko Haram offensive into Cameroon's far North Region	85 civilians, 94 militants and 2 Cameroonian soldiers were killed.
January3-7, 2015	Baga massacre and Raze	Militants razed the entire town of Baga in North-East? Nigeria. At least 2,000 were killed. Boko Haram then controlled 70% of Borno State. The worst affected by the insurgency.
January 9, 2015	Refugees flight from Baga, Borno State	7,300 Refugees flee to neighbouring Chad, while over 1,000 were trapped

		in the land of Kangala in lake Chad (following the Boko Haram Massacre in Baga)
January 12, 2015	Failed Kolofata Raid in Cameroon	The Cameroonian Military claimed the army lost one officer, while the Boko Haram group lost between 143-300 rebels
January 18, 2015	Attacks on Villages in North Cameroon by Boko Haram	80 people kidnapped and 3 others killed by Boko Haram
January 25, 2015.	Offensive against Nigerian Forces in Maiduguri	8 civilians, about 53 Militants and unknown numbers of Soldiers died Rebels captured the nearby strategic town of Monguno.
January 29, 2015	Recapture of Border town of Michika by Nigerian Military in collaboration with Chadian Soldiers	Michika recaptured from the Rebels
January 31 st , 2015	African Union Pledged to send 7,500 International Soldiers to Nigerian and Fighting s in North of Cameroon	Chadian Forces Claimed to have killed 120 Boko Haram fighters while they lost 3 Soldier
February 6, 2015	Niger Raid by Boko Haram on Bosso and Diffa towns	It marked the first time the Boko Haram attacked the country. The Chadian Military assisted the Nigerien Armed Forces to repel the attack. 5 Nigerien were killed while the government claimed to kill 109 militants
February 12, 2015	Invasion of Sambisa Forest, Borno State (Boko Haram Stronghold) by West African Allied Forces of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger	Undisclosed number of scores of insurgents were killed
February 13, 2015	Ngouboua, Chad Attack (after 30 insurgents crossed lake chad in 4 Motor Boats)	The first attack on Chad by Boko Haram
February 21, 2015	Recapture of Baga by Nigerien Army	Baga which had fallen to Boko Haram on January 3 rd was recaptured by Nigerien Army.
February 24, 2015	Chadian Boko Haram Rebels clash near Garambu	Over 200 Boko Haram Fighters were killed, one Chadian Soldier lost and nine others wounded
March 9 & 18, 2015	Recapture of Malam Fatouri and Damasak (North East Nigeria) by Chadian and Nigerien Forces	Insurgents dislodged from Fatouri and Damasak while Chadian and Nigerien Forces retook the towns

April 24, 2015	Sambisa Forest last area controlled in Nigeria by Boko Haram Forces	Intensive efforts are still mounted to dislodge the militants and take over the area.
June 16, 2015	Twin Suicide Bomb Attacks in Chad Capital targeted at Police Headquarters and Police Academy	24 people killed and more than 100 wounded in N'Djamena blamed on Boko Haram Jihadists.
June 22, 2015	Maiduguri Mosque Bombing by 2 female suicide bombers	30 killed at crowded mosque as Boko Haram marked the start of Ramadan by targeting a mosque that they saw as falling short in following 'the Prophet'
July 1-2, 2015	Multiple Mosque Massacres	48 persons killed on the 1 st at one mosque in Kakawa and 17 wounded in the attacks. 97 others mostly men were killed in numerous mosques on the 2 nd July 2015 with a number of women and young girls killed in their homes, while unknown numbers were wounded
July 6, 2015	Jos Bomb attack	At least 44 persons were killed

Source: Extracted and Re-arranged from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_Boko_Haram_insurgency. Retrieved on 16th July, 2015.

THE EFFECTS OF BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY

The unsavoury and unpalatable effects of Boko Haram scourge are many. These are X-rayed below:

Wanton Destruction of Lives and Properties

Since the activities of the sect in Nigeria, from 2009 assumed frightening dimensions, there have been wanton destruction of countless innocent lives and properties worth billions of naira. This can be gleaned from the table of chronology of major attacks of Boko Haram above.

Internal Displacement of Persons.

