ABSTRACT: The Social Tripodal Insurgency Model describes the Boko Haram insurgent group as Historical Violent Mono-defaced Socio-Cultural group. Insurgency, according to this Model, rests on three critical but interdependent conditions, namely: knowledge, reality and the society that led to the phenomenon of the Boko Haram insurgency in the north eastern region of Nigeria and how the interplay of these conditions negatively affects the social structure and social relationships in the Nigerian society. Suggested here in this research is proposition that insurgency is directly proportional to the knowledge base of the individual within the affected region, influenced by, to form realities of the universe as the reinforcement of cultural components of individual during socialisation process in the affected region remains constant. Most available researches on insurgency addressed the issues of how to resolve insurgency but laid negligible emphasis on the root cause of the social facts and the cultural forces surrounding it. Mills (2013), in the Law of Sufficient Reasons, argued that, there must be sufficient explanation as to why insurgency exists in the first place. Again, corroborating, the theory of incompleteness, he asserted that killing and meaningless destruction of property for the insurgent recruits to the Boko Haram group is considered to be normal and a way of life in their own logical realm, while the larger society viewed their actions as criminal. Therefore, Social Tripodal Insurgency Model tried to locate the differential logical realms while attributing these differences to an individual socialisation process. Three social facts are identified as crucial components; these are knowledge, reality and the effects of insurgent activities on the society. The theory of incompleteness argues that the Boko Haram socialisation process is thus incomplete.

KEYWORDS: Social Tripodal, Insurgency Model Boko Haram

BOKO HARAM: FROM THE PERSPECTIVES OF DIFFERENTIAL MODELS OF INSURGENCY, COUNTERINSURGENCY AND TERRORISM

There are a number of researches carried out on insurgency, counter-insurgency and terrorism, most of which were carried out in an attempt to properly place the phenomenon of insurgency in its theoretical frame work or model formulation. However, little has been done in recent times by sociological and criminological researchers to explain the insurgent background knowledge as a critical component to empower their cognitive reasoning capacity which justifies the commission of criminal acts such as bombing, serial killing, and destruction of critical public infrastructure as advanced by Social Tripodal Insurgency Model.

However, Jones’ (2010) model of insurgency, “A Tool for the Prevention and Resolution of Insurgency” argued that insurgency is a product of a failed state and put forward a proposition that ‘insurgency happens when government fails’ but Jones did not relate, in precise terms, much of the insurgent knowledge as it empowered their cognitive reasoning capacity to engage
in commission of crimes that caused colossal collateral damage in the society and committing suicide while ensuring that many fatalities were recorded in the aftermath of such acts. Jones’ notion further argued that insurgency and its resolution centred on forming a strong central government and credible leadership. The fact remained that insurgents were rational human beings and therefore, must have justifications for their social actions.

Again, Jones (2010) further added that foreign terrorism happens when there was support for a failed system, while maintaining that its cause is rooted in perceptions of governmental failure and its resolution equally rooted in governmental recognition and resolution of those same perceptions. As laudable as Jones model was, however, the Social Tripodal Insurgency Model looked beyond Jones’ proposition of a failed state and its solution of establishing a strong and legitimate central government by attempting to find the root cause of insurgency and proffering a solution from a purely humanistic view point. The Model traced the cause of Boko Haram insurgency especially in the affected areas of the north eastern region of Nigeria to the recruits’ background knowledge as it empowered their cognitive capacity to commit crime, and proffered that the solution to ending the insurgency was subjecting the vulnerable jobless youth of the affected region to a rigorous cognitive exercises of de-radicalisation and empowerment.

Unlike Jones Model of insurgency, Xiaohui et al (2007) used a positivistic approach to counter-insurgency. In his Model, “A Particle Swarm Social Model for Multi-Agent Based Insurgency Warfare Simulation” he argued basically on the understanding of insurgent activities, group leadership, dynamically changing environment, strategic planning and effective communications were not the necessary requirements for insurgents to attain their goals. Xiaohui et al worked significantly on insurgent groups’ behaviour rather than questioning or gauging their qualitative knowledge based of the universe and their zeal to appreciate and embrace westernization and its modernity, especially the Boko Haram, as the Social Tripodal Insurgency Model suggested. He summed up his findings with not much to show on how the insurgents’ background knowledge influenced their negative criminal actions against humanity.

Lynn (2005) in his Model the “Basic Pattern of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Model” posits that insurgency is a function of the ‘Box’ defined by geographic, ethnic, economic, social, cultural and religious characteristics. Inside the box are government, counterinsurgent forces, insurgent leaders, insurgent forces and the general population which is made up of three groups: those committed to the insurgents, those committed to the counterinsurgents and those who simply wish to get on with their lives. Often, but not always, state or groups that aid one side or the other are outside the box. Outside-the-box intervention, he held, has dynamics of its own. Lynn’s (2005) solution to insurgency is on the basis of global integrations to further embrace the New World Order unlike Jones’ Model on governmental failure and Xiaohui et al’s Model of insurgent group behaviour. Lynn (2005) further argued that to extinguish insurgency one must integrate the entire world into the global economy and thus give everyone a stake in it. This invariably amounts to saying that if the terrorists are on the train of globalisation they would not want to blow up the track. Lynn (2005) was not specific on the reasons why insurgents such as Boko Haram engage in crime commission but instead suggested broader solutions to end the insurgency with less emphasis on specifics, again, as to how the insurgent recruits’ background knowledge lured them to commit quantitative crime and qualitative attacks of public infrastructure such as the United Nation’s building on Friday, August 26th, 2011 and the Police Force Headquarters in Nigeria on Thursday, June 16th, 2011.
The most widely known insurgency Model is the “Fish-in-the-Sea Model” (where fish stands for insurgent recruits and the sea the civilian population) and from the population (sea) the insurgents draw sustenance, which is synonymous with Mao Tse-Tung’s (1972) philosophy, as much of the Vietnam War fits into this formulation. While, Schaffer (2014), in his Model, “A Model of 21st Century Counterinsurgency Warfare” argued that today’s insurgencies are psychological wars of political endurance, he dwelt much on dual phases of defeat and success noting the ‘fish-in-the-sea’ Model was a throw back of defunct Vietnam and urged for the emergence of a Model to fit the political development phase in today’s Globalised World. Defeat, he pointed out, is the likelihood of troop withdrawal, permitting terrorist insurgents to declare victory and this ‘defeat’, he noted, mirrors public opinion polls. The success counterinsurgency phase, he pointed out, gauges the level of stability and security that permits at least a partial phased troop withdrawal. It is based on estimates of the strength and quality of the host country’s military, police forces, economy and services provided by the government and the willingness of the host government to address insurgency.

Schaffer (2014) unlike Mao Tse-Tung’s (1972) identification of III phases of insurgency Model, postulated defeat-success Model based on the “21st Century Counterinsurgency, Lanchester Theory, Counterinsurgency Victory, Defeat Criteria”. He did not link defeat and success to knowledge based of the insurgents, neither did he establish a link among knowledge, reality and the society, nor did his Model explain how the interplay of the three conditions thus; knowledge, reality and the society affect social structures and relationships in the North Eastern region of Nigeria. Schaffer’s (2014) defeat-success Model emphasised much of Mao’s postulates of three phases of insurgency.

Fitzpatrick et al (2009), in his counter insurgency operation Model, largely attributed individual influence to join insurgent groups like the Boko Haram to individual propensity to favour a particular group, peer influence, the influence of a propinquity-acquired attitude by interaction, receiving rewards, positive reinforcement and the effects of coercive measures. However, Fitzpatrick et al (2009) mentioned very little about how the interplay of the recruits’ knowledge acquired through early socialization and their views of the universe to attack civilian population came to be. The Boko Haram background knowledge is largely influenced by the tradition of misplaced perception of pure Islamic context. Their views are the product of an ideological dogma of an era in history that suffered what Social Tripodal Insurgency Model referred to as “complex cultural synthesis and negative differentiation of insurgents’ background knowledge.”

The first two phases were characterized by small-force ground-yielding insurgent operations but overall military superiority on the part of the counterinsurgents. The 1st phase visualised guerrilla activity using terrorist tactics, which Fitzpatrick et al (2009) termed mine warfare, use of explosives on a small scale, deployment of snipers against counter insurgent forces and terror against non-sympathetic elements of the public. In phase II, insurgent operations became increasingly militarised and their weapons more sophisticated. Mao Tse-Tung (1972), however, noted that there continued to be small-force guerrilla activities that caused the defence to fragment and the engagements to be localized and relatively isolated. In phase III, the insurgent took the strategic offensive and operated with large, more conventional forces.

No doubt Mao’s three phases rightly fits into the stages of Boko Haram insurgency, but Mao did very little in his Model to describe the psychology and background knowledge of the
recruits on what influences them to engage in crime commission and the consequent effects of their actions on the society.

1. Conceptualisation of Classical Social Tripodal Insurgency Model
Social Tripodal Insurgency Model argues that insurgency is directly proportional to the knowledge base of the individual within the affected region, influenced by form realities of the universe as the reinforcement of cultural components of individual during socialisation process in the affected region remains constant. The approach to overcome insurgency in the society should be integrated in a pro-active approach with quick response to threats and feedback relevant to respond to, and address complexities of evolving the politically motivated ideological beliefs of the insurgent to correct historical damages perpetrated on the structure of the society.

Three Principles of the Model
1) Replacement,
2) Engagement and;
3) Improvement
The principle of replacement: to replace the background knowledge of the insurgents of the affected region with objective conventional knowledge devoid of the politically motivated ideological beliefs paralleling and pulling the world.

The principle of engagement: the need to constructively engage and to organise schemes and programmes of action for youth de-radicalisation and empowerment in the affected region.