This is another effect of the Boko Haram insurgency. Many people including women and students have been displaced; many have been kidnapped like the Chibok Girls, traumatized and their future shattered by the nefarious Islamic sect. Other survivors whose houses have been burnt and part of their families killed have also been displaced with its unsavoury attendant consequences. For instance, following the announcement of state of emergency in the North East about 650,000 persons fled the three states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe to neighbouring states, while thousands of them left the country (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko_Haram). The government is currently making efforts to rehabilitate the recaptured victims of the Boko Haram onslaughts. For instance, a National

Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) Transit Camp for displaced persons has been established at Mubi, Adamawa State (The Nation, 11/8/15).

Infringement of Fundamental Human Rights

Closely linked to the above point of displacement is the infringement of the fundamental human rights of people staying in the war-infested zone of Northern Nigeria. Their freedom of movement, association, worship, right to shelter etc. have been trampled upon.

Failure of Security Agencies

So far the security agencies in the country such as the Military, Police e.t.c. have failed to secure the lives and properties of innocent Nigerians in the North-East in light of almost everyday occurrence of bombings and killings in the North. Whatever victory the security agencies claimed as reported in the newspapers is always neutralized by greater bombings, killings and destruction by dreaded Boko Haram sect.

Threat to Democratic Consolidation and Nigeria's Corporate Existence

The insurgency constitutes great threat to democratic consolidation in the country and Nigeria's corporate existence. The Boko Haram scourge constitutes serious threat to national interest, peace and security of the country.

The threat by the sect to detonate bombs in Abuja to disrupt the 51st independence anniversary rally scared many Nigerians. Even the government had to cancel the usual ceremony (Rasheed, 2008). Not only that, the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) passing out parade was equally cancelled because of the threats issued by the sect. Thus, "the cancellation of the usual parade of those national events has since set Nigerians wondering at this kind of psychological victory that the federal government has handed to the militant groups" (Rasheed, 2008:28). The implications of this intractable problem before the federal government might manifest in precipitating another civil war, thereby leading to the disintegration of the country if not urgently addressed.

Wastage of Material Resources.

A lot of unaccounted revenue has been wasted by the government on efforts geared towards combating the crisis, which has not been very successful. This includes huge amount of budget to the defense parastatal and the procuring of needed ammunition. This situation becomes precarious in light of the mass unemployment, poverty, and enormous economic deprivation and suffering ravaging the youths of the country.

Spill-Over Effects to the Countries of the West African Sub-Region.

There is the danger that the activities of the notorious sect, if not urgently checked might infiltrate into countries in the West African Sub-region. Such activities are already being felt in neighbouring countries of Nigeria such as Cameroon.

Religious Effects

As stated earlier, the dangerous nature of the insurgency lunched by the group has pitched Christians and Moslems against each other, owing to the wanton destruction of Churches in Northern Nigeria and lack of respect for the secularity of the nation. This situation portends

great danger for religious harmony in the country because if pushed to the wall, reprisal attacks might be elicited against the Muslims in the other parts of the country by the Christians. The implications of these effects underscore the urgent need for a permanent resolution of the crisis.

GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO THE INSURGENCY

Government has responded to the insurgency of the Boko Haram sect through the following actions:

Dialogue

The government especially during the Jonathan's administration has explored the option of dialogue with leaders of the sect and promising them amnesty if the sect lay down their arms. However the option had not yielded any positive result due mainly to the fact that members of the sect are somehow anonymous, with no clear cut address of locating them. Even if dialogue even occur between the government team and leaders of Boko Haram, the religious fanaticism of the sect will lead to irreconcilable positions that will make rapprochement elusive

Military Expedition

The government has responded and is still responding to the sect beligenyency by waging military expedition against it, but thus far, the military finds it very difficult to curb the sect's activities. Leaking of information to the sect by some 'bad eggs' in the ranks and file of the military contributed to this failure.

Declaration of State of Emergency

The government under the defunct President Goodluck Jonathan's administration declared a state of emergency in Borno at the beginning of 2012. This was extended in May, 2013 to cover the entire North Eastern states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states of Nigeria. (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko_Haram).