The principle of improvement: the need to improve social-economic and political conditions of the development institutions in the affected regions through social policy formulation with immediate implementation to enable institutions dispense much-needed social services that will improve the living standard of those affected in the region. For instance, the need for credible leadership and effective governance that would ensure education: revival of lost value systems; family: the need for moral and cultural re-orientation, and economy: expansion and turn-around in job creating job opportunities for the jobless youths of the affected region.

The Tenets of Classical Social Tripodal Insurgence Model
a. The model describes Boko Haram as a violent historical mono-defaced socio-cultural group.
b. It is historically located from the background of the Boko Haram insurgency that the group’s actions are justification to a faithful course.
c. Boko Haram insurgents operate within consistent paradigms with distinct nomenclature relative to their socio-cultural setting.
d. Boko Haram insurgent background knowledge is seen by the Model as dogmatic commitment to a kind of knowledge borne out of misplaced perception.
e. Boko Haram body of thought was derived from the traditions of authorities whose sources of knowledge were subjected to severe criticism in the realm of its credibility even among the contemporaries of the same faith.
f. The Model identified the Tripodal approach as a plausible solution to the crisis, namely: the principles of replacement, engagement and improvement to correct the historical damages perpetrated on the social structure of the society.
Implementation, monitoring and periodic evaluation of the social policies prevalent in the affected region which is fundamental in the quest to find a lasting solution to the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria.

Mathematical Expression of Social Tripodal Insurgence Model

\[ \text{In} \] is directly proportional to \( Kn Rn Sn \) .......... (a)

\[ \text{In} \] is inversely proportional to \( REI \) .......... (b)

From (a)

\[ \text{In} \propto Kn Rn Sn \]

\[ \text{In} = K \left( \frac{Kn Rn Sn}{Kn_Rn_Sn} \right) \] (i)

Where \( K \) is constant of proportionality

\[ \text{In} = K \left( \frac{Kn Rn Sn}{Kn Rn Sn} \right) \]

\[ K = \frac{\text{In}}{Kn Rn Sn} \] .......... (ii)

From (b)

\[ \text{In} \propto \frac{I}{REI} \]

\[ \text{In} = K \left( \frac{I}{REI} \right) \]

\[ K = \frac{\text{In} REI}{Kn Rn Sn} \] .......... (iii)

Substituting for \( K \) in equation (ii)

then \[ \frac{\text{In} REI}{Kn Rn Sn} = \frac{\text{In}}{Kn Rn Sn} \]

\[ \frac{\text{In} REI}{Kn Rn Sn} = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{In} \\ \text{In} = 0 \end{array} \right\} \] .......... (iv)

4. The Structure of the Social Tripodal Insurgence Model

There are a number of theories, models, approaches, themes and perspectives in sociology that can be used to explain a social phenomenon, however, three broad dimensions are more pronounced, these are, the sociological, biological and psychological theories. Although no single theory is adequate to explain a particular social phenomenon as the insurgent groups portray, Smah (2008), notes that there is the need to appreciate the dominance of information technology in today’s globalised world. Globalisation has increasingly made social contacts easier and instantaneous via wireless internet, email, Face book, twitter, and other social feeds.

These developments, he noted, have greater effects and have exposed the weaknesses of most of the traditional social cum criminological theories, hence, the need for something more creative to address the phenomena of insurgency. Therefore, the researcher suggests a model that better explains insurgency with greater efficiency in today’s world of emerging dominant western-paradigm, swallowing conflicting traditional-paradigms as it celebrates the ushering in of a New World Order occasioned by Globalisation. The Classical Social Tripodal Insurgency Model, which this research developed, revolves around three critical but interdependent conditions namely: knowledge, reality and the society. Logical connection of
these three variables was not established by some of the traditional sociological theories in their examination of social phenomena which were discussed below. Moreover, on the inadequacies of theories that were postulates of 19th Century, and or before 21st century, Benjamin R. Berber supported Smah’s (2008) notion of weaknesses of traditional theories. Berber in his work, “Jihad versus Mc World, how Globalisation and Tribalism are Reshaping the World” described the year 1993 as a terminal year for most traditional social theories, hence, the collapse of most social theories with the emergence of information technology. The collapse of the 19th Century witnessed the emergence of computer and information technology that limited the intellectual strength of most traditional social theories across borders. Nevertheless, this section examines some selected traditional theories out of which, emphasise would be placed on Social Tripodal Insurgency Model.

THEORETICAL ROOTS AND BRANCHES OF CLASSICAL SOCIAL TRIPODAL INSURGENCY MODEL

The Classical Social Tripodal Insurgency Model was developed out of the weaknesses of the following traditional sociological theories, thus, there is Merton’s (1957) ‘Theory of Anomie’, Southerland’s (1939) ‘Differential Association Theory’ (which is one of the social learning theories), Shaw and Mckay’s (1929) ‘Social Disorganization or Cultural Transmission’, and Cohen’s (1955) ‘The Delinquent Boys’. However, critical examination of the tenets of these theories are too short to provide logical connections among three critical but interdependent conditions namely: knowledge, reality and the society that led to the phenomenon of the Boko Haram insurgency and how the interplay of these three conditions negatively affects the Nigerian society.

Boko Haram from the Perspective of Merton’s Anomie Theory (1957):

Robert K. Merton (1957) draws the basis of his structural analysis of the anomie condition from the Durkheimian school of thought. Merton like Durkheim argued that an integrated society maintains balance between social structure and culture i.e. approved means and cultural goals. Drawing from this, Maiduguri, the Borno State capital, the stronghold of the Boko Haram had been in a state of absolute peace and stability for decades despite its composition as highly heterogeneous, partly homogeneous and dominated by the Kanuri cultural groups. Norms and values of the society were respected and adhered to and law and order, brought in by modern institutions, were products of an industrialised society. There was balance between means and goals as Merton wants one to believe. He went on to say that when there is disjuncture between goals and means of achieving them, the society will begin to malfunction, resulting in anomie conditions. When the inbuilt control mechanism that binds people to eschew and appreciate their differences fails to be nipped in the bud, social conditions will make the society malfunction.

When the Boko Haram came up with their ideological hegemony aimed at establishing a regime in 1992, perhaps the internal workings of the society were blind to it. Merton’s Anomie Theory, though postulated in America, can be used to explain society and human social action in any society. Merton held that there are opportunities in society which all classes of people are exposed to; what he referred to as ‘American dream’. Equal opportunities are there for all; however, the reality is that predominantly lower groups do not have equal access to such opportunities.
Opportunities are motivated by one’s ability to have basic education and be socialised. Since the society failed to give adequate socialisation to its members, those who are denied look for a remedy and resort to a philosophy such as that of the Boko Haram. The Boko Haram in their utterances always, and at most times, preached against injustice and social inequality among the people.

Members of the society are socialised through Western education, as far as modern society was concerned, to aspire to greater opportunities, but the lower class or minority groups are relatively blocked from getting free conventional education, good occupations and basic social amenities, health care and other basic needs required to achieve legitimate goals. Hence, the lower class (e.g. the Boko Haram) who were denied these basics needs lose confidence in the system and as a reaction to the structure of the society that failed and denied them these needs formed a radical group that could never see anything good in the Western philosophy that supposedly created inequality and also modernised their hitherto relatively traditional society where members were more or less the same to more dominant institutionalised and highly competitive capitalist societies where everybody was for himself; hence the emergence of the Boko Haram radical group as rebellion youths.

As far as the element of Merton’s theory is concerned, the socio-political structure of Maiduguri as a society has suffered injury. Such a situation, Merton believes produces frustration, pressure and, of course, strains on the lower class (e.g. the Boko Haram) to use whatever means possible even if such means are illegitimate in finding solutions to blocked opportunities. This again is what Merton referred to as ‘Anomie Condition’.

**Boko Haram from the Perspective of Albert Cohen’s Theory of Delinquents Boys (1955)**

Albert Cohen’s (1955) lower class delinquency creates more conflict youth sub-cultures as exemplified by the Boko Haram whose ages range from 20 to 35. The theory assumed that sub-cultures, the likes of the Boko Haram, always viewed the upper class culture dominated by Western values as disseminating against the lower class minority culture. In their effort to strive to close the gap deliberately created by the elite who had acquired Western education, the theory noted, they sought for a means to become accepted but failed in the process since their socialisation had not prepared them for such challenges. This is what Cohen (1955) called ‘cultural deprivation,’ hence the Boko Haram became ‘status frustrated’ and revolted against the society.

Majority of the Boko Haram members are those from minority groups and their status frustrated by Western cultural deprivation. Cultural deprivation here means that they did not go to Western schools to understand and appreciate core values needed to respect our differences as a nation. The theory believes that ‘sub-culture’ is one in which certain forms of anti-social activity are essential for the performance of dominant roles as supported by the Boko Haram. For instance, they react to Western education, Western values such as feminism which has given ‘excessive’ power to women, democracy, and theories of evolution, among other things. Boko Haram, the theory believes, is therefore waging a war to put an end to so-called ‘Westernisation’.

The theory also recognises that the Boko Haram sub-culture believes in their ideological commitments including the norms and values to which they belong. Albert Cohen’s (1995)
theory is therefore a critique of Merton’s Social Anomie Theory. This sub-culture successfully created their strong-hold, Markas and/or Ibn-Thaimiya.

The Boko Haram, Albert Cohen further reiterated, had goals that also helped in getting solidarity among the oppressed lower working class youths by making the upper class elites who were favoured by Western education including the law enforcement agents, who protect the good norms of the nation (the Constitution), their common enemies and hence revolting against them. Cohen described this sub-culture as ‘non-utilitarian’ such as creating trouble, fighting and conflicts, and by so doing those who successfully attained the goals would gain recognition and prestige in the eyes of their sub-culture peers.