Call for International Assistance

The Government also responded to the insurgency through appealing for international assistance to combat the domestic terrorism posed by the sect. President Buhari has sought for greater support from France and other friendly nations to combat the challenge posed by the sect to security in the nation. Especially, the appeals to France and other developed countries of the world to assist in the area of getting more intelligence on the sect's movements, training and sources of arms and ammunitions (The Punch, 9 June, 2015:2)

Relocation of Military Command Centre to Maiduguri

The latest response of the government under President Buhari manifested in the relocation of the Command and Control Centre of the Military to Maiduguri. This action is geared towards adding impetus and renewed vigour to *Operation Zaman Lafiya*, which is aimed at bringing terrorism and insurgency to an end. An alternate command centre was also being established

in Yola, Adamawa State. (The Punch, 1st June, 2015). Efforts are also being made to strengthen the Joint Multi-national Task-Force deployed to the region.

POLICY RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION

This section examines the recommendations proffered in the study towards the quest for a permanent resolution of the crisis and the conclusion.

TOWARDS THE QUEST FOR A PERMANENT RESOLUTION OF THE CRISIS

This section offers recommendations tailored towards finding a lasting solution to the challenge posed by Boko Haram in the country. The first option that has been suggested by writers on Boko Haram menace like Dearn (2011), Rasheed (2008), and Abimbola and Adesote (2012) is that of dialogue with the sect by the government through their religious leaders. Though preventive security management is now in vogue worldwide, the efficacy of dialogue in the Boko Haram situation where the members are terrorists with misguided religious beliefs that stemmed from fanaticism is highly questionable. Moreso that such attempts at dialogue in the past have not yielded any positive result.

The strengthening of the Joint Task Force in the area of intelligence gathering, effective surveillance, security strategies etc. through international collaboration with developed countries is rather advocated towards defeating the sect ‘hands down and nipping the problem in the bud’ once and for all.

The necessity to address poverty reduction and provide employment opportunities by the government is another suggestion. The government should be devoted to efforts geared at delivering the dividends of democracy to the people while the concept of ‘chop politics (corruption) should not be popularized to the detriment of national development. For instance, it has been revealed by Dr. Yemi Kale (Statistician General of the Federation) that North West and North East geo-political zones recorded the highest poverty rate in Nigeria with 77.7% and 76.3% respectively (Nigerian Tribune, 14 February, 2012:1-2).

Moreover, there is need to respect the secularity of the nation. All attempts by any fanatical sect to impose its views and beliefs on others contrary to the country’s constitution should be frantically resisted. This will go a long way to enhance religious harmony in Nigeria.

Finally the evaluation of the country’s domestic and foreign policies as a means of combating the menace of the domestic terrorism is also stressed. As regards the domestic policy, there should be a political re-orientation where security should be seen as everybody’s business as everyone has a role to play in the promotion of national security. While punitive measures should be meted out to identified sponsors of the terrorists sect as well as to identified ‘bad eggs’ within the military leaking intelligence secrets to the leaders of the sect.

There should also be adequate collaboration and partnership between the governments, non-governmental organizations as well as civil society organizations in order to curb this menace (Abimbola and Adesote 2012). As regards the foreign policy area, the need for Nigeria to

establish cordial relations with developed countries of the world so as to ensure permanent solution to the crisis had earlier been stressed.

CONCLUSION

This paper has identified the Boko Haram insurgency as the latest manifestation of domestic terrorism ravaging Nigeria. The menace if not urgently curbed, presents a great threat not only to the stability, peace and security of the nation but also portends great danger to the West African sub-region. The remote and immediate causes of the insurgency, its unpalatable effects and government responses to it had been x-rayed in this paper. Finally, certain recommendations have been proffered geared towards the quest for a permanent resolution of the crisis.

FUTURE RESEARCH

Towards advancing the present study, there is need for scholars to undertake as further research the symbiosis that existed between the Boko Haram leaders and some disintegrative forces in the Nigerian and international community who aided the Boko Haram insurgents in getting weapons of mass destruction that they used to carry out acts of devastation in Northern Nigeria. Research efforts should also be geared towards identifying those “bad eggs” in the Military that leaks confidential and intelligent information to the sect’s leaders, so that they can be ‘flushed out’.

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