Unlike Merton (1957), Albert Cohen (1955) argues that it is not the inability of insurgents (such as the Boko Haram) to achieve material gain or success as a result of means or goals but rather it is the members’ inability to gain status equal to those members of society who were favoured by Western education to have their status acceptable in conventional society that produces the ‘strain’ as exhibited in the struggle of the Boko Haram to overthrow constituted authority that culminated in the ‘anomic condition’ as their ‘status were frustrated’. The Boko Haram sub-culture, the theory assumes is culturally disadvantaged, deprived and deeply rooted in their entrenched background. Therefore, they lack the strategies to overcome their ‘status deprivation’, which produces frustration that leads to a vicious cycle of misplaced perception.

Boko Haram from the Perspective of Edward Southerland’s Differential Association Theory (1939)

Differential Association Theory and/or Social Learning Theory postulated by Edward Southerland (1939), emphasises that Boko Haram, like other social behaviours, are learned in the environment where it is being practiced more frequently and is learned through a process of association. The theory concentrates much on how people learn to become the likes of Boko Haram while placing less emphasis on the ‘why’ they learned, in this case ‘Boko Haramism’. Furthermore, contact with intimate sub-group members of the Boko Haram exposes their preference to go against societal expectations rather than conform to such expectations which makes a neutral member of the society join the Boko Haram sub-group. Southerland also believes that the amount of time one spends with such groups also enhances ones chances of becoming a member (as in the driving force behind the Boko Haram) by imitating and gradually assimilating their philosophical ideas.

A significant number of people who attend the Boko Haram preachings (Da’awa) are in support of their dominant role and increasing in number by the day as seen in the frequent attendance of curious people to Boko Haram gatherings. Southerland, therefore, argues that such movements draw some members of the society who eventually adopt the beliefs of the sub-group through interaction with primary groups of like minds i.e. friends and peer groups.

Learning the Boko Haram ideology involves learning the techniques, motives, and attitudes, which conform to the sub-culture values. A person becomes a Boko Haram member because of what the theory believes are excesses in definition favourable to violation of laws and orders, over definition unfavourable to violation of law and order of the society. Again, the process of learning potential Boko Haram activity, the theory suggests, is by association with their members and involves all it could take in any other learning process. The nature of the
socialisation process of how to learn to become a ‘peace-maker’ is also challenged by the social learning paradigm. Parents, government and affiliated institutions concerned with ensuring adequate upbringing of the members of society are also challenged for failing to live up to their expectations.

**Boko Haram from the Perspective of Shaw and Mckay’s Social Disorganization and/or Cultural Transmission Theory (1929)**

Cultural Transmission Social Disorganization and Ecological Theory are developed in the same large network of researches. Ecological theory emphasized that where groups such as the *Boko Haram* live affects their persistence in breaking laws and orders. This is the hallmark of the cultural transmission theory of Shaw and Mckay in their work “Juvenile Delinquency in Urban Area” (1942), and Burges and Parks’ (1935) “Theory of Urban Zonation”. The theory explains that there are cities, such as Maiduguri, where there are traditional rulers at the core (centre) informally controlling affairs of their subjects. The theory explains cities in concentric manner and gives an explanation to each layer and where high crime rates and/or deviant behaviour are prevalent.

In criminological parlance, the concentric is further classified as lower rate area and higher rate area. Irrespective of individual positions on the strata of social inequality, the theory emphasises that once a person lives where the *Boko Haram* converge and go about their deviant behaviour one may likely learn to become one of them. They mostly informally practice their ideological beliefs and values, and this value system usually dominates the lower class including some middle class and they have a conventional value system of law and order practiced within a formalised frame work.

The theory holds that the *Boko Haram* most likely, live in the countryside where they successfully transmit their norms and values from one individual to another and also move into the down town metropolitan neighbourhood to impact same. The victims of the *Boko Haram*, the ecological theory holds, were products of the slums that lack values and insufficient socialisation to prepare them to be law abiding.

There are also institutions that support their activities and have conflicting moral value systems, and an enabling environment also favours them to continue to breed more members. The *Boko Haram* has a hierarchical leadership-like structure. Upon joining the *Boko Haram*, there is also an organised pattern of activities which one is trained to have knowledge of and taught how to carry out. Differential Opportunity Structure Theory cum Ecological Theory also recognised orientation through institutional norms and values. What the society considers odd behaviour is normal to the *Boko Haram*. The structure is made up of learning and performance structure. The theory also recognised their point of congregation and/or strong-hold as a ‘Dark-hole’.

**Boko Haram from the Perspective of Cloward and Ohlin’s Differential Opportunity Structure Theory (1960)**

Claward and Ohlin (1960) in their postulation of Differential Opportunity Structure Theory, explain how the structure of the society and cultural orientation gives more opportunity for the youth in Borno to go into *Boko Haram*, to deviate from the normal standard and descend into a chaotic situation that had rendered the society into ‘anomie condition’.
The Marxian notion of Boko Haram rested upon the premises of social relation of production. It argues that as a result of sharing of resources in a society, there is the probability of struggle between the upper and lower class. This, according to Karl Marx, lead to class struggle and class conflict between those in power and the Boko Haram members which may at last lead to class revolution, where the lower class, the Boko Haram, take up arms against the upper class and violently overthrow the elitist regime and install in its place a government of the ‘commoners for the commoners by the commoners’.

In short, Marx argued, the first socialist revolution would take place in the most advanced capitalist state where the exploitation of the poor by the rich was at its peak. The Marxian political economy, however, is silent in establishing a link among knowledge, reality and the society as the three elements capable of giving rise to the phenomenon of Boko Haram.

Nevertheless, critics of the Marxian Theory of Class Struggle and the attendant consequences on a bourgeoisie state, point out that there is huge lacuna in the theory, more especially when one considers the fact that the first capitalist revolution took place in the then most backward capitalist state of Russia, also known as the Soviet Union. This lead to the birth of the new idea of Leninism which oversaw the end of the bourgeoisie inclined Tsarist Regime, through the Bolshevik Revolution.

Another pointer to the lacuna on Marxist Theory of Revolution is the emergence of Maoism in China through the peasant revolution which Mao Tse-Tung spearheaded in the name of communism. According to Marx, peasants will never spearhead a revolution because of their backwardness, however, the success of Maoism in China proved Marx wrong.

Marx generally portrayed states and capitalism as two agents of mass exploitation and advocated for the overthrow of capitalism through a socialist revolution and withering away of state to pave way for communism. He argued that armed struggle in any community was as a result of class exploitation in relation to controlling the means of production.

However, critical examination of the tenets of these theories are too short to provide logical connections among the three critical but interdependent conditions of knowledge, reality and the society that led to the phenomenon of Boko Haram insurgency and how the interplay of these three conditions is negatively affecting the Nigerian society, hence, the social root of Tripodal Insurgency Model. The Model is to bridge the disconnect between the grand theoretical positions above and logical connections among knowledge, reality and society that led to the phenomenon of Boko Haram insurgency and how the interplay of these three conditions is negatively affecting the North Eastern region of Nigeria.

**BOKO HARAM: ONTOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL TRADITION**

The Social Tripodal Insurgency Model posits that the background knowledge of the insurgent groups informs the kind of decisions they take about issues bordering on social structure and social relationships in the society. It is also argued by the model that background knowledge of insurgents has been affected by a ‘complex cultural synthesis and differentiation of value system as negative’ to form a notion which crystallised into a destructive reality that has negative effects on the social structure and social relationship in the society.
Insurgence background knowledge according to the Model was conceived out of misplaced perception of the ideological beliefs of Salapism and Wahabism which were derived from the 13th Century scholar Ibn-Thaimiya’s doctrines. The conceived ideas that emanates from such beliefs, the Social Tripodal Insurgency Model argues, forms the insurgents’ background knowledge which crystallised into reality and the tendency of what they perceived as real but which is adversely affecting the society. Peter L. Berger and Thomos Luckman (1956)

Insurgence background knowledge, especially those of the Arabian tradition, the Model holds, was significantly derived as a response to colonial rule of over 200 years. As a result, the effects on the psyche of the Arabs witnessed the blossoming of many scholars with distinctly politically-motivated ideological beliefs. The early 13th, 17th, 18th and mid-19th century reformist movements sprang up in the Arab world in preservation of the Islamic identity against the corrupting influences of Western culture.

For instance, in the Arabian Peninsula emerged Mohammed Ibn Abdul Al-Wahhab (1703-1791), in Iran and Afghanistan Jalal Ad-Din Al-Afghani (1839-1897), in Egypt, Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), and in the India Sub-continent a number of Muslim scholars emerged in the city of Deobandid in the mid-19th Century. Zarabozo (2003) However, these revival movements differed slightly in their interpretation of Islam, and they were misunderstood by later followers who belonged to those schools and who synthesised their interpretation with their politically motivated ideological beliefs. Hence, the Social Tripodal Insurgency Model which describes this condition as a ‘complex cultural synthesis and differentiation of value system as negative’ further refers to it as ‘Relative Knowledge’ with respect to time, place and person. Thus came about a notion which crystallised into a destructive reality with resultant adverse effects. Richard Dawkins (2012)

Therefore, this kind of knowledge is ‘Spacio-Temporal’ knowledge” that led to what the Model describes as ‘misplaced perception’. The synthesis of knowledge signalled the emergence of what is today known as the insurgent Taliban of Afghanistaini origin that fled to Pakistan (The Guerrilla wire house) as refugees in the early 1980s. The pivot upon which the Social Tripodal Insurgency Model revolves challenged the credibility of the insurgence background knowledge on the basis of its varying relative nature as Spacio-Temporal.

The Model also challenged ontological and epistemological origin of the insurgents’ background knowledge while arguing whether it is philosophical knowledge, scientific knowledge, theoretical knowledge or social knowledge which had undergone synthesis and differentiation of value system. Moreover, The Taliban’s underlying philosophy is deeply rooted in the 19th Century Deobandi movements who were perceived to have suffered degrees of humiliation in the hands of the British in the colonial era, directed its retaliation towards the West. The Deobandid had established what is known as the ‘Madrasa’ in the city of Deobandid in India. They inculcated values of violence in the Muslim youth to counter the trend towards Western education. This kind of action is described by the Model as ‘Westoxication’.

The process of inculcating the culture of violence on the recruits, the Social Tripodal Insurgence Model noted, is by way of ‘indoctrination’ of the younger ones of which the end result culminated into what is again referred to as ‘misplaced perception’. The use of religion
as an agent to fuel proxy war against the society had dire effects, according to the Model, on ‘social structure’ and relationships’.

**Boko Haram: Jihad, Indoctrination And The Culture Of Violence**

Furthermore, ‘indoctrination’, the Model further argued, is not only by inculcating the Deobandid cultural values of violence on the youth but also by way of making them truly believe in what Social Tripodal Insurgence Model calls the ‘Jihad on the society’. The whole process of this unholy war (Jihad), the Model maintains, involves the activities of suicide missions, massacres, crusades, banditry and brigandage, Guerrilla warfare, armed groups, high profile assassinations and serial killings of targeted victims.

The ‘warlords’, according to the Classical Social Tripodal Insurgence Model, aim to achieve a revolution under the guise of the “unholy war” while giving the recruits who were predominantly drawn from the lower social standing, were less educated, ‘culturally deprived’ defective background knowledge and perception of the ‘pure Islamic Context’, the hope of establishing an ‘egalitarian sort of society’. The warlord, employs highly strategic intelligence on the recruits while exposing the weaknesses of the government as the recruits’ social condition is responsible for bad governance, leadership deficits, occasioned by corruption due to injustice meted out on them by the government hence the desire to over through the system.

The whole process the recruits perceived as Jihad ‘unholy war’, according to the insurgency Model is a ‘programmed thing’ with a complex network of ‘intelligence’ used by the ‘warlords’ against the insurgent recruits. The recruits were deceived, induced and hypnotised through ‘indoctrination’ to carry out ‘Jihad’ against the society.

Cooley (2002), in his analysis of the ‘drug lords’, reflected in “Unholy War: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism” on the use of drugs to induce recruits to carry out ‘unholy war’. The use of drugs to induce recruits of insurgency, he pointed out, was an integral component of a Frenchman, De Merenches’s, ‘smart man’s intelligence method’ called ‘Operation Mosquito for Sell’. Cooley (2002) further said, De Merenches had bargained, negotiated and sold his method of anti-Soviet antics to the West.

A method used against the Soviet Communist, with Afghanistan *Mujahedeen* as proxy and agents of consuming confiscated drugs mostly cocaine and heroin refined into green tea leaves, fresh Milk and dates to induce the recruits by what the Model calls ‘indoctrination’ to stage proxy war against the Soviet Communism. This notion is in support of the fact that the Nigerian insurgents, the *Boko Haram*, who tagged themselves the ‘Nigerian Taliban’ moved out of the society in 1994 had a special tea used in indoctrinating recruits.

It has engaged public attention as extraordinarily trapping tea used to induce and radicalise recruits to join the Yusuf campaign of ‘Boko Haramism’. The late leader of the *Boko Haram*, Mohammed Yusuf, gave this special sort of tea to his followers every day, and when taken it seemed to have a hypnotic effect that would cause the individual to remain at the stronghold and eventually join the campaign of the leader.

Similarly, on the use of drugs for ‘indoctrination’, Carew (2000), a British soldier on a mission in Afghanistan who claimed to have trained the *Mujahedeen* from camp 1 to 6, for a good number of weeks, narrated his firsthand account of the *Mujahedeen* taking special tea and milk more frequently than food, almost as much as 4 times every day. He also talked about the
habitual **Mujahdeen** addicts of Camp 4 in Afghanistan abusing and pushing opium, and how they were fully protected by the Pakistan military across the border. Carew (2000) reflected on this fact in the book *“Jihad: The Secret War in Afghanistan”*. Yul (2009) also pointed out the destructive tendencies of the religious zealots hypnotised by Jim Johns in the historic Guyana Massacre of November 18, 1978 in the United States of America. The Peoples’ Temple, headed by Jim Johns, set up what Classical Social Tripodal Insurgency model described as an ‘egalitarian sort of lifestyle’ and ‘indoctrinated’ more than 900 people of a population of 1000 members to commit suicide and murder.

The Taliban have taken the Deobandid interpretation to the extreme and developed negative attitudes towards **Shia** Muslims. Based on their philosophy, a number of anti-Shia movements cropped up in Pakistan and wreaked havoc in the society for almost 20 years. Classical Social Tripodal Insurgency Model argues that the action of the insurgent recruits against the society have significant negative effects on social, economic, religious, family, political and educational institutions that made up the society as an entity. Hussain (2001) in his study of the Taliban in the book, *“Taliban and Beyond: Afghanistan Nightmare”* noted that in 1980 when Pakistan was under the military rule of Zia-al-Haq, whose vested interest was to perpetuate himself in power, he ‘Islamised’ his country in order to win the popular support of Pakistan’s religious parties, which the Classical Social Tripodal Insurgency Model described as giving hope for an ‘egalitarian sort of society’.

Cooley (2002), in assessing the government of Zia-al-Haq in *“The Unholy War: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism”* pointed out that General Zia-al-Haq, the military dictator of Pakistan used the gun making and the gun running of the Pakistan tribal North West as an indispensible base to raise, train, and lunch an Islamic Guerrilla army against the Soviet invaders. The Classical social Tripodal Insurgency Model referred to this kind of action as ‘Warlordism’. General Zia-al-Haq, Cooley (2002) reiterated, channelled large sums of money and established **Madarassas**. As at 1972, there were 900 Madarassas in Pakistan, and in 1988 the number rose to 8,000 registered and 25,000 unregistered Madarassas, with inefficient instructional materials and overcrowded students from the lower social status families of Afghanistan refugee camps in Pakistan.

The students by their social background were deprived and their cultural orientation violent, they developed severe hatred against the society for its glaring bad governance, characterised by corruption, injustice and leadership deficiency that ought to be fought through what the Social Tripodal Insurgency Model describes as the ‘unholy War’.

**CONCLUSION**

After the research, the Social Tripodal Insurgency concluded that there was significant positive correlation between poor upbringing and its tendency to generate insurgent recruits. Sub-standard overcrowded political Madrassas with different interpretation of Islam inspired by **wahabism** and **Salafism** derived from *ibn-Thaimiyaism* for instance, funded by Zia-Al-Haq was celebrated in Deobandid in India, Pakistan and their subsidiaries beyond national borders. The Pakistan Taliban and *Jama’a Islamiya* groups that gave birth to Islamic vigilante groups of Bangladesh and several other similar groups were known for their insurgence occasioned by their poor background knowledge and poor upbringing.
The Social Tripodal Insurgence Model, according to the research, noted that the insurgents’ ideology is significantly a correlated response to the phenomenon of corruption, that is, corrupt society breeds the phenomenon of insurgency. Cases in point are Somalia, a failed state; Bangladesh, where effective social services are lacking with wide spread poverty which was seen by the populace as normal ‘way of life’; Liberia, where state power is perpetuated for criminal purposes. India, Afghanistan and Pakistan with the ‘Guerrilla Wire House’ were among the most corrupt countries where insurgency flourished.

The Social Tripodal Insurgence Model assumed that the insurgents’ objective had a significant correlation and impact on the desire to establish a ‘Utopian sort of egalitarian society’ that guaranteed the rule of law, justice, with no social inequality. Hamas dreamt of one in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as defined in their charter; Asbalt Al-Anar also attempted to have one in Southern Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. It suffices to say, one has been achieved in Mali and Afghanistan. However, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Abu Sayyaf in Southern Island failed woefully in their attempts to overthrow the Lebanese Government.

The dream of a ‘Republic of Ibn-Thaimiya’ failed in its brief week in Nigeria; the case of Sudan may be described as a shaky success while Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)’s objective still remains to establish an independent French State in the Basque region. The Classical Social Tripodal Insurgency Model described the process involved in the revolutionary-struggle of the insurgents in their attempts to establish an ‘egalitarian sort of society’ as loaded with ‘negative effects on the social structure and social relationship in the society’.

Insurgency, anywhere it may be, struggles to establish an ‘egalitarian sort of society’ by the constituted authorities. The fact remained that even if they succeeded in establishing a ‘Utopian like regime’, they can hardly be relevant in the scheme of things with an established government in power. Hence, they remain as proxies of the warlords for the actualisation of their personal aggrandisement. The Social Tripodal Insurgency Model assumed that, there was significant positive correlation between insurgents’ source of support/funding and link with foreign sources.

Finally, Tom Carew (2000), comments on the activities of the ‘drug lords’ and their involvement in taking Mujahdeen as proxies across the Pakistan border, the proceeds of the opium trade, he noted, were used to service Mujahdeen activities in Afghanistan. There was also the allegation that a complex network of swapping funds, arms and ammunition existed among Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabab and the Boko Haram in recent times. Warlords funded recruitment, be it internal or external, by means of laundered funds through a complex process of placement, layering and integration of such funds for the purpose of a ‘holy war’. Mohammed Yusuf the erstwhile leader of the Boko Haram, was arrested severally and paraded in the court of law for receiving large sum of monies from abroad. There was no attempt to find out the motive behind the transfer of huge sums of money to Mohammed Yusuf in Nigeria.

For better understanding of the concepts illustrated in Social Tripodal Insurgency Model discussed above, a diagram is presented below.

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